Extended Abstract     
Introduction
China is one of the most important emerging actors that has pursued its interests in the Middle East region since the late 1980s. Despite lacking a colonial history in the region, this emerging power is influenced by the growing competition with the United States, the increasing need for hydrocarbon resources from oil-rich countries for security and continued economic growth, numerous consumer markets, and various economic, political, and security interests aimed at consolidating its influence in the Middle East. These efforts have often involved adopting a unique Middle East policy with diverse geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocultural tools. Such policies have achieved a high level of coherence and purpose during Xi Jinping's leadership. This coherence largely results from the creative policies of the Chinese government at the levels of geopolitics, geoeconomics, and geoculture to expand and protect its growing interests in the region. Mediationist diplomacy at the geopolitical level, the strategy of integrating the Middle East regional economy into the Chinese economy at the geo-economic level, and self-branding at the geo-cultural level exemplify Beijing's creativity in advancing its Middle East policy. However, some geopolitical challenges, such as a weak military and security presence, are impacted by the persistence of the Western-American security architecture and various regional and internal factors, including significant restrictions on China's ability to subvert the current order and establish a new regional order in the Middle East. Despite the strengths of China's Middle East policy in political, economic, and cultural aspects, a wide range of geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geocultural restrictions have affected these strengths. Therefore, the authors agree that the axes of Beijing's potential to shape a new regional order in the Middle East are primarily located at the geo-economic and geo-cultural levels, while the main axes of refusal can be explained at the geopolitical level. This article seeks to identify and explain the most important axes of China's potential and refusal to change the regional order of the Middle East.
 
Methodology
To answer the main question, this article employs an analytical-exploratory method, relying on economic data and library and internet resources. It also evaluates the hypothesis by focusing on the conceptual framework of regional orders in light of the environmental attitude.
 
Results and Discussion
China's Middle East policy evolved in the 2010s as part of Xi Jinping's active and decisive grand strategy to establish Beijing as a dominant power. Xi publicly expressed his ambition for Beijing to play a central role in shaping the multipolar international system, moving away from the strategy of his predecessors. The increase in China's international power due to continuous economic development and growing political influence has led leaders like Xi Jinping to believe that they should play a more active role in important regions such as the Middle East to maximize benefits and protect interests. As power resources and interests have increased, there has been a gradual distancing from ideas of peaceful emergence, aiming for a more prominent position and increased influence and international presence relative to America and the West. This new approach is logically realistic and influenced by the increase in interests and power sources. Furthermore, the Middle East, as a region with high economic-political value, has gained increasing importance in modern world policies. Consequently, Xi Jinping's environmental attitude towards the MENA region in relation to Western powers has become aggressive and multifaceted, utilizing tools such as the quantitative and qualitative expansion of strategic partnerships with regional governments, the establishment of a military base in Djibouti, and the drafting of high-level documents like China's Arab policy. Relying on the five progressive principles of foreign policy, the One Belt and One Road initiative, strengthening cooperation institutions like the China-Arab Cooperation Forum, and expanding Confucius centers in the region have been key components. The actions and new tools of China's foreign policy in the Middle East from the 2010s to the present can be explained through an environmental attitude across three distinct but complementary levels: geopolitics, geoeconomics, and geoculture.
 
Conclusion
The results of this research indicate that Beijing's Middle East policy has achieved a high level of coherence and purpose under Xi Jinping's leadership, primarily due to the creative policies of the Chinese government across the levels of geopolitics, geoeconomics, and geoculture to expand and protect its interests in the region. At the geopolitical level, the pursuit of mediating diplomacy, alliances with key regional actors such as Iran, and increased military presence during regional crises have helped preserve and expand Beijing's interests. At the geo-economic level, the continuous growth of energy, financial, and commercial exchanges, alongside the expansion of comprehensive partnership agreements with regional governments, has made the economic structures of the Middle East heavily dependent on the Chinese economy. At the soft level, self-branding is central to Xi's geocultural approach, supported by initiatives like cultural-educational institutionalization, scientific-tourism exchanges, and the spread of mass media. Although geopolitics has returned to the forefront of China's foreign policy during Xi Jinping's era, it has confronted the country with fundamental axes of refusal in developing the regional order. The insistence on the principle of non-intervention, conditional reliance on Western security benefits, quasi-mediationist diplomacy, military restrictions, and increased focus on the Taiwan conflict represent the most significant axes of refusal in Beijing's geopolitics in the Middle East. These factors largely hinder China's ability to protect its diverse interests in the region and play a constructive role in resolving regional conflicts. Deficiencies are also evident at the geo-economic and geo-cultural levels; however, the rigidity and concentration of challenges at the geopolitical level will serve as Beijing's Achilles' heel in any effort to change or transition the regional order.