

Modelling and Strategic Analysis of Yemen Conflict Based on the Graph Model

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Abstract

Yemen crisis is a political and security one, in which besides domestic actors, regional and transregional actors also play some various roles in this process, based on their own national strategies and interests. Therefore, recognizing effective actors in the conflict, their actions and preferences is the most important factor to determining and finding some ways to settle the conflict. The question is, what will be the future of the Yemeni crisis? Graph model analysis indicated that Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah will accept ceasefire and negotiate, while the war may also be continued, but it will not be the most likely effect and if UN Security Council has a more active role in establishing a ceasefire and creating a peaceful state, the actors for this conflict can reach a political and peaceful solution to settle the conflict. So, the purpose of this article is to show by descriptive-analytical method that by modeling conflicts and using graph model, constructive solutions can be discovered for them and the state of equilibrium in crisis can be suggested to its actors.

Keywords: Graph Model for Conflicts Analysis, Saudi Arabia, Ansar Allah, Security Council, Equilibrium State, Yemen Conflict.

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1. Introduction

The Middle East has witnessed the opening of a new season in its own political history since the first of 2011. Arab Spring, started by Tunisian uprising on 17, Sep, 2010, created some changes in the Middle East Region. This process could lead to the overthrow of four regimes in Tunis, Egypt, Lybia and Yemen, and instability in the countries such as Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and extensive crisis in Syria.

Yemen people, along with the people of other Arab nations, were attempting to change the authoritarian pattern of their own government, were also struggling to transit to democracy, and in January, 2011, demanded for Ali Abdullah Saleh dismissal, who had monopolized the power more than three decades by relying on tribal balance, army and security forces. Along Persian Gulf Cooperative Council's initiative in May, 2011, Saleh stepped down the power and transfer the government to his deputy, Mansour Hadi, on conditions of his immunity. The inefficiency of Hadi's government to solve the problems led to people uprising once again in January, 2015, with the leadership of Ansar Allah. Mansour Hadi was forced to resign and escape to Saudi Arabia, after the presidential palace was captured by Ansar Allah. Saudi Arabia's concern about spreading the protests inside its own country led to some extensive attacks against Yemen in Mrach, 2015 by Saudi Arabia, with the coalition of 9 Arab states in the region, which has continued so far.

So the question is, what will be the future of the Yemeni crisis? Graph model analysis indicated that Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah will accept ceasefire and negotiate, while the war may also be continued, but it will not be the most likely effect and if UN Security Council has a more active role in establishing a ceasefire and creating a peaceful state, the actors for this conflict can reach a political and peaceful solution to settle the conflict.

2. Historical Background

Yemen is a state with many ups and downs during its political era. In 1918, as Ottoman Empire was collapsed, North Yemen was created as an independent government, but South Yemen was still under Britain sovereignty. Yemen has had 7 historical epochs.

The first era comes back to 1962, when the advocates of Nasser's revolutionary ideology, containing mainly the young, especially young military personnel, withstood the royalists, and started a republican era in

this society, by their own coup d'état. The second historical era of Yemen was started in 1967, when a new country, called South Yemen, was created at the end of Britain sovereignty on the south regions of Yemen, specially Aden. Qahtan Muhammed al-Shaabi was elected as the President for the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in November, 30, 1967, and Aden was selected as its capital, too. The third era was started in 1968 when the political and military elites of South Yemen accepted the Marxist ideology officially and became an alliance for the Eastern Bloc and USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), when a new period of some regional struggles was generated in Arabian Peninsula, in which not only the two sections of Yemen (North and South), but also the regional powers (Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Lybia) and the world ones (USA and USSR) were involved (Halliday,1985:243-246).

The fourth historical era comes back to 1990; that is, when Yemenis' unitarianism efforts, hopes inspired by the oil and gas exploration in Yemen and Saudi Arabia borders, and finally, the relative financial and economic bankruptcy of South Yemen due to the interruption of USSR aids brought the northern and southern political elites together and led to the unity and integrity of two Yemens. As Republic of Yemen was founded, Ali Abdullah Saleh was elected as the President, and Ali Salem al Beidh, the President of South Yemen, became the vice-president (Sharqieh,2011:222). Sanaa and Aden were selected as its political and economic capitals, respectively. In fact, until 1990, there were two separate states, as the Arabic Republic of Yemen (North Yemen) and the Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). These two states were governed by two quite different ideological regimes (Phillips,2010:142).

The first parialmentary election of Yemen was held in 1993. In this election, the parties competed to attain the parliamentary seats. Northern parliamentary triumph led to the conflicts rising, Salem al Beidh sit-in in Aden, war declaration against Ali Abdullah Saleh, and separatistic efforts were defeated. But, separatistic actions continued in the south of the state as Harak Movement (Alley,2010:73). along with these developments in Yemen political scene, this state has witnessed Saada Wars in the first decade of 21st century. These 6 wars lasted from June, 2004 to the middle of 2010. (Salmoni and et al,2010:98).

The fifth historical era of Yemen was started in 2011, when in the process of spreading Arab Spring and the beginning of Yemenis' extensive and long protests, Ali Abdullah Saleh was dismissed after 18 years of presidency in the United Republic of Yemen, overall 33 years of presidency (with Saleh presidency in North Yemen from 1978 to February, 2012). The major discussion in the political arena of Yemen, led to embattling the pros and cons of Saleh against each other, was constitution amendment in order that Ali Abdullah Saleh could be a candidate in the next presidency election again. After the constitution amendment in 2001, Saleh could be a presidency candidate for 2 periods (Bankston, 2003: 612-614).

However, even before the revolutionary wave reaches to Yemen, from Tunisia and Egypt, Ali Abdullah Saleh regime was struggling with many challenges, such as fighting with Houthis in the north, fighting with the separatists in the south, battling to the influence of Al-Qaeda, the two-year deadlock for the elections and constitution amendment, and the intensification of economic conditions. The introduction of foreign variables for Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings to the crisis-prone, political arena of Yemen resulted in that Yemenis, demanding for transformation and the governing regime reform from a long time ago, along with Mubarak's overthrow in 11 February, 2011, held some widespread demonstrations in the most cities of Yemen and sit-ins in the main squares of these cities, became famous as "Change Squares" and demanded for dismissing Saleh and changing Yemen's governing regime (Ahmadian, 2011: 57).

At first, Saleh's regime oppressed and slaughtered the people, relying on his own tribal alliances. Then he attempted to reach an agreement with the protesters and resolve the crisis through a political channel. Saleh presented 2 plans to exit out of the crisis. In the first plan, he invited the protesters to amend the constitution to transfer some of his own authorities to the parliament by the end of 2011; in the second one, besides his previous proposal, he invited the opposition to negotiate for forming the national unity government, but none of Saleh's proposals was accepted by the protesters (Ahmadian, 2011: 59).

USA policy was a foreign effective factor in Yemen's developments. For two major reasons, alliance with "Saleh" in the war against terrorism (specifically, the organization of Peninsula Al-Qaeda) and also, the fear of spreading Yemen's transformation to neighbouring states, specially Saudi

Arabia and its effect on oil production and price, USA adopted a quite doubtful policy against Yemen developments, because on one hand, it could not abandon Saleh easily, due to the lack of a confident alternative (such as Egypt army management for the alternative of Mubarak in the transitional period), and on the other hand, it could not clearly withstand against the protesters' demands, and regardless of probable expenses associated with supporting Saleh. But, since the developments took long time and the protesters insisted on Saleh dismissal, USA doubt disappeared and it accepted the necessity of transition from Saleh (Lynch,2012:110- 116).

The sixth and most important historical era of Yemen is related to the developments was made after Arab Spring and Ali Abdullah Saleh dismissal. Based on the peace agreement, concluded among the protesters and "Mansour Hadi", as Saleh's substitution, the president was obliged to provide the required fields to establish the national unity government with Houthis collaboration. But, after a while, the opponents treated the government actions insufficient and dramatic; they resumed their own protests (Sharp,2018:1).

The new round of dissatisfactions with Mansour Hadi's action, with Ansar Allah Movement's direction, has led to some serious consequences in the local and regional scene. These protests expanded in 2014; finally, the protesters tookover Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, and captured the presidential palace. Following this event, the president declared his own resignation to the parliament unexpectedly. While his resignation was not accepted by the parliament, the opponents treated this action as a government attempt to decline their demands, and continued their protests (Nejat and et al,2016:140).

The seventh historical era of Yemen is concerned to Mansour Hadi, who escaped to Saudi Arabia, and demanded from the international community and his Arab alliances to intervene in Yemen militarily. As Houthis dominated the northern regions of Yemen and went forward the south of Yemen, the UN Security Council issued the resolution 2216 under the chapter VII of the UN Charter in 14 April, 2015, with support of Saudi Arabia, USA, and Britain. Saudi Arabia started a series of military raids against Yemen, called "Decisive storm", in 25, March, 2015, in coalition with 5 Arab states in the region (Geneva Academy,2017:6).

So far, some actions have been taken several times to end up Yemen War, but they have been aborted through the sabotage of Saudi Arabia and its alliances. The first peace meeting was ended up with no result in Geneva in January, 2016 (www.swissinfo.ch,2016). After several months, the second round of peace negotiations proceeded in Kuwait in May, 2016, which hit the wall, by the sabotage of Saudi coalition (www.ecfr.eu,2016).

The third round of Yemen peace negotiations was started in Stockholm, Sweden, by mediation of Griffiths, the UN special envoy, in December, 2018; the representatives of Yemen National Salvation Government and resigned Government reached a consensus after one week of negotiations about a ceasefire in Al Hodeidah, Al Salif, and Ain Issa Ports (www.independent.co.uk,2018). Under Sweden Agreement, Ansar Allah retreated from Al Hodeidah, Al Salif and Ras Issa Ports in May, 2019; on the other hand, it attacked on Najran, Jizan, and Abha Airports, located in Asir at the south of Saudi Arabia. This attack indicates the application of “airport to airport strategy”. Saudi Arabia and its alliances have blocked not only the airport but also all ways to help millions civilians in Yemen, and Saudi fighters have attacked on Sanaa Airport many times (www.bbc.com, 2019). Thus, the war continues, and our focus point is to find a solution to exit this deadlock.

3. Methodology


In 1993, Fang, et al, presented the graph model for conflicts resolution. The efficiency of this model, which is of the game theory techniques in a non-collaborative mode, is indicated when the actors’ desirability cannot be expressed quantitatively (Fang and et al,1993). The graph model for conflicts analysis has some advantages than the classic models for the game theory as follows:

- ✓ The plays, with more than 2 actors, are demonstrated easily and alternatively.
- ✓ Each actor can choose some of its own alternatives simultaneously.
- ✓ For the real-world problems, the infeasible states are easily distinguished from the feasible states and removed.
- ✓ It is not necessary to determine the actors’ desirability as the numeric values in different states, and it is only enough to express each actor’s preferences sequentially in different states.
- ✓ It considers irreversible movements.

- ✓ It includes non-aggressive preferences.
- ✓ It applies some various solution concepts to determine the individual stability and balance states (Fang and et al,1993).

Thus, the graph model for conflicts resolution presents a methodology for strategic modelling and analyzing conflicts, it is easily practical, and provides the decision-makers with an appportunity to decide what they should do. This model has many applications to analyze the complicated real-world problems and predicts the most likely scenarios for conflict. The following figure shows the process of applying this model for modelling and analyzing the complicated conflicts very well (Kilgour and Hipel,2005).

Figure (1): Modelling and Analysis steps



(Source:Fang and et al,1993)

So this model has two main stages. in modeling step, decision-makers and their actions, feasible states and their preferences will be expressed. In the second step, the analysis of the conflict and the identification of equilibrium points and the prediction of its outcome are explained; finally, suggestions

and recommendations are given to the actors involved in this crisis.

4. Findings

4.1. Decision-Makers and their Actions

Yemen conflict is not only due to the local actors' role playing, but also the regional and transregional actors have played a determinant role in the process of shaping and stimulating the conflict. In the following, we will mention all local and foreign actors playing a role in the conflict, and discuss the regions, being under their control, their goals and coalition.

4-1-1. Domestic Actors

4-1-1-1. Parties

- Al-Islah Party: At first, Al-Islah Party was formed as a branch of Muslim Brotherhood in Yemen, but Saudi Arabia has supported Al-Islah Party against Houthis, despite of its disputes with Muslim, and attempts to organize its own advocators around this Party, so that it is possible to form a Yemeni government with a focus on Al-Islah Party. Ma'rib Province and the oil regions of Yemen are under the control of this party (Holzapfel,2014:8).
- National Congress Party: The members of this party are Ali Abdullah Saleh's advocators. At some point, the Congress Party of Yemen entered in a tactical coalition with Ansar Allah against Saudi Arabia, but it has been derived after Saleh's death, and some tribes, allied with the Party, have tended towards Ansar Allah, and others have gone with United Arab Emirates (Lackner,2016:23).

4-1-1-2. Groups

- Ansar Allah: Ansar Allah of Yemen is the largest coherent popular group, including Yemeni revolutionists and Houthis. The party demands for confronting with Saudi Arabia raids, it is against Yemen separation, and emphasizes on the unity and integrity of Yemen. Ansar Allah has stabilized its political-military power and position in the future equations of Yemen, withstanding and success in a long war against the coalition forces; it is in a superior position, compared with other groups, and the northern regions of Yemen and Sanaa are under its control (Sharqieh,2013:13-14).
- AlQaeda: Undoubtedly, AlQaeda's present position in the Peninsula is far stronger than pre-war period. They could provide themselves with more bases, through territorial achievements. It means that their previous bases were in the middle of mountains, forests, deserts, and tribal regions during pre-war period, while during the war, they could build their bases in some

strategic and urban regions. So, Yemen War was a good opportunity for them to expand their own geographical territories. Their presence is strongly evident in Hadhramout and Abin Jadhur Provinces (Alistair,2010:6). While Saudi Arabia supported Abdullatif Al-Sayed, the issue of its cooperation with AlQaeda forces in Yemen was introduced. Although it was denied by the commander of coalition forces, some documents were published on the cooperatin of coalition forces with AlQaeda. The documentation indicated that Riyadh has been linked to the Peninsula AlQaeda in two ways. On one hand, many regions, controlled by AlQaeda, have been evacuated, making massive financial payments to AlQaeda's commanders; on the other hand, many AlQaeda members have been employed as mercenaries by the coalition forces to fight with Houthis against receiving some money (Shayea,2010:76).

- Southern separatists or Al-Hirak: It is a popular movement in South Yemen, its biggest target is separating South Yemen from North Yemen, and it is allied with UAE (Philips,2010:5).
- The advocators of resigned Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi Government: Aden is under their control, and they are confident on military and economic support of Saudi Arabia and the powers supporting it (Nejat, *et al*, 2016: 161).

4-1-2. Foreign Actors

4-1-2-1. Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia attack on Yemen, in a coalition form, is a multidimensional issue, for which there is not only one specific reason. Yemen is important for Saudis, in some senses, as follows:

- Ideological reason: The most major reason for Saudi coalition's aggression to Yemen in March, 2015, is to push back Houthis out of Sanaa and return Mansour Hadi. Houthis, capturing Sanaa, the Capital of Yemen, since 2014, are the most major force and actor in Yemen developments. Al Saud believes that Iran makes Houthi warriors equipped and armed to increase its regional influence and put Saudi Arabia and other regional states under the pressure; despite of regional and international warnings, Iran still continues to give advice, training, financial and armed aids to Ansar Allah, and support it. (Nonnemm Hill,2011:10)
- In addition to, some Saudi Shiites reside in the southern provinces, neighbouring Yemen, as Jizan Province, and Jeddah, Asir, Yanbu and Najran cities, and are close to the Houthis of Yemen; under their influence, Saudi Shiite provocations may be intensified, and its local security may be

in danger. As to, in 2011, Saud al-Faisal declared that “the issue of Yemen is not for the foreign policy, but it is an issue of national security.” (Hafeznia and et al,2013:17).

- Geopolitical reason: Yemen has become significant, due to its dominance on Bab-el-Mandeb strait. It can be said that 5-6 percent of the world oil, that is, about 4 million tons of oil is transmitted towards Suez Canal and from there, it is transmitted to the other points of the world. Thus, Iranian presence and influence, even in the least form, means Iranian dominance on Bab-el-Mandeb strait, and maneuver power in Red Sea for the Islamic Republic of Iran. In no way, this case cannot be accepted by Saudis. First, this issue will make Iran in the regional and even world relations. Second, Iranian presence in Red Sea will put Saudi Arabia under the pressure. Saudis export a part of their own oil, its exports is vital for them, through Strait of Hormuz, fully dominated by Iran, and carry another part of it to the west of Saudi Arabia through a pipeline and export it through Red Sea. Thus, Saudis’ dependency on Strait of Hormuz will be decreased. Also, a significant part of Saudi exports to Europe passes Strait of Hormuz, then goes through Bab-el-Mandeb strait and Red Sea. Consequently, Saudis treat Iranian presence in the region as a direct security threat (Shay,2018:1).
- Strategic reason: Saudi Arabia regards Yemen as its own backyard, and treats the presence of other states in Yemen as a potential threat for itself. In fact, Saudi Arabia is strongly concerned about Iranian regional influence, specially among Shiites, and attempts to decrease Iranian role and influence. During past years, Saudi has been concerned about the spread of Iranian influence, in the framework of Iranian competition for regional superiority, and attempted to restrain its influence; therefore; Ansar Allah power in Yemen makes Saudi Arabia strongly feel to be in danger. For this reason, Saudi Arabia has resorted to fighting to remove Houthis and weaken Iranian regional influence, or confront with it (Mudallali,2014).
- Since Houthis are affected by the Islamic Revolution of Iran intellectually and ideologically, their power in Yemen made Saudi deeply concerned about shifting regional power balance in favor of Iran. For Saudi Arabia, Houthis are Iranian proxies in Yemen. For this reason, Saudi attempted to manage Yemen developments, financially supporting the close tribes and movements (Al-Islah parth and AlQaeda), and also diplomatic efforts and direct military intervention. Totally, Saudi Arabia has attempted to remove

Ansar Allah movement from the political power, creating a coalition and military invasion to Yemen, and decrease Iranian influence in Yemen, setting some aligned movements in the structure of power (Cordesman, 2015:4-5).

As to, Saudi Arabia attempted to increase the efforts for ending Yemen crisis and going out of the war decently, entering other regional and transregional actors, and reinforcing its own stance. Achieving this goal, Saudi Arabia attempts to show off its own fight in Yemen as a part of a spread competition with Iran in the region, and stimulate the international sensitivity, magnifying Iranian role in Yemen. Converting Yemen War to a war against what Saudi Arabia calls Iranian “developmentalism and destabilizing policies”, Saudi will be able to attract much support of USA and Israel, make other international effective actors sensitive against Yemen crisis, and put Tehran under much pressure, introducing Iran as the cause for prolonging Yemen crisis and making the international navigation unsafe (Sharp,2018:9).

Saudi Arabia made the UN Security Council focus on Yemen crisis, attempting to prove that Yemenis rockets belong to Iran, emphasizing on the threat of energy instability (considering UAV raid on Aramco’s oil facilities, and also rocket raid on two Saudi tankers), and stimulating the sensitivity of oil importing countries. In this regard, stopping oil transmission through Bab-el-Mandeb strait by Saudi Arabia for several days is significant; the point is that 4.8 million oil barrels are passing through Bab-el-Mandeb strait to be supplied in European market. European severe dependency on Persian Gulf oil will be a cause for Europe’s concern, and probably increasing the pressure on Iran for Yemen issue (Yeranian,2018).

Thus, Saudi government believed that military operations for suppressing Houthis and returning “Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi” to the power would be achieved in a short time. However, the complexities of Yemen War, the fluid nature of alliances and coalitions, Houthis opposition, Saudi operational weak points, specially in ground combats, and the disputes between the two major members of the coalition (UAE and Saudi Arabia) not only led to a prolonged war, but Yemen has become a swamp for Saudi Arabia, where Saudis don’t have a clear strategy to go out of it.

While Riyadh insists on its stance on Mansour Hadi’s returning, it seems that Saudi is not so hopeful for it. On the other hand, despite of Houthis’

weak field position in Yemen, their martial capability has so increased that has followed by some worries. As some examples, we can mention Houthis' rocket raids on Saudi Arabia, UAV raid on Aramco's oil facilities, and two tankers of this company in Bab-el-Mandeb strait, led to stopping Saudi's oil transmission through this strategic pathway for some days.

Considering the mentioned cases, it seems that Riyadh's willing for a political solution to go out of Yemen War has increased. It is obvious that the field state and the balance of power among the forces, being effective in Yemen, will determine the process of peace negotiations.

4-1-2-2. United Arab Emirates

This state is a key partner for Saudi Arabia in the coalition, and its forces are active in the south of Yemen. The ideal state for UAE is that Yemen is separated into two parts, North Yemen and South Yemen, or is governed by a federation; in this case, there is a disagreement with Saudi Arabia. In addition to, UAE and Saudi Arabia have struggled with each other in the south of Yemen several times; even Almashiq Palace in Aden, supported by Riyadh, was surrounded by the forces, supported by UAE. However, this state is hopeful to exploit the economic advantages and investment opportunities in the post-war Yemen, influencing the southern regions of Yemen, stable and long-term controlling over Aden, and dominating the islands of Yemen, specially Socotra Island in the mouth of the Gulf of Aden (Sharp,2018:2).

4-1-2-3. USA

Although USA has not entered in Yemen crisis directly, it has played a significant indirect role in politically supporting Saudi Arabia, and selling the armaments to this state. In fact, the most significant interest for USA in Yemen can be interpreted as "reinforcing regional aligned actors means to reinforce USA's position in the region; powerful opponent actors means the loss of USA political and economic interests." Supporting Saudi Arabia was started, under Obama's command, based on "logistic and intelligence supporting the military operations of the members of Cooperation Council"; Obama government declared that the head for a common planning with Saudi Arabia to be established; this policy also continued in Trump period. (Barzegar and et al,2018:137).

4-1-2-4. Iran

Iran's stance against Yemen is a general stance as against all other states; Iran supports all popular revolutions, and strongly demands for the integrity of Yemen and ending up the war of Saudi coalition. As the crisis was started, Iran established its own strategies with focus on the principle of respect for Yemenis' vote, denouncing and condemning any foreign intervention, adopting the self-control policy to diminish the tensions and prevent from a regional competition field in Yemen. Iranian most strategies are:

1. Submitting a four-point plan, after Saudi Arabia raid against Yemen, including the following clauses:
 - a- Establishing a ceasefire and stopping foreign military raids as soon as possible;
 - b- Dispatching humanitarian aids for Yemenis quickly, and uninterruptedly;
 - c- Resuming the national discourses of Yemen, with the collaboration of all Yemeni political parties and social groups; and
 - d- Establishing the inclusive national unity government of Yemen (www.worldbulletin.net,2015).
2. Evident military non-intervention in Yemen
3. Political and advisory support from Ansar Allah

4-1-3. Mediating Actors

4-1-3-1. The UN Security Council

Considering its own role to keep the international peace and security, the Security Council attempts to play a role for crises management, but the extent of the Council intervention is different, based on the crises spread, the diversity of the involved actors, and the great powers' interests, specially the permanent members of the Security Council.

To keep the international peace and security, the Security Council takes action according to the chapters VI and VII of the Charter; in chapter VI, as a mediator for resolving the international disputes, and in chapter VII, as a peace implementor in the cases of threatening and violating the peace.

Chapter VI, including the articles 33-38, implies the non-military efforts of the Security Council for crisis management. In the article 33 of the Charter, it is proposed to the disputed parties to resolve their own disputes through negotiations, mediation, compromising, arbitration, jurisdiction, and appealing to the regional organization, or arrangements, or other peaceful devices, based on their selection.

Under chapter VII, the Security Council can take the following actions:

- Sanction measures: According to the article no. 41 of the Charter, sanction measures, made by the Security Council against the states to establish the peace and security, are too widespread. The Security Council's sanction measures include stopping all or a part of the economic relations, air, sea, mailing, telegraph, radio communications and other communication devices, and disconnecting political relations.
- Military actions: If the Security Council decides that the sanction measures predicted in the article no. 41 of the Charter has not been sufficient, according to the article no. 42 of the Charter, it can take actions, required for the international peace and security keeping and recovery, by the air force, navy, or army (www.un.org).

Also, the Security Council is a righteous authority to permit the UN peacekeeping operations. There are some various types of peacekeeping operations adopted in different crises by the UN, such as preventive establishment in Macedonia, traditional peacekeeping, including monitoring a ceasefire, controlling the buffer zone, and ... in Kuwait and Iraq crisis, implementing the agreements in El Salvador, Cambodia, Angola, and Mozambique, supporting humanitarian aids delivery in Bosnia and Herzegovina, rebuilding a bankrupt government in Congo, implementing a ceasefire in Bosnia, and peace implementation in Korea and Kuwait crisis (Sajjadpour and AghaMohammadi,2015:164-165).

Considering what was said about the Security Council's authorities, the Council has so far appointed three special envoys to resolve Yemen crisis. Jamal Bin Omar, a Moroccan diplomat, was missioned to propose a solution to end up Yemen conflicts, through negotiating with the involved parties. This was Jamal Bin Omar's quotation, the first UN special envoy for Yemen resolution, "Yemeni political groups were on the verge of agreement when Saudi raids prohibited the negotiations to be continued"; then he resigned (www.aljazeera.com,2015).

When Jamal Bin Omar resigned, Ban Ki Moon, former UN Secretary General, appointed Ismail Wald Al-Sheikh, a Muritanian diplomat, as UN representative for Yemen affairs. He was dismissed due to Houthis protests against him advocating Saudi Arabia, and Ban Ki Moon appointed "Moein Sharim", his deputy, a Palestinian diplomat, to proceed (reliefweb.int).

As Wald Al-Sheikh's mission was ended, "Antonio Guterres", UN Secretary General, introduced Martin Griffiths, a British diplomat, as new envoy to Yemen. He is one of the theorists for international relations, who established Center for Humanitarian Dialogue in Geneva, and was missioned to propose a solution to end up Yemen conflicts. In his first statement about his plan for going out of Yemen crisis, and before the current developments of Alhodeidah, he declared that stopping the war and all-out peace fulfillment in Yemen are his most significant preferences (www.un.org).

In addition to dispatching a special envoy, the Security Council has issued the Resolutions 2251, 2140, 2201, 2204, and 2216, and emphasized on disarming Ansar Allah, making Ansar Allah go out of the capital and governmental institutions, financial and military sanctions, and facilitating the establishment of National Unity Government (Sharp,2018: 8).

4-1-3-2. Kuwait

This state has attempted several times to play a mediating role in Yemen crisis. As its first effort, Kuwait was the host for the negotiations made between the resigned government of Yemen and Ansar Allah in April, 2016, which was aborted. From Kuwait's viewpoint, its success in this way will increase the stability, while its regional role will also be highlighted (Holzapfel,2014:6).

4-1-3-3. Oman

Oman was one of the alternatives for mediating in Yemen conflict. This state has started a serious effort to create a discourse among the involved parties. In this regard, "Martin Griffiths", the UN representative in Yemen conflict, travelled to Muscat to talk with the parties involved in Yemen (Lackner,2016:62)


As it has been drawn in the following table, since the local actors of the conflict are in coalition with the foreign actors, three main actors, with two actions, can be considered for Yemen conflict:

1. Ansar Allah with two actions: war continuation, ceasefire and negotiations;
2. Saudi Arabia with two actions: war continuation, ceasefire and negotiations; and
3. The UN Security Council with two actions: issuing resolution, peacefully resolving the conflict between the parties.

Table(1): Actors in Yemen Conflict

| | | | | | | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|---------|--------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|
| Foreign Actors | USA | | | | United Arab Emirates | Iran |
| | Saudi Arabia | | | | | |
| Local Actors | Al-Islah Party | National Congress Party | AlQaeda | The advocators of Mansour Hadi | Southern separatists | Ansar Alla |
| Mediating Actors | The UN Security Council | | | | Kuwait | Oman |

Figure (2): The map for the regions influenced by Yemen groups and Saudi Arabia



(Source: www.amnonfreepress.com,2020)

4-2. Feasible States

Each actor’s strategy is one option among all feasible actions of that actor. The actors for this conflict have totally 6 potential actions, which they may or may not choose them in their own strategy; thus, the number of combinations for the game is 2^6 or 64 states. Many combinations of the options cannot be happened actually and must be removed. Infeasible states are affected by the limitations which must be applied on the game as follows:

- At least one: This limitation expresses that the actor must choose at least one of the feasible actions. For example, in our model, Saudi Arabia or Ansar Allah must choose either of two options for war, or ceasefire and negotiations.
- Pairwise incompatible options: The combinations, in which the options cannot be put together, or are not happened simultaneously. For example, it is not possible for Saudi Arabia to choose fighting and accept a ceasefire and negotiations simultaneously (Hipel and et al,1997).

As it is shown in the table (2), in GMCRplus+, the number of feasible states is decreased to 12, applying the limitations and removing infeasible combinations. Each state or column of the table is a feasible scenario for this conflict. For example, state no. 7 indicates the conditions, in which Saudi Arabia, Ansar Allah, and the Security Council will choose fighting, negotiations and peaceful resolution, respectively.

Table (2): Feasible State of the Conflict

| DM | | Option | | | | | | | | Feasible State | | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|--------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|----------------|----|----|----|
| Saudi Arabia | war | Y | N | Y | N | Y | N | Y | N | Y | N | Y | N |
| | negotiation | N | Y | N | Y | N | Y | N | Y | N | Y | N | Y |
| Ansar Allah | war | Y | Y | N | N | Y | Y | N | N | Y | Y | N | N |
| | negotiation | N | N | Y | Y | N | N | Y | Y | N | N | Y | Y |
| UNSC | resolution | Y | Y | Y | Y | N | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| | Peaceful settlement | N | N | N | N | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| State Labels | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 |

4-3. Decision-Makers Preferences

Saudi crown prince, Muhammed Bin Salman, has followed several goals to enter Yemen War and continue it: Firstly, stabilizaing its local power, reinforcing its national personality, and contriving for his own kingdom; secondly, reinforcing Saudi’s position as a regional power for the great powers; thirdly, restraining Iran’s role in Yemen, and introducing Saudi as the main force restraining Iran’s regional role. At the beginning of military raid against Yemen, Saudi Arabia has put Yemen in an economic and arms siege, through the intelligence-military aids of USA, Britain, France, and other its regional alliances, but it has failed to achieve its own major goal, i.e., full control over Yemen.

Salman Bin Abdulaziz, Saudi king, spoke about Riyadh's local and foreign policies in the opening ceremony for the seventh period of Saudi Assembly Council, discussed about the issues of Yemen, Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Iran, and declared that the state will welcome the UN efforts to end Yemen War. Thus, at the present, Saudi Arabia prefers to proceed with a ceasefire and negotiations for three reasons:

1. When Khashoggi was killed, a paradox was generated in the equation of relations among Muhammed Bin Salman and the western states. Undoubtedly, the west is willing to keep its close relations with Saudi Arabia as an oil and financial power to secure its interests, but the murder of an international critic journalist by Saudi officials is an issue that compelled the western leaders to backlash (Jafari Valdani and Jafari,2019:63). Under media pressure, Trump declared that he will not pass this issue simply and will listen to the Congress decisions. On this basis, he prohibited his treasury secretary to travel to Saudi Arabia. The managers of big multinational corporations, investing in Saudi Arabia, have also committed to cancel their trip for "Davos in the desert" Conference, Bin Salman's main brand for introducing Saudi ambitious plan 2020. Secretary of Defence, James Mattis, and Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, also demanded for holding the peace negotiations in Yemen. Also, French, British and German leaders condemned this action severely, in a common declaration, and stopped selling the armaments to this state (Hannah,2018).
2. Based on the UN report 2018, Yemen is facing with the greatest world human crisis, and UNICEF, WHO and FAO also provide the UN with some statistics for women and children slaughter, famine, hunger and cholera outbreak, and demand for ending the crisis.
3. In 2018, Saudi Arabia was located at fourth position in the world, in sense of military spendings. According to some sources, it was the greatest armaments importer in the world in 2014 and 2015 (SIPRI Fact Sheet, May 2018). Based on the report of the American website, Insider Business, Saudi Arabia has purchased any required armaments, from F-15 fighters and Eurofighter to Abrams tanks, Apache helicopters, and modern destroyers from American, British and French companies, and in a military sense, has become one of the most equipped states in the world. But, despite of all modern armaments, it has not been able to win Yemen War yet. Based on the report, Saudi army has two big problems. First, it is too large so that the

quality issues and organizational discipline cannot be implemented in it. Second, its arsenal is not suitable for asymmetric or proxy warfares. The experience of Yemen War has shown that Saudis will have a very difficult task to be the winner in this state. Inside Yemen, they are facing with the forces, which are well acquainted with proxy warfares, unlike Saudi military; for this reason, Saudi Arabia has not been able to settle many troops in this state yet. Military experts believe that if Saudi Arabia will not enter Yemen War by land, it cannot win the war, only relying on air attacks. Also, Saudi army has not even trained for widespread ground operations, apart from the lack of the practical experience; so, there are some worries among Saudi officials that the presence in Yemen may not be in their favor and may increase their casualties (www.businessinsider.com).

It should be said that the war continuation is not in favor of Ansar Allah, and it is willing to establish a ceasefire and negotiate, for three reasons:

1. It is difficult for Ansar Allah to create a political consensus in Yemen to confront with Saudi Arabia.
2. The continuation of Yemen current process depends on the local financial resources and foreign aids for Ansar Allah. Yemen is a poor state, where 70 percent of its economy depends on selling 160 thousand barrels of oil per day. These oil resources are located in Ma'rib Province, where Al-Islah Party has gotten the control of it, with the cooperation of some tribes supported by Saudi Arabia. Thus, Ansar Allah suffers from the severe lack of the local financial resources. In sense of foreign aids, Saudi Arabia has made the greatest contribution to Yemen economy, which now has cut off these financial aids, due to an identity conflict with Ansar Allah.
3. A human tragedy in Yemen, with about 14,000 casualties (6,000 women and children). Hunger, famine, and the malnourishment of over 3 millions Yemeni children have developed some difficult conditions for Yemenis that make them disappointed and distrusted against this movement, and leads to discontent with Ansar Allah. Thus, in this period, Ansar Allah prefers to establish a ceasefire and start negotiations than war continuation (www.aljazeera.com,2018).

Considering its own performance in Yemen conflict, The UN Security Council has so far attempted to resolve it peacefully.

Table (3) indicates the order of states for each of decision-makers, according to their preferences. The states in the left are most preferred, and the states

in the right of the table are least preferred. For example, for Saudi Arabia, states 8 and 2 have the highest and lowest priority, respectively.

Table (3): Decision makers’ preferences over feasible states

| Decision Maker | Most Preferred | | | | | | Least Preferred | | | | | |
|----------------|----------------|----|----|---|----|----|-----------------|---|---|---|----|---|
| | Saudi Arabia | 4 | 12 | 8 | 7 | 11 | 3 | 9 | 5 | 1 | 10 | 6 |
| Ansar Allah | 8 | 12 | 4 | 6 | 10 | 2 | 5 | 9 | 1 | 7 | 11 | 3 |
| UNSC | 8 | 4 | 12 | 7 | 11 | 6 | 10 | 9 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 1 |

4. Analysis

4-1. Stability Analysis

A stable state is one, from which the actor is not willing to exit. If all actors are in a stable state, it is called a equilibrium state. Stable states are achieved by some various solution concepts as follows:

- Nash stability: it is the most common definition for stability, used in the non-collaborative game theory, and was firstly introduced by John F. Nash in 1950s. In this equilibrium state, each actor sees only one step forward, and adopts the best feasible strategy in its own interests, regardless of the other actors (Nash,1951:286).
- General metarationality: This approach was introduced by Howard in 1970s. In this approach, besides investigating his own unilateral improvement states, the actor takes into account his rival, and he decides to change the state only if his rival cannot move him into a worse state after. So, the actor sees two steps forward (Howard,1971:53).
- Symmetric metarationality: Here, it is assumed that the actor can have another movement after his rivals’ responses, and in case of a better state, he decides to move; that is, the actor sees three steps. This approach was introduced by Howard in 1970s (Howard,1971:53).
- Sequential stability: It was introduced by Fraser and Hipel in 1980s. In this approach, at the time of state changing, the actor not only considers his own unilateral improvement, but also regards his rival as an intelligent actor. In this case, the actor decides to move when his rival cannot block him (Fraser and Hipel,1984:7).

Table (4) indicates the balance states of the game, according to some different rationality, and using the software of “GMCRplus+”. Since all decision-makers in the conflict prefer state 8 to states 9, 6, and 7, so, we predict state 8 as the most probable consequence for this conflict. In state 8,

Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah will accept ceasefire and negotiate; the UN Security Council will also help them resolve the crisis.

Table (4): Equilibria

| Player | Option | States | | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|--------|---|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | war | N | Y | N | Y |
| | negotiation | Y | N | Y | N |
| Ansar Allah | war | Y | N | N | Y |
| | negotiation | N | Y | Y | N |
| UNSC | resolution | N | N | N | Y |
| | Peaceful settlement | Y | Y | Y | Y |
| State Labels | | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

4-2. Sensivity Analysis

In Sensivity analysis, we are not sure about the decision-makers, their actions and preferences; therefore, in this section, we will change the decision-makers' preferences to measure their effect on the balance state.

Sensivity analysis 1: Since we are not sure about Saudi Arabia preferences, we assumed that Saudi Arabia will give the priority to the war than negotiations to measure its effect on the equilibrium state. Thus, we gave the priority to the states of 1, 3, 9, 11, 5, and 7, in which Saudi Arabia will choose a fighting option; we decided that if the opposite party's strategy is fixed even by changing Saudi Arabia preferences, the equilibrium state is fixed, and the states of 9, 8, 7, 6 will remain as the equilibrium states of the conflict.

Table (5): Revised preference Ranking for Saudi Arabia

| Decision Maker | Most Preferred | | | | | Least Preferred | | | | | | |
|---------------------|----------------|---|----|---|---|-----------------|----|---|---|----|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | 7 | 5 | 11 | 9 | 3 | 1 | 12 | 8 | 4 | 10 | 6 | 2 |

Sensivity analysis 2: Since we are not sure about Ansar Allah preferences, so we preferred the war than negotiations to measure its effect on the equilibrium state. Thus, we gave priority to the states 1, 2, 9, 10, and 6, in which Ansar Allah selects the war option, and decided that if the opposite party's strategy is fixed even in case of changing Ansar Allah preferences, the equilibrium state will not change; the states 6, 7, 8, and 9 remained as the equilibrium state for the conflict.

Table (6): Revised preference Ranking for Ansar Allah

| Decision Maker | Most Preferred | | | | | | Least Preferred | | | | | |
|----------------|----------------|---|----|---|---|---|-----------------|---|---|----|---|---|
| Ansar Allah | 6 | 5 | 10 | 9 | 2 | 1 | 12 | 8 | 4 | 11 | 7 | 3 |

Sensitivity analysis 3: To investigate the role of the UN Security Council in this conflict, we considered the Security Council impartial; namely, an organization that only take action for issuing resolutions and sanctions. Under these circumstances, the states 1, 2, 3, and 4 were resulted as some new equilibrium states. New equilibrium states don't provide any peaceful solution for the conflict. So, it shows that the UN Security Council plays an important role to resolve the conflict.

Table (7): Revised preference Ranking for UNSC

| Decision Maker | Most Preferred | | | | | | Least Preferred | | | | | |
|----------------|----------------|---|---|---|----|---|-----------------|----|---|---|---|---|
| UNSC | 4 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 12 | 9 | 11 | 10 | 8 | 5 | 7 | 6 |

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

In the paper, the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in the Middle East has been modeled, using game theory and based on the graph model for conflicts analysis. Two main actors in this conflict are Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah, and UN Security Council also plays a mediation role. On one hand, the optimal state for Saudi Arabia is to reach a field achievement, that is, to capture the Port of Hodeidah and Sana to be superior in the negotiations. On the other hand, Ansar Allah stipulates any negotiation for stopping Riyadh attacks. Ansar Allah is well aware that it can claim for a power share in Yemen future only by protecting Sana'a. Therefore, achieving Sana'a and the Port of Alhodeidah is a keystone to settle the crisis and issue of Yemen war, where each side attempts to achieve this target in any way, and keep its superiority in compromise negotiations and post-war Yemen, capturing the strategic regions.

Concerning the results of this model, it is predicted that Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah will accept ceasefire and negotiate, and the UN Security Council will also help them resolve the conflict. Three other equilibrium states also indicate that the war may continue, and the Security Council is the only institution that can alleviate the tensions among the war parties. Thus, the Security Council must play a more active role to resolve the

conflict, considering its own power. In December, 21, 2018, over more than 3 years of war in the state, a ceasefire agreement, so fragile one, was concluded among the involved parties to take a step towards the peace negotiations, where the role of UN is important to supervise and implement the agreement. So, it is recommended that as the UN could end up the Cambodian and Somalian conflicts through the peacekeeping missions, it can also deploy the peacekeeping forces in Yemen to have a more active role in supervising and implementing the ceasefire, and finally, the peace. The Security Council should ask the peacekeeping forces to guarantee the humanitarian aids transmission and protect the civilians, creating some safe regions.

There are various cases where the UN cannot take effective actions, because the role and action of the UN Security Council has been directly dependent on the role and action of the great powers, specially the five permanent members of the Security Council. Based on the Council permanent members' standpoints regarding the missions for peace protection, in some cases where these five members have been convergent and supported the UN unanimously, the role of UN has increased to solve the conflicts. But where there are some disagreements among the governments and they cannot find any agreement and consensus, not only they will support the UN, but also they will hinder its activity, using their own leverages.

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