The Middle East Security and Donald Trump’s Grand Strategy

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Abstract

The Middle East region has been a longstanding major source of concern for American leaders due to its eternal religious and cultural relevance, a strategically pivotal location, huge oil reserves, interlocked and intractable conflicts, and the persistence of major security threats such as terrorism and the risk of nuclear proliferation.

The Middle East region is undergoing security shifts. Regional security in the Middle East will be changed in Trump era. Security and power in each region has connected, empowered and influenced a new generation of young people, who are questioning political authority with new intensity.

The outcomes of the Arab Spring mostly disappointed the world and its policymakers. The region is violent, disfigured by inter and intrastate conflict and by sectarian divisions. Power and security in Middle East countries has been fragmented. The nature of security in Middle East policy is based on Proxy war and Non-state actor’s initiation. Non-state actor who are active in the region, are both a symptom of state weakness and amplify the threats to states.

The Middle East region recognize with economic bedrock of the regional security as exports of hydrocarbons is under threat. Surveying the region shows that, in the throes of historic turmoil and facing massive challenges. The US, UK and other European countries has critical interests in the region, both economic and security. Moreover, what is happening in the Middle East, it will be expanded to other regions and does not stay in the Middle East. In this situation, Trump’s policy and strategy lead to instability, turmoil and power transition. For control and leading this process, world politics to need co-operational security model with other great powers and regional actors like Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

This article, by descriptive-analytical method, seeks to study the "Trump’s Grand strategy in the Middle East", the main hypothesis emphasis that “U.S strategy on Middle East in Donald Trump policy based on offshore balancing, proxy war and increasing chaos”.

Keywords: Regional security, Trump’s Grand Strategy, the Middle East.

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1. Introduction
The United States seeks a Middle East that is not a safe haven or breeding ground for jihadist terrorists, not dominated by any power hostile to the United States, and that contributes to a stable global energy market. For years, the interconnected problems of Iranian expansion, state collapse, jihadist ideology, socio-economic stagnation, and regional rivalries have convulsed the Middle East. The United States has learned that neither aspiration for democratic transformation nor disengagement can insulate us from the region’s problems (National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017:48).

US grand strategy based on to use power for regional and international security. In this context, emerging power as china, UK and Russia have compatible role in world system. Barak Obama policy was regional engagement. Engagement policy must also be modest and realistic. In this process the US does not have a moral obligation to do what we cannot do. In sum, US president for arranging security policy has need hegemony role in the new conditions. New threat in international security contains refugees and terrorism as consequences of the unrest and insecurity of the region(Haass, 2017: 268).

Trump’s policy as it stands has not always adjusted to new conditions. This doctrine generally had criticized. They propose to Trump for multilateralism and engagement. This approach can be sustained and developed, although engagement doctrine based on substantially revised assumptions from those that have guided Trump’s policy. In this condition, US policy and Trump cannot remain aloof or walk away from the chaos and instability, hard though it is to identify solutions. This process based on the ugly dilemmas posed by the region must be faced (Diemers and Khalil, 2015:4).

US president needs to have close co-operation with other powers, and with forces outside normal government reach, will be required at all times. This approach may mean less reliance on US leadership in the region
depending on whether or not America in practice ‘pivots’ away from the
Middle East and working more closely with other powers in and outside the
region. In this process, competitor actors like China and Russia have major
development and infrastructure ambitions across the Middle East. US policy
must hone its proverbial skills for understanding and respecting the cultures
and customs of the countries, societies and communities of the region, while
resisting the impulse towards nation-building or overzealous instruction as
to how peoples should govern themselves or decide internal differences.
Approaches to different countries will need to be sensitively
tailored (Alterman, 2016: 41).

Relationships in US Middle East policy and security could be rounded
and based on wider aspects than trade or security. There must be cultural,
social, educational and professional dimensions, with attention paid to such
sensitive issues as ease of travel, degree of welcome to students and other
aspects which if badly handled can undermine influence and friendship.
Trump’s military intervention, always in coalition with willing partners,
may be unavoidable where all diplomacy and discourse is rejected.

In Barak Obama era some policy as intellectual, diplomatic and soft
power resources be used to the full. With power decentralized and non-
governmental influences increasingly at work in most Middle Eastern
societies, US will need to update its policy deployment and operating
systems to connect with, and influence, the decisive trends of opinion. In
new era, Donald Trump must be recognition that the complex challenges of
the whole Middle East region. US policy and Trump’s administration cannot
be met by one country alone (Alterman, 2016: 41).

US policy need to cooperation with Europe, Western world and other
partnership in regional countries. Nowadays the security issues are global,
the security threats are global and that the full resources of a post-Western
world will be needed to turn decline and turmoil into the beginnings of
sustainable peace and prosperity. Donald Trump needs to co-ordination with
the resources of Asia, to which the Middle East is increasingly connected, as well as of Russia, must be part of the way forward.

Trump and US policy must continue to be engaged and active. Trump’s policy is undergoing a dramatic shift in its foreign policy stance; it is an opportunity which must be seized to review long-standing positions of successive governments. The Middle East countries and identical groups are undergoing a period of revolutionary change. A transformation of power who wields it, how it is exercised is catalyzing radical changes to the order and organization of the region. The transition is messy and chaotic. It is challenging to forecast how the region might evolve, but it is likely to be unstable, to involve high levels of violence, and to constitute an ongoing challenge to policy makers. Policy makers will have to be prepared to increasingly take account of power structures, outside the traditional ones of governments (Hass, 2017: 215).

2. Methodology
The main question in this article is about “Trump’s Grand strategy in the Middle East”. The main hypothesis emphasis that “U.S strategy on Middle East in Donald Trump policy based on off shore balancing, proxy war and increasing chaos”. The methodology of the article is based on data analysis and content analysis. The Middle East contains Persian Gulf, Asia South West and North of Africa.

3. Theoretical framework
3.1. Offshore balancing
Offshore balancing is a strategic concept used in realist analysis in international relations. It describes a strategy where a great power uses favored regional powers to check the rise of potential hostile powers.

Offshore balancing is, at its core, a fairly straightforward concept. It derives directly from the realist tradition in international-relations scholarship, and so focuses heavil —almost entirely—on “system
maintenance” and the preservation of an acceptable balance of power. In particular, offshore balancers believe that outside of the Western Hemisphere, there are three primary overseas regions—Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf—that are of fundamental importance to U.S. interests because of the resources, wealth, and geopolitical geography that they command. Were one or more of these regions to come under control of an American adversary, that adversary might be able to generate the strength necessary to endanger the United States itself or to interfere massively and unacceptably with U.S. economic wellbeing. Offshore balancers therefore strongly affirm a core tenet of postwar U.S. statecraft—that the essential and overriding goal of American grand strategy must be to ensure that none of these regions are dominated by a hostile power (Brands, 2015: 13).

Offshore balancing as a principle underlying U.S. policy in the Middle East and especially the Persian Gulf region died in stages during subsequent years. During the presidency of George H.W. Bush, the United States responded to Saddam's swallowing of Kuwait with the influx of U.S. troops that became Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. This was not so much a discarding of offshore balancing as a recognition that occasionally even an offshore balancer has to come onshore to do the balancing. This time Saddam had not picked a fight with someone his own size or bigger, but instead with little Kuwait. Undoing the aggression and restoring the previous regional balance without trying to change regimes not to American liking was an appropriate response by the United States. But then came “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran during the Clinton administration, which sounded more like long-term direct U.S. involvement, and less like skillful exploitation of regional rivalries, than offshore balancing implies. Then under George W. Bush any resemblance to offshore balancing was blown out of the water with a large offensive war and a misguided attempt to remake the region politically in the U.S. image (Pillar, 2016).
3.2. Proxy war

Referring to the Oxford dictionary, proxy war means: “A war instigated by a major power which does not itself become involved” (Oxford dictionary). A proxy war is a conflict between two states or non-state actors where neither entity directly engages the other. While this can encompass a breadth of armed confrontation, its core definition hinges on two separate powers utilizing external strife to somehow attack the interests or territorial holdings of the other. This frequently involves both countries fighting their opponent's allies, or assisting their allies in fighting their opponent. Proxy wars are the product of a relationship between a benefactor, who is a state or non-state actor external to the dynamic of an existing conflict, and the chosen proxies who are the conduit for the benefactor's weapons, training and funding. In short, proxy wars are the logical replacement for states seeking to further their own strategic goals yet at the same time avoid engaging in direct, costly and bloody warfare (Loveman, 2002: 30).

4. Finding

4.1. The Middle East in transition; disorder and turmoil

After the post-World War, boundaries and system have crumbled. The Middle East is undergoing an era of transition. Some of scholars like Richard Haass, had a fairly dark view of the region with its conflicts that are within and between states. New challenges are direct and indirect, where boundaries in many cases count for little and there is an odd mixture of strong governments and weak governments. This process created an antagonist relationship between regional, subnational and international actors (Haass, 2017: 217).

Trump’s national security on December 2017 has been a rebalancing between Western powers and states of the Middle East. Trump’s doctrine has been a shift away from Western states as the global center of economic power; and as economic power has been shifting to the East, countries in the region have been turning their political attention there as well. The role of
shale oil in its energy mix has reduced the importance of the Middle East to the US, a trend which is likely to lead, over time to a concomitant diminution of the protection offered by the Western security umbrella to the region.

Regional actors have been taking a more active role and jostling for power, particular concern, a virulent competition for regional hegemony between Saudi Arabia and Iran is destabilizing the region. The declining role of external states particularly the US has helped usher in, and been amplified by, a more multipolar Middle East. Throughout the region political conflicts are being conducted under the auspices of sectarian concerns, with the potential to trigger civil wars with religious dimensions (Mossalanejad, 2016:8).

The Middle East non-state actors can be both negative and irredeemably disruptive such as terrorist groups, most notably Al-Qaeda and ISIS, and they can also be positive such as civil society. There are also sub-state actors, were groups trying to institute governments, working within states they are local and trying to develop states. The most prominent examples are the Kurds in both Syria and Iraq. Sub nation groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas are non-state actors that have transitioned into either sub-state actors or even become part of legitimate state structures.

The reality of Middle East security is the powerful popularizing influence of communication and political interaction, driven by the expansion of technology and the mass move online on a scale never before known. Virtual reality such as new media and technology fusing with a rising young generation have been both triggering and enabling social change. In most countries in the Middle East young people the range of 15–24 years old, make up more than a quarter of the population. In some countries, the numbers are much larger. For example 70 percent of the Jordanian population is under the age of 30 for instance. In the process of Iran’s turmoil on December 2017, the young generation had a major and determine
role (Baker & Others, 2017: 2).

The process of democratization and changing is based on information revolution. Virtual sphere and social networks had created a more activist public, who feel empowered and prepared to question, with new intensity. This process is passing from traditional social contracts and new generation to demand more accountability. A new generation of young people, the majority of whom are excluded from formal political processes, are now better informed and connected by technology to their peers within their own countries, the region and internationally.

The new era of Middle East policy is based on new tools of technology and connection have also had darker implications. Network technology has been leading the most of chaos signs. Social networks and the young population have empowered ISIS, whose use and abuse of the internet is profoundly troubling. Traditional and ancient regimes have responded adroitly too, exploiting technology to extend their surveillance and suppress disagreement. Some of the more depressing facets of the region remain stubbornly resistant to change (Mossalanejad, 2016:14).

There is a new antagonist relationship between some transitional societies which merely an economic question but essential to understanding the fertile ground for the growth of unrest and sectarianism. In this process, widening gaps of wealth are present within the borders and between countries of the region. According to a 2014 report by the Institute of International Finance, foreign assets of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council rose to $2.27 trillion at the end of 2014. This compares to a decline of foreign assets of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco to a deficit of $46.7 billion at the same time. Privately-held liquid wealth in the PGCC has grown from $1.1 trillion in 2010 to $2.2 trillion in 2014 (Cammack, 2016: 19).

Religious and sectarian difference incited and exploited by states of the region, often with violent ramifications. This process will almost certainly
continue to be key characteristics of the landscape. There is a risk that the political and religious dimensions of the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran have already spilt over into a full religious civil war, beyond the control of the states. There are tensions within the Sunni Islam camp, between the extreme form of Salaﬁ Islam, represented by ISIS, al-Qaeda, and the rest of the Sunni schools of Islam.

Donald Trump and the new US administration have the potential to destabilize further the region. On seeking a two-state solution and relations with Iran, the US President has taken positions that are unconstructive and could even escalate conflict. Trump’s executive order for comprehensive arrangement common action on 2018 January 12 show that the cooperation with international community has decreased. The mercurial and unpredictable nature of policy-making by President Trump has made it challenging for the EU Governments to influence US foreign policy so far, a challenge that is not likely to ease (Donnan & Mitchell, 2017: 5).

The Middle East is not, in itself, a national security priority for the Russians, unlike Ukraine and the European countries. Putin has been able both to foment and to exploit the turbulence of the Middle East to gain considerable authority and leverage, which it is likely to wish to trade off in the global arena. The scope of Russia’s role in the Middle East remains unclear. As a result, the US engagement with Russia, while desirable, could continue to be cautious.

Donald Trump and the US should pursue a transactional approach with Russia in the Middle East, willing to cooperate on specific objectives, but this should not be at the expense of compromising on Ukraine or Crimea. Where it is possible for European countries to secure closer cooperation with Russia on specific objectives in the region, including stability in Syria and Libya, counter-terrorism, making progress on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and supporting the Iran nuclear deal, this should be pursued (Dean & et al, 2017: 4).
The US foreign policy in Donald Trump era must retreats in its support for the international rules-based order and in its security commitments to the Middle East, China’s economic interests may necessitate deeper political engagement. There is no indication that the rise of China in the Middle East will be threatening to US and European countries interests. China is likely to want to manage its rise without clashing with any other external power, balancing regional relationships, without committing to onerous security burdens, and acting through multilateral institutions. US as a conductor member of NATO, the G-7, the G-20, UNSC and the EU, has a seat at virtually every international table of consequence (Bierman, 2016: 4).

The European countries could wield its diverse range of memberships in the world’s most influential organizations effectively. It should also work closely with its leading European allies, in particular France and Germany, on issues in the Middle East. Over the past 60 years, US policy has often been at loggerheads in the Middle East behaving as rivals even when they were allies elsewhere in the world. The time for that is past. (Flood, 2017: 7)

The right objective in future should be for the European countries to work together and thus to maximize their cooperation in a region of great importance of them. The resources of the international community will be critical to rebuild Yemen, Libya and Syria. For peaceful situation, Donald Trump foreign policy should support UN efforts at mediation in Yemen, Libya and Syria in particular urging Saudi Arabia to demonstrate its constructive cooperation with the peace process in Yemen and other critical environment.

4.2. The Middle East States Crisis Management
Tension between the Saudi-Iranian competitions is mostly, but not exclusively, political in nature. Such tensions are likely to endure and could even increase as the Iran nuclear deal nears the end of its term and both countries compete on the international oil market. A sectarian dimension helps fuel the conflict and domestic factors contribute heavily. The interests
of the international community are ill-served by this rivalry (Economist magazine, 2017: 3).

Donald Trump’s foreign policy will have to be more transactional and adroit in its partnerships in the region. Power amongst states in the region is in flux and the UK cannot rely merely on its traditional allies. Despite concerns about their own internal political direction, the UK will have to maintain productive working relationships with principal regional countries. It is not in the Middle East regional states interest, nor in that of their principal cooperation, that the Saudi-Iranian rivalry should continue to spread geographically and to intensify (Martel, 2015: 148).

For peaceful cooperation between Middle East countries, we need a determined effort should be made to develop a modus vivendi between these important Middle East states, perhaps in a wider regional framework as like Islamic cooperation organization. It is in the US and EU interests to pursue a better relationship with Iran, and we recommend that this should be a key priority for the UK. More cooperative political and economic engagement will also depend on Iran ceasing its campaign of harassment against British-Iran dual nationals, in particular in the case of human right subjects (Kaplan, 1999: 176).

The Trump foreign policy is unlikely to try to destroy the Iran deal, but the administration is also unlikely to take any steps to facilitate more effective sanctions relief to Iran. This will be a grave impediment to the sustainability of the Iran nuclear deal and it will mean that Iran’s ongoing frustration with opening Western markets will continue. A strategic opportunity will be lost as Iran looks to non-Western powers, like China and Russia, which will be able to develop faster and more extensive trade relations, opening new channels for financing trade and investment.

The future of the Iran nuclear deal, are imperiled by the political context in 2018. This subject could create a hostility position between Iran and US administration. In this process European supporters of the deal such as
France and the UK consumed by their own internal political debates. The interests of the Iran and European countries are clear. The EU countries should continue to support the Iran nuclear deal, whether or not it is supported by the US. It will have to work closely with its European partners, and Russia and China, to ensure the sustainability of the deal. There is sufficient international and regional support to ensure that the Trump administration and their policy will not be able to resurrect the international coalition to rebuild sanctions or impose new ones on Iran (Krasna, 2016: 92).

In this process the international community is limited in its capacity to respond to Iranian provocation in the region, but the approach by the US has a dangerous escalatory logic. International actors could recommend that the external parties to the Iran nuclear agreement should find a way to discuss amongst themselves any hostile foreign policy actions by Iran in order to form a united and proportionate international position on Iranian actions. It will also have to recognize that Iran has legitimate regional and international security interests and needs to be recognized as having a role as a regional power (Larres, 2016: 25).

The terms of the Iran nuclear deal could be broadened into an international standard, making Iran less of a special case. We urge the EU countries; China and Russia must to extend some energetic diplomacy to secure backing amongst the P5 of the UN Security Council to explore such ideas. The EU countries, China and Russia have a crucial interest in maintaining a clear-eyed but close relationship with the Persian Gulf monarchies. As political authority collapses in many Middle East countries, the EU countries, China and Russia needs a good working relationship with the remaining stable countries.

The EU countries, China and Russia have to go to considerably further lengths to improve transparency and accountability around its relationships in the Gulf. The UK has not taken the opportunity to set out a clear
assessment of its objectives in the region, to which it can be held to account. All of the great powers also recognize the shared interests: defense sales, nondefense commercial interests and trade, the fight against terrorism, and security of energy supply throughout the Persian Gulf (Landler & Forsythe, 2017: 7).

The future of Palestinian government is unknown. In this situation international community have need a negotiated two-state outcome remains the only way to achieve an enduring peace that meets Israeli security needs and Palestinian aspirations for statehood and sovereignty, ends the occupation that began in 1967, and resolves all permanent status issues. The EU countries, China and Russia must condemn the continuing Israeli policy of the expansion of settlements as illegal and an impediment to peace (Bell & Others, 2015: 25).

The consequences would be grave for the region. The resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute must remain high amongst EU foreign policy priorities. On its current trajectory, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is on the verge of moving into a phase where the two-state solution becomes impossibility and is considered no longer viable by either side. The Government should be more forthright in stating its views on these issues despite the views of the US administration. Donald Trump cannot to play a more active role in such critical situation (Hagen, 2016: 8).

Donald Trump and US administration cannot to manage such as crisis. In the absence of US regional role, it is time for the European countries and other great power to play a more active role. The EU countries, China and Russia should support European diplomacy, including the French-led initiative. The International Conference intends to meet again at the end of 2017 and the UK should undertake to support it meaningfully, both politically and financially.

The balance of power in the delivery of peace lies with Israel. It is also an opportunity to bring moderate states and groups of the region on board to
build a broad coalition of international support. If Israel continues to reduce the possibilities of a two-state solution, the balance of power in the delivery of peace lies with Israel. It should be ready to support UNSC resolutions condemning those actions in no uncertain terms. All of the great powers like as the EU countries; China and Russia should give serious consideration to now recognizing Palestine as a state (Lake, 2017: 5).

Since the smaller Persian Gulf countries have demonstrated more economic dynamism and political flexibility in recent years, the process of building more multilateral structures in the Middle East security is a long term one. The process of working within regional security structures helps produce progressive changes in the economic sphere and can help strengthen rules of conduct in the political sphere. It is not a specifically EU countries, Russia and China interest that countries of the Middle East remain centralized, unitary states (Haberman & et al, 2017: 5).

Neither should the EU countries, Russia and China actively support this process of state unraveling. It should be prepared to live with de facto arrangements and de Jure sub-state entities. The problem of weak states is likely to remain part of the landscape, and often what happens at the national level has little impact at the local level (Larres, 2016: 92).

The Middle East countries have to deepen its engagement beyond the state, using all the instruments available to do so. It should be a priority EU country, Russia and China policy to build local ties and seek the broadest range of co-operational relationships, with a range of sub-state actors. This must be a coherent regional countries effort, not just one undertaken by the Foreign Office. The core stats of international politics could recognize that there is a balance to be drawn between engaging with sub-state actors, and avoiding the risk of undermining the central state (Brzezinski, 2009: 5).
sub-state jihadist actors, a distinction must be drawn between ISIS as a millenarian and brutal and other sectarian groups that are fed by local grievances, desire power and can win electoral successes. There is an important distinction and differentiation between being prepared to talk to individual members of such groups and being prepared to negotiate with them. The latter should be dependent on their willingness to renounce violence. The US, EU countries, Russia and China should be cautious in its engagement with Islamist groups. There are practical benefits to talking to those who have influence and power in the region (Gaddis, 2011: 63).

4.3. Economic depression and the future of Middle East countries
The main focus of spatial justice’s approach locates on political identification and explanation, economic and social processes and factors which cause these injustices. Attraction to create a fair society Strongly has been the placement of further gathering wide spectrum of social justice aspects like economic justice, racial justice, environmental justice and global Justice that introduce justice with each other both in corporeal dimension (redistributive policies) and incorporeal dimension (freedom, happiness, satisfaction, opportunity, security, ….) Experiential researches of spatial justice’s idea in the matter of resource’s distribution and public services have focused more on the issues like geographical distribution of financial supports and public services, appraisal financial equalization or normative deliberation justice advantage (Hafeznia & Ghaderi Hajat, 2016:40).

Economic issues are the first and maintenance ambitious menu of Middle East countries. The differentiation between Middle East regional countries and the BRICS trade deals have a deep gap. Great powers should reiterate the conclusions of the EU Select Committee and echo our concerns as to whether the resources available. There is a shared desire and scope for significant growth in services between the US, EU countries, Russia, China and Middle East countries which have been developing a new structure
capacity in trade, education and financial services (Walcott & Holland, 2017: 2).

A promising possibility for the US, EU countries, Russia and China trade policy will be to open up the emerging markets of North Africa. This process can create more liberal trade policy, facilitating greater access for the US, EU countries, Russia and China markets than had previously been possible within the EU, will be particularly beneficial for the economies of the Middle East countries can stabilizing and contribute for their structural strength. There are the new challenges in significant markets in Middle East countries. It will be simultaneously negotiating trade agreements with the EU (Marshall, 2017: 8).

In other countries, such as Jordan and Algeria, the US, EU countries, Russia and China will also be negotiating a series of agreements for economic development, migration and visas. These parallel negotiations will put a strain on the infrastructure of developed countries partners and Government departments, which will undoubtedly delay the process (Haass, 2017: 135).

There is a risk for the US, EU countries, Russia and China trade relationship with all countries of the Middle East and North Africa. There is a preferential trading arrangement with the EU and other developed countries could be disrupted. The Government should take steps to avoid this eventuality. The investment opportunities in Iran are significant and the US, EU countries, Russia and China is already losing potential market share to other European countries that are currently taking advantage of a weak developed countries role and presence.

Developed countries need a new trade strategy, should make trade with Iran a priority. There remain significant barriers and easing banking restrictions and developing trade with Iran should be a necessary for the US, EU countries, Russia and China trade priority. To broaden EU Iranian commercial links, the EU Governments should plan a high-profile trade
mission to the country, which would go some way to softening the sense of hostility from the US (Hirschfeld Davis, 2017: 4).

Improving trade relations between the US, EU countries, Russia, China and Iran will also require a broader effort to improve developed countries soft power in the Middle East countries. All of these countries should consider a strategy for utilizing that may go some way to counter the animosity towards the EU still present in some parts of Iranian society. Saudi Arabia is a global economic oil producer and regional security actor. This country has capacity of ambitious transformation that can be critical importance for world community interests (Bendix, 2017: 17).

It should be a priority of the EU’s approach to the Middle East countries to support the Saudi transformation. The US, EU countries, Russia, China have a potential role in fostering more economic dynamism in oil producing countries. The EU countries should consider a series of programs, with private sector participation in Middle East countries to prepare young people in those countries to find employment in the private sector. This process can be opportunity for governmental cooperation in supporting these countries to build more efficient, transparent and streamlined government administrations (Morello & Filipov, 2017: 4).

The priority is to encourage efforts for stabilizing sympathizes with the demands for the EU countries to undertake an expansive role in the region but it is not possible. External powers cannot on their own build a peaceful Middle East, which respects the rule of law. Nevertheless, the UK and other international partners have also to recognize that the approach of prioritizing short-term stability is just that, short-term. Cycles of revolution, counter-revolution and insecurity will continue to be generated by many countries of the Middle East, continuing to pose an ongoing challenge for policy makers (Horsey, 2017: 5).

The US, EU countries, Russia, China should focus its efforts on sustaining and building the momentum for reform in moderate countries.
Countries such as Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan have made important commitments towards domestic reform. Yet all these countries now face significant macro-economic pressures and security concerns that could lead to backsliding. Additional trade incentives and aid compacts are necessary to build the momentum for political and economic reforms in Tunisia, Jordan and Morocco (Loth, 2015: 92).

It will often be advantageous for Britain and United States funds to be deployed in cooperation with EU funds. As part of its international and regional negotiations, the EU countries should accord a high priority to ensuring that the UK and EU can continue close working arrangements in trade and development policy in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region. In this process, some other countries like China and Russia should invest in a long-term plan to increase the developed countries expertise and proficiency in Middle East region.

Co-operational economic relations options to set up Arabic excellence programs which could be run in conjunction with organizations such as the EU countries, for the Mandarin Excellence programmed. There is a real risk that if EU countries should convey the wrong or insensitive impression in seeking to control immigration, its soft power and standing could be diminished across the Middle East countries and Arab world (Parker & Gearan, 2017: 5).

The cases of social critical in Syria, Libya, Lebanon and Yemen have offered lessons both about intervention and non-intervention that must be learned for intrusive system. Syria demonstrates that a limited use of force, without the willingness to commit troops on the ground, is often an ineffective position, especially when the regime and external powers such as US in Donald Trump strategy and Saudi Arabia are willing to bear significant military costs. Syria makes the case that inaction and nonintervention are also policy choices with consequences. Iraq demonstrates that military intervention has costs, unexpected consequences
and risks of escalation; external powers that undertake intervention must be prepared to meet those costs and prepare to engage for the long term (Nguyen, 2017: 5).

4.4. Rise of Trump and increase the regional crises

Donald Trump may never become a truly conventional President. But many of his advisers and Congress and the Courts have certainly done their best to ‘normalize’ the new President and make him shape and pursue his policy within the parameters of the U.S. constitution and established global institutions, rules and conventions. Containing Trump is not impossible it seems. With the unexpected and even shocking election of Donald Trump, President Barack Obama’s prioritization of transatlantic relations, norms of responsible global governance, and international institutions feels suddenly like a rearguard effort on behalf of a collapsing post-Cold War order (Smith & Luhn, 2017: 3).

His centerpiece trade initiatives the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership seem to have reached the end of the road. In contrast, Trump’s focus on tearing up trade agreements, pursuing protectionist policies, and idealizing the art of the deal is undergirded by an implicit assumption of zero-sum global economic competition (Shear & Apuzzo, 2017: 4).

Trump approach to the Middle East that blended militarism with economic nationalism. In this way, Trump’s apparent disinterest in the region, his political mission statement to expand working-class economic opportunities, and his background as a real estate developer and reality TV celebrity suggest that he sees trade policy as the overriding focus of his administration’s foreign policy. Trump’s Twitter feed is an unfiltered and unprecedented direct look into his worldview and governing priorities.

Donald Trump issued a single tweet referring even indirectly to Islam, Muslims, terrorism, or the Middle East, in response to a November 28 domestic mass stabbing attack at Ohio State University, claimed by the
Islamic State. What happens when Trump’s transactional approach to world affairs meets the cold realities of the Middle East? Trump’s policy play out in relations with America’s core regional partners, the nuclear agreement with Iran, and the military campaign against the Islamic State and the Syrian civil war (Rawlinson & Martinson, 2017: 8).

The election of Trump represents, in their eyes, a stark repudiation of Obama who was viewed by many of his Middle East counterparts as an uncertain leader who misunderstood both the nature of the region and America’s proper role in it. By contrast, in Trump, they see an alpha male who speaks a familiar but announced language of hard power and transactional politics. A friend in Beirut jokes that Middle East Arabs have long awaited the arrival of American-style leadership, Arab-style leadership has instead come to America, as evidenced by the advisory role Trump’s children play, his general suspicions of liberal norms, the blurring of his official and private interests, and even his affinity for gilded interior decoration (Rosenberg & et al, 2017: 3).

American president more to the liking of Middle East leaders may not be what Arab publics see as being in their best interests. U.S. allies in the region will not lament the likelihood that under a Trump administration human rights and democracy promotion in the Middle East, which were already downgraded by the Obama administration, will be jettisoned altogether in all but name. For Benjamin Netanyahu’s rightwing government in Israel, Trump’s pro-Israel sentiment seems to represent an opportunity to greatly expand the pace of settlements in the West Bank, which some of his ministers openly hope will end any remaining hope in a “two-state solution” agreement to end the long conflict between Israelis and Palestinians (Campbell, 2016: 146).

Trump appointed David Friedman to be ambassador to Israel, is an outspoken financial supporter of the Israeli settler movement who has endorsed the Israeli annexation of parts of the West Bank. While Trump has
expressed his desire to broker an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement and designated his company’s top lawyer Jason Greenblatt as his senior international negotiator, the prospects of such an agreement seem exceedingly remote.

For U.S. allies in the Middle East, Trump’s rhetoric might offer potential openings to leverage American popular anxieties about terrorism in order to potentially eradicate their own domestic rivals, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups, even if the evidence linking some of these groups to violence and terrorism can be tenuous. While Trump thus has an early opportunity to rejuvenate relations with these traditional, but sometimes testy, American partners in a region where foreign policy gains are difficult to come by, it is hard to predict how long this honeymoon might last (Larres, 2016: 18).

Obama in his presentation after the election focused on the same issues that every U.S president had used to accuse Iran after the revolution but with softer words. He praised Iranians and their civilization and then focused on the pernicious subjects that the previous U.S administration had stumbled upon. But that its actions over many years now have been unhelpful when it comes to promoting peace and prosperity both in the region and around the world (Marandi & Halalkhor 2016:109).

Achieving such arrangements will require a level of international and by extension American, commitment and engagement which Trump has shown little inclination to pursue. Iraq and especially Syria are likely to be unstable incubators of metastasizing radicalization and terrorism for years to come. As the recent history of the Levant makes amply clear, neither Iraq nor Syria will enjoy long-term stability absent new political arrangements and social contracts to address the catastrophic failures in governance which led to the emergence of the Islamic State in the first place (Phillips, 2017: 15).

Donald Trump has promised to escalate the military campaign against ISIS. Increasing numbers of Special Forces or changing rules of engagement
might have some marginal benefit in killing ISIS fighters, but carry potentially significant risks as well, including ethical ones. He could tack more sharply toward the Kurds, but this could provoke a rupture with the Turkish government of Prime Minister Erdoğan. He could seek closer cooperation with Moscow, but he’d likely find this easier said than done and possibly trigger a backlash from Congress, the military, and the intelligence community. Trump would quickly find the Syrian army nearly depleted and such an approach incompatible with a tougher stance against Hezbollah, Iran, and the IRGC (Specter, 2017: 5).

The Trump administration chooses to confront the many challenges of the Middle East, significant questions await it. In the wake of the battle for Mosul, how will the Trump administration react to Kurdish moves toward independence? How will it approach the Arab-Israeli conflict? How will it square Trump’s apparent desire for rapprochement with Moscow with its hostility toward Iran? Amidst this turmoil, we shouldn’t expect a fully coherent approach from a fledgling administration (Sullivan, 2017: 9).

A contradiction-free American policy for the Middle East would only be possible with an ideological approach devoid of nuance or flexibility. We cannot predict Trump’s policies with any degree of certainty. Almost every American president since Dwight D. Eisenhower has entered the White House only to have their designs for the Middle East completely overturned. Events in the region are rarely linear, and sooner or later, Trump too will face his moment of Middle East truth (Diemers & Khalil, 2015: 17).

The election of Trump as president of the United States has significant implications for the Gulf. Workshop participants explored the Gulf Arab states’ relations with the new administration, dissecting the challenges and opportunities arising from the White House are evolving policy positions and the obstacles they are likely to face. The discussion then turned to the impact domestic politics in the Gulf Arab states and Iran were likely to have on regional geopolitics.
The electoral slogan of Donald Trump based on “America First”. This slogan campaign rhetoric appears to be developing into a more nationalistic foreign policy agenda. However, Trump seems to have a positive view of the Persian Gulf Arab states, although he expects them to bear their “fair share” of the regional security burden. Building on strong historical cooperation, Trump sees potential for collaboration between the PGCC states and the United States on many issues, particularly his stated priorities: confronting Iran, including in Yemen; combatting terrorism and extremist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and al-Qaeda; and providing PGCC capital for investment in the United States (Burt, 2017: 25).

The PGCC states view the Trump administration with optimism following a strained relationship with former U.S. President Barack Obama. One participant said, “It will never ever be worse than the previous eight years.” Addressing U.S.-Saudi relations, the participant added that the two countries are nonetheless “strategic allies, no matter what; it doesn’t matter who comes and goes.” Although Trump had criticized Persian Gulf states during his presidential campaign, his tone has now changed a positive shift that began when the president spoke with Saudi Arabia’s King Salman during his initial days in office. The Persian Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, also see a potential for cooperation with Washington on energy issues (Carney, 2017: 8).

In recent years, a common perception among the Persian Gulf Arab states has been that the United States is pulling back from the region, and that the Persian Gulf Arab states have been forced to play a more proactive regional role to fill the vacuum. Historically conservative when it comes to military action, the Persian Gulf Arab countries’ involvement in the civil wars in Yemen and Libya, as well the deployment of the PGCC Peninsula Shield force to Bahrain in 2011 and support for allied forces in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere, point to a bold new foreign policy course (Baker,
Trump has repeatedly argued that many U.S. partners do not contribute enough to their own defense, and rely too heavily on Washington. While campaigning he specifically demanded that the Persian Gulf states do more. One participant noted that the current moment is an opportunity for the Persian Gulf Arab states to highlight the cooperation they have extended to the United States, including offering over flight and military basing rights. The Persian Gulf states have played a role in development, reconstruction, and humanitarian efforts in much of the Middle East, including many war-torn areas (Li & Balin, 2017: 36).

One participant noted they tend not to play traditional roles in post conflict reconstruction and have a very different approach to multilateral peace building. The Persian Gulf Arab states are less trusting of foreign nongovernmental organizations and multilateral efforts, and are more likely to want direct control of reconstruction processes. The participant suggested there is a “value for money” ethic in their foreign aid policy, and a “brick and mortar understanding of reconstruction efforts” (Alterman, 2016: 215).

Saudi Arabia is confronting a number of challenges as it seeks to diversify and reform its economy. The Vision 2030 reform program being rolled out in the kingdom implies a change in the social contract that has existed between the government and its citizens, and it is not clear that all will welcome this change. Saudi Arabia has a growing number of unemployed young people, many of them Western-educated and competing with foreign workers for jobs. In the last year, the Saudi government has cut compensation to government employees by 20 percent, increased utility prices by about 30 percent, and implemented a program to raise utility prices to the global market rates within three years (Totten, 2016: 7).

The change in leadership from King Abdullah to King Salman had implications for many facets of Saudi life, including foreign policy. According to one participant, the Saudi elite had felt that King Abdullah
was too easily taken advantage for instance by Egypt, to which Saudi Arabia has given large amounts of aid with little tangible benefit (Sullivan & Tumulty, 2017: 4).

A good deal of instability in the Middle East is exacerbated by the tensions, lack of trust, and rivalry between Gulf Arab countries and Iran. Participants agreed this enmity is ultimately a lose-lose proposition for all parties, but several suggested there are issues on which they could find common ground if there was the right level of political will. Much depends on the development of real dialogue between Riyadh and Tehran. A participant argued that a good place to start discussions would be on Syria and combating terrorism, an issue that threatens both Riyadh and Tehran (Anderson, 2017: 45).

Another participant noted that Saudi Arabia and Iran managed to improve relations in the early 1990s, and there have been efforts from Iran to engage with the Gulf Arab states recently, including trips by President Rouhani to Kuwait and Oman following an invitation to dialogue from the PGCC. However, the Persian Gulf states remain skeptical of Iranian intentions, in no small part because a number of Iranian officials persistently engage in rhetoric around “wiping out” the UAE, or asserting that Bahrain should be Iranian territory. Saudi Arabia believes Iran is trying to engineer regime changes in the Persian Gulf states, and therefore views Iran as an existential threat (Exum, 2017: 25).

4.5. The future of Middle East regional security
The Trump administration continues to be an administration in transition. It has taken the new President and his entourage a prolonged period of time to settle in. The new administration has not yet managed to formulate something approximating a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy and a “grand strategy” for establishing a new global order. However, preceding administrations have also found this difficult and almost impossible to achieve. The Trump White House is divided between an ideological wing
and a more pragmatic faction with the President unable to decide which faction to side with (Fridman, 2016: 19).

This article also considers U.S. foreign policy toward Europe, Russia, the Middle East and China. It concludes that compared to the shrill rhetoric of the election campaign, the administration has begun to pursue a more moderate foreign policy. The White House has come out in support of NATO, there is even talk about a revival of the TTIP negotiations, there has been a new relatively harmonious relationship with China and the administration attempts to pursue a constructive policy of re-engagement with Russia regarding Syria and Ukraine. The notion of a “normalization” of the Trump administration’s foreign policy should not be taken too far, however. A predilection for constant change, turmoil and self-promotion is the one enduring and reliable factor that characterizes the administration and the President himself.

Trump needs to side with the pragmatic faction among his foreign policy advisers. America’s traditional values ought to be the basis for US foreign policy rather than the achievement of narrow national security and economic objectives independent of these values. The rapprochement with China ought to be continued but should not lead to the marginalization of uncomfortable issues such as human rights, climate change and the South China Sea dispute. The rapprochement with China should include a new initiative for multi-party talks with North Korea (Garrett, 2010: 29).

Many of the assertive and aggressive foreign policy statements made by Trump and his entourage during the election campaign, the transition phase and the first few months in office have been reversed in the meantime. Relations with China, NATO and Russia come to mind above all. Since the Florida summit with the Chinese president in early April 2017 Trump’s condemnation of China has given way to a new precarious harmony between Washington and Beijing. Trump’s skepticism about the continuing existence of NATO has been replaced by renewed US support for the
alliance. And his admiration of the Russian president has given way to criticism of Russia’s international behavior in Syria, Ukraine and elsewhere (Gordon, 2017: 4).

Trump’s skepticism and lack of understanding of the process of European integration has not changed. He referred to the British decision to leave the EU as “fantastic.” There has been no indication that he understands or is even aware of the fact that peace, stability and prosperity on the continent have been based to a large extent on the European integration process. In particular this was the case in the first few decades after the end of World War II (Loth, 2015). Instead in the early months of 2017 Trump did not hesitate to come out in support of French presidential candidate Marine Le Pen who had made no secret of her ambition for France to leave the EU. If she had won the French presidential elections in April/May 2017, the future existence of the EU would have been very much in doubt.

Trump has a very traditional understanding of the role of sovereign nation states. Essentially it is based on the concept of the concert of nations that dominated Global Policy, May 2017 international politics in the 19th and first half of the 20th century. Trump would have no difficulty to agree with the real-political. This belief in a narrowly defined national interest also explains Trump’s skepticism toward NATO which he repeatedly expressed during the election campaign. He referred to NATO as “obsolete.” In the meantime, however, he has reversed his view. Visitors such as German Chancellor Merkel and other European leaders as well as the impact of the advice of McMasters and Mattis and some Members of Congress, such as John McCain, have enlightened him about the benefits of NATO for the U.S (Hooker, 2014: 29).

Trump continues to be an impulsive and unpredictable ‘leader of the free world.’ Nevertheless, in the foreign policy realm he has become much more ‘mainstream’ than expected, albeit in a hardline conservative way. In the
course of his first months in office Trump appears to have arrived at the insight that for the sake of his country’s global standing and prosperity, the U.S. has no choice but to engage with its major allies and foes, look after America’s national interests and pursue the country’s resulting global objectives in cooperation with other states.

The U.S. is capable of containing Iran but only with a substantial force. The U.S. has been at war since 2001. At this point, it doesn’t have a clear strategy for the Middle East. In Iraq, the American approach has been to block both Sunnis and Shiites from dominating the country – while reducing the number of U.S. forces present. This left it in the position of having to rely on forces controlled or influenced by Iran to defeat the Islamic State. In Syria, U.S. strategy has been to create a proxy force to overthrow Assad. That has failed (Larres, 2017: 21).

American guarantees to Saudi Arabia and Israel are still in place, but what they mean at this point is unclear. Israel has no need for direct U.S. involvement except under the most extreme war of attrition scenario. As for the Saudis, the guarantee the U.S. gave and delivered on during Desert Storm was a very different situation. Oil prices and supply being what they are, it’s not clear what that guarantee is worth (Lope, 2017: 8).

The U.S. is not configured to deal with the new reality one that it helped create by invading Iraq and then leaving it, and by supporting the Arab Spring in Syria, which turned into a disaster. These U.S. policies led to the rise of ISIS and the fight against ISIS in turn opened the door to Iran in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, in Syria. Washington has been obsessed with Iranian nuclear capabilities and didn’t anticipate that Iran’s conventional capability and political influence would turn out to be more effective. At this point, it’s not clear what the American interest is in the region and what price it’s prepared to pay to pursue it (Larres, 2017: 41).

The Middle East has a new and radically different shape. For the moment, Iran has been freed to assert itself. But it still has a long way to go.
to assert significant power. Apart from the United States, it faces a potential coalition of Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey. Each has its weaknesses, but Iran does too, and together they can manage the problem and probably will. Don’t forget the Sunni jihadists, either. Defeated in the guise of ISIS, they have merely dispersed, not surrendered. And Iran has been their enemy. Thus the Iranian surge must be placed in context. It has changed the dynamic of the Middle East, but it remains vulnerable.

5. Analysis and Conclusion
A reduction of U.S. engagement in the Persian Gulf is unlikely. Instead, Washington will likely find itself drawn into a sustained, or possibly intensified, presence in the region. Some policymakers and a large portion of the broader public in the United States remain skeptical of additional military engagements in the Middle East, however. The Trump administration’s “America first” approach could easily lend itself to a reduced U.S. role in strategic areas such as the Gulf region, if not an isolationist foreign policy.

However, given the new administration’s emphasis on containing Iran and combating terrorism, such an outcome looks unlikely. Instead, Washington, while still cautious, is nonetheless finding itself drawn deeper into regional conflicts in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. This trend is most likely to intensify. A dramatic event such as a major attack on U.S. interests in the Middle East, or one on U.S. soil that originates from the Middle East, would almost certainly draw the United States into the region even more deeply.

Iran is also in a strong position in Syria. Together, Iran and Russia have prevented the collapse of the Assad government. Lebanon’s Hezbollah has been deeply involved in the fighting in Syria, with a large number of Iranian officers deployed with it, and Iranian forces are scattered in support of Assad’s Syrian army. The Russians are already discussing an endgame in which Assad regains the parts of Syria he lost. Whether that happens the pressure is off the Assad regime now. Moreover, Russia has already said it
plans to reduce its presence in Syria, which leaves the Iranians as the primary influence on the Syrians, deepening a relationship that existed even before the civil war broke out.

Yemen is another area of Iranian strength. In Yemen, bordering Saudi Arabia to the south, the Iranians are supporting the Shiite resistance. As the Shiite Houthis grew stronger in recent years, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and others launched airstrikes against them. The airstrikes failed to defeat the Shiite Houthis, and now they’re even more powerful. A missile was fired from Yemen toward Riyadh early this month. It was allegedly an Iranian-made missile, and a warning to the Saudis to get out of Yemen. It is important not to overstate Iran’s strength. It is clearly influential, and the door to more power is open, but Iran is not yet positioned to exert decisive military force in the Middle East.

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