

## **Iran and the Resistance Policy making Toward US Regional Client's Actors**

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### **Abstract**

Resistance is a concept that has been raised at different times and considered by many analysts from different angles. Islamic Republic of Iran's resistance Policy Making is a method for foreign Policy analysis. Iran's Foreign Policy is based on Policy Making. The Indexes of Islamic Republic of Iran's resistance Policy Making in Foreign Policy is Cooperative method and interactive process with regional and international actors in environment crisis. Iran's foreign policy is related and accordance with Identity and Revolution a thought on international relations.

This article uses the descriptive method of analyzing and using library resources and information to answer the main questions of the article. What is Iran's strategic policy towards the American regional clients and what is the role of resistance in this process?

The results show, the content and orientation of resistance policy making is based on regional competitive approach. Each kind of resistance Policy based on environmental competitive controls structural, identity, cultural and ideological differences and changes Islamic Republic of Iran's resistance policy making have been seen in different issues especially resistance diplomacy and environmental security making in competitive regional policy.

**Keywords:** Resistance, Identity Group's, Security Policy Making, Islamic Values, Violence.

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### **1.Introduction**

Islamic Republic of Iran's resistance Policy Making on foreign policy reflects some of the differences items. These items included political culture, political structure and ideology, imagination of elite, attitudes and geopolitical policy. Current article will identify the linkage between identity, resistance and revolutionary values.

Iran's resistance Policy Making was constructed on the concept of identity, mobility, role making and revolution supra nationalism which places its emphasis on the unity of the region. Resistance policy making is incompatible with the current political regional order which is based on the concept of the structural rules and international institutions.

Islamic Republic of Iran's resistance Policy Making in regional crisis and conflict issues needs a function of cultural images, identity, structural implications and repeatable historical signs. Islamic Republic of Iran's regional resistance forms impact to Iran's political culture and foreign policy. Islamic Republic of Iran's resistance policy making is linked by the process, nature and structure of Iran's foreign policy.

The type and kind of Iran's foreign policy are related and implemented by the Iranian nationalism and Islamic revolutionary ideology. Iran's regional policy in the period after the victory the Islamic revolution was formed based on the policy of resistance. Regional politics of Iran as well as the challenge the dominate system.

Iran's regional policy against terrorist groups is formed and left its mark on the regional balance. Therefore, the regional policy of Iran based on managing the regional crisis and client actors. The foreign policy and orientation of Islamic Republic of Iran's based on resistance policy confrontation with conservative proxy groups, states and actors.

The necessary of Iran's foreign policy for regional management crisis and confrontation with terrorist groups as so ISIS needs to promote revolutionary thought and action. Achieving such goals requires: identity, revolutionary thought social legitimacy, regard to international laws and regulations. Ethnical and geographical boundaries among Muslims in order to unite Muslim communities in a new power bloc within the current political world order.

Resistance policy of Iran is different from other revolutionary paradigms. Therefore, Iran's policy more confuses for understanding the Shia Identity and Revolution nature of its policy. This index Identity and Revolution

ideology is an important constraining factor which limits the choice of an appropriate conceptual framework to analysis the Islamic republic policy making toward resistance regional policy (Nia,2011:8).

Biden and Trump's Regional politics have been shaped to counter Iranian resistance policy. The unpredictable and to an extent confusing Islamic Republic of Iran's resistance Policy Making has been the source of resistance process against the ISIS, which is one of the actors in the proxy war in the regional environment. Iran's Resistance politics have played an effective role in countering regional insurgent groups. The ISIS and other proxy war actors are the main crisis forces making in the Middle East and Southwest Asia region (Paik,2015:2).

The Islamic Republic of Iran's resistance Policy is the synthesis of different factors as so as Westphalia systems and export of revolution. In applying the policy of resistance, Iran has used other mechanisms such as exporting the revolution. The nature of Biden administration's response to the most urgent problem in the world crisis including the corona virus pandemic and regional security has been indirect process (Powe,2021:63).

## **2.Methodology**

This article has considered the relationship between regional politics and resistance in Iran in regional dimensions with an analytical approach that benefits from rational inference. Therefore, this article uses the descriptive method of analyzing and using library resources and information to answer the main questions of the article. What is Iran's strategic policy towards the American regional clients and what is the role of resistance in this process?

## **3.Theoretical Farmwork**

### **3-1 .The Theory of "Resistance"**

Resistance is a concept that has been raised at different times and considered by many analysts from different viewpoints. Resistance means standing, equality, opposition, persistence and stability, as well as endurance and strength. The equivalent in Arabic is "Al-Mawwamah" and "Al-Mana'a". Conceptually, resistance is an action that controls negative and positive actions. In the field of negative actions, the negation of domination, the fight against tyranny and oppression, and from the point of view of the positive concept, the concept of resistance is elaborated around values and norms such as the pursuit of justice, ethics and the pursuit of rights.

**3-1-1 .Resistance and Identity Approach (Structuralism):**

Resistance and Identity Approach (Structuralism): Constructivists pay attention to ideas, meanings, rules, attitudes, perceptions, norms and social practices and play a role in forming the formative components of political action. Along with the structural components in international politics, constructivists try to highlight the cultural signs, social rules and hidden doctrines of a society and measure their impact on international political action. Therefore, the cultural-value components have been influential in the formation of the shaping factors of the political culture of resistance. Constructivism's emphasis on the commonalities of identity is an issue that brings resistance closer to constructivism in some of its components. Some analysts see the emergence of identitarian approaches in international relations as one of the effects of the idea of resistance, the first sign of which was the victory of the Islamic Revolution. Some have gone further and considered the birth of the constructivist approach in international relations as a result of the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the idea of resistance. Based on the belief in resistance, it is possible to influence the rules of the material world and even the rules of governance through culture-oriented human action. The most important commonality between constructivism and resistance is the belief in the nature of social consciousness. This nature of social consciousness causes resistance to find a meaning-oriented nature. When the threats to resistance become tangible and practical, the hidden norms in society become power. Both the idea of resistance and constructivism, in principle, were able to bring the components of social culture, which had a religious and social nature, into the strategic field.

**4.Finding**

**4-1 .Foundations of the Iran's Regional Resistance Policy in Southwest Asia**

Iran's regional policy has been based on asymmetric security and multilateral cooperation with the resistance forces. Iran's regional security building depends on 5 basic indexes. Each indexes effects on power, security and equivalence of international relations. Each of these 5 components has an effective role in shaping regional security and includes topics such as religions, cultism, social cohesion, crisis and the role of great power regional intervention.

Though ideologues and apologists of the "Resistance Axis" may have wanted to deny it, many nevertheless implicitly accepted that the Trump Administration's approach to Iran and its allies and proxies the self-styled

“Resistance Axis” has been qualitatively different from that of prior U.S. administrations. Accordingly, true to the record of nearly four decades, pro-Iranian media and government statements alike assert that the current U.S. drive will fail, even if its current intensity may inflict an elevated degree of harm (Mneimneh,2020:2).

US regional policy is based on the equilibrium signs offshore balancing and this has increased the role of regional client actors. Proxy actors generally have mechanisms to deal and confront with Iran. As a result, Iran’s regional policy will be to confront regional proxy actors. Middle East crisis has been escalated when United States and some European countries supported as the fundamental groups in Syria and Iraq such as ISIS (Weber,2020:14).

#### **4-1-1 .Confrontation with Terrorist Takfiri Groups**

Takfiri groups are a major security challenge for the Iranian region in West Asia. The ideology of Takfiri has been based on confrontation with Iran and Shiites. Takfiri groups have an ideology of violence and use threats and intimidation to confront their enemies. Takfiri groups have become a violent force in Iran’s regional environment since 2012 with Saudi support (Al-Dawsari,2021:15).

Fundamental Takfiri groups are not a religion, nor are it a cult. In its fullest form, it is a complete and total system of life that used for struggle and resistance. Fundamental Takfiri groups in Europe have religious, legal, political, economic, social, and military components. The Takfiri religious component is a beard for all of the other components. Fundamental Takfiri groups begin when there are sufficient Muslims in a country to agitate for their religious privileges.

Fundamental Takfiri groups they exercise an inordinate influence in proportion to their percentage of the population. For example, they will push for the introduction of halal (clean by Takfiri standards) food, thereby securing food preparation jobs for Muslims. They will increase pressure on supermarket chains to feature halal on their shelves along with threats for failure to comply. At this point, they will work to get the ruling government to allow them to rule themselves (within their ghettos) under Sharia, the Takfiri Law. The ultimate goal of Fundamental Takfiri groups is to establish Sharia law over the entire world.

Trump and Pompeo demands towards Iran, when spelled out, were not realistic. They effectively summoned the Revolution to voluntarily liquidate

at a moment when it was decisively the dominant force in the Iranian conjoint political entity. Yet the “extreme pressure” applied by the Trump Administration on Tehran and its elimination of Soleimani, combined with regional developments in particular the normalization of relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and others shifted the Iranian attitude towards “compromise,” sincere or otherwise (Mneimneh,2020:5).

These groups can expect hair-trigger rioting and jihad militia formations. Fundamental Takfiri groups they tend to increase lawlessness as a means of complaint about their conditions. In Fundamental Takfiri groups, peace is never achieved, as in their thought the most radical Takfiri’s intimidate and spew hatred, and satisfy their blood lust by killing less radical Muslims and Non-Muslims, for a variety of reasons.

#### **4-1-2 .Organizational and Structural Formation of Takfiri Groups**

The group's senior leadership operates freely in Pakistan and enjoys the support and protection of the Pakistani Army and Saudi Arabia financial support. Lashkar-e Taiba like ISIS are more dangerous today than ever. Fundamental Takfiri groups as like as Lashkar-e Taiba like ISIS paid no penalty for its attack, nor did its Pakistani patrons. The world needs to do much better countering the Fundamental Takfiri groups and its leadership (Yee,2019:3).

This makes every policymaker a forecaster. But forecasting is difficult, particularly when it comes to geopolitics—a domain in which the rules of the game are poorly understood, information is invariably incomplete, and expertise often confers surprisingly little advantage in predicting future events. These challenges present practical problems for decision-makers in the U.S. government. On the one hand, the limits of imagination create blind spots that policymakers tend to fill in with past experience (Scoblic and Tetlock,2020:28).

Politicians and some “experts” have followed the same pattern - overreacting to the most recent event and losing sight of the reality that there are not going to be any turning points in the near future. Years of new tragedies like Paris are almost inevitable, and the struggle against extremism is going to be a long, long battle of attrition.

#### **4-2 .Saudi Arabia to Confront Iran’s Regional Policy**

The policy of resistance in Iran's foreign relations will have dangerously consequences. Among these dangers, we can mention the emergence of confrontational forces and the role of proxy actors. Saudi Arabia has played an effective role in organizing proxy actors against Iran's regional policy. Saudi Arabia's regional policy towards Iran has been formed and the country is trying to reproduce and integrate the resistance forces in the regional environment .

Regional politics of Iran according to signs of resistance is formed. Saudi Arabia uses its policy of confrontation with Iran to control the regional balance. Saudi Arabia has taken advantage of a pro-western balance policy and is trying to control and reduce Iran's power. Saudi Arabia is trying to play a regional balancing role. Limiting Iran's power in Lebanon Yemen and Iraq is one of Saudi Arabia's main policies in regional security (Brehony, 2020:518).

Saudi government's accelerating pressure campaign and confront against the Iran's policy toward Lebanese government. Saudi government threatens to weaken Lebanese Hezbollah's voter support and influence within the country's governing coalition prior to the 2022 election. Saudi Arabia's is trying to reduce the strength of the resistance in Lebanon. To play such a role, diplomacy uses security mechanisms and the media model.

Iran in its regional policy is using the diplomatic mechanisms of social cooperation and confrontation with threats. Saudi Arabia seeks to reduce the power and influence of the Iranian region in Lebanon. Lebanese election outcome for Hezbollah could fragment the March 8 Alliance political coalition it controls (Lawlor and others,2021:2).

#### **4-2-1 .The Logical of Saudi Political Action in Lebanon**

Lebanon can be considered as the fault line of geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. In addition, Saudi government has been buttressed domestic and regional support and consolidating controls over the March 8 Alliance. Saudi government intensified its longstanding economic and diplomatic coercive campaign against Iran's regional policy as so as the Lebanese government in response to remarks made by LH-aligned Lebanese Information Minister George Kordahi on October 26 that were critical of Saudi government's role in the Yemen war (Atef,2021:4).

The necessities of implementing the policy of resistance will not be possible without regional. Regional competitions between Iran and Saudi Arabia

have been formed since the early 20th century. Saudi government expelled Lebanon's ambassador and banned Lebanese exports and mail to Saudi government. Saudi Arabia has played an effective role in coordinating the conservative Arab states in the region to limit Iran's power.

Saudi Arabia seeks to pave the way for control of Iran through Arab countries and cooperation with Israel. Saudi Arabia has taken on the role of coordinator of the Persian Gulf countries to limit Iran's regional power. Saudi Arabia has played an important role in changing the political of Bahrain and United Arab Emirates toward Israel.

The United Arab Emirates also expelled Lebanon's ambassador, and Kuwait prohibited charitable as well as Saudi donations to Lebanon and canceled visas for some of Lebanese citizens. However, Saudi government will likely continue its campaign to further erode Hezbollah influence in the Lebanese government (Atkin,2021:3).

Lebanon can be considered the center of Iran's resistance policy in the regional environment. Iran Saudi Arabia regional rivalry in Lebanon is important; because it can pave the way for stated building. Resulting from competition between Lebanese political groups it has left its mark on the 2022 Lebanese elections. This process as a defeat for the March 8 Alliance could create incentives for non-LH segments of the bloc to incorporate new, increasingly popular independent and reformist lawmakers into the political coalition to retain a governing majority (Chehayeb,2021:2).

#### **4-2-2 .The Process of Saudi Arabia**

The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia always escalates the Lebanese domestic political challenges. Fractures in the March 8 Alliance would jeopardize Hezbollah political supremacy in Lebanon. Hezbollah has played an important role in Lebanese social and security policy in the 21st century. The Lebanese cabinet could improve Lebanon's economic situation after the election by concluding energy transfer deals and IMF debt relief negotiations.

The Biden administration is indeed equipped to engage in a more careful way with all of these dossiers, along with the still relevant Palestinian question. When faced with how the administration allocates its human and material resources to address a world in crisis, it may choose to delay the question of Iran and the U.S. role in the Middle East. It is important to remember; however, that Iran and the "Resistance Axis" are poised for

another round of “strategic patience,” which, if ignored, will serve to the detriment of the United States, its allies and partners (Henderson,2022:2).

This process is related to Hariri as a conservative and pro Saudi Arabia MPs in the March 8 Alliance would control over all of the political coalition. severely forces in Lebanon would adverse election results for the March 8 Alliance against resistance groups could encourage segments of the splinter and form a new coalition or align between Lebanese domestic groups with the resistance groups as the March 14 Alliance.

However, voters are unlikely to perceive the associated economic results until at least several months after the agreements enter into effect. The Lebanese Parliament voted in October to move the election from May to March. Saudi Arabia role to counter Iran’s regional politics in Lebanon has continued to lead to challenges between rival political groups to elect a government.

Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) may increasingly pursue localized revenue generation activities to compensate for new terrorism designations and international constraints on funding streams. The United Kingdom (UK) designated Hamas’ political wing as a terrorist organization on November 19, 2021.<sup>9</sup> Australia similarly designated LH’s political wing as a terrorist organization on November 24, 2021.<sup>10</sup> Australia and the UK previously designated the military wings of LH and Hamas as terrorist organizations; the inclusion of political actors in terrorism designations indicates that Western actors are increasingly interpreting the military and political wings of LH and Hamas as interconnected (Zach,2021:4).

The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)-aligned Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc (LRB) political parties are setting conditions to challenge the results of Lebanon’s 2022 general election, likely to preserve the governing majority of their parliamentary alliance. The FPM and LRB are likely aiming to postpone elections as long as possible to give themselves sufficient time to improve Lebanon’s dire economic situation, which has injured their political popularity (Landale,2021:5).

#### **4-3 .Limiting America’s Interventionist Role of Southwest Asia**

Main centric of U.S policy toward Southwest Asia is based on balancing of great power. These policy are self-serving, even deluded, a political fantasy. The George W. Bush administration created many of today’s worst geopolitical crises. First, President Bush used a terrorist attack conducted by

Saudi citizens trained in Afghanistan as an excuse to invade Southwest Asia, a long-time objective of offensive as part of their plan to reorder the Middle East (Walter,2002:15).

Although the rise of ISIS posed many security challenges for Iran, but Iran's regional power increased after the defeat of ISIS. In the aftermath of the Syrian crisis, The US and European policy toward Iran changed. The power equation played an influential role in new political formations.

The Biden cabinet may have more urgent issues to attend to, but Syria is a test for U.S. leadership, values, and interests. The United States will have to graduate from its current limited capability of merely interdicting Russian position to assuming a more coherence and effective role in shaping the course of a post-war Syria.

Administration officials justified preventive war based on the policy of a dishonest informant provided by a crooked émigré hoping to rule Southwest Asia. War advocates planned to establish a liberal government aligned with the West, governed by an American puppet, friendly to Israel, and home to bases for U.S. military operations against its neighbors. These deluded plans all came to naught. More than a decade later the invasion is viewed by most Islamic Republic of Iran's resistance Policy Making analysts as a historic mistake, American's worst foreign policy blunder in decades.

Second, after ousting the Sunni dictator whose authoritarian rule held the nation together, the administration mishandled the occupation at every turn. The U.S. failed to exert control, allowing widespread looting, and disbanded the military, creating a large pool of angry and unemployed young men. Then Washington attempted to remake Southwest Asia society, pushing an American-made constitution and deploying U.S. political appointees even to draft Baghdad traffic regulations.

#### **4-3-1 .The Policy of Balancing the US Threat Against Iran**

The United States has always sought to impose restrictions on the political fabric and pattern of behavior in Iran's regions. The main axis of US policy in dealing with Iran is the balance of threat. The threat balance means US support for groups opposed to Iran's regional policy. Iran's resistance policy can be considered as a model of Islamic Republic's reaction to US regional policy.

Expanding focus to Iran's other activities helped prevent accidental accommodation of the use of resistance forces by proxy to secure Iranian hegemony, to which the Obama Administration effectively acquiesced.

Instead, through the conditions was emphasized by Pompeo, it has challenged the dual identity of Iran as state and revolution to shed the latter in favor of the former, adhere to the world order, and reap benefits.

The Trump Administration in the Iranian ‘Strategic Patience’ Narrative So far, the “Resistance Axis’s” framing of these Trump-era policies towards Iran is that of temporary efforts that will fail once they are revoked by the next cabinet. It depending on the steps it takes, the new cabinet can either build on these developments in a more careful way or risk returning to the earlier status quo (Mossalanejad,2018:42).

Iran finds a new administration that is not willing to accept these efforts unchallenged, it may seek to exchange the United States' recommitment to the JCPOA for a truce, rhetorical and kinetic, on other regional fronts. It may allow the unfolding of a regional process of normalization with Israel, for example. Many ideologues aligned with Tehran already label this process as bound to fail, and even to unravel the equilibrium that the Arab states involved may have accomplished with their own populations. On this issue, Iran may be set for another form of “strategic (Mneimneh,2020:4).

US regional policy in West Asia has been on signs of liberal democracy and the expansion of the liberal approach in the international system. The era of liberal U.S. hegemony is an artifact of the Cold War’s immediate afterglow. Trump’s transactional approach to foreign policy, by contrast, has been the norm for most of U.S. history. As a result, Trump’s imprint could endure long after Trump himself is gone (Beckley,2020:35).

American liberal thought bears signs of globalization and regional control. The policy of American presidents in the 21th century is based on regional expansion. Iran’s policy of resistance has been against the expansionism and hegemony of the American region in West Asia. However, Washington failed to achieve its underlying, essential objective of sectarian reconciliation (Regan,2001:41).

US security policy under Bush, Obama, Trump and Biden is based on the continuity of Wilson’s mechanisms. Wilson policy was an egregious racist even by the dual standard. Central US policy has been limiting Iran’s regional role. However problematic Wilson’s theory was as an approaches and ideologist. Wilson’s policy would be counted among the most influential makers of the modern world. This approach was not a particularly original policy (Mead,2021:16).

US regional policy during the time of George W. Bush was opposed to regional policy of Iran. Bush pursued a approach of wickedness in relation to Iran, Iraq and North Korea. In 2007 U.S. military adviser Emma Sky wrote of the U.S. military's frustration by what they viewed as the schemes of Iraq's Prime Minister and his internal circle to actively sabotage our efforts to draw Sunnis out of the crises. Al-Qaeda in Southwest Asia survived, mutating into the Islamic State. Iran and the US had a relatively similar policy toward Al-Qaeda (Mansour,2021:4).

US security during the Bush administration was organized on the basis of military and security confrontation in Iraq and the regional environment. The Bush administration then became one of the Islamic State's chief armorers when Southwest Asia soldiers fled before ISIS forces, abandoning their expensive, high-tech weapons which U.S. aircraft had to destroy last year (Reuter,2015:2).

#### **4-3-2 .Obama's Policy Against the Iran's Resistance Policy**

Obama's policies toward Iran's regional behavior have been phased and changeable. The Obama administration has played a malign, but secondary, role. Like its predecessor it also intervened too much rather than too little. For example, Obama continued to back Southwest Asia's security making. Washington commitment changed with little leverage to press ruling Shia politicians to make concessions to disaffected Sunnis.

The United States sought to adopt a pattern of regional action in relation to Iran's regional security. Obama sought a new regional policy keeping a few troops on station against the Southwest Asia's resistance. The Bush administration failed to transform the Baghdad government when tens of thousands of American soldiers that were fighting on its behalf in Southwest Asia.

The politics of the region and Obama in the region have been gradual and changing in nature. In Syria Washington inadvertently discouraged a negotiated compromise between Bashar al-Assad and the peaceful opposition by insisting on the former's administration. That convinced some structural opponents that the U.S. would force Assad's ouster, precluding need for compromise which might have ended or at least limited the conflict early (Perry,2015:9).

The Obama policy turned Libya into another fulcrum of conflict, following Europe's lead in promoting low-cost government change in the name of rescuing the Libyan social policy. US regional policy generated chaos,

highlighted by competing political and proliferating armed bands. More recently murderous regional state acolytes filled the void (Luft,2014:35).

The war in Libya created new security problems for the United States. Civil wars in Libya and Syria create four problems that threaten U.S. interests: civil wars reduce oil production, they provide a safe haven for terrorist groups to organize and spread, they bring potentially hostile new governments to power, and they proliferation spawning new wars between and within regional countries. The United States faced emerging challenges in the late decade of the 20st century. The result of such a process must be seen in the regional challenges and crises of the early 21st century (Walter, 1997:32).

That may seem outdated at this moment of low oil prices, but the forces which produced the current dip are likely to prove temporary. The overall approach in energy indicate that oil prices will rebound in a matter of years and oil would be remained the core input of the global economy. Iraq and Libya oil production often plummets as a result of civil war .

The United States has spent years nurturing relationships with Middle Eastern governments to ensure consistent access to oil and to protect U.S. allies in the Southwest Asia. The onset of civil war in any country means that new governments could come to power that are not only brutal, but also openly antagonistic to the United States, its partnerships and its interests (Pollack,2014:115).

#### **4-3-3 .Biden's Policy Against the Iran's Resistance Policy**

The Biden Administration ought to also recognize that the irretrievably corrupt political class in Lebanon has been enhanced and maintained by Iran's local resistance coalition a seemingly less corrupt Hezbollah. It should avoid the temptation of elevating the latter to the status of an antidote to the country's ongoing political collapse.

The ideologically Hezbollah's continued dominance of Lebanon spells the further promote of Lebanon as a country. Just as the U.S. Government, under the current and previous cabinet has incrementally identified and sanctioned the destructive role of Hezbollah both at local and abroad. In Yemen, the Biden team to justify the Saudi conducts of war. This policy could Saudi Behavior is to restore balance within Yemeni society, and even within the influential Ansarullah community that has been largely abandoned to Iranian influence (Brehony,2020:519).

The Biden cabinet is indeed equipped to engage in a more careful way with all of these dossiers, along with the still relevant Palestinian question. When faced with how the cabinet allocates its human and material resources to address a world in crisis, it may choose to delay the question of Iran and the U.S. role in the Southwest Asia. Iran and the “Resistance Axis” are poised for another round of “strategic patience”, improved Iran’s position in the regional environment. Iran was able to cooperate fully cooperation with its allies in the region, thus paving the way for the formation of an identity of resistance (Biden,2020:8).

## **5 .Analysis**

### **5-1. Iran’s Resistance Policy in a Regional Environment**

Iran’s political role and region extend from Southwest Asia to the eastern Mediterranean. In this way, the countries of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon will play an important and decisive role in the policy of regional resistance in Iran. The application of the policy of resistance by Iran is based on the formation of a new regional balance. Each regional country will have its own interpretation of the balance of power (Felter and Fishman,2008:50).

Islamic Republic of Iran’s Resistance and Revolution is not so much a stringently formulated ideology in the true sense of the word as a mixture of different political takes on the world embracing nationalism, anti-conservatism, resistance and anti-imperialism. Iran’s revolutionary ideology and its regional policy were able to play an effective role in regional developments.

The inherent contradictions between these oppositions make it almost impossible to shape any kind of cohesive real politic. In this way, political Islam and the Iranian leaders argue that the ideology, power and export of revolution are the main influential forces in the politic of resistance. Such concepts are both revolutionary doctrines that claim to be universally valid; nationalism and Shia on the other hand are, respectively, Iran or Shia-Centered and are traditional and conservative (Kahn,2014:41).

Despite breaking off political relations, Iran and the United States maintained economic contacts for many years after revolution. In the early 1980s, in the critical phase of the revolution in other words, the United States was still the largest purchaser of Iranian oil. It was not until the “Iran Libya Sanctions Act” of 1996 that US curtailed its trading relations with Tehran, and even then, food and medicines remained exempt from the

sanctions until the middle of 2012. The United States was thus for a long time the most important supplier of Iranian wheat (Ramazani,2004:17).

**5-1-1 .Competing with US Regional Policies**

Iran's regional policy has strategic, tactical and operational differences with the United States. The rivalry between the two countries has led to completely different strategic policies and this has expanded the regional crisis. Advocates of US-Iranian rapprochement about Iraq, Syria and Lebanon were able repeatedly to voice their views.

Iran's multilateralism makes sense at the regional, international and sub-national levels. A Significant part of Iran's regional policy has been related to multilateral cultural, economic and political cooperation and Track Two Diplomacy. In May 2003 an Iranian memorandum was made public which formulated the chief points of possible cooperation between the United States and Iran (Katzman,2011:14).

The main axes of Iran's resistance policy are related to counter-terrorism in parallel protecting and conservative countries in Southwest Asia. Iran's regional policy has had an anti-terrorist approach. Iran's approach to terrorist groups is quite different from that of the United States and Saudi Arabia. The main focus of Iran's foreign and strategic policy will be on how to play a role in the Palestinian nuclear program and the resistance groups.

The policy of balancing power from Iran's point of view based on the withdrawal of great power forces from the Southwest Asia. Such an approach seems completely different from the policies of Saudi Arabia and other conservative regional countries. Each of policy making for cooperation in the field of terrorism, an agreement on the transparency of Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program and recognition of the two-state solution for Israel and Palestine (Mohns and Bank,2012:30).

The main challenge of Iran-US foreign policy in 2022 has been how to lift economic sanctions. The main import of this document was its detailed timetable for confidence building measures whereby the regional resistance policy were prepared to make concessions in return for the lifting of US sanctions. The Biden administration in cooperation with Israel and Saudi Arabia has continued its restrictive nuclear policies against Iran and the end of sanctions (Ramazani,2004:8).

**5-1-2 .Iran's Security Policy Against Saudi Arabia and Takfiri Groups**

Takfiri groups have acted as Saudi proxy forces to confront Iran. Takfiri groups are ideologically and strategically opposed to regional politics in Iran. Iran's policy toward Saudi Arabia and Takfiri groups is critical. It is critical to keep Fundamental Takfiri groups like ISIS in perspective. The Fundamental Takfiri groups that drives ISIS is only one of the world's sources of terrorism and insurgency by non-state actors, and ISIS is only one such movement.

There are similar extremist groups in many countries with large Islamic populations. Iran's resistance groups allied with Iran in Iraq have disingenuously named December 31, 2021, as the legal deadline for the departure of all US forces from Iraq. That date actually marks the formal transition of US forces' role in Iraq to an exclusively advisory, training, and support role.

The Iraqi Resistance Coordinating Committee which represents Kata'ib Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kata'ib al-Imam Ali, and possibly other Iranian proxy militias claimed in a November 19 statement that US forces are increasing their presence in Iraq and promised to attack US forces immediately following the December 31 deadline (Powe,2021:35).

A significant part of resistance groups allied with Iran media channels distributed a combination of social role imagery, misleading legal arguments, and deceptive "resistance recruitment drives" to justify the planned resumption of attacks. Each of these groups has to fight against US proxy policies in the region in order to survive.

Iran has played a confrontational role in Saudi Arabia's regional policies and has sought to improve its position in Yemen, Iraq and Lebanon. The Shiites have been the main focus of Iran's communication in the Heart of Asia. Shiite groups are Iran's main regional allies in the resistance. Shi'a political groups will negotiate to form a coalition government to select the next Cabinet as they await, or attempt to prevent, the court's approval of the election results (McKernan,2021:4).

The emergence of Shiites as a resistance force in the regional environment has led to an increase and enhancement of the role of the Iranian region in Southwest Asia. The winnings bloc, led by nationalist Shi'a cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, is attempting to box out Iran's proxies and to form what Sadr calls a

“national majority government” that omits some the main parties despite their electoral success .

The fact is that there are difference between the Shiite groups in Iraq and Lebanon. And as a result, Iran should play a mediating and facilitating role in national politics and them. A Sadr- majority governing coalition poses a substantial threat to Iran’s proxy influence in Iraq; Sadr has called for the disarmament of Iran backed groups and the reinstatement of current Prime Minister Mustafa Kadhimi, whom Iran backed groups attempted to assassinate on November 7(Mead,2021:65).

Iran’s Iraqi Coalition groups may threaten members of other political blocs and the Federal Supreme Court to delay the court’s approval of the election and to limits the other groups from joining a Sadrist bloc. Other possible trajectories include a compromise cabinet between Sadr and the other Shi’a blocs, an uptick in some Iranian Coalition against Sadrist and Kadhimi administration assets to push for new elections, or the formation of a Shi’a bloc to oppose a Sadr-majority coalition through regular parliamentary means.

## **6 .Conclusion**

Though ideologues and apologists of the “Resistance Axis” may have wanted to deny it, many nevertheless implicitly accepted that the Trump Administration’s approach to Iran and its allies and proxies the selfstyled “Resistance Axis” has been qualitatively different from that of prior U.S. administrations.

The role of the Iran’s regional Power in the years after the victory of the Islamic Revolution is obviously has been increased. Since 2011 the Iran’s resistance policy extended its influence in the Middle East. The expansion reached its apex in 2018. It has since entered a new phase in which Tehran, despite not suffering any strategic military setbacks, is hitting a wall.

The growing power of the Iranian region has led to the emergence of serious challenges to the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. Iran’s biggest Revolutionary problem is that a majority of its allies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen are primarily military and Revolutionary actors. They frequently succeed in Social sleep and political confrontations. Yet they are subsequently incapable of ensuring political and economic stability.

Since 2011 the Islamic Republic of Iran has significantly extended its Social and political The Syrian security crisis has increased Iran’s role in the

Iranian regional influence in the Middle East. In Syria, its role alongside Russia from 2015 onwards contributed to the Assad regime's victory in the civil war.

The role of the Iranian region in Iraq increased when the United States occupied the country militarily and the ground was created for the formation of a very secure. In Iraq, Iranian military advisors and Iran-controlled local militias helped in the fight against Islamic State (ISIS). In Yemen, the Islamic Republic has been extending its support for the Ansarullah since 2014, to the extent that the Houthis were able to assert themselves in the war against Saudi government and the United Arab Emirates.

In 2003 to the next, Iran was forced to play a revolutionary role in the region. In 2015 Islamic Republic went on the Revolutionary and offensive role. Regional allies tried to establish itself in Syria, with the aim, inter alia, of creating a "second front" in the conflict with Israel. To this end, it equipped its ally Hezbollah with more, and more accurate and smart weapons.

This Process leads to the conclusion that Iran's policy and practice towards its western neighborhood will play a Revolutionary role. The regional role of Iran step by step become an important topic on the international stage in coming years: either as part of the negotiations with Tehran, or as a problem that West World needs to tackle in a different way.

The Trump administration did not limit pressure on Iran to nuclear armament an issue that Iran has leveraged to secure gains on separate strategic concerns. Nor did the administration attempt to induce a revolutionary regime change in Tehran, as the Bush 43 Administration was believed to pursue.

The Role of Iran's region gradually improved after the Syrian crisis. In this historical period, Hezbollah is mightier and more forceful in Lebanon than ever before, and its rockets and drones continue to be the most dangerous threat to Israel. The Hezbollah area and the resistance force in the eastern Mediterranean increased.

In Iraq the role of resistance groups influenced by the resistance force to counter ISIS After the defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, resistance forces is more powerful than ever before due to the newfound strength of the militias loyal to it and their political wings. After October 2019 until the April 2020, there was a series of protests against Iran's allies, but the demonstrators

were unable to decisively weaken the pro-Iran Shi'ite militant groups and parties.

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