فصلنامه بین المللی ژئوپلیتیک

فصلنامه بین المللی ژئوپلیتیک

دفاع تهاجمی روسیه در جنگ 2022 اوکراین؛ ماهیت و چالش‌ها

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان
استادیار روابط بین‌المللِ دانشکده اقتصاد و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه شهید بهشتی، تهران، ایران.
چکیده
هدف این مقاله بررسی چرایی ورود روسیه به جنگ 2022 اوکراین با تأکید بر "راهبرد دفاع تهاجمی" است. مجموعه متون، اظهارات و اسناد روسی نشان از درک این جنگ به‌عنوان جنگی نیابتی دارد که از سوی امریکا و در قالب راهبرد مهار تهاجمی علیه مسکو عملیاتی شده است. هدف این راهبرد و جنگ قبض کارگزاری و مزیت‌های ژئوپلیتیکی روسیه با اثرگذاری منفی بر سه مولفه مهمِ هویت(جهان روسی)، سیاست(قدرت بزرگی) و امنیت(موازنه و امنیت راهبردی) است. از این رو، احساس تهدید در سطوح مختلف فردی، ملی، منطقه‌ای و بین‌المللی از ناحیه امریکا و جنگ اوکراین در روسیه احساس شده است. این مقاله، به‌کمک نظریه واقع‌گرایی نوکلاسیک که در کنار مولفه‌های کلان‌نگر از جمله ساختار، عوامل سطح خرد چون ادراک نخبگان را نیز در نظر  می‌گیرد، تلاش دارد چرایی ورود روسیه به جنگ پرهزینه اوکراین را تحلیل کند. یافته‌های مقاله نشان می‌دهند که به‌تبعِ درک بالای تهدید در سطوح مختلف فردی و ساختاری از ناحیه نفوذگذاری امریکا در خارج نزدیک(تر) و انگاره "اوکراین، سنگر آخر"، کرملین خود را در "اجبار" ورود به جنگ دیده است. نظر به تواتر اقدامات تضعیف‌ساز امریکا علیه روسیه در قالب راهبرد "مهار تهاجمی"، کرملین "راهبرد دفاع تهاجمی فعال" را با تأکید بر کنش پویا و مبتکرانه راهکار بهینه‌تری برای تأمین منافع و امنیت خود یافته و با این راهبرد وارد جنگ اوکراین شده است. هرچند این راهبرد دستاوردهای کوتاه‌مدتی در کاهش نسبی سطح تهدید داشته، اما هزینه‌ها و چالش‌های بلندمدت آن، روسیه را به احتیاط در کاربست بیشتر این راهبرد وا خواهد داشت. نظر به تمرکز موضوعی مقاله بر رویکرد و سیاست روسیه، از بررسی مواضع سایر طرف‌ها از جمله اوکراین صرف‌نظر شده است.
کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله English

Russia's Offensive Defense in the 2022 Ukraine war; Nature and Challenges

نویسندگان English

Alireza Noori
Heidarali Masoudi
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran
چکیده English

Extended Abstract     
Introduction
The 2022 war in Ukraine, the largest conflict in Europe since the Second World War, erupted amidst a backdrop of profound uncertainties. It quickly drew in a wide array of actors, including states such as the U.S., European nations, and even Iran; intergovernmental organizations like NATO; and international corporations such as McDonald’s, which participated in the Russian embargo, whether willingly or unwillingly. The war’s implications extended across a broad spectrum of issues, ranging from macro-level concerns like shifts in the structure of the international order to specific security challenges such as nuclear, energy, and food security. Political dimensions, including the formation of new coalitions, economic aspects like sanctions on Russia, and softer issues such as environmental impacts, were also directly or indirectly tied to the conflict. The complexity of the situation was further compounded by the interplay of numerous domestic, regional, and international variables, as well as the insistence of the primary actors—Russia and the U.S.—on pursuing a zero-sum game. 
Amid this intricate landscape, Russia’s position and actions warrant particular attention and form the focus of this research. In the lead-up to the war, the Kremlin perceived itself as facing a forced choice between bad and worse options. On one hand, remaining indifferent to NATO’s eastward expansion and the U.S.’s assertive strategy in Ukraine risked undermining Russia’s balance, security, and strategic depth. On the other hand, entering the war would inevitably incur significant costs. Driven by a "hard approach" to security, balance, and geopolitics, as well as the presence of multiple security threats tied to the Ukraine issue, Russia ultimately opted for the latter course of action. Thus, Russia’s decision to initiate and sustain this costly conflict can only be understood through the lens of its security paradigm and the historical context of its relations with the U.S. and the West. From Moscow’s perspective, Ukraine represented a critical link in a chain of U.S.-led offensive actions against Russia, framed as part of an "offensive containment" strategy. In response, the Kremlin sought to counter this perceived threat through an "offensive defense" strategy, aiming to neutralize the dangers posed by Ukraine’s alignment with the West. With this context in mind, the aim of this article is to analyze the reasons behind Russia’s entry into the Ukraine war within the framework of this strategic approach. By examining the interplay of security concerns, geopolitical calculations, and historical grievances, the study seeks to shed light on the motivations driving Russia’s actions in this pivotal conflict.
 
Methodology
In this research, a descriptive-analytic review method is employed to examine the subject matter. Within this framework, the study delves into the content of scientific texts, internet resources, and foundational documents relevant to the topic. The primary objective of this content analysis is to identify the key variables involved, operational indicators, units of analysis, and the relationships between these variables. By describing the topic and tracing its genealogy, the research extracts and analyzes the main themes through the operational indicators derived from the theoretical framework. The researcher’s interpretation and explanation of the topic serve as a scientific contribution and innovation, adding depth to the analysis. 
From the perspective of this article, the drivers of Russia’s actions in the Ukraine war are understood as a combination of internal-level variables, such as the specific threat perceptions held by Kremlin officials, and systemic-level elements, including the structure of the international system. Given this dual focus, neoclassical realism is adopted as the most suitable theoretical framework for explaining the research topic. Neoclassical realism bridges the gap between domestic and systemic factors, making it particularly well-suited to analyze how Russia’s internal decision-making processes interact with broader international dynamics to shape its strategic behavior in the Ukraine conflict. This approach allows for a nuanced understanding of the motivations and constraints influencing Russia’s actions, offering a comprehensive explanation of the war’s underlying causes.
 
Findings and Discussion
Russia, as one of the main actors in the 2022 Ukraine war, has been involved in nearly all levels and issues related to the conflict. This involvement spans individual, national, regional, and international analyses; encompasses security, political, geopolitical, geoeconomic, social, identity, legal fields; and involves various stakeholders from Ukraine to Europe and the U.S. The contributions and effects of Russia can be observed in areas such as stability and strategic balance, international economy—including energy and food security—and in the frameworks of international and regional orders in Europe and Eurasia, as well as in relations between great powers and international social issues, including public opinion.
In analyzing the research data, it is important to highlight the tripartite political, identity, and security significance of Ukraine for Russia. The Kremlin views the 2022 war as Washington's proxy war against Moscow within the framework of a containment strategy, compounded by other U.S. anti-Russian actions. Consequently, the Kremlin has concluded that "offensive defense" is a more effective strategy than compromise for repelling threats from this direction. Two main reasons underpin this strategy: 1) the unsuccessful experience of reconciliation and ongoing aggressive U.S. threats, and 2) structural changes in the international order, which have increased Russia's self-confidence.
Although Russia's "offensive defense strategy" has been relatively successful in certain instances, such as the annexation of Crimea and military actions in Syria, the costs and challenges emerging from the Ukraine war urge caution in repeating this approach. The reasons for this caution include the trap of the Brezhnev Doctrine, inadequacy and lack of diversity in resources and tools, costs associated with confronting the U.S., the possibility of greater divergence within the CIS, an expanded security gap in the region, weaknesses in network power (coalition building), institutional power, the individual nature of foreign policy, and challenges related to consensus and internal support.
 
Conclusion
Moscow views Washington's insistence on advancing its goals in Ukraine—through methods such as color revolutions, political interference, military aid, and NATO membership proposals—as part of an aggressive containment strategy against itself. According to the Kremlin, failure to respond to this threat could undermine Russia's comprehensive identity, great power status, and jeopardize its security depth. This threat has been perceived at various levels of analysis, including the individual level of decision-making elites, such as Putin's perspective on security, as well as at the societal and governmental levels, and at the macro level concerning structural and systemic pressures. Consequently, Moscow sees itself compelled to respond militarily.
From the Kremlin's perspective, Ukraine represents a critical last stand; if it collapses, Russia faces extensive regional and international losses. The developments in Ukraine are believed to carry significant contagion potential and a domino effect beyond its borders. Therefore, the rationale behind Moscow's costly military intervention in Ukraine in 2022 can only be understood within the context of its security charter and great power competition with the U.S. While this strategy has achieved short-term goals by reducing the immediate threat level, its long-term costs and challenges will compel Russia to exercise caution in employing this approach in the future.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Russia
2022 Ukraine War
Near Abroad
the U.S
NATO
Neoclassical Realism
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دوره 21، شماره 1
بهار 1404
صفحه 112-142

  • تاریخ دریافت 03 فروردین 1403
  • تاریخ بازنگری 11 شهریور 1403
  • تاریخ پذیرش 25 شهریور 1403