The Rise of ISIS and the Future of Iraq’s Security

Abbas Mossallanejad* - Full Professor of Political Sciences, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran

Received: 05/09/2015              Accepted: 10/11/2015

Abstract
The group calling itself the Islamic State poses a grave threat, not just to Iraq and Syria but to the region more broadly and to the United States, as well as its global coalition partners. A deadly and adaptive foe, the Islamic State seemed to come out of nowhere in June 2014, when it conquered Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city. However, the Islamic State of today is the direct descendant of a group that Iraq, the United States, and their partners once fought as al-Qaida in Iraq and then as the Islamic State of Iraq.

Analysts and specialists had already spent years studying the group and actually knew quite a bit about it: how it financed and organized itself, how it established control, how it responded to airpower, and what its ultimate goals were. The Republican meme is that every problem, including in the Middle East, is Barack Obama’s fault. Although emphasizing independence and self-reliance for America, they deny responsibility and accountability for their party. According to the GOP, George W. Bush left America and the world secure. The feckless Obama administration allowed the collapse of Iraq and rise of the Islamic State.

For instance, Jeb Bush defended his brother’s policies. He cited the “brilliant, heroic, and costly” success of the Iraqi troop surge, asking “why was the success of the surge followed by a withdrawal from Iraq, leaving not even the residual force that commanders and the joint chiefs knew was necessary?” He complained that “now we have the creation of ISIS.” In contrast, he contended, “had we kept the 10,000 troop commitment that was there for the President to negotiate and to agree with, we probably wouldn’t have ISIS right now.” Bush declared that “The one thing about my brother: he kept us safe.”

Keywords: Crisis, Disintegration, Regional security, ISIS, Iraq.

* E-mail: Mossallanejad@ut.ac.ir
1. Introduction
The Islamic State’s history began well before it conquered Mosul in 2014 indeed more than two decades before. In the darkest days of Operation Iraqi Freedom, one particularly violent terrorist stood out: Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, the “Sheikh of the Slaughterers.” By 2005, al-Zarqawi, a militant Islamist born in Jordan, already had an impressive résumé. Among other “accomplishments,” al-Zarqawi had helped found a jihadist group in his home country in the early 1990s (Knights, 2008: 8).

By 2002, he was operating in Iraq, and, by 2003, he was leading a group called Jama‘at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. In 2004, he aligned his group with al-Qaida. With this alignment, he changed the group’s name to the Base of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers, better known as al-Qaida in Iraq. Starting at this time, AQI built a sophisticated propaganda campaign, transmitting text, pictures, and videos suitable for online streaming and slickly produced, capturing attacks from multiple angles. Although focused on Iraq, the group had activities beyond (Fearon & Laitin, 2003: 12).

For example, in August 2005, AQI fired rockets at two U.S. warships in the port of Aqaba, Jordan. Three months later, it carried out simultaneous suicide bombings at three U.S.-branded hotels in Amman. Al-Zarqawi also had a network in Europe that had been active since at least 2002 and not only was inspiring, if not planning, attacks in Europe but was also attracting Europeans to travel to Iraq to carry out suicide attacks.

The five fundamental pillars of the ISI organization—security, sharia, military, administration, and media—were essential to the group’s operations, as becomes evident as one learns how ISI went about establishing control over an area. First, ISI would rent houses in the area in question and move experienced members and their families into those houses. Group members would begin surveillance and attempt to create a network of residents who would host other members.

Then security personnel would move in to conduct an assassination campaign against “the heads of apostasy,” which probably refers to
government officials. After the assassination campaign, the plan called for “shelling” the city, perhaps referring to actual shelling or to a bombing campaign, such as through vehicle-borne improvised explosive Devices Direct conquest was to follow (Buhaug & Kristian 2008: 225).

2. Methodology
This paper based on a descriptive and analytical method and relying on the library resources is trying to review the rise of ISIS and the Future of Iraq’s security.

3. Theoretical Frame work

3-1. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; Arabic: الدولة الإسلامية في العراق وشام), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (Tharoor, 2014). Daesh, or simply Islamic State (IS) (Tharoor, 2015) is a Wahhabi /Salafi jihadist extremist militant group. It is led by and mainly composed of Sunni Arabs from Iraq and Syria. As of March 2015, it has control over territory occupied by 10 million people in Iraq and Syria, and through loyal local groups, has control over small areas of Libya, Nigeria and Afghanistan. The group also operates or has affiliates in other parts of the world, including North Africa and South Asia (Zavadski, 2014).

On 29 June 2014, the group proclaimed itself to be an Islamic state and worldwide caliphate, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi being named its caliph, and renamed itself ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah (الدولة الإسلامية), "Islamic State" (IS). As a caliphate, it claims religious, political and military authority over all Muslims worldwide, and that "the legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the khilāfah’s [caliphate’s] authority and arrival of its troops to their areas" (Roggio, 2014).

The United Nations has held ISIL responsible for human rights abuses
and war crimes, and Amnesty International has reported ethnic cleansing by the group on a "historic scale”. The group has been designated a terrorist organization by the United Nations, the Union and member states, the United States, India, Indonesia, Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria and other countries. Over 60 countries are directly or indirectly waging war against ISIL.

The group originated as Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in 1999, which pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2004. The group participated in the Iraqi insurgency that followed the March 2003 invasion of Iraq by Western forces. In January 2006, it joined other Sunni insurgent groups to form the Mujahideen Shura Council, which proclaimed the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) in October 2006. After the Syrian Civil War began in March 2011, the ISI, under the leadership of al-Baghdadi, sent delegates into Syria in August 2011. These fighters named themselves Jabhat an-Nusra Front and established a large presence in Sunni-majority areas of Syria, within the governorates of Ar-Raqqah, Idlib, Deir ez-Zor, and Aleppo. In April 2013, al-Baghdadi announced the merger of the ISI with al-Nusra Front and that the name of the reunited group was now the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). However, Abu Mohammad al-Julani and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leaders of al-Nusra and al-Qaeda respectively, rejected the merger. After an eight-month power struggle, al-Qaeda cut all ties with ISIL on 3 February 2014, citing its failure to consult and "notorious intransigence". In Syria, the group has conducted ground attacks on both government forces and rebel factions in the Syrian Civil War. The group gained prominence after it drove Iraqi government forces out of key cities in western Iraq in an offensive initiated in early 2014. Iraq's territorial loss almost caused a collapse of the Iraqi government and prompted a renewal of US military action in Iraq (Sly, 2014).

SIL is adept at social media, posting Internet videos of beheadings of
soldiers, civilians, journalists and aid workers, and is known for its destruction of cultural heritage sites. Muslim leaders around the world have condemned ISIL’s ideology and actions, arguing that the group has strayed overwhelmingly from the path of true Islam and that its actions do not reflect the religion’s true teachings or virtues (al-Taie, 2015).

The group’s adoption of the name “Islamic State” and idea of a caliphate have been widely criticized, with the United Nations, NATO, various governments, and mainstream Muslim groups rejecting both (Hasan, 2015).

Map 1: ISIS attack zone, control zone and support zone

4. Finding

4-1. the genealogy of ISIS in Middle East

In short, but for the Bush administration’s decision to blow up Iraq there would have been no Islamic State rampaging through a chaotic Mesopotamia. The invasion was the critical mistake. The botched
occupation compounded that initial error. Even by the GOP presidential contenders’ own flawed standard failing to maintain an Iraqi troop presencePresident Bush is most responsible for the ISIS deluge (Regan, 2002: 63).

The Obama administration has played a malign, but secondary, role. Like its predecessor it also intervened too much rather than too little. For instance, President Obama continued to back Iraq’s Maliki government despite the latter’s sectarian excesses. That commitment left Washington with little leverage to press ruling Shia politicians to make concessions to disaffected Sunnis. Keeping a few troops on station against the Iraqis’ would have changed little—after all, the Bush administration failed to transform the Baghdad government when tens of thousands of American soldiers that were fighting on its behalf in Iraq.

4-1-1. the Bush Heritage for Middle East Security
These claims are self-serving, even deluded, a political fantasy. The George W. Bush administration created many of today’s worst geopolitical problems. First, President Bush used a terrorist attack conducted by Saudi citizens trained in Afghanistan as an excuse to invade Iraq, a long-time objective of neoconservatives as part of their plan to reorder the Middle East(Walter, 2002: 15).

Administration officials justified preventive war based on the claims of a dishonest informant provided by a crooked émigré hoping to rule Iraq. War advocates planned to establish a liberal government aligned with the West, governed by an American puppet, friendly to Israel, and home to bases for U.S. military operations against its neighbors. These deluded plans all came to naught. More than a decade later the invasion is viewed by most foreign policy analysts as a historic mistake, American’s worst foreign policy blunder in decades.

Second, after ousting the Sunni dictator whose authoritarian rule held the nation together, the administration mishandled the occupation at every turn.
The U.S. failed to exert control, allowing widespread looting, and disbanded the military, creating a large pool of angry and unemployed young men. Then Washington attempted to remake Iraqi society, pushing an American-made constitution and deploying U.S. political appointees even to draft Baghdad traffic regulations.

But the administration established a sectarian regime in Iraq as conflict flared and Iraq disintegrated: perhaps 200,000 Iraqis died, hundreds of thousands of Christians fled their country, and millions of Iraqis were displaced. In the midst of a virulent insurgency and civil strife the administration underwrote the “Sunni Awakening,” through which Sunni tribes turned against al-Qaeda in Iraq. However, Washington failed to achieve its underlying, essential objective of sectarian reconciliation (Regan, 2001: 41).

Bush continued to support the Maliki government even as it ruthlessly targeted Sunnis, setting the stage for Iraq’s effective break-up. In 2007 U.S. military adviser Emma Sky wrote of the U.S. military’s frustration “by what they viewed as the schemes of Maliki and his inner circle to actively sabotage our efforts to draw Sunnis out of the insurgency.” Al-Qaeda in Iraq survived, mutating into the Islamic State. The Bush administration then became one of the Islamic State’s chief armurers when Iraqi soldiers fled before ISIS forces, abandoning their expensive, high-tech weapons which U.S. aircraft had to destroy last year (Reuter, 2015: 2).

Third, President Bush failed to win Iraqi approval of a continuing U.S. military presence and governing Status of Forces Agreement. With Americans ready to leave and Iraqis determined to move on, Bush planned an American exit. Retired Army Chief of Staff Gen. Raymond Odierno explained: “us leaving at the end of 2011 was negotiated in 2008 by the Bush administration. And that was always the plan; we had promised them that we would respect their sovereignty.”
4-1-2. Obama Policy toward Fundamentalist Group in Middle East

In Syria Washington inadvertently discouraged a negotiated compromise between Bashar al-Assad and the peaceful opposition by insisting on the former’s departure. That convinced some regime opponents that the U.S. would force Assad’s ouster, precluding need for compromise which might have ended or at least limited the conflict early (Perry, 2015: 9).

Then the administration apparently rejected a Russian initiative to ease Assad out of power. The Guardian recently reported that former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari held talks in February 2012 with representatives of the UN Security Council’s permanent members, during which Moscow proposed Assad’s departure as part of peace talks. However, Washington, along with France and Great Britain, believed Assad was destined to fall and rejected Moscow’s initiative. At the time an estimated 7500 Syrians had died in the conflict, compared to the current death toll approaching a quarter million. Said Ahtisaari, “It was an opportunity lost.”

The Obama administration turned Libya into another fulcrum of conflict, following Europe’s lead in promoting low-cost regime change in the name of rescuing the Libyan people. That policy generated chaos, highlighted by competing governments and proliferating armed bands. More recently murderous Islamic State acolytes filled the void (Luft, 2014: 35).

President Obama also put U.S. credibility on the line by making ISIS’s sectarian war in Iraq and Syria America’s own, without committing sufficient forces to do much more than contain the Islamic State. The Obama administration became a source of weapons for the Islamic State after “moderate” insurgents backed by Washington repeatedly surrendered both personnel and arms to more radical forces. Ironically, one of the most effective Islamic state commanders, Abu Omar al-Shishani, had been trained by the U.S. as a member of the Georgian Special Forces. Two years ago he joined ISIS and has played a leading role in organizing attacks on the U.S.-supported Free Syrian Army.
In general, civil wars create four problems that threaten U.S. interests: civil wars reduce oil production, they provide a safe haven for terrorist groups to organize and spread, they bring potentially hostile new governments to power, and they proliferations pawn wars between and within neighboring countries. When it comes to the Middle East, the United States’ first and foremost interest is in oil exports and oil market stability (Walter, 1997: 32).

That may seem outdated at this moment of low oil prices, but the forces which produced the current dip are likely to prove temporary. The overall trends in energy indicate that oil prices will rebound in a matter of years (if not months) and oil will remain the core input of the global economy. Yet, a country’s oil production often plummets as a result of civil war.

Despite the presence of 150,000 U.S. troops, Iraqi oil production still fell by 64 percent (from 2.8 million barrels per day to just 1 million bpd) during the 2006-2008 civil war. The 1979 revolution in Iran related form of internal strife caused oil production to fall by 78 percent. As a result of its current civil war, Libyan oil production has fallen 92 percent (from 1.6 million bpd to 235,000 bpd).

Civil wars create ungoverned spaces where extremists and terrorist groups can organize, operate, and spread. It is no accident that many of the worst terrorist groups on the planet were born or incubated in civil wars. Today, the real terrorist threats from al-Qaeda and its offshoots are entirely located in states facing civil wars of one kind or another: Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and Mali. These extremist groups keep trying to gain a foothold in strong states like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and elsewhere, but haven’t succeeded.

The United States has spent year snurting relationships with Middle Eastern governments to ensure consistent access to oil and to protect U.S. allies in the region. The onset of civil war in any country means that new governments could come to power that are not only brutal, but also openly
antagonistic to the United States, its allies, and its interests (Pollack, 2014: 115).

Civil wars tend to create more violence both between neighboring states and within them. Neighboring states often get dragged into civil wars either because they intervene to help rebels, or because rebels take refuge on their territory, triggering an attack from the neighboring government. Israel and Syria repeatedly came to blows over Lebanon, and the Congolese civil war eventually sucked seven of its neighbors.

4-2. US Dual Approaches Toward Middle East Crisis

More than two dozen Coalition partners, led by the United States, have contributed to the military campaign in Iraq and Syria, conducting over 7,200 air strikes to date and training and providing equipment and ammunition to local partners. As a result, ISIL has lost the ability to operate freely in 20-25 percent of the populated territory it held one year ago in Iraq and Syria. In Syria, Kurdish and Arab partners with Coalition support have cut off ISIL’s access to all but 68 miles of the 600-mile long Syria-Turkey border, which is an important step toward preventing FTF travel and squeezing ISIL supply lines.

- In Iraq, 18 Coalition members have trained more than 13,000 Iraqi and Peshmerga soldiers. The Coalition has also facilitated training for thousands of Sunni tribal fighters, supporting Baghdad’s efforts to recapture Ramadi and liberate Anbar Province.

- In Syria, the Department of Defense is training and equipping appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian armed opposition to counter ISIL and create the conditions for a political settlement. Training sites were established in Turkey and Jordan, and sites in Qatar and Saudi Arabia will open shortly. Coalition strikes and nonlethal assistance have also helped a variety of other forces in Syria, many of whom played critical roles clearing ISIL from all but approximately 68 miles of the Turkey-Syria border.
The United States established and is leading a Coalition of more than 60 partners committed to degrading and ultimately destroying ISIL, and today welcomed new Coalition members Malaysia, Nigeria, and Tunisia to join those efforts. While military power rolled back some of the group’s territorial gains and improved local partner forces’ capabilities, Coalition efforts to begin countering ISIL’s messaging, disrupting its finances and countering the FTF threat continue to be equally important. And through humanitarian assistance and stabilization programs, the Coalition is helping those who have survived ISIL’s barbarity. Yesterday the Coalition released a statement outlining the breadth and depth of counter-ISIL efforts in the past year.

The challenge of establishing effective governance is even greater in Syria, where the regime is conducting a brutal campaign that has fractured the country and allowed ISIL to flourish. With our allies, we are pursuing a negotiated political transition that removes Asad from power and establishes a transitional government uniting the Syrian people (Obama, 2015: 2).

4-2-1. The Impact of Obama’s Anti-Terrorism Policy
Since the adoption of UNSCR 2178, 22 countries have passed legal frameworks to better address the threat posed by FTFs, 34 countries have arrested FTFs, and 12 have successfully prosecuted at least one foreign terrorist fighter. The United States has supported several of our partners’ development and implementation of laws addressing the FTF threat while respecting fundamental human rights and civil liberties (Whiteside, 2014: 21).

The United States continues to help partners improve border security to better identify, restrict and report suspected FTF travel, including encouraging partners to participate in multilateral information sharing mechanisms. Today, through INTERPOL’s Counterterrorism Fusion Center (CTFC), 52 countries now share foreign terrorist fighter profiles. Bilaterally, the United States has concluded arrangements with over 40 international
partners to provide a mechanism for sharing terrorist travel information.

The Coalition is working to squeeze ISIL financially. Early this year, the Coalition’s Counter ISIL Financial Group (CIFG), co-chaired by the United States, Italy and Saudi Arabia, developed an action plan to disrupt ISIL’s financial activity and ability to raise, move and use funds. This week, the United States designated over 30 ISIL officials, facilitators and supporters and announced a State Department Rewards for Justice Offer of up to $5 million for information leading to the significant disruption of the sale of oil or antiquities benefiting ISIL. Additionally, the UN added key ISIL facilitators to the UN al-Qa’ida Sanctions List, effectively freezing their assets and preventing them from using the international financial system as well as prohibiting their travel in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1267.

The Coalition is also working to erode ISIL’s appeal by strengthening capabilities to counter the group’s messages of hate. The State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications operational zed an Interagency Counterterrorism Communications cell to improve cross-government collaboration on countering ISIL’s online messaging. And the UAE-based Sawab (“the right path”) Center is increasing online debate to undermine ISIL’s claims to legitimacy and strategic success.

The United States and its partners are responding to the humanitarian impact of the conflict and ISIL’s depravity. In Syria, ISIL has contributed to the crisis that has forced nearly 12 million people from their homes, including more than 4 million refugees, 7.6 million internally displaced persons and 5.5 million children. The United States is the single largest humanitarian aid donor for those impacted by the Syria crisis, contributing $4.5 billion since the crisis began. Since 2014, 3.2 million Iraqis have also become internally displaced, and the United States has contributed more than $477 million in humanitarian assistance to address this and the needs of other vulnerable populations. Additionally, on September 15, the
Department of Defense approved up to $75 million for relief supplies to help address immediate lifesaving needs for displaced Iraqis. Our joint efforts with Coalition partners, including financial contributions to the United Nations Development Program’s Funding Facility for Immediate Stabilization, have begun yielding positive results near Tikrit, where approximately 100,000 civilians displaced by ISIL’s violence have returned.

ISIL is a unique threat in large part due to its ability to attract FTFs, and the United States is leading global efforts to address this challenge. Last year, President Obama chaired a UN Security Council summit at which UNSCR 2178 was adopted. The binding resolution, which has improved the international community’s ability to counter the FTF threat, requires countries to prevent suspected individuals from entering or transiting their countries; disrupt financial support to FTFs; implement UNSCR 1267 sanctions obligations and propose sanctions against those supporting ISIL and affiliates or derivatives of al-Qaida; and implement legislation to enable prosecution. UNSCR 2178 also underscores the centrality of efforts to counter violent extremism to suppress the FTF threat, a theme amplified at today’s summit.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is encouraging additional countries to join the U.S. and more than 60 other countries that use travel information, like Advanced Passenger Information (API), to more effectively identify known and previously unknown FTFs. In May, DHS and the State Department drove an unprecedented meeting of Interior Ministers of UN Security Council nations to advocate for strong implementation of UNSCR 2178 principles. The ministerial focused on border controls particularly. DHS also announced the creation of an open-source tool for strengthening border security. At a July meeting in Spain, DHS, State and partner nations made key financial commitments to strengthening border security.
4-2-2. US Regional Coalition against the Middle East Terrorist Groups
As President Obama has said, “ideologies are not defeated with guns; they’re defeated by better ideas – a more attractive and more compelling vision.” That is why President Obama convened the February 2015 White House Summit to Counter Violent Extremism, where the international community came together to expand efforts against violent extremism. Since then, driven by U.S. leadership, the global CVE movement has grown rapidly (Bell & Others, 2015: 15).

4-2-3. US Global Approaches against the Middle East Terrorist Groups
Today, the United States announced the launch of the International CT and CVE Clearinghouse Mechanism (ICCM) to improve capacity-building coordination among key partners in several pilot countries. The ICCM will identify programming gaps, and mobilize and coordinate donor resources to address identified needs. We also highlighted new initiatives and progress on a number of key initiatives announced at the February 2015 White House Summit to Counter Violent Extremism:

**Strong Cities Network:** Today, Attorney General Loretta Lynch will keynote the launch the first global network of municipal and other sub-national leaders to support the development of effective rights-based community focused programs and training to build resilience against violent extremism.

**The Global Youth Summit to Counter Violent Extremism:** Yesterday, Lisa Monaco, the President’s Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Advisor, kicked off a summit that brought together more than 80 global youth leaders and organizations from more than 45 countries to build support for innovative youth-led initiatives. The development of global virtual platforms will allow participating youth leaders and youth-oriented organizations to remain connected and share best practices.
Peer-to-Peer Global University Challenge: Spanning both domestic and international CVE efforts, the United States Government recently launched this initiative to empower university students in the United States, Canada, North Africa, Middle East, Europe, Australia, and Asia. Their objectives were to design and implement a social or digital initiative, product, or tool to motivate and empower their peers to join the movement in countering violent extremism. The spring 2015 winner of the Peer-to-Peer Challenge, One 95.org from Missouri State University, was showcased yesterday at the Global Youth Summit.

RESOLVE (Research and Solutions for Violent Extremism): This international CVE research network, which was launched last week, will provide grants to local researchers and serve as a platform to facilitate information sharing and mentoring. It will be managed by a consortium of organizations that will include the Geneva Centre on Security Policy, Hedayah, the Institute for Security Studies, the Africa Policy Institute, and the U.S. Institute of Peace.

Balkans Regional CVE Initiative: The Government of Albania will lead a Western Balkans regional CVE initiative to build regional capacity and cooperation on CVE issues, in particular through supporting front-line CVE practitioners, civil society, and local communities, developing national CVE strategies, and promoting research, education, and counter-messaging.

East Africa CVE Center of Excellence and Counter-Messaging Hub: The Government of Djibouti will host an Intergovernmental Authority on Development center to provide dedicated support, training, and research related to CVE, and serve as a resource for governments and civil society from across the region.

Guidelines and Good Practices for Developing Inclusive National CVE Strategies: Hedayah, in collaboration with the Global Center on Cooperative Security and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe, produced a set of guidelines, good practices and principles for the
development of national CVE strategies/action plans that promote a “whole of society” approach to CVE (Whiteside, 2015: 18).

4-3. Violence and Failed State Process in Iraq
The data on the patterns of violence in Iraq are uncertain at best, and so are the data on many of the factors that have generated that violence. There are, however, enough data to gain some insights into how the current fighting compares with fighting from the U.S. invasion to the withdrawal of U.S. combat force at the end of 2011, to illustrate the different patterns in casualties, and to show the importance of some of the factors that have driven the fighting and the growing divisions within Iraq.

One needs to be careful about confusing correlation with causation, but some key factors that have helped shaped the violence in Iraq are clear. In other cases, the sheer complexity of the different factors involved is a warning against putting too much emphasis on any single cause or pattern, assuming that national trends can explain local or regional patterns, or seeing the conflict in terms of single threat. Complexity and uncertainty are not easy to deal with, but they are often the reality (Blattman & Miguel, 2010: 45).

4-3-1. The Roots of Violence and Instability in Iraq
One way to turn the past into a continuing future is to forget it, and both Iraqis and Americans seem to have little desire to understand the extent to which Iraq’s security and stability problems began decades before the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the departure of U.S. troops. Iraq never had the kind of governance that helped it effectively exploit its potential for development or meet the needs of the accelerating growth of its population after 1950.

The bloody end of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 was followed by decades of equally bloody political infighting between largely Sunni Arab Iraqi factions, and a shift to a focus on state industry and military competition with Iran that systematically distorted the Iraqi economy and limited Iraqi
development on a national level. While many Iraqis remain in denial of the scale of the discrimination against religiously active Shi’ites and the scale of the problems with Iraq’s Kurds, these were a key factor of Iraq’s development from 1958 through the late 1970s and a civil war with the Kurds that began in 1961 and lasted at various levels through the first half of the 1970s (Bakhash, 1990: 230).

These struggles culminated in Saddam Hussein’s ruthless purge of all rivals in 1979, and the creation of a ruthlessly repressive dictatorship that was built of a Sunni Arab Minority power base, and lasted until the U.S. led invasion in 2003.

The fall of the Shah in Iran and the resulting unrest in world oil markets gave Iraq a brief burst of wealth in 1979, most of which was wasted on further distorting the economy by unproductive investments in the state sector. In 1980, however, Saddam Hussein tried to take advantage of the revolutionary turmoil in Iran to invade and annex key oil rich areas in Iran’s southwest under the guise that its Arab population had called for such aid (Brennan, 2014: 24).

By 1984, the Iraqi invasion had virtually bankrupted Iraq, forced mass conscription, halted development, and sharply reduced the quality of education and most government services. Iraq became dependent on Saudi and Kuwaiti loans and aid in oil exports, and it entered a period of continuing internal fighting and crisis that still continues. It never had a period after 1980 in which its civil government services and education sector fully recovered. One over-ambitious economic plan after another faded into unimplemented archives and civil governance became less effective.

From 1980 to the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1998, major elements of Iraq’s Kurds again began to seek independence, and in 1986, Saddam began the bloody Anfal campaign that caused some 50,000-200,000 casualties. Significant elements of Iraq’s Shi’ite population came to support Iran and
Saddam’s overthrow, and a Shi’ite armed opposition movement developed in the border areas and marshes in the south, leading to the ruthless suppression of any Shi’ite religious and political leaders that appeared to be a threat.

4-3-2. Iraq Invasion of Kuwait and Change the Balance Power

The invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was followed by Iraq’s catastrophic defeat in 1991, and by major new Kurdish and Shi’ite uprisings. The Shi’ite uprisings were initially joined to Sunni protests, but came to have significant ties to Shi’ites in Iran and were put down relatively quickly in the south - followed by further repression of any Shi’ite challenge to the regime through 2003 and the quiet execution of several key religious figures.

This long history of growing Sunni and Shi’ite tension between the early 1980s and 2003 laid the groundwork for the creation of Iraq’s Shi’ite exile movements and ties to Iran, as well as the Shiite effort to dominate Iraq’s government after the U.S. invasion and both take revenge and ensure continued power through measures like De-Beatification and disbanding the Iraqi Army, as well as establishing Shi’ite control over the security services and key elements of the once minority Sunni controlled structure of governance (Coller & Hoeffler, 2004: 31).

The outcome was different in the north. The U.S. led an effort that created a Kurdish security zone during 2003-2005, and laid the groundwork for the creation of a Kurdish Regional Government in spite of the infighting between the two leading Kurdish political factions - the KDP and PUK - and a civil war between them during the mid-1990s and that lasted until 1997. The result was the creation of an unstable and corrupt Kurdish enclave that became the Kurdish Regional Government, and was able to take control of significant amounts of disputed territory after the U.S. invasion in 2003, as well as more territory in Ninewa and Kirkuk during the fighting against ISIS in 2014.

The U.S. invaded Iraq and overthrew Saddam in 2003 under the
assumption that Iraq did not need the U.S. to plan for stability operations, the restructuring of the Iraqi government and security forces, and that U.S. combat units could begin to withdraw 90 days after the fall of Saddam Hussein. A combination of this lack of planning and the sudden rise to power of inexperienced and deeply divided Shi’ite leaders, coupled to an awkward and unstable relationship with the KRG, helped keep Iraq from developing any form of stability and triggered a civil war between Shiite and Sunni that lasted from 2004 to 2010, and was then revived by Maliki’s actions during 2011-2013 (Whiteside, 2015: 15).

The gross over-centralization and authoritarianism enforced by Saddam Hussein through 2003 was followed by a series of elections, political crises, and half-formed, half-implemented plans which failed to produce either stable governance or development, wasted most of the outside aid that was not consumed by the fighting, and proved unable to find any political solution to the need to integrate Sunnis into Iraq’s new power structure, the divisions between Kurd and Arab, or the effective allocation of Iraq’s oil export income.

The following charts can only begin to cover some of the underlying forces at work and the scale of the problems in Iraq’s governance and economy that now contribute to its level of violence, ethnic and sectarian tensions, and popular dissatisfaction with the Iraqi government. They do, however, illustrate how close Iraq is to a failed state, the secular forces that divide it, and the full range of challenges that the Iraqi government must deal with challenges that go far beyond ISIS and the current popular demonstrations over corruption and electric power that began in August 2015.

the growing impact of the current level of violence - much of which is affected by ISIS, but which has been matched by equal or greater levels of crisis, sanctions and violence during most of the period between 1980 and 2015 (World Bank Overview of Iraq, 2015: 14).

World Bank Global Ranking of Ease of Doing Business in Iraq in 156th worst of 185 Countries the current fighting in Iraq has made its problems in creating climate for effective economic development even worse, but Iraq has not developed meaningful plans for modernizing its overall agricultural sector since the fall of the monarchy, and its large state sector has become one of the least productive and most overstaffed in the developing world (World Bank Overview of Iraq, 2015:15).

4-3-3. The Role of Identity and Density Population on Crisis and Failed State In Iraq
Iraq’s population density is critical to understanding the real world nature of the gains ISIS has made in the West, the impact of hyper urbanization centered around Baghdad, and the fact that ethnic distribution and patterns in violence disguise how small a portion of Iraq’s population is in the west, how well Sunnis and Shi’ites are mixed in urban areas and some eastern provinces, and how large a portion of the population is located in areas disputed by Arabs, the Kurds as well as Turkmens and other minorities (Iraq Population Density, 2015: 20).

The Social character of Iraq is based on differentiation and conflict. The element of crisis and failed state in Iraq dependent on social and economic index as:

- Youth Bulge: 56.3%: 0-14 years: 36.7% (male 6,093,069/female 5,878,590); 15-24 years: 19.6% (male 3,237,212/female 3,142,202).
• Ethnic Divisions: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkmens, Assyrian, or other 5%.
• Sectarian Divisions: Muslim (official) 99% (Shia 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian 0.8% (cut 50% since 2003), Hindu <.1, Buddhist <.1, Jewish <.1, folk religion <.1, unaffiliated .1, other <.1.
• Urbanization: 69.4% (3.01% per year).
• GDP vs. Labor Force: agriculture: 3.3%, industry: 64.5%, services: 32.2% (2014 est.) versus agriculture: 21.6%, industry: 18.7%, services: 59.8% (2008 est).
• GDP: $505.4B (PPP 2014)$232.2B (2014 Official Exchange Rate)
• Per Capita Income: $14,100 (2014 in $2013) (109th in the world)
• Budget: revenues: $101.4 billion; expenditures: billion $94.58(2014 est).
• Taxes & Other Revenues: 43.6% of GDP.
• Exports vs. Imports: $94.43 billion (84% crude oil) vs. $62.34 billion.
• Direct Unemployment: 16% (2012).
• Poverty Level: 25% (2008).
• Transparency International Global Corruption Ranking: 170th worst of 175 countries.

Iraq faces massive population pressures, compounded by a major youth bulge, low real job creation and employment rates, and poor income distribution. Its population rose from 5.2 million in 1950 to 11.1 million in 1975, and 22.7 million in 2000, and 33.3 million in 2015. It will rise to 40.4 million in 2025, and 56.3 million in 2050. Jobs of any kind, and earnings sufficient to support marriage, housing, and family are critical problems for Iraqi youth compounded by violence, instability, and deteriorating education(Demographic Pressures on Iraq, 2015: 22).

4-3-4. the Continuity of Crisis and Conflict in Iraq
The metrics involved are uncertain, particularly in absolute numbers - although many of the trends seem valid. They are a clear warning not to focus on ISIS as the major threat in Iraq. The need to create a stable
structure that can deal with a broader range of challenges described in the previous section, and create a political and economic structure that can reduce Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic challenges is the critical goal, and any defeat or weakening of ISIS is simply one means to this end.

The two key metrics used in this section and throughout much of the rest of this report are the trends in civilian casualties and in incidents of violence. These seem to be the best data available that reflect the overall level of violence rather than the loss of combatant forces, although the chronologies of major violent incidents present in SIGAR, Iraqi Body County, Institute for the study of War, and other sources often provide useful insights. As the first chart in this section shows, there are major uncertainties in the estimates of both civilian killed and wounded. The same is true, however, of efforts to count incidents as a measure of violence(Khalilzad&Pollack, 2014: 72).

Regional dynamics have exacerbated an already complex environment. The Syrian conflict has resulted in the flow of refugees and armed groups in and out of the country. Escalating violence in Iraq is threatening the development of non-oil economic activity in much of the country. The interruption in the supply lines and the distribution systems had serious impacts on the private sector disrupting the move of merchandise between the northern regions and the rest of the country.

It also increased tensions broadly at a sectarian and ethnic level. There is no clear way to divide the major periods in the fighting in Iraq since the U.S. invasion in 2003. In broad terms, however, the fighting was dominated by U.S. forces and Sunni insurgents between 2003 and 2009; although Shi’ite militias and forces also played a role as did the growing strength of Iraqi government security forces and Kurdish PeshMerga forces.
The results of the March 2010 election left Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki without a clear mandate, and his primary rival -Ayad Allawi - without sufficient votes to form a government. The resulting power struggle between them pushed Maliki into an increasing effort to take control over the security services, turn the government in a group of loyalists, sideline Allawi, and push leading Sunnis out of office, often through false accusations and show trials. It gave Iran new leverage over the Iraqi government, and was a factor in Iraqi refusals to grant the U.S. the kind of status of forces agreement that would have allowed it to retain some troops(Cederman&Others , 2010: 7 ).

The power struggles that led Maliki to become steadily more authoritarian, to seek personal power at the cost of tolerating corruption in the security forces as well as the government, to try to purge Sunni rivals, alienate Sunni support in western Iraq, and effectively alienate the Sons of
Iraq coincided with a series of political events that meant the U.S. was unable to keep a cadre of combat forces in Iraq, and the U.S. phased out almost all forces by the end of 2011 except for a small military mission and let the police train and assist mission collapse (Knights, 2011: 12).

The grim aftermath of the 2010 election, and Prime Minister Maliki’s ability to retain office, was his systematic effort to take full control over the security services, abrogate his power sharing agreement with Allawi, eliminate or buy off his rivals and any serious Sunni political opposition, reinforce his rule through favoritism and corruption, and suppress any popular opposition - including peace demonstrations by the Sunnis in western Iraq who were largely excluded from Iraq’s oil revenues, power, and the security forces.

From the 2010 election to late 2013, the fighting gradually became a struggle between the Iraqi government forces increasingly shaped by Prime Minister Maliki to assert his own control and reflect Shi’ite interests, and the growing Sunni resistance. The next period which still continues began in late 2013 when small convoy of ISIS forces invaded Iraq from Syria in December 2013, expanded its control to take Mosul in June 2014 and started that new round of conflict that still continues.

The following charts reinforce the message of the previous World Bank data showing that Iraq’s economic position and governance deteriorated to levels equal to those of the worst periods under Saddam Hussein, and that corruption became even worse. They also show that the inevitable result was a steady rise in violence, sectarian conflict, tension with the Kurds, and abuse by Iraq’s security forces. Maliki’s steady shift toward Shi’ite rule and personal authoritarianism enable the recovery of elements of Al Qaida in Iraq (Gleditsch & Others, 2008: 495).

It coincided with a growing civil war in Syria, and laid the ground work for the rise of ISIS, the decay of already weak and incompetent security forces, and a level of popular Sunni hostility in Western Iraq that made it
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uniquely vulnerable to the ISIS invasion that began in December 2003. There is a wide range of detailed official and NGO reporting on the “ISIS War” that has shaped the most violent aspects of the conflicts in Iraq since late 2013.

It explains that tactical character of that fighting detail, and shows that the fighting in Iraq cannot be decoupled from the fighting in Syria or the broader regional tensions and violence between Sunni and Shi’ite. Islamic extremists and mainstream Muslims, and ethnic groups like the Kurds. It is important to note, however, that much of this reporting continues to show how critical it is to look beyond ISIS and at the broader causes of violence in Iraq (Gleditsch, 2007: 41).

Insecurity and violence have escalated in Northern Iraq but the situation in Baghdad and the south is improving. The June 2014 advances by ISIS have thrown parts of Iraq into violent chaos and instability. ISIS controls nearly one third of Iraq’s territory including major cities such as Mosul, Tel Afar and Fallujah. According to Iraq Body Count, 17,073 civilians were killed in 2014; 1.5 million people have been displaced since the fighting erupted.

The greatest numbers of deaths have been in Baghdad, Ninewa, Salah al-Din and Anbar provinces (governorates), which between them accounted for close to 80% of civilian deaths. Baghdad had the highest number of deaths, with 4,767 civilians recorded killed this year, while Anbar had over 3,600 civilians killed, half of them (1,748) by the Iraqi military in daily air strikes, primarily in and around Fallujah. In Salah al-Din and Ninewa civilian killings by ISIS have contributed significantly to the death toll. All four of these provinces have seen a marked increase in the number of deaths over 2013, with Baghdad almost doubling and the other three provinces more than doubling.

Among the 17,049 civilians recorded killed, many deaths were attributable to the actions of specific armed groups while the perpetrators of
many killings remain unknown. 1,748 civilians were reported killed by Iraqi military air strikes, while 4,325 were killed by ISIS. A further 10,858 civilians were reported killed by unidentified actors, where it has not been possible to establish which of the major actors, or possibly other, less well-identified groups, were involved. 118 civilians were reported killed by US-Coalition air strikes, the first time since 2011 that civilian deaths have been directly attributable to US-Coalition actions.

5. Analysis and Conclusion
As the report also argued, Iraq has simultaneously experienced communal cohesion and segmentation - among both Sunnis and Shies - as well as the fragmentation of the segments within each community. This diverges from conventional wisdom in U.S. policymaking circles and elsewhere, which sees Iraq’s principal challenge as managing sectarian, ethnic and regional differences.

Portraying these categories as primary and immutable overlooks fundamental political disagreements within each that present critical obstacles to building a durable and legitimate governing order in the Arab parts of Iraq. The result of this process could be better described as follows:

- A fragmented Sunni arena The Sunni Arab political arena is severely fragmented. Some Iraqi nationalists, including former Baathists among the current anti-Baghdad insurgents, resent the loss of what they see as the Sunnis’ historic role in leading the united Iraq.
- In contrast to this revanchist goal, many Sunnis are willing to deal with Baghdad in return for significant political and material concessions and greater local authority. There are also those who envisage Islamic rule in Iraq, albeit without supporting IS, which has its own supporters, for want of better options. And although U.S. officials, Western media and some of their Arab counter-parts tend to speak simplistically about mobilizing Iraq’s Sunni Arab tribes against IS, these tribes too are at least as diverse in their political calculations and loyalties.
- This has given rise to a serious problem of representation, impeding
negotiation with Baghdad. Sunni politicians in the capital are often seen as corrupt and lacking in credibility, but many other political and tribal figures have sought refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan or neighboring Jordan and do not represent a unified or coherent platform. IS has eliminated or marginalized non-IS factions of the Sunni insurgency, narrowing the field of potential Sunni interlocutors even further.

- With massive dislocation among Sunni Arabs - some 20% of whom had taken refuge in the Kurdish autonomous region alone by June 2015 - and with IS ruling over several millions more, nobody has sufficient standing to speak with authority on behalf of the wider community.
- Clearly, the threat posed by IS was grossly underestimated prior to the group’s capture of Mosul and its sweep towards Baghdad in June 2014. The difficulty of the battle that still lies ahead before IS can be defeated continues to be underestimated as well, not because it is invincible, but because of the deep structural problems and fundamental political failings of those ranged against it.
- The greatest risk is that those confronting IS will fail to do what they must to rebuild a cohesive and inclusive Iraqi state. The ‘Abadi government needs to put down real political, civic and institutional roots in Sunni areas if it is to consolidate gains against the IS.
- It cannot risk disappointing Sunni expectations once again, as they were under Maliki, and must forge new relations even as combat continues. But reintegrating Sunni towns and provinces will require immediate and massive investment in the repair and reconstruction of physical infrastructure and housing, social rehabilitation, and the empowerment of local and provincial authorities.
- Nor can Baghdad continue to ignore the development needs of Iraq’s poorest provinces, most of them in the Shia south, if it is to ensure both equity and political buy-in to its vision of national reconciliation and integration.
- The ‘Abadi government must start showing visible successes where its
predecessors since 2003 have failed in making a head start on rebuilding a viable state and crafting a new social pact, even as it faces the existential threat posed by IS.

- The August 2015 reform plan is a start, but must be swiftly deepened and widened. The U.S., Iran and other external powers must also throw their weight behind it unlikely as such convergence is if the Iraqi state is to start looking and acting more like a state. But even if the state is not broken beyond repair, the domestic and external actors most committed to its revival may not have enough political and financial capital to fix it.

- In spite of the Sunni Awakening movement in 2006, the U.S. troop surge in 2007, and a campaign of highly refined U.S. and Iraqi counterterrorism operations that badly damaged ISI, the group was strong enough to persist.

- By 2009, it was regenerating, conducting a series of suicide attacks. In 2010, more people were still being killed in terrorist incidents in Iraq than in Afghanistan or Pakistan (Table 2), although not all of these attacks were perpetrated by ISI.

- Second, any coherent plan against the Islamic State must aim to eliminate, not merely degrade, its leadership and potential leadership. The coalition has successfully targeted numerous senior leaders. But the organization’s focus on creating a deep bench of personnel has meant that attacking individual leaders will not destroy the group.

- Replacements will rise, and any damaging effect will be temporary. So, to be successful, the coalition must do more than take out key leaders: It must eliminate entire layers of high-level managers, such as an administrative emir and his administrative committee.

- The capture of the group’s computers, hard drives, memory sticks, and other records as the United States did against one target in spring 2015 would multiply these effects. Such collection provides valuable information not only about people in the group but also about how it is
organized, how it raises money, and how it operates.

- However, capturing this information would likely require increased U.S. involvement in combat situations, so policymakers must continue to evaluate the costs of such action against its benefits, as they have presumably been doing. As with counter finance efforts, territorial control will boost counter leadership efforts.

- The Islamic State’s control of large swaths of land enables it to more easily train new leaders, in addition to fighters. Such efforts would be stunted were the group forced to do them surreptitiously.

- Third, a better hold strategy once the Islamic State is pushed out of an area is essential. Ending the ability of the Islamic State to operate openly does not mean victory it simply means that the nature of the fight has changed. Even in 2008, the organization was majority Iraqi with extensive underground support networks. It has consistently followed a strategy of infiltration, assassination, and intimidation before fully controlling an area.

- The group has successfully maintained underground networks in areas that had been liberated. This means that after the Islamic State is thought to be expelled from a town, the trust of the community must be gained so that intelligence can be collected. An active police or troop presence needs to be established. History shows that ISI could not control urban populations in the face of a strong security presence that was positioned to receive tips from the community.

- Finally, defeating the Islamic State will require persistence. And even if it is declared defeated, Iraq, the United States, and their allies would benefit by committing attention and analysis to the group over the longer term.

6. Acknowledgment
I want to thank the Research Deputy of Tehran University and the Editorial Board of Geopolitics Quarterly who cooperated with me for publishing this article.
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- Hasan, Mehdi (10 March 2015), " How Islamic is Islamic State?", New Statesman, retrieved 7 July 2015, Consider the various statements of Muslim groups such as the Organization of Islamic Co-operation, representing 57 countries (Isis has "nothing to do with Islam"); the Islamic Society of North America (Isis’s actions are "in no way representative of what Islam actually teaches"); al-Azhar University in Cairo, the most prestigious seat of learning in the Sunni Muslim world (Isis is acting "under the guise of this holy religion . . . in an attempt to export their false Islam"); and even Saudi Arabia’s Salafist Grand Mufti, Abdul Aziz al ash-Sheikh (Isis is "the number-one enemy of Islam").