Extended Abstract
Introduction
The political organization of space in Iran has two dimensions. The first is the national divisions' system, and the second is constituencies. The national divisions’ system divides the country into provinces, cities, districts, and villages by the interior ministry. The executive branch plays a role in the territorial space according to these divisions. The second dimension is the territorially determined constituencies, where the competition for the representative seats is divided between many distinct regions. The details of these areas have an influential impact on the election outcome. In the Constitution of Iran, only Article 64 and Note 2 of Article 14 of the National Divisions are the only legal principles about electoral constituencies. Since the weight of indices is not definite in Article 64 of the Constitution, this caused many problems in determining the limits of constituencies. This research tries to identify these problems and provides an optimal model as a solution.
Methodology
This research is an applied in terms of its purpose, and is descriptive-analytic in terms of methodology. The method of collecting information is a library data collection which includes the study and review of books and scientific articles, and documents (government bills, studies of the Islamic Parliament Research Center, and speeches of the parliament members), interviews, and statistical information. We use the AHP method and Expert Choice, SPSS, and GIS software to content analysis of the documents.
Results and Discussions
There are 208 constituencies In Iran, and the total number of representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly is 290. Using 2016 census data, the country's population is 79926270. There is one chair for every 280443 individuals. Given the fact that five seats are reserved for religious minorities, we divide the total population to 285 instead of 290 since it has no significant impact. Therefore, by dividing the country's total population by 285, the average number of representatives to the country's total population was calculated. By implementing the simple proportionality equation, the percentage deviation from the average of the constituencies has been calculated. According to the table and calculating their population deviation from the national average, demographic inequality in the constituencies was confirmed.
Table 1. The percentage of demographic deviation of constituencies from the national average




Raw


The deviation from the national average (percentage)


The frequency of constituencies




1


0-20


55




2


20-30


36




3


30-50


45




4


50-100


60




5


More than 100


7




By examining the table of constituencies, it was found that nine constituencies of the country do not conform to the national divisions (non-compliance with the city boundaries). Eight constituencies are faced with a multiplicity of cities (four or more), and ten constituencies are faced with both a multiplicity of cities (four or more) and a large size of constituencies (more than 10,000 square kilometers). In addition, three constituencies are faced with a large size of constituencies, and six constituencies are faced with tribal, local, and religious competition with security aspects. There is a gerrymandering problem in Bijar, Gorgan, and Akgala constituencies. Among other problems, we can mention the lack of territorial continuity constituencies in "Taft and Meybod" and "Bandar Abbas, Qeshm, Abu Musa, Haji Abad, and Khamir." Also, the separation of constituencies of Bonab and Malekan, Borujen and Lordegan, Ardakan and Meybod based on local competitions caused security problems in 1999.
With the comprehensive analysis of the deliberations of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, articles and books related to constituencies, laws related to the electoral zone, and obtaining experts' opinions, we reached eleven scenarios according to the criteria listed in Article 64 of the Constitution. In order to present the optimal model of the constituency, we used a Delphi method to criticize the existing scenarios. At this stage, the desirability of each scenario was evaluated using a (5) scale questionnaire.
Out of all eleven identified scenarios in this study, six scenarios suffer from required utility from the experts' points of views. As a result, these six scenarios are eliminated, and the rest of the five scenarios are accepted using the t-test. In this test, the average of three is considered the basis for evaluating the scenarios. Table 2 summarizes the t-test results.
Table 2: T-test results of different election constituencies scenarios in Iran




Scenario


t-statistics


Mean


Standard Deviation (SD)


Degree of freedom


p-value


Hypothesis Decision




Redistribution of Provincial representation seats based on exploration indicators’ weights


7.64


4.12


0.83


31


0.000


Reject the null hypothesis




No Change in seats of religion minorities


26.28


3.81


0.82


31


0.000


Reject the null hypothesis




Adaptation of the constituencies to the boundaries of national divisions so that the constituencies are in line with the districts of each county


36.75


4.19


0.64


31


0.000


Reject the null hypothesis




Territorial contiguity of constituencies


28.7


3.97


0.78


31


0.000


Reject the null hypothesis




Delineation of constituencies by considering the amount and share of exploratory indicators


37.44


4.16


0.63


31


0.000


Reject the null hypothesis




Four criteria were identified using the library and archival data and interviewing experts. These criteria are population, underdevelopment, area, and border length. These criteria are considered essential and significant factors for redistributing provincial representative seats. In the next stage, the AHP questionnaire is sent to 32 experts of constituencies. The geometric mean of the pairwise comparison of one criterion concerning the other criteria has been done in Expert choice software. Figure 1 illustrates the output of this exercise.
Figure 1: The Calculation of criteria's weight
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With the comprehensive analysis of the deliberations of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, articles and books related to constituencies, laws related to electoral zone, and obtaining experts' thoughts and obtaining the opinions of experts on the indicators of population, area, distance, security considerations, border location, underdevelopment, cultural and geography cohesion to draw the boundaries of constituencies for the provinces of the country. Then, the AHP questionnaire was prepared and sent to 32 experts of election constituencies.
After the completion of questionnaires, the geometric mean of pairwise comparison of indicators entered in the Expert Choice. Figure 2 and figure 3 Illustrate output of this exercise for border and inland provinces.
 
 
 
Figure 2: weight and rank of indicators for border provinces
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Weight and rank of indicators for inland provinces
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The optimal model is a combination of the indicators of the two mentioned scenarios and the scenarios of the territorial continuity of the constituencies, the adaptation of the borders of the constituencies with the country's divisions, and no change in the five representation seats of religious minorities. Apart from increasing the seats of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, applying this model can solve the problem of designing the boundaries of constituencies.
Conclusions                                                
The constituency is the most apparent spatial manifestation of citizens' participation in political decision-making. The primary basis of power is formed in the relationship between spatial justice and Parliamentary electoral constituencies. This relationship deals with the participation of people in power through the election of representatives and is linked to electoral constituencies. The research findings showed that population inequality, non-compliance with the country's divisions, the number of cities and the large size of some constituencies, gerrymandering, competitions that have security aspects, and the absence of an independent institution of election constituencies are the most critical shortcomings of electoral constituencies in Iran. In order to reduce these problems, the optimal model of electoral districting in Iran needs fundamental changes to ensure its efficiency. These changes include a series of actions such as scenarios for redistributing representative seats in the provinces, attention to religious minorities, adaptation of the boundaries of constituencies with national divisions, territorial continuity, and determining the boundaries of constituencies in the provinces based on the importance of exploratory indicators.