

## **U.S. Crisis Management in Geopolitical Regions**

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### **Abstract**

The United States can be considered as a country that enjoys strong motivation, different instruments, effective structural position to play the security and political role in critical fields. This country has started to play security role in Middle East since the World War 2. Many of U.S presidents had organized their regional policies based on confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The U.S role has become especially significant since the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union could have made a safer atmosphere for the U.S to control regional conflicts on the basis of crisis management. But the U.S interventions have led to an increase of security complications in Middle East which has an effective geopolitical role in world politics.

The U.S crisis management model is based on confrontational indexes rather than diplomatic process and balancing model. The United States' goal of crisis management in M.E can not be considered to be providing equilibrium and stability. Americans prefer to apply the engagement method and this has led to more instability and conflicts in M.E.

**Keywords:** Cold War, Crisis Management, Regional conflict, Engagement, Enlargement, Instability, Regional equilibrium, Great Middle East (GME).

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## **Introduction**

Evidence suggests that even advanced countries remain very sensitive to the cultural impact on their national cultural identity of close economic ties with the USA. Patricia Goff shows that two of America's closest economic partners-Canada and the EU have taken significant steps to protect their own cultural identity from American encroachment, while introducing measures that strengthened their economic ties.

But at the cultural level in the Middle East, globalization can cause serious new ruptures between society and elites. Although, on the one hand, the elite is expected to protect society from the cultural encroachment of the West on the other, largely in an effort to adjust society to the tempo of it feels compelled to encourage the adoption of international norms and as well as baggage loads of Western practices.

Bill and Chavez place the emphasis more squarely on Islam itself: 'As a powerful universal force, Islam finds itself in great demand by those trapped in incoherence' (Bill and Chavez, 2002: 265).

Roy holds that the Islamic 'neo-fundamentalist's preoccupation is with the cultural impact of Westernization.

The Middle East and North Africa is a geopolitical system with strong political and cultural cross-border linkage and interdependencies. Here political events are intertwined with one another, and the effects of events in one part are quickly felt in its other parts. While fracturing the region, has also deepened these linkages and accelerated the transmission and delivery of political developments to every corner of the regional system.

As noted in the Introduction, the regional debate has been finding expression in an altogether different axes uncharted international context since September 2001. From that moment, the nature of the debate changed in the Middle East, as did the USA's relationship with the region. 11 September 2001 became a new defining moment of the relationship between the West and the Muslim world. It also formed a strong feature of the USA's position (as both victim and aggressor) in, and relations with, the Muslim world, as both cause and victim of violence.

One of the key strategic changes since 9/11 has been the transformation in US-Saudi relations, which for over 50 years had assisted both countries in dealing with their domestic and regional problems. The Kingdom had been a strong ally of the USA for years, assisting it containing radicalism, Arab nationalism, and Soviet communism in the Arab world (Buckly and Singh, 2006: 170).

Saudi Arabia had been one of the USA's key partners in the fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s; it had assisted the USA in its efforts to contain the Iranian revolution; and had been the main regional ally of the US-led, UN-sanctioned military coalition against Iraq in 1990/91. Indeed, it was a historical irony of the latter partnership that brought 500,000 American soldiers to the holiest Muslim land, and in the process sparked off bin Laden's campaign against the al-Sauds.

Even today, Saudi Arabia is still touted as an important ally in the war on terror. Yet it is hard to deny that after 9/11 something fundamental changed in this partnership. For one commentator, the partnership was now said to be 'in tatters'.

Not only was the image of Saudi Arabia in the USA tarnished, but in policy terms the Kingdom's role as a regional pillar of American power changed to that of a neo-pariah, where it was seen more as part of the problem for the USA in its war against terrorism, than a trusted ally.

Victor Davis Hanson of California State University was not unique in publicly and vociferously questioning every aspect of Saudi Arabia's society and its partnership with the USA. In an article entitled, 'Our Enemies, the Saudis' in the influential and widely read *Commentary* magazine, he argued that Saudi Arabia was every bit part of the Islamist terror network.

Another commentator boldly stated that 'the roots of much terrorism lie in the intolerance and hatred preached in many mosques and taught in madrasses, often supported by Saudi money.'

### **1- Crisis Management: the art of crisis management**

While we do not propose a formal definition of word crisis in this manual, we treat any event that can, within a short period of time, harm institution's constituents, its facilities, its finances or its reputation as a crisis. Crisis management is the art of making decisions to head off or mitigate the effects of such an event, often while the event itself is unfolding. This often means making decisions about institution's future while we are under stress and while we lack key pieces of information.

What is usually called in GME "crisis management" should be best understood as part of a broad continuum of U.S activities as follows:

- **Planning.** Planning relates to getting your institution in the best position to react to, and recover from, an emergency.

- **Incident Response.** Incident responses are the processes that you have put into place to ensure that your institution reacts properly and orderly to an incident as it occurs. Examples of incident response include:
  - a. Evacuation after a called-in bomb threat
  - b. Denial of entry to suspicious persons or country
- **Crisis Management.** Crisis Management is the management and coordination of institution's responses to an incident that threatens to harm, or has harmed, institution's people, structures, ability to operate, valuables and/or reputation. It takes into account planning and automatic incident response, but must also dynamically deal with situations as they unfold, often in unpredictable ways.

Given above-mentioned points, U.S pattern of crisis management in Great Middle East (GME) is based on these five tenets:

- Prevention is key.
- Interventions are always client-centered.
- Interventions balance consistency with flexibility.
- Safe Havens are committed to residents for "the long hale."
- Staff need to know when and how to get help (Anderson, 2008:128).

## 2- Great Middle East (GME) as a Geopolitical Region

In the GME, the reason lies largely in the geopolitical forces governing the region, and also elite fears of loss of control to extra-territorial powers. From the elites' point of view, while globalization precipitates chaos, they crave 'order'. Voices from within the region provide ample evidence for this. Skepticism, coupled with the perceived threat to Arab and Muslim social values 'through the export of American popular culture, leads the general Arab population to be fearful of further Western penetration of their Societies' (Hakimian, 2001: 152-5).

A typical geopolitically rooted view is that Americanization is little more than the invasion of a 'Satanic civilization', which is bent on corrupting Islamic values and destroying Islam's central unity. It seems that we have been invaded by a civilization whose characteristics are different from ours and which invaded us without our being aware of what was happening... Madonna... had a child from [her husband to be] three months before the marriage... Catherine Zeta-Jones had her child two months before her wedding... Woody Allen was involved in a relationship with his stepdaughter...and let us not forget Bill Clinton's affair with Monica

Lewinsky as well as with Paula Jones. She was so shameless as to appear nude in a magazine in order to boost her income! This is the civilization which now leads the world in science, technology and military might. We face the caravan of Satan with all its weapons and attractions. Its attack is against our society.

Iran's former Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, who served in President Khatami's two administrations and is known for his moderate views, stated at an international gathering in Rome in 2001 that 'neglect of cultural rights of the nations, disregard for cultural values, and efforts geared at the creation of a mono-culture rank among the negative consequences of globalization that presage whole new challenges for humanity at large... a case worth mentioning is that the shaping of a monolithic culture... runs counter to the ideal of cultural pluralism and could trigger violent reactions by its critics'.

### **3-The Geopolitical Context of Conflict**

The geopolitical context of the MENA region today provides another backdrop for the pace and nature of change. Broadly speaking, five countries in the GME region have the ability actively to shape the geopolitical setting of the area. The first two are Iraq and its on-Arab Shia neighbor Iran; the third is Libya; and the fifth is Pakistan.

With regard to Iraq, the geopolitical context is being shaped by a dangerous conflict between the country's Shia majority and militant Sunnis, including al-Qaeda.

The primary focus of the guerrilla operations in Iraq began to shift in the second half of 2003 towards the Shia community. It has been noted by Sunnis in general, and al-Qaeda and the Wahhabis in particular, that large sections of Iraq's Shia community not only did not rise against the US occupation, but has worked with the USA to facilitate a transfer of power that will make them the dominate political and socio-economic force in Iraq (Woodward, 2004: 47-50).

In Iraq, the al-Qaeda and Sunni militants believe, the Shia, with the connivance of the USA, are busy implementing their plan for domination of the important Arab state of Iraq, and intend to use Iraq's territory to target Sunni Islam's heartland in Saudi Arabia. The militant Sunnis' perception of the growing political role of the Shia in Iraq has increase the frequency and intensity of terror attacks on the Shia communities there. These attacks

reached a high point on Ashura (Shia Islam's major religious occasion) in early March 2004 (Islamic month of Muharram) with the deadly synchronized attacks on the main Shia shrines in Baghdad and Karbala, which killed at least 170 people and injured hundreds more.

It is the rather sudden shift of focus in US circles to the geocultural overlap between Persian Gulf oil and Shia communities that alarms the (largely Sunni-dominated) Arab regional actors, as King Abdullah of Jordan, President Mubarak of Egypt and several Saudi princes have already articulated. The West, suggests Mai Yamani, had 'woken up to the accident of geography that has placed the world's major oil supplies in areas where the Shi'ites form the majority.

It is the awareness of this geocultural cross-section in Western policy terms that petrifies the Arab leaders and fuels their suspicions of the USA's end-game strategy in the region. In the tense post-Saddam environment of the Persian Gulf subregion, even faint suspicion of the USA's end-game strategy in the region. In the tense post-Saddam environment of the Persian Gulf subregion, even faint suspicion of US-backed sectarian power struggles between the Sunni and the Shia can ignite a much bigger fire to engulf the entire Arab world (Yaphe, 2002: 93).

It is into this grave situation that neighboring Iran treats. As the world's only Shia, and expressly Islamist state, Iran in its post-revolutionary mode has been careful not to stray too far from the wider Arab region in its policy pronouncements. It has remained loyal to the Palestinian cause, has developed co-operative relations with virtually every Arab state, and has ensured that it keeps in close touch with its Gulf Arab neighbors.

To the west of Iraq we have to consider the geopolitics of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is increasingly defined by the policies of the one dominant actor, Israel. Since its foundation in 1948, Israel has never shied from using its considerable capacity to affect the geopolitics of the region to its own advantage. In the age of globalization, Israel has utilized to great effect in order to advance economically, it can also now count on the security fallout from 9/11 and the war on terror campaign to advance further its own interests in the region. It has been able to do this much more easily with the fall of Baghdad in April 2003 than at any time since the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian Camp David accords in 1978-79. Compounded by the collapse of the Soviet Union and Iraq's foreign policy debacles since 1980, the Arab world has been unable to find an appropriate response to Israel's supremacy, having to watch from the sidelines manipulation of the Arab-

Israeli agenda and its ever closer strategic partnership with non-Arab Turkey. Therefore, has managed to secure for itself a key role in the balancing of forces in the Arab world (Dodge and Higgott, 2002: 101-103).

Finally, Pakistan's role on the eastern fringes of the MENA region has grown immeasurably since it joined the US war on terror and assisted the West in its overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the military campaign against al-Qaeda. For the Gulf Arab states, Pakistan has been a steady supplier of cheap Muslim labor, cheap manufactured and processed goods, and military support. In the 1980s Pakistan provided a great deal of logistical and personnel support for Saudi Arabia as the Kingdom tried to incorporate its massive weapons purchases in its rapidly modernizing armed forces. It has kept this military partnership alive ever since.

Persian Gulf states are alive to the possibility that the positioning of Pakistan as a close US ally could have serious domestic consequences in that country. Any instability there, or a further consolidation of Salafi Islamist forces in Pakistan, can easily spill over into Afghanistan (and even Iran), and the Gulf Arab allies of the West. Pakistan's closeness to the USA, therefore, could worsen the political tensions between regimes and Islamist forces in the eastern Arab world, causing further instability in the region and possible delays in the implementation of badly needed political, economic and social reforms. Yet this anti-terror alliance is here to stay, despite American concerns about Pakistan's long-term stability (Ottaway and Carothers, 2004: 76-79).

One result of the problems is that MENA elites will probably find it increasingly difficult to provide economic (and physical) security nets for their citizens in return for their acceptance of political apathy, tolerance of corrupt practices, and the exercise of economic power by ruling circles. This is so despite the rapid rises in oil prices. As Cordesman notes with reference to one of the richest oil states of the past 100 years, 'Saudi Arabia is no longer "oil wealthy" in the sense that its present economy can provide for its people.

The same story can be repeated for four other oil-rich MENA states: Algeria, Iran, Iraq and Libya. In Iran's case, the conservative Heritage Foundation's 2003 'economic freedom' index point out that, among 155 countries, Iran came in at 148th for its economic standing in the world.

As a consequence, and in the course of the predictable tension, some countries will close up, adopting a defensive posture; while in others reforming elites will break rank and openly pursue a more liberal and

forward-looking approach. But, as was asked indirectly earlier, can such schemes as the USA's 2004 GMEI help in advancing the cause of reform, or do they hinder it?

The imitative, first brought to light by Vice-President Dick Cheney at the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos in January 2004, was called 'the most ambitious U.S. democracy effort since the end of the Cold War'.

#### **4- The Iranian Role in GMS**

Iran's most authoritative and outspoken anti-us, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, saw the phenomenon in a slightly different light. To him, it was the 'big powers led by the United States [forging] economic, political and cultural hegemony over the globe'. 'For some time now', he declared at a meeting with Iran's parliamentarians, 'a new movement has gained momentum at the international scene like a destructive flood and certain countries believe there is no way but to surrender to the "global flood", or Americanization ... Iran believes that nations should neutralize globalization by strengthening their economic, political and cultural structure. In the Arab world, similar issues are peddled. For Arab intellectuals, it is also often the concerns about Arab/Islamic culture that dominate. For them, will eventually extinguish the *khususiyat* (specialties, peculiarities) of Arab culture (kemp, 1998-9: 139).

At another extreme are the leading entrepreneurs of the region, figures such as Prince Walid bin Talal of Saudi Arabia, who have become uncompromising champions of globalization, which they see as a powerful energizing force. In a typical interview in December 1999, for instance, he argued that change must come to the Arab world if it is to keep up with the rest of the world.

In January 2003, support for major reforms in the Arab world, as an acknowledgement and full embracing of U.S strategy came from a least expected quarter-the conservative Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In its new 'Arab Charter', the Kingdom noted that 'full reform is needed in order to respond to the requirements for positive integration within filed of international competition, to achieve sustainable development, and to deal objectively and realistically with the myriad of novel changes in the economic sphere, especially with the emergence of huge economic blocs, the rise of and what it provides In opportunities and imposes challenges, and accelerating development in the technological, communication and information areas'.



### **5- U.S Directive Pressure on GME Economy**

In Held's words, 'by creating new patterns of transformation and change, can weaken old political and economic structures without necessarily leading to the establishment of new systems of regulation' as many of the political and economic structures in the Muslim world are already weak. One effect of globalization in this environment is to make the state more defensive, while acting as a rallying point for Islamist activists (among others) who resist globalization on the basis of its corrosive impact on Muslim systems of social regulations, to use Held's vocabulary (World Bank, 1995: 89-93).

Henry and Springborn articulate the problem in political economy terms, arguing that the region draws a direct line between the pressure of U.S policy and those 'neo-colonial' ones exerted through such bodies as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 'With the rise of the Washington Consensus in the 1980s and its overt extension into the political realm with "good government" in the 1990s, government in the developing world perceived IFI [international financial institutions] as the shock troops of globalization.

Structurally adjusted states in the Middle East have seen their economies opened up to international markets and multinational companies in return for the provision of much-needed loans. This has caused globalization to be perceived as a Western imposition forced on countries that have very little alternative'.

### **6- Geo-economics of U.S Policy in MENA**

Added to the pressures on the state that globalization brings, we can name others that have a strong economic focus. Hook et al. identify three dimensions to the economics of globalization: 'as a world without borders in which TNCs [transnational corporations] act in the three core regions of the global political economy [USA, Europe and Far East]: as the spread of a US-led liberalist political project which forces the removal of protective national and regional barriers to global trade: or as the fragmentation of economic interests and growth of sites of resistance to global economic trends'.

With regard to the Middle East, these three elements converge to generate new pressures for the region to manage. With fairly small and underdeveloped markets outside the MENA oil economies, and as the

transnational corporations are unlikely to divert resources from the three cores to expand their presence in this region, some parts of the region will present themselves as 'resistance sites' (sklair and Robbins, 2002: 89-90).

On the issue of USA's liberalist strategy, the region has been a subject of the US liberalist political project from at least 1977 and President Carter's democratization drive. Some would say that the Shah of Iran was the first victim of this drive. Followed by President Marcos of the Philippines.

But since 9/11, the US liberalist political project has acquired new life great urgency, and a much hardened edge. To all intents and purposes, the US liberalist political project is now rooted in the Middle East, as President Bush's forward strategy for freedom has continued to underline since early 2002 (Glain, 2003: 96-97).

AS we see in chapter 5, the new liberalist political project has left no Arab state immune to the associated pressures to open up the public space, which in itself is proving a destabilizing situation as far as Arab elites are concerned.

But the process of controlled openness is allowing the emergence of political forces still hostile to the economic and political imperatives. With the region already exhausted by war and its own economic failings, and by the cumulative pressures of containment, sanctions and isolation imposed on several of its key actors, the fragmentary impact of was manifested here are more easily that in other regional systems.

The way in which the end of the Cold War deepened globalization-induced fragmentation is in need of some comment too, for until 1989 the region had largely been bound by the bipolar structures of the Cold War, and it was only after the demise of the Soviet state that the regional actors began to behave out of the mould of the Cold War. With no international alliance structures to provide regional stability any longer, key actors began to explore the prospect of independent action in a post-bipolar environment, sometimes with disastrous consequences. State behavior tended to be anachronistic, although still rational within its own narrow terms of reference. Actions by different governments undermined, instead of complementing, collective action.

### **7- The Role of Al- Qaeda in MGE Conflict**

It was also being said in American circles that 'there can be little doubt that the key components of al-Qaeda derive direct support...from the desert kingdom. The group's leader is himself a Saudi from one of the country's richest and most

powerful families. Fifteen of the 19 [9/11] hijackers were allegedly Saudis, and though there is no direct evidence yet, logic suggests that much of al-Qaeda's financing comes from sympathizers there (Telhami, 2002:231-3).

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the Heritage Foundation, the RAND Corporation and the CATO Institute were among the key think-tanks peddling a similar argument and advocating a weakening of political and security ties with the Kingdom. Some even recommended regime change in Saudi Arabia as the ultimate solution to the problem of Islamic terrorism.

The consequences of any strategic shift in the relationship between the USA and one of the world's key oil states is likely to be far-reaching, but already, as Niblock notes, since 9/11 both countries have found good reason to step back from the intimate partnership that had marked their relations since the middle of the previous century. In the sub-regional environment of the Persian Gulf, where Washington has consistently relied on Saudi Arabia to contain Iran and Iraq, it will now act more unilaterally and distance itself from the largest Arab country on the Peninsula, relying more on weaker and smaller allies such as Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar.

This would have seemed hardly likely, or sensible, at the turn of the century. Yet that is exactly what has been happening since the military campaign which unseated the Iraqi dictator in March 2003. The neo-conservatives' regional agenda did not end in Baghdad, however: Iraq was just the beginning. In the words of a former Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs (Edward Walker): 'they want to foment revolution in Iran and use that to isolate and possibly attack Syria in [Lebanon's] Bekaa Valley, and force Syria out...They want to pressure Libya and they want to destabilize Saudi Arabia, because they believe instability there is better than continuing with the current situation. And out of this, they think, comes Pax Americana.

But the loosening of Saudi-US ties also affords Riyadh the chance to engage more forcefully with South and East Asia and consolidate the already strong energy partnerships into broader political and security ones. In this regard, the Saudis would be traveling down the road that another important Persian Gulf state (Iran) has already set off on, in terms of building solid ties with China, India, Japan, Pakistan and Southeast Asia, as well as with Central Asia.

A strategic shift could be taking place in the Middle East as the states of West slowly but surely gravitate closer to their eastern Asian neighbors. The Strategic shift is already influencing, and will further affect, the flow of globalization in the MENA region as it will increasingly penetrate the

region with both a Western and an 'Oriental' face. It will be shown later that as China, India and their satellites rise in the coming years, so the geographical shift in the power of globalizing forces themselves will play into the strategic shift taking place in the GME (Barber, 2003: 45-47).

### **8- The Role of United States in MGE Conflicts**

For the USA, which today is depicted as a global hyper-power with overwhelming military and economic power-even as the New Rome-these strategic developments have macro-consequences. This hyper-power looks around the world and identifies the 'unruly tribes'-the rogue states and actors-and goes out of its way to bring them into line. Where it can, it will also aim to punish them for challenging the New Rome's power and its unilateral pursuit of its interests.

It also pursues them in order to make an example of them in front of other potential rivals. In the context of the post-9/11 international environment and the USA's new national security strategy, MENA regional actors must be seen to pose the most serious and direct challenge to this hegemonic actor.

The American strategy anticipates confronting them in an effort to 'roll them back'. In the context of globalization, the 'containment' strategy has surely been replaced by 'roll back', as exemplified in the treatment of Iraq in 2002/3. globalization and the revolution in military affairs in the 1990s, as well as the USA's strategic responses to 9/11, have brought the New Rome and its regional rivals more directly into confrontation with each other.

The posture the Middle East oil exporters Asian partners adopt in this struggle will have direct and far-reaching consequences for the region, as well as for the USA's global strategy. If they resist the USA in West Asia, they will encourage the regional counter-hegemons to resist. But if they submit to the USA's grand strategy, will they not only help in strengthening Washington's grip on the region? (Asmus, 1996:29-31). They cannot afford to remain passive actors when the re-ordering of the region is being encouraged in the manner outlined by the Bush White House since 2002 and the publication of its two (2002 and 2006) national security documents.

But American imperial over-reach will also have huge implications in the MENA region. Over-reach can lead to deeper and more prolonged military engagements-a procession of rolling and costly wars with no end and no clear winners or losers.

This is already the state of affairs with regard to the wars led by the Bush administration in Afghanistan and Iraq. Under such conditions, the

security aspects of globalization can very easily undo any economic fruits that liberalizing responses to globalization might have brought. In the long run, it is not inconceivable to expect the GME region to be exposed to further tensions, but more as a consequence of its security parameters than of its socio-economic failings, which globalization so forcefully unveils. As we will see, strategic interdependence of this nature will extract a higher price for globalization of the region (Hinnebusch, 2003: 115-118).

For over 50 years, the MENA region has been seen as a single unit of analysis. I have viewed it in these terms myself. Making assumptions about the political, socio-economic and cultural aspect of MENA as a distinct subsystem of the international system. Its body was neither invented nor imagined to apply Higgott's comment referring to East Asian regionalism. But to argue that MENA is a regional system does not necessarily mean that its 'regionalization' is also pre-ordained.

As shown below, this is one of the least 'regionalized' regional systems of the world, when measured by economic integration criteria-market, freedom of mobility, unhindered trade and investment flows, and internal market for the subsystem's members, collective measures to standardize legal financial management regimes, a truly regions-wide technical secretariat for co-operation or establishment of a convergence criteria act. Indeed, some might argue in spite of the strength of Arabism as a transnational force, state remain the strongest unit of political organization. State barriers to integration are strong, and national frontiers are far from porous in political or economic terms.

Beyond the security realm and externally imposed theaters of operation, such as that of the Bahrain-based US Central Command. It is hard to justify the MENA region as a fully fledged subsystem. Indeed, as the security envelope widens we have to include in our analysis an understanding of the GME, which incorporates Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Asian republics of the former Soviet Union into one large, strategic realm. It thus becomes even more difficult to locate a core to the subsystem. By the same token, it will not be easy to identify the convergence criteria for the region.

As will be shown, subregions are much easier to define analytically in the MENA region than the boundaries of the MENA subsystem as a whole. Moreover, it has been at the subregional level that attempts at institutionalized co-operation have been most effective, although not necessarily particularly successfully.

At the heart of the MENA region is the Arab world, the status of which

are 'joined at the hip' by a common language, religion, customs, roots, geography, and some shared history. With these strong links virtually unmatched by other regions in the world, one would have expected the rise of a single unit regulating the affairs of the Arabs. Since then in twentieth century Arab states have found it particularly difficult to use this 'material basis' for co-operation or as 'ready-mixed' cement' for structure-building. They have also found that their common features do not necessarily lend themselves as platforms for common action in instances of strategic importance.

Stretched in several directions due to external pressures, these states and the Arab peoples in general have found unity an unrealizable destiny. As Barakat has put it, this sense of Arab one-ness 'is constantly being formed and reformed, reflecting changing conditions and self-conceptions; together these exclude complete separation as well as complete integration (Zoellick, 2000, 32).

#### **9- The Role of EU in GME Conflict**

Colonialist policies of the European powers, and then the 1945-89 Cold War, have had much to do with the creation of division in the Arab world. Sovereign Arab states have found it hard to create an effective Arab-wide platform to share, as manifested in the failures of the Arab League as a regional organization since its foundation in 1945. Arab states, since their foundation, have been divided, largely thanks to the machinations of such western European powers as France, Britain and Italy, and their own desire to carve for themselves national identities.

Halliday argues that 'part of this involved the assertion and maintenance of claims with regard to other states, based on what were viewed as historic rights, or on denunciation of the partitions and division imposed by colonialism'. However formed, these divisions enabled, indeed encouraged, the Cold War's superpowers to separate the Arab political units from each other, placing them in opposing camps. Even here, though, neither superpower was able to impose discipline on its regional allies, and co-operation between them was not always a common feature of such alliances at the regional level.

As well as intra-Arab problems, other geopolitical factors were at work to prevent the Gulf Arab states from creating a wider Arab market. No sooner had the regional star of the Gulf Arab petrodollar states begun to rise, then the Iranians next door rose against their ruling monarch, and in one fell

swoop in 1979 replaced his secular, pro-Western regime with a Shia-led theocratic anti-Western one. For some of the Gulf Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, which had seen itself as the only true beacon of Islam, the emergence of a new revolutionary (Shia-based) Islamist state in the same neighborhood was a challenge too far (Anthony, 2004: 32).

Its existence was made public a year after the Arab world's own 'Arab Charter', which Saudi Arabia tabled in January 2003. The charter, seen as a revolution of sorts in its own right, had called for 'internal reform and enhanced political participation in the Arab states'. The later US plan, in contrast, had encompassed a wide range of diplomatic, cultural and economic measures. The GMEI had deliberately moved the agenda on by calling for the USA and its European allies and partners (in the G8 Group, NATO and the EU) to press for and assist free elections in the Middle East (through support for civic education, the creation of independent election commission in MENA countries, and comprehensive voter register), foster the growth of new independent media there, press for judicial reforms, help create a 'literate generation by helping to cut regional illiteracy rates in half by 2010, train 'literacy crops' of around 100,000 female teachers by 2008, finance the translation of Western classical texts into Arabic to foster better understanding of the West among Muslims, establish a European-style GME Development Bank, an International Finance Corporation-style GME Finance Corporation to assist the development of larger enterprises, and give US\$500 million in micro-loans to small entrepreneurs, especially women, in order to assist 1.2 million small entrepreneurs out of poverty.

#### **10- U.S. Security Difficulties in MENA and GME**

Since 9/11, reform of the region has become a high US priority, and the launch of the GMEI should be seen in the context of developing and accelerating the reform process. The concern from the region, however, has been that the 2004 US initiative, like its predecessor in 2003, tried to explain its logic in purely Western security terms-as its early 2004 draft states: 'So long as the region's pool of politically and economically disenfranchised individuals grows, we will witness an increase in extremism, terrorism, international crime and illegal migration (Rosenau, 2006: 65-73).

Furthermore, there was concern that the initiative perceived the region in largely Cold War transfer example speaking of creating MENA security structures based on the 1975-launched Helsinki process and NATO's

Partnership for Peace programme. It anticipated that a complex set of security structures could bring six Middle East countries, including Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar and Israel, into partnership with NATO.

On more than one occasion, regional policy-makers have stated that the Helsinki process first ended the alternative power bloc to the West and then caused an internal collapse of the Soviet Union. 'Is that what's in store for the Muslim world as well with this initiative?', several leading Arab (and Iranian) policy-makers have asked. Another important concern was how much notice the initiative would take of the situation on the ground in the Middle East, and how much attention it would give to the legitimate concerns of the region's ruling regimes.

This again featured heavily in 2006, forming a main plank of the state of the Union address in January: 'Ultimately, the only way to defeat the terrorists is to defeat their dark vision of hatred and fear by offering the hopeful alternative of political freedom and peaceful change. So the United States of America supports democratic reform across the broader Middle East. Elections are vital, but they are only the beginning. Rising up democracy requires the rule of law, and protection of minorities, and strong, accountable institutions that last longer than a single vote'.

Bush's vision is consistent with earlier US attempts to change the world in America's image. Soon after the start of the Cold War, and well before President Reagan's 'evil empire' typology of the 1980s, the right had begun a wide-ranging assault on Marxism. By adopting a Marxian lexicon for referring to the expansionist zeal of the Soviet Union (calling it imperialist, for example), these forces slowly but surely made of the Soviet state and its successor states their own allies in the globalization process. As Stephen Ambrose noted, those Americans who 'wanted to bring the blessings of democracy, capitalism, and stability to everyone [advocated that] the whole world...should be a reflection of the United States' (Murphy, 2002: 73-75).

### **Conclusion**

In August 2002 the US military concluded 'Millennium Challenge 2002', a war game costing \$250 million, designed to test the concepts of Transformation and Network-Centric Warfare championed by Donald Rumsfeld. The game attracted some controversy due to the decision of retired Marine: t.-General Paul Van Riper, who commanded the game's Opposing (or Red), Force, to quit prematurely on the grounds that the



game was scripted to ensure victory for the US (Blue) force. Before he quit, however, van Riper's unconventional tactics created considerable difficulties for the US forces: for example, he used motorcycle messengers to transmit order, negating Blue's high-tech eavesdropping capabilities.

At least during its first term, the Bush administration's basic assumptions about war were distinctive in their radical optimism with regard to the political utility of military force. This optimism extended both to the domestic and strategic dimensions of political utility: it was assumed both that military action could be made acceptable to the American public (for technology would make it human), and that it could achieve its strategic objectives with little risk of events spiraling out of control (for technology would render the battle field transparent and predictable). With regard to the latter dimension, a further assumption was central: that for the prosecution of grand strategy to be successful it was sufficient simply to destroy those entities, whether they be hostile regimes or terrorist networks, that threatened US security.

U.S. security policy has encountered different problems in regional fields since the end of Cold War. The reason could be an increase of its security movements in critical fields. Middle East is considered as one of the critical regions that has been constantly facing wars; among these conflicts we can name Arab-Israeli wars, revolutionary groups' resistance within the countries of the region, Iraq war against Iran and regional wars of the U.S against Afghanistan and Iraq as well (Ambrose, 1985: 193).

Each one of these conflicts has influenced the essence and the behavior of the countries of the region. The U.S has embarked upon applying the escalation crisis pattern to encounter these conflicts. Countries use such patterns when they enjoy having various power instruments as well as the possibility of their movements through military bases. The United States has increased the number of its military bases in M.E since 2001. It has deployed more troops in the region and started two regional wars as well. Such actions can be the cause of an increase in conflicts.

In general, Middle East countries are in a changing security situation. They feel that the economical, cultural and identity fields are losing their political positions as compared to actions and security pressures of the West. That is why a rapid process has been created to

confront U.S actions in Middle East.

An increase in the intensity and extent of the conflicts does not mean the reactions of special political or military groups, though. It means that social groups' movements, economical ability and motivation of M.E society have increased since 1990s. An increase in such capabilities can be considered as one factor which has motivated the Middle East to confront military actions and the pre-emptive war.

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