

The New Eurasianism and the Chinese-European Strategy towards It

Omar Saadi Salim Al-Musawi* - Faculty Member at the College of Education Ibn Rushd for Humanities, University of Baghdad, Iraq.

Received: 12/03/2024

Accepted: 07/07/2024

Abstract

The current study looks at New Eurasianism as a fundamental ideology of Russia's geopolitical strategy, New Political economy in shadow of its economic integration towards the Eurasian region. New Eurasianism has called for greater cooperation among civilizations and the development of a polycentric world pattern, promoting investment, trade, security, and infrastructure. The study examines key international actors, principally China and the European Union (EU), in the context of their responses to Russia's Eurasian project, by using qualitative approach. The approach of China is to have a strategic partnership with Russia with the aim of fighting US unchallenged dominance and for regional peace. Given its dependence on Russian energy, the EU is combining economic sanctions with energy cooperation. The findings show the influential role played by New Eurasianism in advocating the establishment of a multipolar world order and reforming the global geopolitical architecture with various strategic partnerships and regional integration projects.

Keywords: New Eurasianism, Russian Foreign Policy, American Dominance, Strategic Instruments, International Challenges.

* E-mail: omar.s@ircoedu.uobaghdad.edu.iq

1. Interduction

New Eurasianism represents one of the Russian Federation's projects expressing economic and political integration in the Eurasia region. As a philosophy based on political impressions and a method for studying history, it also relies on structural analysis (Karlov, 2006). It is founded on the formula of civilizational plurality, positing that each human society has its own civilization, and that civilizational integration leads to enhanced economic and political cooperation among nations. Consequently, this would result in increased investment and trade, bolster security and infrastructure, and thereby achieve a geopolitical balance in the region (Pezard, 2017). Alexander Dugin defined "Eurasianism" as a movement that opposes the global dominance of Western countries, supports the Russian Orthodox civilization, and thus it is an ideology that competes with the West and opposes the norms imposed by Western society, such as good and evil, marketing them as though they are a universal standard to be emulated (Al-Samarrai, 2018).

Eurasia represents one of the most important regions in the world, being the largest continental mass and containing most of the world's material and human resources. Approximately 75% of the world's population resides in this area, which possesses over three-quarters of the world's energy resources, including oil and gas (Al-Waeli, 2015). Halford Mackinder, in his Heartland Theory, pointed to the Eurasian pivot area extending from the Volga River to East Siberia and from the Arctic to the Iranian Plateau and Central Asia, later expanding the area to include Eastern Europe (Al-Qasir, 2014). Fadel (2019) traces the role of New Eurasianism in the evolution of Russian strategic thought, positioning it as an ideology advocating for a unique Eurasian civilization opposed to Western liberalism. Sharieh (2014) similarly examines Russia's Eurasianism in the context of the Arab East, depicting it as a strategy for resisting American unipolarity and fostering multipolarity. The current phase of Russian geopolitical thought is anchored in "New Eurasianism," which emphasizes the cultural uniqueness and the political heritage of Russia, distinguishing it from both European and Asian worlds (Dugin, 2004).

This ideology is based on the pressing need for the Russian Federation to achieve a set of goals focused on its "cultural, geographical, and political" independence and to enhance its international and regional role (Al-

Azzawi,2002). One of the most prominent means to achieve these goals is by focusing on its Eurasian surroundings, aligning with Russia's long-term strategy to restore the Federation's status. This involves creating a state of stability for Russian borders and establishing a "Eurasian" sphere that includes several European and Asian countries (Fadel, 2019).

New Eurasianism entails several elements:

1. Developing economic relations: Aiming to enhance trade and investment between Russia, European countries, and Central Asia, achieving mutual trade reliance (Mossalanejad,2023).
2. Infrastructure development: Enhancing regional infrastructure for transport, energy, and communications to facilitate trade and investment and increase inter-state connectivity (Pezard,2017).
3. Security cooperation: Strengthening security collaboration between Russia, Europe, and Central Asia to enhance regional stability (Abd al-Hai,2012).
4. Cultural relations development: Enhancing cultural and scientific relations and finding common factors for integration (Erson, 2004).
5. The Russian "Eurasian" project comprises several initiatives and plans, including the establishment of a Eurasian Free Trade Area, reviving the New Silk Road initiative, establishing an Economic Cooperation Zone, and the Arctic initiative, all part of Russia's strategy to expand its economic, political, strategic, and military influence in the region (Hamood,2023).

Finally, this concept has relevance in various fields:

Geopolitical Importance: Aims to bolster the global stance of the Russian Federation and facilitate integration between European and Asian states, thereby transforming Russia into a new geopolitical hub. This aids the Russian Federation in advancing over the United States (Hafeznia,2017).

Economic Importance: Offers investment and development opportunities by expanding the base of available products and services, enhancing infrastructure, and improving communications among participating countries(El-Sheikh, 2011).

Cultural Importance: Encourages the exchange of expertise and education between participating countries, which fosters mutual understanding and cultural communication (Diab, 2007).

Security Importance: The study seeks to elucidate the enhancement of

security and stability in the Eurasian region in the context of the success of New Eurasianism and the improvement of security cooperation to reduce terrorism (Dugin, 2004).

1-1. Research Problem

The study problem lies in "New Eurasianism" is a geopolitical paradigm which aims for the rejuvenation of Russia's role and significance by playing up its own cultural and political individualism and enhancing its regional and global presence through strategic partnerships as well as economic inter-linkedness inside the Eurasian area. That's why it is also opposed to the underpinnings of western colonialism and aims at a multipolar world order, to challenge the US-led unipolarity. At its core, the contradiction of New Eurasianism is that while it seeks to reinforce Russian influence and establish regional stability, it faces major international and regional challenges. Such challenges range from disparate responses from major global states and power (Karlov, 2006), notable China and the European Union — as well as internal pressures within the countries participating. The strategies of these main actors may be either supportive of, defiant to or tentatively coexisting with the Russian initiative on Eurasia and therefore may shape the emergence and viability of New Eurasianism (Al-Waeli, 2015).

An understanding of these dynamics is vital for any judgement on both the potential impact and long-term sustainability of New Eurasianism as a driver of a new geopolitical map.

1-2. Research Question

What are the strategies of key actors in the international system, such as China and the European Union, regarding it?

1-3. Research Hypothesis

The research proceeds from the hypothesis that New Eurasianism has a strategic impact on the regional and international environment, which aids in fostering a novel understanding of international relations.

1-4. Literature Review

The concept of Eurasianism has a long intellectual history in Russia, but has taken on new significance in the post-Cold War era as "New Eurasianism". Fadel (2019) traces the role of New Eurasianism in the evolution of Russian strategic thought, positioning it as an ideology advocating for a unique

Eurasian civilization opposed to Western liberalism. Sharieh (2014) similarly examines Russia's Eurasianism in the context of the Arab East, depicting it as a strategy for resisting American unipolarity and fostering multipolarity.

In recent years, there has been extensive scholarly analysis of New Eurasianism as a geopolitical strategy employed by Russia under President Vladimir Putin. Hafeznia (2017) characterizes Eurasianism as an "active geostrategic fault" shaping global power dynamics. Mossalanejad (2023) situates Russia's Eurasian strategy within the geopolitical balancing against U.S. hegemony in the Biden era. Hafeznia and Roumina (2021) even suggest Eurasianism could provide a geopolitical framework for addressing global crises like pandemics.

The economic dimensions of Russia's Eurasian project have also received attention. Al-Obaidi (2022) examines the geopolitical impacts of Eurasian energy projects in particular. Salimifar and Khadem (2016) analyzed the strategic implications of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a key institution for Eurasian integration, on Iranian energy geopolitics.

Regarding China's strategy towards Eurasianism, sources emphasize the Sino-Russian strategic partnership as a counterweight to American power, despite some differences. Sakwa (2017.) characterizes Russia as between the West and China, highlighting complexities in Russia's "pivot to Asia". The deepening of Sino-Russian economic ties is evident in the rapid growth of bilateral trade to \$84 billion by 2017 (Sputnik Arabic,2018). However, Ashhab and Ismail (2019) frame China's rise as its own challenge to U.S. dominance, not simply an adjunct to Russia's Eurasianism.

European responses to Russia's Eurasian integration project have been mixed, especially after the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Pezard et al. (2017) survey the diversity of European relations with Russia, identifying a spectrum from conciliatory to adversarial approaches. States like Germany have exhibited internal divisions over engaging or isolating Russia (Sama'een,2016). However, Europe's energy dependence on Russia consistently constrains its opposition to Eurasianism (El-Sheikh,2006).

In conclusion, the literature from 2018-2023 underscores that New Eurasianism remains a central pillar of Russian foreign policy and a significant factor in the strategic calculations of China and the European Union. Scholars continue to debate the implications of Russia's Eurasian

project for the shifting balance of power in the international system.

2. Theoretical and Frameworks

For the purpose of the understanding of the concept of New Eurasianism and the identities related and its repercussions on the strategies of Russia, there are a number of fundamental theories and concepts in the fields of geopolitics and international relations. For an instance The classical geopolitical theories, such as The Heartland Theory of Mackinder (1904) which states that dominance of the world system may be determined by dominance of the Eurasian “heartland” because of its central position, huge resources, and strategic position. This theory, as we shall see, underlies the geopolitical significance of Eurasia, and provides the context to understand the Eurasian integration projects of Russia (Dugin,2015) . in addition to the balance of power theory, that states that, Russia will try to forestall the rise of any one state by creating alliances and counterbalancing coalitions (Waltz 1979), This idea clarifies the strategic partnerships of Russia with China and the European Union in its overtures to Russia. Finally , The notion of spheres of influence refers to the tendency of great powers to establish areas of exclusive political, economic and military influence (Keal,1983).

Balance of power and sphere of influence are key notions that serve as tools for analysing concrete strategies and actions in Russia, China and the European Union's response to the challenges and opportunities of Eurasianism.

3. Methodology

The theoretical framework is designed as qualitative, to study the concept of New Eurasianism, and highlight its influence on Russian, Chinese and EU strategies (Creswell and Poth,2018).The reasons for selecting the qualitative approach underlies twofold, The study seeks to serve three purposes: First to offer a nuanced and rich interpretation of the complicated global politics around New Eurasianism by branching out abundant perspectives and subjectivities of the actors involve in enacting and advancing these perspectives. Second, the research questions are exploratory, aiming to uncover the determinants of Russia, China, and the European Union' strategies towards Eurasianism rather than testing exact hypotheses or quantified variables.

The collecting data of the study was done by literature review of previous

studies that are related to New Eurasianism and the geopolitical strategies of Russia, China, and the EU . The review of literature was conducted from various databases (i.e. JSTOR, Web of Science and ProQuest). New Eurasianism, Eurasian integration, Russian foreign policy, Chinese foreign policy, European Union foreign policy were the Key search terms.

Data analysis was done by a thematic analysis approach which includes identifying, analyzing patterns (Braun and Clarke,2006) Analysis started with an in depth reading of the selected sources, and continued to the coding process as we translated analyzed data into categories and items reflecting the guiding research questions and the theoretical framework.

4. Results and Discussion

The Russian "Eurasian" project comprises several initiatives and plans, including the establishment of a Eurasian Free Trade Area, reviving the New Silk Road initiative, establishing an Economic Cooperation Zone, and the Arctic initiative, all part of Russia's strategy to expand its economic, political, strategic, and military influence in the region. as well, strategies in the international system, which are going to explain them as follows:

1)The Chinese Strategy

The Chinese Strategy in the wake of the post-Cold War global shifts and developments, China embarked on crafting a new security strategy, underpinned by three principal objectives aimed at:

1. Ensuring a conducive security environment to sustain China's economic reforms, striving by all means to maintain this milieu to achieve the targeted economic growth rates as outlined in the annual plan, approximating 8% annually (Nema,2013).
2. Employing peaceful means to reclaim Chinese territories that have been annexed, encompassing Taiwan and the islands over which China claims sovereignty in the East and South China Seas(Mohammed and Hamood,2023).
3. Upholding China's national security through maintaining territorial unity and resolving border disputes with neighboring countries (Abd al-Hai,2012).

The foundational strategic goal for China revolves around creating a secure environment surrounding China, deterring the emergence of any potential regional threats that could escalate to the level of the former Soviet threat,

thereby endangering the security and stability of the region which inevitably threatens China's vital interests in what it considers its primary sphere of influence (Fadel, 2019). Consequently, China saw in fostering cooperation with the Russian Federation a substantial fulfilment of its aspirations in establishing such a secure environment.

Moreover, China aspires to play a significant and influential global and regional role in the international arena, Hence, the Russian Federation emerged as the ideal ally for China to play this role, and reciprocally, Russia found in China the best ally to realize its vision of "New Eurasianism." (Pezard, 2017). The dialogue between China and Russia, initiated during the former Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Beijing on April 24, 1996, evolved into a strategic understanding enabling the signing of numerous security and economic agreements between the two nations. This visit imbued the Sino-Russian relations with new dimensions, manifested in strategic convergence and understanding (Sharieh, 2014). albeit not escalating to a strategic alliance level, yet underscored both nations' desire to establish a (joint cooperation strategy) towards the 21st century, opposing the dominance of a single power over the world, alluding to the United States, and advocating for a multipolar world order (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

The two sides signed a strategic partnership agreement in April 1996, which included:

1. China's acknowledgment of Chechnya as an internal Russian matter in exchange for Russia's recognition of China's sovereignty over Tibet and abstaining from relations with Taiwan.
2. Establishment of a hotline between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.
3. Reorganization of military presence by both parties away from their shared borders.
4. Development of economic relations and trade stimulation between the two countries.
5. Russia and China considered their defensive partnership, which is non-confrontational, as a new model of relations suited for the 21st century.

The strategic understanding between the two nations was further deepened with the visit of the former Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Moscow in

April 1997, where an agreement was signed to reduce military forces along the borders shared with China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, described by the Chinese president as an important step towards establishing an Asian security system (Sama'een,2016).

The dawn of the 21st century marked a significant development in security and strategic cooperation between China and Russia, culminating in the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on June 15, 2001, in Shanghai, China, comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. This establishment was a crucial step in the strategic understanding between the two countries to balance American policies, especially in countering the "Missile Defense Shield" proposed by the United States at that time, which also aimed at combating the threats of religious extremism in the Islamic member states of the organization (Dugin,2012). In recent years, both China and Russia have sought to strengthen their strategic partnership through conducting "Sino-Russian Strategic Security Talks," aimed at bolstering coordination on strategic security issues and providing stronger mutual support in key matters related to state sovereignty and national security (Sama'een,2016). With the ascent of President Vladimir Putin to power and his visit to China, clear steps were taken to deepen the relationship and cooperation, culminating in the "Sino-Russian Strategic Partnership," the first of its kind between two major nuclear powers in Asia. The strategic treaty between the two countries, known as the "Sino-Russian Good-Neighborliness Treaty," was signed on July 16, 2001, and included:

1. Affirming good neighborliness, friendship, and cooperation between the two countries.
2. Russian support for China's claim to Taiwan.
3. Confronting American hegemony and unipolarity, with the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin stating that the treaty primarily aimed at countering American dominance on the international stage.

This development in Sino-Russian relations deepened mutual political trust, and during May 26-28, 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao officially visited Russia, affirming the deepening of the strategic partnership with the Russian Federation (Mossalanejad,2023). The Sino-Russian strategic alignment stems from a comprehensive understanding of the dangers of American unilateralism in global geostrategic balances and its capacity for unilateral

force application, underscoring that the basis of alignment between the two nations aims at curbing American hegemony. This view is supported by the "realist" school, stating that the foundation of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership is based on balancing power in the global system and establishing equilibrium with a party that, following the Soviet Union's dissolution, has assumed economic, political, military, institutional, and technological capabilities, dominating the international political system and seeking to extend its control over other powers (Hafeznia and Roumina 2021).

In 2005, the two countries conducted joint military exercises named "Peace Mission 2005," with Chinese leaders stating that the goal of these exercises was to deepen Sino-Russian cooperation and coordination between their armed forces in defense, security, and jointly combating international terrorism, extremism, and separatism (Nema,2013).

The rapid development in Sino-Russian relations enriched their cooperation partnership, with bilateral trade volume increasing tenfold, reaching \$856 billion in 2008, achieving significant investment breakthroughs, especially in the energy sector, including oil and gas trade and pipeline transportation. This success enabled China to exert its influence in the region, establish a strategic partnership with Russia, and develop its relations in the economic and military fields, aligning with its future aspirations in the region (Sama'een,2016). China managed to maximize its economy through trade, which saw a significant leap from \$10 billion in 2001 to \$70 billion in 2011, and then to \$84 billion in 2017. According to a report by the Chinese news agency Xinhua, the bilateral trade goals set by the two countries aimed to reach \$200 billion by 2020, in addition to increasing Chinese investment plans in the Russian economy by nearly one billion dollars (Pezard,2017).

On the military level, China leveraged Russia's military capabilities to develop the Chinese military system and transfer Russian military technology, becoming the main market for Russian arms, accounting for 50% of Russia's total arms sales (Erson,2004). The sales of Russian arms to China from 1990 to 2007 amounted to \$85 billion. It can be said that the Chinese policy adopted the system of "Strategic Partnership with the Russian Federation" with the aim of:

1. Maximizing its economic and military capabilities.
2. Ensuring an effective and influential role in the new international system

post-Cold War.

Hence, it is observed that the cooperation between the two sides revolves around two fundamental aspects:

The first: A mutual recognition of the United States' uniqueness in leading the world, especially after the Cold War, which altered the structure of the international environment.

The second: China's increasing need for energy, in addition to its need to develop its industrial base, can be said that the Sino-Russian alignment towards American policy revolves around:

1. Rejecting the United States' uniqueness in leading the international system.

2. Rejecting the American Missile Defense Shield project, which the United States justified as aiming to protect its territory from potential attacks by "rogue states," whereas Russia and China view this project as a threat to global security and a resurgence of the arms race.

Thus, the Russian Federation leveraged the Chinese strategy to realize its "Eurasian" project. President Vladimir Putin, during the signing of the 2011 strategic cooperation agreement between Russia and China, outlined three axes, stating:

1. Benefiting from the Chinese economic momentum to achieve economic revival, especially in "Russian Siberia" and the Far East, indicating the actual realization of "Eurasianism."

2. Continuing to exchange support between Russia and China on the international stage, especially in resolving regional and international issues.

3. Developing the bilateral partnership on a pragmatic common foundation.

From this point, the Chinese strategy continued to advance towards the Russian Federation. In 2015, as a result of Russia's persistent efforts, an economic integration in the "Eurasia" region was achieved, announcing the establishment of the "Eurasian Economic Union," a step in leveraging China's project to revive the Silk Road, known as the "Belt and Road Initiative."

A "Cooperation and Convergence Agreement" was signed in May 2015 between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping, incorporating the Eurasian Economic Union within the "Heartland" strategy, a concept well-known in classical political geography formulated by "Halford." On July 9, 2015, President Vladimir Putin delivered a notable

speech in the presence of the leaders of the countries included in the Eurasian Economic Union, stating: "We consider this continental bloc not as a stage for any conflict between great powers or a venue for any strategic game, but as our home. We want this region to be peaceful and economically prosperous, not a vast haven for extremists or attempts to protect certain interests at the expense of others" (Mohammed and Hamood, 2023).

European Union Strategy

Energy resources, particularly Russian gas and oil, along with the Ukrainian crisis, constitute the cornerstone in shaping the contemporary strategic relations between the European Union (EU) and the Russian Federation and its Eurasian project. The energy sector has played a fundamental role in Russian-European relations, with Russia emerging as a vital alternative to Middle Eastern oil for Europe due to its strategic and vital ties with the European community. Russia has endeavored to strengthen its relations with Europe in a manner that benefits both parties, the "European-Russian" strategy, which both sides have sought to maintain under the banner of (cooperation in the energy sector "oil and gas") (Jari,2003). This collaboration began to manifest since 2000 through coordination between the two parties at meetings of the "Permanent Partnership Council in the field of energy," leading to the realization of numerous projects, among which the most significant are:

The North European Gas Pipeline Project (Russian-German): Extending from Vyborg, Russia, on the Baltic Sea to German shores, spanning over 1200 kilometers with a production capacity of 27.5 billion cubic meters annually for the benefit of Nord Stream (Allison,2020).

The project to transport Russian gas through Turkish territory to Southern Europe: Known as the Turkish Stream, passing through the Black Sea to Greece, benefiting Turkey by allowing it to purchase Russian gas through the same pipeline from Gazprom at a rate of 10.25% (Sharieh,2014).

The establishment of a joint venture named (Naryan-Mar "Oil and Gas"): A collaboration between Russia's Lukoil and ConocoPhillips, aimed at exploiting the Timan-Pechora oil and gas fields in the northern European part of Russia, with transportation by oil tankers to the Barents Sea shore for export. Lukoil holds a 70% stake in the venture, while the American company owns 30% (Sputnik,2018).

The European Union well recognizes its principal vulnerability in "energy," understanding that American strategies revolve around controlling the energy sources upon which EU countries rely. Thus, the EU has sought alternatives, turning its attention towards the Russian Federation, which possesses no less than "ten billion tons" of oil reserves and the world's largest natural gas reserves estimated at over "40 trillion cubic meters." By 2011, Russia's contribution to the EU's gas supply was about 51%, and oil supplies constituted approximately 41% (Al-Obaidi, 2022).

However, following the Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea in Ukraine in March 2014, a new challenge emerged for the security of Europe's borders in general and the EU's safety in particular. This new challenge was confirmed in the 2008 Georgia war, indicating that the Russian Federation could act aggressively towards any perceived challenge within its sphere of influence, affecting all of Europe due to geographic proximity (Abdulhai,2000). Therefore, European countries sharing borders with the Russian Federation live with the possibility of a Russian invasion at any time, especially countries like the Baltic states, Poland, and to a lesser extent, Finland and Norway, which recognize the military imbalance between Russia's forces and their smaller forces. These countries look to compensate for this imbalance and lack of balance through reliance on NATO, while European countries without direct borders with the Russian Federation do not currently perceive any threat from Russia (Jafari and Jafari,2019).

Thus, the European strategy post-Ukraine crisis has relied on imposing economic sanctions on the Russian Federation and supporting the Ukrainian government both economically and militarily, emphasizing the establishment of a NATO presence in the Baltic states as a means to deter Russia and reassure NATO members in Eastern Europe. This strategy was reinforced by the "Minsk II Agreement," asserting that the Russian Federation is no longer a partner but a potential competitor and adversary to the EU (Diab, 2007). According to a Finnish official, Russia represents the primary security concern and will always remain so. Finland, among the most Russia-wary countries in Europe, believes that joining NATO could lead to World War III. Therefore, European countries recognize that their forces are incapable of confronting Russia unless supported by NATO and the United States due to Russia's military superiority and its "time-space"

advantage, allowing for several expected scenarios in Europe to achieve its Eurasian project (Braun and Clarke, 2006).

Poland considers Russia capable of launching a conventional wide-scale war in Europe, a possible but unlikely scenario. A Polish official stated that Russia is heading towards a devastating war. The Swedish defense bill for 2016-2020 focused on the strategy of (enhancing bilateral and multilateral cooperation) to secure defense against any potential Russian aggression in the region, considering the Baltic states as the main military vulnerabilities and the most likely points of Russian aggression. Norway, however, is more optimistic about the Russian Federation despite aligning with the European decision on (imposing economic sanctions) against the Russian Federation. Norwegian Prime Minister Erna Solberg expressed her rejection of Russian policies in Ukraine but affirmed Norway's good relations with Russia (Ashhab and Ismail, 2019).

The German strategy in dealing with the Russian Federation's project has faced the most significant divergence in the EU's approach to the Eurasian Union. Angela Merkel insists that the EU's policy towards Russia must be less open to cooperation, contrary to Foreign Minister Walter Steinmeier, who advocates for deepening openness and joint cooperation with Russia and its Eurasian project. The German strategic disagreement in dealing with Russia is partly due to the migration crisis and the lack of a unified European policy towards Russia in the future (Karlov, 2006).

These differences and European perceptions on how to engage with the Russian Federation and its project signal significant divergences that could potentially lead to the dissolution of NATO, as Eastern European countries, particularly NATO members, are concerned about the alliance's readiness to deal with Russia and its aggressions. A Polish official mentioned the possibility of divisions within NATO regarding how to respond to any potential Russian attack, describing it as a "nightmare scenario" and stating that the security of the Baltic states is a critical test for NATO. They believe that the Russian Federation is attempting to undermine NATO to reach a point where the alliance is no longer capable of performing its collective defense duties in Europe (Nema, 2013). However, the European vision (EU) in dealing with the Russian Federation has been characterized by imposing economic sanctions since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis through asset freezes and travel bans for specific individuals while maintaining the

relationship established to ensure the supply of Russian energy to Europe. Both parties believe it is not in their interest to jeopardize cooperation in this field. In July 2015, European Council President Donald Tusk stated that the duration of economic sanctions on Russia is linked to the full implementation of the "Minsk Agreement," aiming to exert maximum impact on the Russian economy to limit the realization of its Eurasian project and exert control over some European countries (Mossalanejad, 2023).

Thus, European countries strive to balance between imposing sanctions and continuing dialogue with Russia. France, adopting a declared policy strategy of (dialogue and firmness), recognizes that Russia's goal with Crimea is to limit the EU's capacity and involve Russia in several decisions to achieve "Eurasianism." Moreover, maintaining dialogue with Russia ensures the avoidance of excessive military force by Russia against some European countries.

6. Conclusion

The research aims to map out and portray New Eurasianism as a critical ideology in Russia's geopolitical strategy. This idea focuses on bolstering Russian influence and order in the Eurasian neighbourhood through economic, political, and cultural means. The deeply rooted civilizational plurality of New Eurasianism is premised on the assertion of the original and distinct, cultural and political identity of Russia, fundamentally opposed to the Western hegemony and continuing to argue in favor of a multipolar world order (Salimifar and Khadem, 2016).

This paper explores how these ideas have largely emerged from and been elaborated on in Central Asia and on the strategies of key international actors (China, the European Union (EU)) vis-à-vis New Eurasianism. Another feature of China's strategy is its strategic partnership with Russia, a great power, with the purpose of providing the stability necessary for continued economic growth and regional stability. This partnership is based on considerable economic and military cooperation, which demonstrates the growing role of China, both in buying energy resources and in the international scene (Fadel, 2019). This deepening of Sino-Russian relations is manifested in the formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and various economic agreements in order to realize a common objective: a deterrent from American domination (Mohammed and Hamood,

2023). For the EU, the situation is however more complicated as it must strike a fine balance between economic sanctions against Russia and energy cooperation. The EU even finds itself increasingly dependent on NATO for its defense after one of all the events that most strongly influenced the EU dimension was the annexation of Crimea and the crisis in Ukraine. Despite splits and competing national positions, the endgame in general terms is to contain the Russians from exploiting disunity while seeking to guarantee energy security. The energy bonds between Russia and the EU will continue to limit the European resistance to Eurasianism meaning that European policy towards Russia will remain hampered by a strategic dilemma between the conflicting goals of a project for stability vs a challenge to *realpolitik*. The conversation shows that New Eurasianism occupies an important place in Russian foreign policy and, accordingly, affects the strategic thinking of China and the European Union. Central to the shaping of the geopolitical landscape is the ideology's emphasis on regional integration through initiatives such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the reincarnation of the historical Silk Road, known as the New Silk Road (Hamood,2023). New Eurasianism further challenges American-led unipolarity by developing a web of strategic alliances and economic ties that are supportive of a more balanced global power distribution, towards a multipolar order.

In conclusion, New Eurasianism is consequently a vital component in restructuring Russian geopolitical strategy as well as an important element to establish regional peace and economic -cultural development in Eurasia. The tactics of principal and secondary global actors, joining this discussion subject to their reactions to this ideology, are important of the changing aspects of international relations. Therefore, to assess to what extent and in what form the New Eurasianism may functionally influence shaping a new geopolitics landscape, it is essential to understand these dynamics.

7.Acknowledgment

There is no Acknowledgment Can be Wrote.

8.Conflict of Interest

The Author declare no conflict of interest. And this research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

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