Rebalancing of Iran’s Regional Role in U.S Policy

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Abstract

Rebalancing of Power is one of the most important subjects for international and national security in U.S policy toward Iran and other regional actors. President Trump attempts to change U.S regional policy based on offshore balancing in Persian Gulf and Middle East. This approach concentrated on promotes U.S national interest. Trump’s policy will effect on regional structure of international politics. Barak Obama policy toward Iran concentrated on negotiation and engagement process for promote Iran’s position in regional and international politics. Obama foreign policy team argues that politics and international relations depended on Iran’s role in regional balancing of power. Geopolitical approaches emphasized on Trump interaction of geography and strategy. Trump’s team argues that defense and security policy depended on how U.S policy and regional countries collaborates their goals and interests. Trump’s foreign policy team has systematically tried, significant rapprochement among the Persian Gulf states on the issue of security almost impossible. For these reasons, a collective regionally crafted security arrangement that includes littoral states on Iran.

Keywords: Offshore Balancing, Regional Rebalancing, Conflict, Security Arrangement, Containment.

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1. The Framework of Research

Washington favors the following measures: to extend its military umbrella over the friendly countries in the Persian Gulf through a massive military presence and build-up mainly in Qatar and Bahrain; a close military cooperation between this council members and other pro-American Arab states (Egypt and Jordan as being the only viable players in the region); and a massive sale of military hardware to enhance the capability.

U.S great strategic value, the Persian Gulf waterway has always been of particular interest both to the regional and foreign Powers. In the past, when control of the maritime routes guaranteed the supremacy of European states, dominating the Persian Gulf Ports was the supremacy of European states, dominating the Persian Gulf ports was the subject of covetousness for these powers, particularly the British Empire. The discovery of oil, combined with the Cold War exigencies, captured the attention of new emerging powers towards this region.

1.1. The Analytical of Research

In the 21 century, only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic Security and guaranteeing political and assure their future prosperity. The United States post-Cold War era dominance transformed Washington's concerns, into world concerns. A National Security Strategy for a New era identifies a range of threats to U.S security.

President Trump announced that "the goal of the national security strategy is to ensure the protection of our nation's fundamental and enduring needs: protect the lives and safety of Americans, maintain the sovereignty of the United States, with its values, institutions and territory intact, and provide for the prosperity of the nation and its people. He also firmly stated that the strategy will achieve three core objectives of "enhancing our security, bolstering our economic prosperity, and promoting democracy". 
1.2. The Question of Research
The question of article is: “Rebalancing of Regional Role in U.S Policy toward Iran is forming? It is possible to create a favorable environment that will enable oil producing states to send their oil to the world market. Trump’s policy in regional security may be on a Crusade-type mission in the aftermath 9.11, in The National Security Strategy of the United State of America.

Trump’s approaches like George W. Bush pictures his worldview with a triumphant tone: "The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory of forces of freedom-and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.

1.3. The Hypothesis of Research
The hypothesis of research emphasized that: “U.S security policy in Trump’s era was adopted as to confront Iran's strategic objectives and rebalancing the regional security.” U.S policy underwent a change from engagement to confrontation in new era like Bush period. The George has restored. The axis of evil policy show the confrontation policy required the U.S to use pressure and containment diplomacy in dealing with Iran.

1.4. The Concept of regional rebalancing
Regional rebalancing in strategic literature means the change and continuity in foreign policy. Probably the oldest concept in the study of international relations going back at least to the work of “Thucydides”. It is closely associated with both diplomatic parlance and “realist theory”. Its logic derives from the self-help imperative of the international systems anarchic structure in which states are obliged to give priority to survival and security.

2. Trump’s Policy Ignoring the Cooperative Iran’s Foreign Policy
Ruhani’s foreign policy reflects some of the differences between, Iran’s political culture, political structure, and ideology. The Ruhani’s foreign
policies implemented by the Iran to bring about their supra-nationalist ideology as well as the challenges they face in the current political world order. Iran’s “Identity and Revolution ideology” is not so much a stringently formulated ideology in the true sense of the word as a mixture of different political takes on the world embracing nationalism, anti-colonialism and anti-Imperialism, and traditional Shiite political thinking.

The inherent contradictions between these components make it almost impossible to shape any kind of cohesive realpolitik out of them: political Islam of the Iranian Leaders think and Third World thinking are both revolutionary doctrines that claim to be universally valid; nationalism and Shia on the other hand are, respectively, Iran or Shia-Centered and are traditional and conservative (Kahn, 2014: 41).

Despite breaking off diplomatic relations, Iran and the United States maintained economic contacts for many years after that. In the early 1980s, in the critical phase of the revolution in other words, the United States was still the largest purchaser of Iranian oil. It was not until the “Iran - Libya Sanctions Act” of 1996 that U.S curtailed its trading relations with Tehran, and even then food and medicines remained exempt from the sanctions until the middle of 2012. The United States was thus for a long time Iran’s most important supplier of wheat (Ramazani, 2004: 17).

Advocates of US-Iranian rapprochement in both countries were able repeatedly to voice their views. It is probably thanks to these people that the two sides were able to keep open low-profile channels of Interaction known as Track Two Diplomacy. In May 2003 an Iranian memorandum was made public which formulated the chief points of possible cooperation between the United States and Iran (Katzman, 2011: 14).

The necessary of Iran’s foreign policy for regional management crisis and confrontation to terrorist groups as so ISIS needs to promote revolutionary action. This incompatibility exists on three levels; firstly, Identity and Revolution places its emphasis on ideological boundaries rather
than political borders and therefore rejects the idea of nationalist states. Secondly, Identity and Revolution denies current sources of legitimacy with regard to international laws and regulations, and finally, Identity and Revolution calls for the elimination of cultural, ethnic and geographical boundaries among Muslims in order to unite Muslim communities in a new power bloc within the current political world order.

Confrontation with terrorist groups and management of regional crisis is a section of Iran’s foreign policy. The direction of the Iran policy making has been a source of argument among the scholars since the establishment of the revolutionary government in 1979. Iran’s policy making just like its revolution is still a mystery to many researchers as it is difficult to find an appropriate theoretical framework for it.

However, what makes the policy making of revolutionary Iran different from other revolutionary states and therefore more confusing to study is the Shia Identity and Revolution nature of it. “The Identity and Revolution ideology is an important constraining factor which limits the choice of an appropriate conceptual framework to analyze the country’s policy making” (Nia, 2011).

A new genre of professional formation, steeping U.S diplomats in the origins, questions, and debates around the creed of individual rights, will be necessary to equip them for this mission. Institutional practices and structures will also be needed; a corps invested in the mission will shape them best. The unpredictable and to an extent confusing policy making of Iran has been the source of this division within the scholars to theorize Iran’s policy making toward regional crisis and confrontation with terrorist groups (Paik, 2015: 2).

With respect to this division, this paper briefly argues that the conflict between the Identity and Revolution supra-nationalist nature of Iran’s foreign policy and the current Westphalia system of international relations is the main source of confusion and disintegration in Iran’s policy making.
Islamic Policy Making is the synthesis of differences between Westphalia systems with Iran supra national which appears in the form of “export of revolution”.

The main factors in Iran policy making are flexibility, compromise and cooperation Policy Making action appears in continuity of “duties”. Procedures of policy making in Iran’s Islamic revolution are based on the “duties”. The necessary of settlement Conflict based on continuity of the “duty policy” which has Policy Making nature.

Economic goals could balance the ideological and political priorities China the same as Iran has Policy Making policies. Grand Bargain is based on China’s political Policy Making. Now this question is prompt up whether. New Grand Bargain possible in the relations of Iran, U.S and international system? Policy making approach in Iran’s foreign policy makes grand Bargain possible.

Security building depends on 5 basic indexes. Each parameter effects on power, security and equivalence of international relations. These 5 basic indexes contain religions, cultism, social cohesion, crisis and Great power intervention. Each of these indexes has a basic role in Future of European security. Middle East crisis has been escalated when United States and England enforcement the fundamental groups in Syria and Iraq against Iran’s regional security. In these process religious groups has been changed to a fundamental groups, who have terrorist orientation.

Trump's policy like Bush’s administration integrated regional approach, the Middle East Israeli-Palestinian conflict and favored the two-state solution as part of a new security equation to protect America. It was ironic for Bush junior to implicitly recognize the essence of Saddam Hussein's message on the interconnectivity of security issues in the Middle East; the message that Bush senior didn't want to know about in the heat of the Kuwaiti crisis in 1990-1991 (Questi, 2007: 14).

Trump’s Cabinet extensively enjoys the largesse of all PGCC client
states as the following passage of the above-mentioned Report shows. Washington pays tribute to its PGCC partners for their contribution to regional security by providing U.S forces the use of military facilities, transit rights, and other forms of access. Bahrain, for example, has provided port facilities to U.S naval forces for 50 years; it also hosts the headquarters for U.S Naval Forces Central Command, furnishes facilities for prepositioned equipment, and has granted rapid access for U.S military aircraft when needed (Blanchard, 2008: 16).

3. Rebalancing Iran in the way of strengthens the Persian Gulf Countries

The Trump’s policy toward Iran is based on power and strategy. Persian Gulf Countries are located in the southern littoral states of the Persian Gulf as its principal security partners in this region. They continued to spend above-average shares of GDP on defense despite reductions in oil prices in 1998. Relative to its share of total GDP, Bahrain contributed the largest share of ground combat capability; the second largest share of combat aircraft; and the third largest share of military naval tonnage.

When it comes to the Middle East, Donald Trump's stances are contradictory, especially regarding Iran. Saudi Arabia, while certainly concerned about the Islamic State's presence in Syria and Iraq, is much more perturbed by the actions of Shiite Iran. Trump is vocally anti-Iranian, but he also supports Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian conflict, which ultimately bolsters Iranian regional control. Thus, Saudi Arabia is rightfully nervous about a Trump presidency.

The Iranian-supplied rockets were raining down on Gen. James N. Mattis's troops throughout the spring and summer of 2011 with greater and greater intensity. Six American soldiers were killed by a volley in eastern Baghdad in early June. A few weeks later, three more Americans died in a similar strike, driving the monthly death toll to 15. It was the worst month for U.S troops in Iraq in more than two years, and Iran’s proxies were
vowing more rockets and more bloodshed (Greg & Entous, 2017: 2).

3.1. U.S Regional Strategy for Promoting Persian Gulf Countries

The report emphasizes that no other state in the Report matches this performance in all three armed services. Kuwait's foreign assistance contributions proportion to its GDP is second only to Denmark's, and it is the only other state that meets the highly ambitious Congressional foreign assistance target of contributing one percent of its GDP. Kuwait provides significant grant aid and humanitarian assistance to lesser-developed countries, primarily in the Arab world, but also includes nations in Southeast Asia, Africa and the Balkans, the Report states (Gearon, 2007: 14).

Immediately after praising them for their military effort, the Report invokes the existence of a substantial disparity between the military forces of the PGCC states and those of their principal antagonists in the Persian Gulf (Cohen, 2000). Iran is the apparent target of this evaluation because the only other non-PGCC state in the region is Iraq, considered to be a client state to the U.S. As a remedy to bridge this gap in the PGCC collective ability to confront with Iran in the region.

Oman likewise allows the United States to preposition equipment on its territory, and has granted access to its military bases since 1980. Since the Persian Gulf War in 1991, defense cooperation agreements permitting access and pre-positioning have been signed with Kuwait Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Under the agreement with Kuwait, that nation has agreed to offset U.S pre-positioning and exercise costs.

Four devastating wars have created the opportunity for the U.S to regain and reinforce the position they had in the Middle East before the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. American rehabilitation started with the Iraq – Iran war. The Kuwaiti crisis Jan 1991 consolidated the U.S Partial domination over the region. The events of 9/11 contributed to the denunciation of Islam and pretending it as a violent religion and depicted
Muslims as terrorists and anti-Westerners.

As a result, the war on the Taliban and the subsequent occupation of Afghanistan extended the long military arm of the U.S, portrayed as apparent savior of Muslims from the tyranny of their own Islamist rulers. With the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the U.S became a Middle Eastern country in the same way they became European after the World War II. As their presence in Afghanistan and Iraq continues, America behaves like other states in the region by interfering in regional security affairs.

In May 2006, the American administration launched a new Persian Gulf “Security Dialogue” that principal coordination mechanism between the U.S and these littoral states. The core objectives of the Dialogue are the promotion of intra-PGCC and PGCC-US cooperation to meet common perceived threats. He couldn't be more explicit in stating in stating how redesigning and transforming U.S forces are a crucial instrument of American foreign policy.

The Dialogue provides a framework for U.S engagement with the PGCC countries for rebalancing Iran in the following six areas:
- The improvement of PGCC defense capabilities and interoperability;
- Regional security issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
- Counter-proliferation;
- Counter-terrorism and internal security;
- Critical infrastructure protection;
- Commitments for Iraq’s security (Blanchard & Grimmett, 2008: 1).

Some of council conservative members were actively supporting Iraq in its war efforts against Iran. It's worth mentioning the depth of dependency with regards to Arab states and the U.S military for their security. There is no doubt about the real nature of this one-sided Dialogue as past practice of U.S- PGCC relations show, as the creation of PGCC was a reaction to the Iranian revolutionaries perceived threat in war with Iraq.
3.2. The initiation for Promoting Persian Gulf International cooperation

In the volatile and unsettled context of security in the Persian Gulf and in absence of an effective regionally generated cooperation, dominant foreign powers have always attempted to position themselves as guarantor of stability in the region. One of the consequences of this presence is widening the security gap among the eight Persian Gulf states (Benjamin, 2008: 14).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a newcomer in the Persian Gulf. For the Alliance, the region encompasses a vital strategic importance for three reasons: 1. its geographic location; 2. its continuing instability and; 3. its energy resources—approximately 60% of the world's oil reserves is located in the region. Moreover, the Persian Gulf counties hold the world's second (Iran), third (Qatar), Fourth (Saudi Arabia) and fifty (UAE) natural gas reserves after Russia. The current increase in oil prices is a reminder of how the global economy is heavily dependent on the Persian Gulf's energy resources and will remain so far decades to come.

By the same account, NATO assumes that region's volatile security has recently been aggravated because of the new global security threats posed by internationally active terrorist groups and the (alleged) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Most countries in the region are facing the danger of potential extremist and terrorist activity on their territory, with perhaps profound implications for the stability of the Middle East as a whole.

The Persian Gulf also presents an increased strategic importance for NATO's ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The future of Iraq is a crucial determinant for the whole region. All NATO member states are highly aware of the dangers of instability in Iraq and of the importance of assisting the new Iraqi authorities to take control of the security situation themselves.

Moreover, Iran, by far the most populous country, is emerging as a more powerful state in the region. NATO assumes that a nuclear capable Iran, with ballistic missiles capacity, would be a truly frightening prospect. Therefore, developments in the Persian Gulf and the Greater Middle East
are likely to have an increasingly important impact on Euro-Atlantic security.

Because of its strategic importance, there has been considerable Western, primarily US, military presence in the Persian Gulf for decades. After 9/11, the perception of the region's pivotal international security role has further increased. The PGCC states who have basing agreements with the United States, the most powerful NATO member, serve as important bridgeheads for the hyper-power. Furthermore, in the context of the war against terrorism, forces from NATO member countries have been operating in the region.

3.3. Arms selling in the case of petro dollar

The United States also has vital interests in the kingdom's facilitation of air and sea travel between Asia and Europe, its economic and military support rather than opposition to U.S policies and interests in the region, and its continued reliance on conventional rather than nuclear weapons for its defense. Saudi Arabia, for its part, has no alternative to the United States as the ultimate guarantor of its security. The next administration should strive to restore U.S -Saudi relations so that they permit exploration of how to advance interests that both countries share with Iran, like the stabilization of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Trump has also inflamed the "War on Islam" rhetoric, and the resultant spike in Islam phobia could conceivably lead to increased torture, bans on American Muslims, and indiscriminate bombings in the Middle East all of which would exacerbate the problem of international terrorism. Alternatively, Trump may be inclined to outsource his Middle East policies to Russia (Khashoggi & Others, 2016: 7).

In spite of the existing regional organizations such as the league of Arab States and the September 30, 2006, the United States delivered over $72 billion in weapons, training, equipment, and related services to the six member states of the council through the government-to-government Foreign Military Sales program. Over $57 billion of these sales were made to Saudi Arabia (Defense Security, 2006).
It seems that Washington justifies the Arab purchase of U.S armaments, especially after the regime change in Iraq, as a measure to counter Iran. In late July 2007, the United States announced new military pacts worth 20 billion dollars for Saudi Arabia, 13 billion dollars for Egypt and 30 billion dollars for Israel in a bid to counter and confronting Iran.

Arms sales are a powerful component of the U.S and other defense firms regard the [Persian] Gulf kingdoms as an especially lucrative market today, given that record oil prices have them swimming in surplus revenue. The six PGCC states spent $233 billion on arms imports from 2000 to 2005, accounting for 70 percent of total armament expenditures in the Arab world"(Gearon, 2007: 65).

The U.S government has always attached conditions for the use of arms purchased by Arab countries. This package follows the same rational. "In October 2007, 188 Members [of Congress] signed a letter to president Bush stating that unless the Administration provides assurances that the sale of JDAM (Joint direct Attack Munitions) kits to Saudi Arabia will not 'harm U.S forces in the region or undercut Israel's qualitative military advantage'.

In November 2007, 117 Members signed a letter to President Bush requesting that formal notification regarding any proposals to sell 'high technology armaments to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia' be postponed until January 15, 2008. This process is against Iran’s security role in the Middle East and Persian Gulf (Blanchard & Grimmett, 2008:1).

The joint AIPAC-Congressional pressure on the white House appeared to be an extra assurance since in July 2007; Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert confirmed that Israel had received a detailed and explicit commitment from the United States to ensure Israel's qualitative military edge over the Arab states. This has been reiterated by Israeli Defense Minister Barak during an October 2007 visit to Washington, where he stated that Israel has understandings and arrangements with the U.S Administration that make Tel Aviv confident that Israel's military qualitative edge will be kept (Blanchard & Grimmett, 2008:1).
The Middle East has become known primarily as a region of conflict, dysfunction, and political and economic instability. The pathologies of Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya have come incorrectly to characterize the entire region. The next U.S administration will necessarily be preoccupied with the Middle East as well, though it should guard against disproportionate fixation on the region.

The Cooperative Defense Initiative was a scaled-back version of an earlier U.S idea to develop and deploy a PGCC-wide theater missile defense (TMD) system. However, this missile defense concept is reportedly a focus of the renew Bush Administration initiative, in response to Iran's growing missile capabilities. The original idea envisioned a system under which separate parts (detection systems, intercept missiles, and other equipment) of an integrated TMD network would be based in the six different constraints PGCC states.

That concept ran up against PGCC states' financial constraints and differing perceptions among the [Persian] Gulf States of the threat environment. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have Patriot antimissile units of their own, and these states, in addition to Qatar, host U.S -controlled patriot systems" (Katzman, 2006: 18).

As debate surrounding Iran's nuclear program heats up, the question of non-proliferation, even de-proliferation, became prominent in the U.S security approach to the Persian Gulf. For instance, the 2006 Bush Administration joint U.S -PGCC security initiative focused on counter-proliferation actions as Washington encouraged the PGCC States to close Iranian companies which might be used to procure WMD technology. Another aspect of the initiative is to track shipments to Iran. The Bahrain-based 5th Fleet/ Nascent command plays a major role in part rolling the Persian Gulf to prevent smuggling (Ibid: 19).

Despite American push for more military cooperation between the PGCC States, cyclic in the region revealed the Peninsula Shields' incapability to provide any worthy security for its state-members. Based on an inter-Arab initiative called "Damascus Declaration Based on an inter-Arab initiative
called "Damascus Declaration" (March 1991), Syria and Egypt were expected to provide forces to the Peninsula Shield.

By the same account, NATO assumes that region's volatile security has recently been aggravated because of the new global security threats posed by internationally active terrorist groups and the (alleged) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Most countries in the region are facing the danger of potential extremist and terrorist activity on their territory, with potential extremist and terrorist activity on their territory, with perhaps profound implications for the stability of the Middle East as a whole.

A new attempt was made at the Treaty summit in Istanbul in 2004 to involve NATO in the Middle East region through the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). The initiative's primary goal was to improve security and regional stability through actively promoting NATO's co-operation with friendly countries in the field of security.

In that sense, the Alliance established a framework for collaboration with those countries in the areas of tackling internationally active terrorist groups, helping prevent WMD proliferation and illegal arms trafficking, as well as contributing to NATO-led peace operations. NATO deepened its involvement by providing advice on defense reform, defense budgeting, defense planning and civil-military relations to friendly States in the Persian Gulf. By Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE have formally joined the ICI.

NATO's talks with members of the PGCC were successful as Kuwait, Bahrain Qatar and the United Emirates signed the NATO's Istanbul Summit Communiqué in 2004. At the symposium "NATO and the PGCC: Cooperation within the Framework of the Istanbul Summit", held in Riyadh in January 2007, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sand Al-Faisal said "The kingdom will study the proposal submitted by NATO to join the Istanbul Summit". NATO's Deputy Secretary-General Alessandro Minuto Rizo was among the conference participants. The communiqué proposes Cooperation to combat terror in addition to border security (Qusti, 2007: 24).
4.1. Pre-emptive war in The U.S Heritage for the Middle East Security
Main centric of U.S policy toward regional crisis is based on balancing of power. These claims are self-serving, even deluded, a political fantasy. The George W. Bush administration created many of today’s worst geopolitical problems. First, President Bush used a terrorist attack conducted by Saudi citizens trained in Afghanistan as an excuse to invade Regional Crisis, a long-time objective of neoconservatives as part of their plan to reorder the Middle East (Walter, 2002: 15).

Administration officials justified preventive war based on the claims of a dishonest informant provided by a crooked émigré hoping to rule Regional Crisis. War advocates planned to establish a liberal government aligned with the West, governed by an American puppet, friendly to Israel, and home to bases for U.S military operations against its neighbors. These deluded plans all came to naught. More than a decade later the invasion is viewed by most policy making analysts as a historic mistake, American’s worst foreign policy blunder in decades.

Second, after ousting the Sunni dictator whose authoritarian rule held the nation together, the administration mishandled the occupation at every turn. The U.S failed to exert control, allowing widespread looting, and disbanded the military, creating a large pool of angry and unemployed young men. Then Washington attempted to remake Regional Crisis society, pushing an American-made constitution and deploying U.S political appointees even to draft Baghdad traffic regulations.

4.2. Constructive security at Obama policy toward the Middle East
The Obama administration has played a malign, but secondary, role. Like its predecessor it also intervened too much rather than too little. For instance, President Obama continued to back Regional Crisis’s Maliki government despite the latter’s sectarian excesses. That commitment left Washington with little leverage to press ruling Shia politicians to make concessions to disaffected Sunnis.

Keeping a few troops on station against the Regional Crisis’s would have changed little after all, the Bush administration failed to transform the
Baghdad government when tens of thousands of American soldiers that were fighting on its behalf in Regional Crisis. In Syria Washington inadvertently discouraged a negotiated compromise between Bashar al-Assad and the peaceful opposition by insisting on the former’s departure. That convinced some government opponents that the U.S would force Assad’s ouster, precluding need for compromise which might have ended or at least limited the conflict early (Perry, 2015: 9).

The Obama administration turned Libya into another fulcrum of conflict, following Europe’s lead in promoting low-cost government change in the name of rescuing the Libyan people. That policy generated chaos, highlighted by competing governments and proliferating armed bands. More recently murderous Islamic State acolytes filled the void (Luft, 2014: 35).

President Obama also put U.S credibility on the line by making terrorist groups sectarian war in Regional Crisis and Syria America’s own, without committing sufficient forces to do much more than contain the Islamic State. The Obama administration became a source of weapons for the Islamic State after “moderate” insurgents backed by Washington repeatedly surrendered both personnel and arms to more radical forces.

Civil wars create ungoverned spaces where extremists and terrorist groups can organize, operate, and spread. It is no accident that many of the worst terrorist groups on the planet were born or incubated in civil wars. Today, the real terrorist threats from al-Qaeda and its offshoots are entirely located in states facing civil wars of one kind or another: Syria, Regional Crisis, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and Mali. These extremist groups keep trying to gain a foothold in strong states like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and elsewhere, but haven’t succeeded.

The United States has spent years nurturing relationships with Middle Eastern governments to ensure consistent access to oil and to protect U.S allies in the region. The onset of civil war in any country means that new governments could come to power that are not only brutal, but also openly antagonistic to the United States, its allies, and its interests (Pollack, 2014: 115).
Civil wars tend to create more violence both between neighboring states and within them. Neighboring states often get dragged into civil wars either because they intervene to help rebels, or because rebels take refuge on their territory, triggering an attack from the neighboring government. Israel and Syria repeatedly came to blows over Lebanon, and the Congolese civil war eventually sucked in seven of its neighbors.

Each of arrangements for cooperation in the field of terrorism, an agreement on the transparency of Iran’s nuclear program and recognition of the two-state solution for Israel and Palestine. But the main import of this document was its detailed timetable for confidence building measures whereby the Iranians were prepared to make concessions in return for the lifting of U.S sanctions (Mohns & Bank, 2012: 30).

The Syrian civil war is all too typical between the state repression and Fundamental Salafi groups that support from interventionist groups. Some of which is all too inevitable and does all too good a job of “legitimizing” Fundamental Salafi groups as an extremism given the crisis in region’s security. The war in Yemen is another example of violence that has interventionist actor have basic role. The United States has supported several of its partners (Whiteside, 2014: 21).

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is encouraging additional countries to join the U.S and more than 60 other countries that use travel information, like Advanced Passenger Information (API), to more effectively identify known and previously unknown FTFs. In May, DHS and the State Department drove an unprecedented meeting of Interior Ministers of UN Security Council nations to advocate for strong implementation of UNSCR 2178 principles. The ministerial focused on border controls particularly. DHS also announced the creation of an open-source tool for strengthening border security. At a July meeting in Spain, DHS, State and partner nations made key financial commitments to strengthening border security.

As President Obama has said, “ideologies are not defeated with guns; they’re defeated by better ideas – a more attractive and more compelling vision.” That is why President Obama convened the February 2015 White House Summit to Counter Violent Extremism, where the international
community came together to expand efforts against violent extremism. Since then, driven by U.S leadership, the global CVE movement has grown rapidly (Bell & Others, 2015: 15).

5.3. Re Securitization and Rebalancing Iran in the regional U.S Policy

A new genre of professional formation, steeping U.S diplomats in the origins, questions, and debates around the creed of individual rights, will be necessary to equip them for this mission. Institutional practices and structures will also be needed; a corps invested in the mission will shape them best (Paik, 2015: 2).

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The main factors in Iran foreign policy are flexibility, compromise and cooperation Pragmatic Management action appears in continuity of “duties”. Procedures of foreign policy in Iran’s Islamic revolution are based on the “duties”. The necessary of settlement Conflict based on continuity of the “duty policy” which has Pragmatic Management nature.

Iranian Middle Eastern policy focuses on three main regions: Regional Crisis, the Persian Gulf and the Levant. In all three cases ideological and strategic considerations are intertwined, but the emphasis on Policy Making is different in each. With respect to Israel and Palestine the ideological
aspect dominates (political Identity and Revolution, Third World radicalism), whereas vis-à-vis Regional Crisis Iran chiefly pursues the strategic goal of ensuring that Baghdad never again wages war against it.

In the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia sees Iran as a hegemon, which inevitably brings Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf powers, with the United States into conflict with Iran. Iran for Policy Making is facing a far more complex and fluid situation than did his predecessors. The Middle East and North Africa have experienced unprecedented uprisings, and Syria Iran's sole Arab ally is embroiled in a bloody civil war. Upheavals have been a mixed blessing for Iran. On the one hand, they have presented a setback for the Iranian model of change and governance.

When President Obama took office, U.S was in the midst of an economic collapse: banks were at risk; two out of five mortgages were underwater; pension funds were collapsing; unemployment was doubling and the American dream was dying. In Trump polling for the first time, two-thirds of the American people were saying they no longer believed their children were going to have a better life than they had. In addition to that and the hyper-partisan environment in Washington, which created the gridlock we're living with, Obama faced severe crises in the Middle East, despite the change in tone in the last few years of the Bush administration. The Iraq War had created consequences U.S was still reeling from.

Trump's platform of "no confidence in Washington" clearly gripped large swaths of the American population, many of whom ascribed to angry populism and partisan tribalism. While citizens had definite grievances about issues such as wealth disparity, Obama care, and limited job opportunities, their negative partisanship was largely reactionary: "US hate the other side," they said with their vote (Zogby, 2017: 8).

In addition to Trump's skillful maneuvering of the antiestablishment wave, his Republican supporters also played the game well, guaranteeing themselves control over the House and Senate. The appointment of Supreme Court justices is now the prerogative of a unified Republican government, which will influence social policy for the next twenty to thirty years. Ultimately, the outcome is a case of the dog catching the bus.
Here are good reasons to worry about how Donald Trump will handle foreign policy, but there are also reasons to think he won’t be any worse than some other administrations. The neoconservatives who dominated foreign-policy making in George W. Bush’s administration had lots of prior experience, God knows, and look at all the harm they did. My fears about Trump’s foreign policy have always been two-fold.

6. Conclusion
Iran attitude to worlds, regional, Crisis such as Syria, Yemen and Regional Crisis is cooperative and constructive. President Iran emphasized better relations with regional countries. Tehran tries to improve its relations with the Arab States. Iran’s orientation on regional crisis as Syria, Yemen and Regional Crisis is on cooperative and constrictive with global society Iran’s position on view, Paris and New York about the future of Syria show the Policy Making model for crisis management.

The sign of this process based on cooperation with international institute for collective management crisis. The model of Iran’s regional policy is based on Policy Making process. Iran’s position about Middle East Crisis like Syria, Yemen and Regional Crisis in some points are along with the international community specially in the matter of using peaceful solution and non-interfering of internal issues of each countries.

As the report also argued, Regional Crisis has simultaneously experienced communal cohesion and segmentation among Sunnis and Shies as well as the fragmentation of the segments within each community. This diverges from conventional wisdom in U.S policymaking circles and elsewhere, which sees Regional Crisis’s principal challenge as managing sectarian, ethnic and regional differences. The result of this process could be better described as follows:
- A fragmented Sunni arena The Sunni Arab political arena is severely fragmented. Some Regional Crisis nationalists, including former Baathists among the current anti-Baghdad insurgents, resent the loss of what they see as the Sunnis’ historic role in leading the united Regional Crisis.
- The Fundamental Salafi group’s also has a long-term strategic objective.
It seeks to consolidate territorial control in Syria and Iraq and then expand its so-called “caliphate” throughout the Fundamental Salafi group’s world and beyond.

- Fundamental Salafi group’s ideologues want to sharpen the conflict between Muslims and others and force people in the middle to choose sides.
- To do this, the Islamic State hopes to provoke responses that will reinforce its narrative of irreconcilable religious conflict and attract even more sympathizers to its bloodstained banner.
- Fundamental Salafi group’s needs to be fought more at home than abroad. But this did little to improve their Fundamental Salafi group’s problem, and they soon had to bring the fight against terrorism home.
- In contrast to this revanchist goal, many Sunnis are willing to deal with Baghdad in return for significant political and material concessions and greater local authority. There are also those who envisage Islamic rule in Regional Crisis, albeit without supporting IS, which has its own supporters, for want of better options. And although U.S officials, Western media and some of their Arab counter-parts tend to speak simplistically about mobilizing Regional Crisis’s Sunni Arab tribes against IS, these tribes too are at least as diverse in their political calculations and loyalties.
- This has given rise to a serious problem of representation, impeding negotiation with Baghdad. Sunni politicians in the capital are often seen as corrupt and lacking in credibility, but many other political and tribal figures have sought refugee in Regional Crisis Kurdistan or neighboring Jordan and do not represent a unified or coherent platform. IS has eliminated or marginalized non-IS factions of the Sunni insurgency, narrowing the field of potential Sunni inter locators even further.
- With massive dislocation among Sunni Arabs - some 20% of whom had taken refuge in the Kurdish autonomous region alone by June 2015 - and with IS ruling over several millions more, nobody has sufficient standing to speak with authority on behalf of the wider community.
- Building relationship that helps it escape from international isolation, which it sees as guarded by U.S global hegemony.
References