عنوان مقاله [English]
Third millennium especially after September 11 has been associated with large changes in different areas and regions. Turkey, Iran and Armenia, as three neighboring countries, have experienced domestic, regional and international dramatic changes. Mountainous Karabakh region of Azerbaijan has occupied by Armenians. In the first years of the 1990s relations between Turkey and Armenia was heavily under the influence of issues such as the alleged Armenian genocide by the Ottomans, but once again has risen. AKP has opened a new chapter in Turkish foreign policy related to neighbors, including Armenia. Although other factors such as energy security and unresolved conflicts continue to rattle Russia's war with Georgia, Turkey will take more attention to the South Caucasus. Armenia and Turkey agreement on April 22, 2009 in Zurich was the peak of meetings and it was seen that they will improve their relations. Caucasus has taken Iran’s attention more than the past. Although unpromising relations between Turkey and Armenia would give Iran an opportunity, but a question arises: "whether the relations between Turkey and Armenia will affect Armenian-Iranian relations or not? To answer this question, we first examined the relations between Turkey and Armenia in the form of analyzable Ahmet Davut Oglu theories. The hypothesis is that improving the relation between Turkey- Armenia does not affect Armenian-Iranian relations. To illustrate this relationship Neo-realism oriented paradigm is used.
Turkish and Armenian officials have reached an agreement to normalize relations without considering Karabakh conflict. It is obvious that normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations is not possible without recognition of the massacre of Armenians and settlement of Karabakh crisis. This approach has put Turkish statesmen in a very difficult situation for improvement relations with Armenia. On the one hand, Turkey should appease Azerbaijan about Ankara’s position related to Karabakh, and from the other hand it should not give points to Armenia on the issue of genocide, which would also face Turkey with international responsibilities.
In fact, closing the two countries’ borders during the past 18 years has had no positive effect on the settlement of Karabakh conflict, and has also made it more complicated, increased Armenia's security concerns, and prompted Armenia to get closer relation with Iran and Russia. This situation is not desirable for Ankara and, at a higher level, for the Western states. Therefore, Russia has used the interests of Turkey, Armenia, and the Western countries in a more complicated game – whose main goal was originally to put the Western-minded government of Mikheil Saakashvili under pressure– in order to pave the way to improve relations between Yerevan and Ankara.
In the view of the mutual needs of Iran and Armenia in various areas, it would be unrealistic to say that rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey will have a negative impact on Armenia’s relations with Iran. Meanwhile, it is essential that Iranian policymakers have a correct and accurate understanding related to the new dynamics of political, security and economic equations of South Caucasus in order to be able to protect their country’s interests in the face of gradual changes in traditional balance of power in this region.
Turkey and Armenia are slowly improving bilateral relations but this does not mean that this issue will necessarily affect Iran-Armenia relations in a negative way. While there has been competition between Turkey and Iran (especially over the Syria crisis), but relations between Iran and Turkey have been cordial. Iran and Turkey have common views on some regional issues. Erdogan’s recent visit from Iran proved that despite essential differences over the Syria crisis, both Iranian and Turkish officials share mutual benefits.