تنهایی استراتژیک تاریخی ایران و سیاست خارجی غیردولتی: از نفرین جغرافیا تا مخمصه ژئوپلیتیکی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده

استادیار گروه روابط بین الملل، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.

چکیده

نوشته پیش‌رو به دنبال ریشه‌های سیاست خارجی غیردولتی ایران با کاوش جغرافیا و تاریخ ویژه این کشور است. "چه عواملی و با چه سازوکاری برسازنده سیاست خارجی غیردولتی ایران است؟" این پرسش بنیادین و محوری نوشته پیش‌روست که خوانشی تحلیلی از ژرفا و دامنه پیوندهای استراتژیک ایران با گروه‌های غیردولتی در منطقه را نمایان می‌سازد. برای روشن ساختن این استراتژی ژئوپلیتیکی‌، نوشته با برجسته ساختن نفرین جغرافیایی و ناامنی تاریخی پیوسته ایران به تشریح مفهوم بنیادی "تنهایی استراتژیک تاریخی ایران" می‌پردازد. از این دریچه، نوشته به پیوند دیرین تنهایی استراتژیک تاریخی با ژئوپلیتیک  ایران اشاره دارد. در ادامه، تأثیر پیوسته چنین تنهایی استراتژیک تاریخی را بر سیاست خارجی غیردولتی برای مهار دشمنان منطقه‌ای ایران نشان می‌دهد. سرانجام، نوشته استدلال می‌کند که گرچه سیاست خارجی غیردولتی باعث حفظ یکپارچگی و امنیت ملی ایران شده است، اما کشور را در یک "مخمصه ژئوپلیتیکی" مداوم به دام انداخته است.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Iran's Strategic Loneliness and Non-State Foreign Policy: From Curse of Geography to Geopolitical Predicament

نویسنده [English]

  • Arash Reisinezhad
Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
چکیده [English]

Extended Abstract     
Introduction
While much ink has been spilled to Iran's regional policy, the majority of these analyses, either intuitively or deliberately, build their explanation on the so-called ‘Persian-Shia offensive intentions’. Conversely, the present paper seeks the roots of Iran's regional policy in its specific geography and history. From this perspective, Iran’s regional policy is inseparable from its geopolitical strategies. To shed light on these strategies, the paper begins with the rise of the Persian Achaemenid until the establishment of the Islamic Republic, focusing on major driving forces behind Iran’s regional policy and strategies. The paper elaborates on a foundational concept of ‘strategic loneliness’, as Iran’s permanent feature, by highlighting the country’s curse of geography and its long- standing historical insecurity. In following, it shows the consequential impact of Iran’s strategic loneliness for the country’s non-state foreign policymaking strategic connections with military non-state actors—in the containment of its regional enemies. The paper ultimately argues that while this policy has kept Iran’s national integrity and security while entrapped the country in a durable ‘geopolitical predicament’ and deepened regional crisis in the Middle East.
 
Methodology
The present paper engages intimately with Iran’s connections with its proxies through adopting an ‘analytical process-tracing narrative.’ The strength of this narrative lies in its potential to generate a conceptual framework organically and incrementally along the unifying theme. As Alexander George and Andrew Bennett argue, analytical process-tracing is a tool in extrapolating a case study’s “explanation into a generalization.” Process tracing will allow me to capture the dynamics of change and the causal mechanisms behind these changes within the evolution of the subject under study. Put differently, in the analytical process-tracing an otherwise atheoretical narrative presented “in the form of a chronicle that purports to throw light on how an event came about” is embedded into “an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical terms.”
 
Result and Discussion
Iran’s specific geography and historical insecurity are integral elements and dimensions of regional policy and strategy. In addition to its geostrategic location and geographical proximity to the threat sources, Iran’s geographical vulnerability and its lack of natural defense impediments have shaped the country’s fate of territorial occupation and military encirclement for more than twenty-five centuries. This fact has nourished and galvanized Iran’s historical insecurity. The final product is Iran’s strategic loneliness. For a country with a deep sense of greatness, Iran’s strategic loneliness pushes the country to take a dynamic geopolitical strategy—namely, non-state foreign policy—to preserve its national security and territorial integrity. Indeed, the very logic of geography and history reveals the fact that Iran’s ultimate deterrence capabilities have been mainly predicated on its ability for the external power projection (Reisinezhad, 2016). Nonetheless, the lack of regional collective security institutions and pact(s) has trembled the credibility of this geopolitical strategy. Although Iran’s non-state foreign policy has been partially effective in keeping the country’s security safe, it has weakened Iran’s financial sources and, more significantly, entrapped the country in a durable offensive-defensive complex. It is Iran’s durable geopolitical predicament. Iran’s specific geography and history have crucially shaped its geopolitical strategy. However, it should be important to disentangle the argument from geographical and historical ‘determinism’. At first glance, putting emphasis on these two factors opens door for fatalism while ignores human agency. Geography and history by no means determine state’s approaches to use military force and regional strategies. In reality, human agency matters since it is men who decide and take action. There are still historical instances wherein men overcame the dictates of geography and unchained historical patterns. Nevertheless, “in the long run, those who are working in harmony with environmental influences will triumph over those who strive against them” (Parker and Mackinder, 1982: 121). Indeed, geography and historical trends limit human choices by constraining or instigating states’ actions. To be more precise, geography and history provides a framework within which geopolitical strategy is formulated and implemented. They set contours on which trajectory and path is achievable and which is not. As Robert D. Kaplan cogently argues, “the more we remain preoccupied with Iran’s specific geography and history have crucially shaped its geopolitical strategy. However, it should be important to disentangle the argument from geographical and historical ‘determinism’. At first glance, putting emphasis on these two factors opens door for fatalism while ignores human agency. Geography and history by no means determine state’s approaches to use military force and regional strategies. In reality, human agency matters since it is men who decide and take action. There are still historical instances wherein men overcame the dictates of geography and unchained historical patterns. Nevertheless, “in the long run, those who are working in harmony with environmental influences will triumph over those who strive against them” (Parker and Mackinder, 1982: 121). Indeed, geography and historical trends limit human choices by constraining or instigating states’ actions. To be more precise, geography and history provides a framework within which geopolitical strategy is formulated and implemented. They set contours on which trajectory and path is achievable and which is not. As Robert D. Kaplan cogently argues, “the more we remain preoccupied with current events, the more that individuals and their choices matter; but the more we look out over the span of the centuries, the more that geography plays a role (Kaplan, 2012: 28). Therefore, a balance between geography and history, on the one side, and the decisions and actions of men, on the other side, matter for a deeper analysis of Iran’s regional policy. In short, geography and history imprison Iranian leaders and delimit, rather than determine, their choices and opportunities for regional maneuver. The ideas emerge and vanish, the leaders are born and then die; but what remains durably is Iran’s geography and history!
 
Conclusion
For more than half century, Iran’s connections with its proxies have been the country’s pivotal geopolitical strategy crafted to contain regional and global threats. In contrast to the mainstream view, this strategy is rooted less in Iran’s revolutionary ideology rather than its specific geography and history. The paper shows that Iran’s strategic loneliness is a very historical product of its specific geography and history. It also argued how Iran’s geopolitical strategy has intensified its geopolitical predicament and entrapped the country in the offensive-defensive complex. Within this situation, regional cooperation in several domains, particularly the conflict resolution processes, is vital and necessary for Iran’s regional policy. The establishment of a path-dependent bilateral or multilateral security institution(s) with regional states would be crucial for the stability of the Middle East. As the regional tensions spiraling out of control, building comprehensive collective security with tripartite power centers of Tehran-Ankara-Riyadh would deescalate geopolitical competition in the Middle East.
While it is a major driving force for the country’s power projection beyond its borders, strategic loneliness sets Iran’s center of gravity within its internal territory. Relying on the inside shows that Iran’s center of gravity has predicated on ‘state-society relation’; rather than on strategic alliance with whether the Great Powers or non-state actors. In other words, Iran’s strategic loneliness shows intrinsic and independent foundations of Iran’s national security. Within this context, popular support and legitimacy are the most crucial and vital assets for a country whose borders have been historically bloody frontier zone. It was this very fact ignored by the last Shah of Iran.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Geopolitical Strategy
  • Strategic Loneliness
  • Historical Insecurity
  • Non-State Foreign Policy
  • Geopolitical Predicament
  1. Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin, Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic,Oxford University Press, November 9, (2010).
  2. Alagha, J;(2011). Hezbullah’s Documents: From the 1985, Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto, Amsterdam University Press, April 15, (2011).
  3. Alam, A (1993). Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. I: 1347–1348/1968–1969 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1993).[In Persian]
  4. Alam, A (1995). Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. II: 1349–1351/1971–1972 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995). [In Persian]
  5. Alam, A (1995). Yad’dashtha-ye Alam: Virayesh va Muqaddamah az Alinaqi Alikhani [The Alam Diaries: Edited by Alinaqi Alikhani], Vol. III: 1352/1973 (Bethesda, MD: Iranbook, 1995). [In Persian]
  6. Al-Balādhurī. F.Al.B (1916). The Origins of the Islamic State: Translation with Annotations Geographic and Historic Notes of the Kitāb Futūḥ al-Buldān of al-Imâm abu-l'Abbâs Aḥmad ibn-Jâbir al-Balâdhuri. 1. Translated by Philip Khuri Hitti. New York: Columbia University Press. [In Persian]
  7. Axworthy, M (2010). Sword of Persia: Nader Shah, from Tribal Warrior to Conquering Tyrant, I.B. Tauris; 1 edition, 2010.
  8. Azani, E (2009). Hezbollah: The Story of the Party of God, from Revolution to Institutionalization, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
  9. Becker, S (2012). ‘The ‘great game’: The history of an evocative phrase.’ Asian Affairs 43.1, pp61-80.
  10. Beeman, W (2008). The Great Satan vs. the Mad Mullahs (University of Chicago Press, April 15.
  11. Bill, J (1089). The Eagle and Lion (Yale University Press, Reprint edition, September 10.
  12. Briant, P(2002). From Cyrus to Alexander, Eisenbrauns.
  13. Buzan, B; Waver, O (2003). Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press, 4 Dec.
  14. Canepa, M.P (2010). The Two Eyes of the Earth: Art and Ritual of Kingship between Rome and Sasanian Iran, University of California Press. 1 edition.
  15. Clausewitz, C.V(2008). On War, translated by Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press; Reprint edition.
  16. Dale, S.F (2010). The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals. Cambridge University Press; 1 edition.
  17. Dandamaev, M; Abdulkadyrovic (1989). A Political History of The Achaemenid Empire (translated by Willem Vogelsang).
  18. Dandamaev, M; Abdulkadyrovic (1992). Iranians in Achaemenid Babylonia. Mazda Publishers in association with Bibliotheca Persica.
  19. Daryaee, T; Sasanian, P(2014). The Rise and Fall of an Empire, I.B. Tauris; 1 edition.
  20. Dignas, B (2007). Engelbert, Winter, Rome and Persia in Late Antiquity: Neighbours and Rivals, Cambridge University Press, First Paper Back Edition edition.
  21. Doran, C (1971). The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
  22. Ehteshami, A (1995). After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic Routledge, March 10.
  23. Elton, H (2018). The Roman Empire in Late Antiquity: A Political and Military History, Cambridge University Press.
  24. Ewans, M (2004). The Great Game: Britain and Russia in Central Asia. Edited, Routledge Curzon, Milton Park, England.
  25. Farrokh, K (2007). Shadows in the Desert: Ancient Persia at War, Osprey Publishing; First Edition edition.
  26. Floor, W (2009). The Rise and Fall of Nader Shah: Dutch East India Company Reports, 1730-1747, Mage Publishers.
  27. Frankopan, P (2016). The Silk Road: A New History of the World, Vintage; Reprint edition.
  28. Gebb, M (1983). ‘Review: Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1810-1895’. UCLA Historical Journal. 4: 130–132.
  29. Gerard, M; Gen, M. G (1897). Report on the Proceedings of the Pamir Boundary Commission. Calcutta, Office of the Superintendent of Government Printing, India.
  30. Gold, D; Diker, D (2007). Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Global Jihadi: A New Con ict Paradigm for the West Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, January 18.
  31. Graham, D (2013). Rome And Parthia: Power, Politics and Profit, 1st Edition, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform; 1st edition.
  32. Gray, C (2014). Geoffrey Sloan, Geopolitics, Geography, and Strategy, Routledge, January.
  33. Hafeznia, M.R (2006). A new Concept of the Heartland, Geopolitics Quarterly, Volume 3, Issue 8, Pages 6-1. [In Persian]
  34. Hafeznia, M.R; Ahmadypur, Z; Roumina, E (2008). Transformation Pattern in the political Transition Period of the Revolutions Case Study: Islamic Revolution of Iran, Geopolitics Quarterly. Volume 3, Issue 10. Pages 33-55. [In Persian]
  35. Head, D (1992). The Achaemenid Persian Army, Montvert.
  36. Hedrick, L (2007). Xenophon's Cyrus the Great: The Arts of Leadership and War, Truman Talley Books; Reprint edition.
  37. Hinz, W (1979). Darius und die Perser. Eine Kulturgeschichte der Achämeniden, 2 Bde., Baden-Baden 1976 / 1979.
  38. Holland, T (2005). Persian Fire: The First World Empire and the Battle for the West, Little, Brown.
  39. Ingram, E (1984). In Defence of British India: Great Britain in the Middle East, 1775-1842. Frank Cass & Co, London.
  40. Kaplan, R. D (2012). “The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate,” Random House; First Edition, September 11.
  41. Kinzer, S (2008). All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Wiley; 2 edition.
  42. Koch, H (1992). So Says King Darius ... Life in the Persian Empire, Saverne, Mainz 1992,Cultural History of the Ancient World; Vol. 55.
  43. Kuhrt, A (2007). The Persian Empire: A Corpus of Sources from the Achaemenid Period, Routledge.
  44. Lee, R;  Braudel, F (2012). the Longue Duree, and World Systems Analysis. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
  45. Levitt, M (2015). Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God Georgetown University Press, April 9.
  46. Mahmud, M (1999). The Political Relations of Iran and Britain in the 19th Century [Ravabet-e Siasi-ye Iran va Engelestan], Eghbal Publisher. [In Persian]
  47. Maksymiuk, K (2015). Geography of Roman-Iranian wars military operations of Rome and Sasanian Iran, UPH.
  48. Matthee, R (2011). Persia in Crisis: Safavid Decline and the Fall of Isfahan, B. Tauris.
  49. Mesbahi, M (2011). ‘Free and Confined: Iran and the International System’, Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, 5 (2): 9–34.
  50. Milton, E (2010). Beverley and Stephen Farrell, Hamas Polity, April 26.
  51. Motaghi, E (2008). Soft Geopolitics Interaction and Balance Case Study: Middle East in 2001-9, Geopolitics Quarterly,Volume 4, Issue 11, Pages 8-35. [In Persian]
  52. Newman, A (2008). Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire, B. Tauris.
  53. Parker, W. H (1982). Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
  54. Parsi, T (2007). Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States, Yale University Press.
  55. Plutarch (2000). The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, Modern Library.
  56. Pollack, K (2005). The Persian Puzzle Random House Trade Paperbacks, August 9.
  57. Pourshariati, P (2017). Decline and Fall of the Sasanian Empire: The Sasanian-Parthian Confederacy and the Arab Conquest of Iran, I.B. Tauris; Reprint edition.
  58. Qassem, N (2010). Hezbollah, Saqi Books, April 1.
  59. Rae, C; Leviathan, V.S (2014). Behemoth: The Roman-Parthian Wars 66 BC-217 AD, CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, July 8.
  60. Ramazani, R (2010). Re ections on Iran’s Foreign Policy, Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, 1 (1).
  61. Ramazani, R. (2004). Ideology and Pragmatism in Iran’s Foreign Policy, The Middle East Journal, 58 (4).
  62. Rawlinson, George, Parthia, Merkaba Press, (2017).
  63. Reisinezhad, A (2018). The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia, Palgrave Macmillan.
  64. Rousseu, D; Garcia-Retamero, R (2006). ‘Estimating Threats: The Impact and Interaction of Identity and Power’ in: American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear, Edited by Trevor Thrall and Jane Cramer, London: Routledge. 16-39.
  65. Rowe, W.C (2010). Chapter 4: The Wakhan Corridor – The endgame of The Great Game". In Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen (eds.). Borderlines and Borderlands: Political Oddities at the Edge of the Nation-state. Rowman & Littlefield.
  66. Sajjadpour, S.K; Amiri Mogahddam, R (2009). Geopolitical and the Legal Resolution of Iran-Iraq Border Disputes: Comprehensiveness and Integrity of 1975 Algeria Treaty, Geopolitics Quarterly, Volume 5, Issue 15. Pages 1-40. [In Persian]
  67. Sariolghalam, M (2017). ‘Nezam-e Beinolmelal va Geopolitik-e Jadid-e Khvarmianeh [International System and New Geopolitics of the Middle East]’, Pajoheshnameh Oloum-e Siasi, pp. 101-139. [In Persian]
  68. Sarkhosh Curtis, V; Stewart, S (2007). The Age of the Parthians, B. Tauris.
  69. Sergeev, E (2013). The Great Game, 1856-1907: Russo-British Relations in Central and East Asia. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press.
  70. Shay, S (2005). The Axis of the Evil: Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror, Routledge, January 31.
  71. Sheldon, R.M (2010). Rome's Wars in Parthia: Blood in the Sand, Vallentine Mitchell.
  72. Siegel, J (2002). Endgame: Britain, Russia and the Final Struggle for Central Asia. I.B.Tauris, London.
  73. Streusand, D (2010). Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals,
  74. Tabatabaie, J (2007). On Iran: The Theory of Constitutionalism in Iran [Taamoli bar Iran: Nazariye-e Hooumat-e Ghanoon], Minou-ye Kherad. [In Persian]
  75. Thucydides (1974). History of the Peloponnesian War, Penguin; Revised edition.
  76. Xenophon,C (1997). translated by Miller, Walter, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
  77. Yazdanpanah Dero, Q; Zaeri, B; Rahimi, R (2018). Geopolitical Factors of U.S Tendency to Form an Arabian ‎Military Coalition in Persian Gulf and its Consequences on ‎Iran's Security, Geopolitics Quarterly, Volume 14, Issue 50, Pages 83-108.[In Persian]
  78. Zarrinkoub, A.H (1975). The Arab Conquest of Iran and its aftermath: in Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 4, London. [In Persian]