

Trump and the Perspective of the US National Security Strategy; the Transition from Multilateralism to Unilateralism

Soheil Goodarzi*- PhD Student of International Relations, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

Ahmad Soltaninejad- Assistant Professor of International Relations, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

Mostafa Zahrani- Associate Professor of International Relations, School of International Relations, Tehran, Iran

Mohsen Eslami- Assistant Professor of International Relations, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

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Abstract

Donald Trump, the forty-fifth president of the United States, entered the White House with a very different agenda and sought to redefine the pattern of US action and engagement in the international sphere. While rejection of Obama's policies, Trump has sought to alter the US foreign policy and security strategy at almost all levels, and in this pathway has sought to change the strategic mechanisms of the United States. The present paper, through a brief review of the US National Security Strategy during Barack Obama's presidency, discusses the most significant signs of a possible transformation in the US National Security Strategy in the coming years. This survey is based on reports, documents and white House new president and decision makers speech. The main question of the present article is what features of the Trump National Security Strategy in the coming years differentiate from Obama's strategy in 2008-2016, And its initial hypothesis focuses on the formulation of a national security strategy in a different framework than Obama's multilateralism, mainly as a form of moderate unilateralism, and based on ambiguous politics and, in particular, the Madman theory of Henry Kissinger as the main difference between Obama's declared strategy.

Keywords: National Security Strategy, Multilateralism, Unilateralism, Donald Trump, Barack Obama.

* E-mail: soheil.godarzi@gmail.com

Introduction

The US National Security Strategy, by its nature, always had the form of objectivity, and, on the other hand, has been the expression of American ideals and aspirations. The study of US national security documents and doctrines over time suggests that threats and even the perceptions of threats against the security and the existence of the United States have always been the cornerstone of the formulation of its national security strategies, and depending on the nature and extent of these threats, strategies security has been developed to deal with them. However, a brief review of the triple schools that form the basis of strategic thinking in the United States clearly confirms the claim that American values act as the basis for the legitimacy of such strategies. Therefore, it can be assumed that the US National Security Strategy is in the general view of two objective and subjective dimensions, one that refers to hardware and immediate threats and the other to values and threats to American values.

The practice of the US governing body in applying and articulating the national security discourse, and in particular the formulation and implementation of the national security strategy in each era, is somewhat different from that of the other period. On the other hand, the plurality of US national security and foreign policy strategies over the past decades, in ways such as isolationism, balance of power, hegemony, offshore balancing, selective conflict, etc., reflect the fact that each president is modeled on a variety of domestic and international characteristics. Or at least a different tactic for national security. Looking at the practical arrangements of the presidents of the United States in the context of the national security strategy, it can be assumed at the outset that the policies tested in each period will usually provide guidance for the next period; on this basis, it can be assumed that the security policy of a president in continuity Or the breakdown of the procedures and mechanisms of the previous period.

For example, Bush's failure to achieve the goals sought by unilateral measures, the crisis in the global economy, and the need to rebuild the

United States in the world, and specifically in the Muslim world, have contributed to the transformation of Obama's strategy of national security and multilateralism with The supremacy of the deterrence and political processes replaced the unilateralism of neoconservative hegemonic actions(Mahmoudi, 2010). Thus, the unexpected choice of Donald Trump as the forty-fifth president of the United States, as well as his speeches and positions on national security, and the strategies of the past government in this field, promise acute and rapid changes in the context of the National Security Strategy and its mechanisms In the coming years. Focus on U.S security strategy in the case of new president's policies and plans about global threats such as ISIS, Arab-Israeli conflict and Treaties like JCPOA, alongside future acts of new administration about essential subjects related to Iran (like implementing the Vienna agreement, stability in the Middle East and etc) is necessary. Nonetheless because of the short life of U.S new administration and lake of Trump's national security document there is no a main and impressive text about America's future strategy.

1. Conceptual framework: US national security strategy

By examining the annual US National Security Strategy documents, it can be seen that all of these strategies are rooted in three prominent schools of thought, as long as the process of developing, developing and expanding national security strategies of the United States, while respecting the impact of the requirements and conditions of each period Specific in both internal and in international affairs, has been influenced by three schools of Hamiltonism, Jacksonism, and Wilsonism. So that these three tendencies in particular situations, each one in a different era, were individually and individually, or in conjunction with the other two schools, were the attention of policy makers and White House strategists (Kissinger, 2001, 235-6).

Hamiltonism, while focusing on American values instead of its own interests, seeks to expand American values rather than the direct pursuit of American interests outside its borders (possibly through war and hardware

intervention). According to the ideas of the Hamiltonian school, this expansion is practiced through the provision of a successful state-nation model based on the voluntary adoption and acceptance of other nations of the world (Zahrani, 2013: 280; Mead, 2002: 39). In other words, other countries and human societies will see it as "A City upon a Hill" (Deneen 2012: 30).

The Jacksonism School is influenced by the opinion and operation of the Seventh President of the United States (Andrew Jackson) and the 1815 New Orleans War Commander (Schweigler, 2003: 59-65). This school is based on three axes as an alternative to designing broad-based security strategies: First, this US intervention school in other parts of the world has been authorized to preserve, maintain, develop, and develop its national interests, even in the context of prescribing and recommending it does. Second, it emphasizes the preservation and expansion of the position of the United States as a superpower in the hegemonic power position, thereby centralizing the principle of pivotal power alongside the principle of national interests. Finally, according to the principles and foundations of this school, the rapid and decisive response to the threats and threats facing the United States is one of the main and unchangeable tasks of the state (Futurecasts online, 2003).

Based on Wilsonism prescriptions, the third foundation of strategic thinking in the United States is the basis for developing and expanding American patterns and values through the war. In other words, strategists and statesmen of this school believe that intervention in the affairs of other regions of the world is in order to govern American patterns and values in those regions and in a word the Americanization of the outside world. In his view, the acquisition of short-term and short-term interests has a secondary aspect and is not of prime importance or importance. This tradition has been applied by the Presidents Such as Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower (Hampton, 1996: 9-12).

In addition to the three intellectual traditions mentioned above, some sources also mention the American strategy of Jeffersonism, based on Thomas Jefferson's remarks, the third president of the United States. In short, Jefferson sought to preserve something that was exclusively worthy of the American society, namely freedom and democracy. For him and his intellectual disciples, the best way to achieve such a goal was to avoid going beyond the United States, and in this sense Jeffersonism was a kind of isolationism.

Historically, the formation of the three previously mentioned schools dates back to the first years of the First World War, but security strategies and US foreign relations have typically been influenced by these three schools to date. US National Security Strategies, even after the Second World War, during the Cold War and also during the post-Cold War period, led by the presidents of the country, such as Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, Nixon, Reagan, George W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush and Barack Obama, each of which has been influenced by one of the three mentioned schools or a combination of them. This paper due to the Trump's declared priorities will study U.S possible strategy in Jeffersonism and also Jacksonism framework.

2. Obama and change policy

Barack Hussein Obama was chosen with the slogan "Change" to US Presidency. The dimensions of the use of this slogan in his early years as President of the United States was so much that, according to Onderjcsak, became the "brand" of Obama (Onderjcsak, 2009: 5). Based on the slogan that public opinion in America and many scholars and even politicians expect changes to different extents in the sphere of interests, interests and America's performance in the face of crises and global issues were.

However, it appears that some of the affirmative elements involved in US policy have left Obama's shift in focus, not in the strategic sphere but in terms of foreign and security policy tactics. In other words, Obama, in spite

of the promises that he served as Senator of the State of Illinois and as the presidential candidate, is in fact acting as President of the United States influenced by a set of factors that, in many cases, including in the field of security and foreign policy He is limiting his actions and Obama has, in many cases, been forced to violate his declared policy and take the path of former US presidents. One of the most important areas where Obama's commitment to change policy can be judged is the formulation and implementation of the US National Security Strategy.

1.2. Change policy and Obama national security strategy

Generally, according to Rosen's theory, the formulation and implementation of political and security decisions are influenced by ideas and thoughts, personality, bureaucracy, and the conditions of the international system. Undoubtedly, Barack Obama was no exception to this rule, and a series of steady and changing domestic and international factors have affected his performance in the area of national security strategy.

Obama's election has made many "first ever" appearances in the White House and the United States. His identity as a "black man" with his fatherly "Muslim", who lived in Kenya and Indonesia, has made him an exceptional figure (Mahmoudi, 2010: 3). His opposition to the Iraq war as UN-mandated war, as well as his history as a politician who is not so enthusiastic about the military solution, has influenced his attitude to strategic and security requirements.

In addition to Obama's personality characteristic, his political and party legacy also plays a role in this attitude. The influence of liberalism, Wilsonian idealism, and components of Jeffersonism as Wilson, Roosevelt, and Truman on the Democratic United States and the Obama cabinet have a complete and distinct effect, while defending the values and interests of the United States at any time and in Each spatial coordinate emphasizes the strengthening and expansion of the authority of international organizations, the strengthening of multilateralism in the conduct of global affairs and the

resolution of humanitarian problems, the creation and growth of democratic institutions and the efforts to globalize such institutions (Obama, 2007, 11).

But in spite of this modality for Obama's change policy, elements such as the reality of the global strategic environment, the internal and international notions of US security policy and its long-term strategic interests, are elements and constituents of the US security policy that have embraced the slogan of Obama's change. Face serious constraints. Preventing the emergence of regional hegemons in certain areas such as the Middle East and Eurasia, maintaining balance in East Asia, Israeli security, etc. Among these are the priorities of security and foreign policy, regardless of changing the cabinet in the White House. The United States plays a role and is repeated in every US national security strategy document (Onderjcsak, 2009: 8).

Obama has worked on a number of occasions on a different basis from his slogan and personality, and his foreign and security policy has been developed and implemented in a similar way. This is especially true in the Middle East, for example, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Obama's statements and actions in this regard confirm the lack of change and action based on the predecessors (Mahmoudi and Goodarzi, 2012: 449)

Specifically, in relation to Israel, the beginning of Obama's role as President of the United States seemed to be a new chapter in US-Israeli relations. But at the start of his tenure, he assured that he would continue to "special relationship", like most US presidents. During the campaign, Obama considered Israel as the main ally of the United States and expressed support for the strong US-Israeli relations, as well as its predecessor. In addition, Obama uses a deal with nuclear Iran like George W. Bush, including "All options on the table" (Onderjcsak, 2009: 17-21).

Considering the Obama administration as a government that has no interest in using military force is not true. However, Obama has been pushing for a withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan or has been struggling

to disarm Iran's nuclear dispute, but during the presidency, he always looked at the US military capability. Introduction of the 2015 Obama National Security Strategy document explicitly states the use of military force: "... We possess a military whose might, technology, and geostrategic reach is unrivaled in human history. We have renewed our alliances from Europe to Asia" (National Security Strategy 2015: 1).

In addition, Obama, while insisting on Bush's hegemony strategy irrational and disregarding it, while Obama continues to do exactly the same thing as his predecessors: "American forces continue to be through timely presence and participation. To defend the country, to carry out anti-terrorism operations globally, to reassure allies and to repel the invasion. If deterrence fails, US forces will be ready to power the world over to halt and stop the invasion in different scenes"(Ibid: 8).

3. Trump: the challenge of internal and international structure

Talking about the national security strategy of that's president, who has not only changed his understanding of security issues but has also frequently changed his political base in some minor political processes, is somewhat difficult. This difficulty appears not only due to the short-term and less than one year of the Trump cabinet but also due to personal characteristics affecting the president's decisions. The approach of the Trump government to national security and the strategy to achieve it has not yet come to the fore and has not been announced. There has not been a definitive view on the national security strategy and the change in the national security adviser has fueled uncertainties in this regard.

Moreover, the examination of the national security strategy and even beyond the security perspective governing the decision making of the new US government is more difficult than its predecessors; the denial of the conventional structure and mechanisms of politics in the United States by Trump is probably the main factor that has made his foreign and security policy unclear, and the observers can't talk about them

confidently(McAdams, 2016).

In addition, despite the relative coordination of the White House and the Republican majority of the US Congress, which itself potentially means less function of the balancing mechanism in the president's decisions, there is no clear prospect of convergence between the legislative body, the judicial body, and the White House; Trump is the prime priority Republicans were not in the electoral process; there are also many Republicans among those who even now do not know the Trump for the US presidential credentials. Congress with the majority of Republicans is still hesitant about some of Trump's policies on health, public services, and even foreign policy; his bill to reverse Barack Obama's public insurance plan was rejected by influential Republican senators like John McCain, and ultimately in Congress was defeated, and this doubt made its secretaries firmly convinced by Congress. The number of Secretary-approved congresses on the day Trump's inauguration illustrates this situation; there are only five ministers who show the lowest rates compared to other US presidents.

The almost constant challenge with the media is another remarkable feature of the Trump Politician in recent months; the challenge which caused some of his agents have been to expel the media outlets and resign, before the end of the first year of Trump's presence at the White House(Cillizza, 2017). Ultimately, Trump's controversy with the US judiciary is another issue that, in addition to charting the state of Trump's challenge to the official US structure, is the lack of popularity and popularity of his ideas with other parts of the country's sovereignty. The violation of the Trump Immigration Decree on the ban on the travel of citizens of seven countries with the majority of Muslim populations by the federal judge in Washington, and finally by the Supreme Court of the United States, to enforce the decree, with a significant modification and reduction of the scope of validity (Green, 2017), and dismissal of the Secretary of Justice by Trump (Yates, 2017), is probably the first indication

of the more serious challenges faced by the president and the US judiciary.

1.3. Purpose: Reviving American Power

Zalmay Khalilzad, now Donald Trump International Advisor, nominated a new doctrine entitled "The Trumpet Doctrine" before his election at a meeting hosted by the National Intergroup, which implies a different approach to certain US strategic assumptions since the end of the Cold War to date. Assumptions about the hegemonic role of the United States in the world, maintaining peace with other major actors, and ultimately maintaining international order based on the hegemony of the United States. Moreover, the doctrine does not accept the principles and current mechanisms of the United States in areas such as the fight against terrorism, the role of the United States, the role of relations with other actors, the spread of democracy and the process of nation-building, and will seek to make a difference (Khalilzad, 2016).

From this perspective, the inattention to interests of the United States in international cooperation, especially in the economic and strategic spheres, is the most critiqued subject of Trump's criticism and probably one of the most important areas for action. In fact, Obama's multilateralism has, in a sense, increased US spending as well as greater profits for allies, which in the long run could face the country's top position in the international order. The slogan "Priority to America", which was presented by Trump in the inaugural speech, is in the same sense related to this issue; the priority with the United States, which is within itself a form of US nationalist ideas, is based on Trump as the basis for political and strategic action. The United States is introduced in the world and requires action to increase US power and maintain the strategic distance of other actors (Cofman Wittes, 2017).

This is not only in the interests of business but also in terms of political and strategic commitments. The Munich Security Conference was one of the first examinations of the new policy and strategy of the United States to represent this logic. The United States made it clear at the conference that

the United States, under the leadership of Trump, would like to participate not as "superpowers" but as "super partners" in global processes (Tisdall, 2017). The United States does not seem to be willing to pay the security costs of the allies in the coming years, and those countries, whether in Europe or some Middle Eastern countries, should take responsibility for their security costs. From this perspective, Trump has restored the old policy of the gas station by joining Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and has demanded that Europe pay its commitments on costs and secure global security in Europe.

The Economic cost-benefit analysis seems to be the basis of Trump's attitude toward US strategic issues on one hand and his efforts to achieve his goal of restoring American power on the other. Reducing security and economic commitments than providing alternative strategies is a break with costly American measures; commitments that were made from the security considerations of Trump's predecessors in the context of the national security strategy, but are not as consonant with the economic considerations of the new president. Accordingly, strategic commitments to maintain the security of allies or military actions for the expansion of democracy and possibly nation-building in the remote areas as the "exorbitant foreign policy of the former" government have been criticized by Trump, and the rebuilding of the country and its declining industries is a new objective. The costs related to this foreign policy are announced (Traub, 2017).

2.3. The Context of Trump National Security Strategy Compilation

Unlike Donald Trump's unique features, generally speaking, if the party or president does not provide a pre-programmed course for tenure, two aspects can be taken into account in understanding the US political and security processes. The first is the review of political and security brokers and, second, the challenges faced by the United States in the foregoing. If we look at the US foreign policy and security policy on the first pathway, then it seems that the role of the think tanks and the circle of advisers to the

president is significant in the formulation and implementation of US strategic processes. In fact, a look at the history of decision-making, especially in the context of the crisis, has shown that, at many times, think tanks and senior advisers have taken the lead in making a decision; a military strike to release hostages in Tehran in the form of Operation Tabas, Iran, in the context of MacFarlane's trip, the processes of the beginning and the end of the Vietnam War and even the negotiations with Iran to end the nuclear dispute, are all concrete examples of the role and influence of think tanks and advisers near the president in US decision-making (Zahrani, 2013: 217-212).

Based on this, examining the main Trump agents in the government as well as his advisers can help understand a lot of complex issues about his national security strategy. In this regard, Trump Cabinet is concerned, the US most watched cabinet At least since the end of the Cold War, since the major security appointments of Trump were senior military personnel, each having a history of Middle Eastern crises, and having military backgrounds, always associated with military action, prone to hardware action They are also in the area. A glimpse of the White House posts over the past months can at first give a general insight into the strategic thinking of the Trump Cabinet. Michael Flynn and McMaster as national security advisor, Mike Pompeo, the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), James Mattis as Defense Secretary, Steven Mnuchin at the Treasury Department, First Secretary Mike Pens and, finally, the Secretary of Homeland Security, John Kelly, are all faces Known in the United States as an extreme Republican faction, calling for its clear and decisive action in the United States over the past years in areas like the Middle East (Berman, 2017).

3.3. Trump national security strategy components

By studying the US national security strategy over the past decades, Republicans appear to be distinct in certain cases with Democrats; the priority is military and military action, unilateralism, prudential

interventionism, and ultimately the priority of Israeli interests in all areas. Although the priority of the interests of Israel and the maintenance of the special relationship between the United States and Israel is largely subject to foreign policy and has always been supported by both parties (Slater, 2009:4; and Mearsheimer, 2010), Obama's position vis-à-vis settlements, and ultimately support the draft Security Council resolution against Israel in the year 2016, marks an interruption in the undisputed support of the Democrats. It seems that Trump and his policy and strategy are not in contradiction with these principles.

In terms of the importance and priority of military power, Trump seems to think that the new US government has come to believe that US military and defense spending and defense spending during the Obama era (as a response to Bush's imposed costs on the US economy) sends down signals to other Governments have been sent to make them more capable of acting against the United States (Scott, 2016). Increasing US military funding by Trump, lifting Obama's decree on reducing military spending, and allowing more military presence in decision-making processes are likely to be two indications of Trump's determination to prioritize US military power over the coming years (Dreazen, 2017).

Trump's unilateralism is about other countries, as well as about US security and political agenda. The withdrawal of the Trans Pacific treaty as one of the main economic drivers in the world, as well as welcoming the election and diminishing power of the European Union are among the other issues that at least show the desire for unilateralism of the new US government. Warnings that Trump's relief role from United States international and international organizations has diminished, is another way of moving away from Obama's multilateralism in dealing with global issue. Even the sanctions plan against the Islamic Republic under the administration of Trump which has been seen as a factor to curb the destabilizing efforts of the United States as contradicting the provisions of

the nuclear agreement as a strategic and multilateral agreement and multilateral Policy (Dubowitz, 2017: 16; Harb, 2017: 3).

The slogan of priority with the United States and its implementation requirements, along with the unilateralism logic, includes a degree of isolation, at least in the context of strategic and business cooperation (Sestanovich, 2017); in other words, isolationism can be examined in two ways: first, in logic The protectionist of the industry and the national economy against international competitors and the foreign labor force, which has shown itself to be withdrawing from business treaties and reviewing economic agreements; Second, in the form of reduced cooperation or reduced support (military, political and financial) from processes and institutions responsible for the security and stability of the world, including NATO, the United Nations, and so on.

The critical perception of inclusive intervention as well as the spread of democracy and nation-building in areas such as the middle-east is also one of the components likely to play a part in defining the Trump National Security Strategy in this outlook. Trump called the existence of ISIS as the result of disorderly policies and policies that lack the logic of the previous government and emphasized the lack of intervention in other areas. His approach to the civil war in Syria and Iraq, the lack of deployment of ground forces, and the scarcity of remote missile attacks on al-Shayrat base or the shelters of radical groups in Afghanistan indicate that at least it has remained loyal to this approach at the very least.

4.3. Understanding Threats against National Security

In the context of US threats, Trump and his security team are clearly focused on the threat posed by the Islamic State of their own (ISIS). In the Middle East, the Middle East continues to be the main scene of the US-led conflict in the security sector, and in this context, the elimination of ISIS's threat, the lack of military entry into the region and the transfer of responsibility to strategic partners in the region are in the limelight of his

speech about the region. Trump and his security and foreign policy team, Islamic State's radicalism in the form of ISIS, is the most immediate and immediate threat to the United States. In addition to terrorist acts against US European allies, Washington may end up in al-Qaeda, ultimately through suicide attacks and terrorist attacks in the United States and life. Target the citizens of that country (Feaver and Brands, 2017: 31).

In this perspective, the co-operation of other actors with the United States in suppressing these groups in the Middle East and even cracking down on them, even in a different framework from Washington's agenda, is transform the point of view of alignment and coalition to achieve the common goal. This would probably be a significant basis for operating the ideas of Trump about improving relations with Moscow; the relations that followed the Ukrainian crisis and, to a lesser extent, the Syrian crisis and Russia's support for Bashar al-Assad during the Obama era, Crisis in relations between the two countries (Deyermond, 2017: 2).

Regarding the way to take action against terrorism and confront ISIS's threat, Trump stated that massive ground-based operations against the group are not on the agenda of the United States, and that extensive intervention is needed to address the threat and possibly accelerate the process of state-building and nation-building in crisis-affected countries (such as George W. Action Bush will not attack Iraq and Afghanistan). From this point of view, a missile attack on the al-Shayrat base in Syria shortly after being charged with the Assad government regarding the use of chemical weapons against the opposition is a clear indication of the kind of Trump action to deal with regional tensions as well as response to terrorist threats. (O'Hanlon, 2017) The high cost of military action, along with Trump's foreign policy approach, makes it clearer in the same sense of non-interference that the third feature of his national security strategy is clear. Conveying the responsibility of stability to regional allies and, at the same time, securing their confidence in the continuity of the US umbrella, is a factor in the

Trump strategy and, while protecting its allies, shares the costs and strategic actions against common threats. (Coates, 2017)

4. Conclusion: The distinction between two strategies

If Obama wanted to strengthen US power through multilateralism and set global agendas in cooperation with other stakeholder activists and involved in international processes, Trump sought to maintain the hegemonic position of the United States in the world and displaying its power in the international arena while improving its interests and position. The United States is in economic and military processes. In the last eight years, the United States strives to stay away from the effects of bad developments, such as Islamic awakening, and also by adopting a policy similar to the transnational balancing of developments in different regions, and ultimately providing a diplomatic solution to disputes such as Iran's nuclear case. Reset the balance of regional power. It was implemented through multilateral mechanisms and joint international agendas, reflecting Obama's national security strategy to deal with threats to national security as well as international order.

At the same time, the new US administration is turning away from multilateralism in various international processes, reversing the hegemonic strategy, reflecting the American effort to maintain its strategic distance with other international actors. Trump's strategic ideas in this context are particularly indicative of the late-Cold War reggae that ultimately led to the elimination of the Soviet Union's threat and made the world a prerequisite for a new order based on the United States. At the same time, Trump's approach to contradictions cannot provide the basis for a coherent and credible national security strategy. Contrary to Reagan, Trump does not believe in liberal values, nor does he support the free world. On the other hand, apart from the logical contradiction, Trump's strategy also suffers from a functional contradiction: the alignment with the opposition of ISIS means aligning with Iran and Russia, and even the rule of Bashar al-Assad

in Syria, a problem which, at the outset, is based on its approach to the repression of the Republic Islamic of Iran is inconsistent and incomplete.

Convergence and the desire to regain relations with Russia, as Russia has been rebuilding its strategic role in the world since the fall of the Soviet Union, and this is in contradiction with the approach of restoring American power and restoring the role of hegemony. The withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Territory has meant Japan's weakening of China, and on the other hand, tensions with North Korea may well pave the way for a crisis in the region. Competition with China in the economic and commercial field, while neglected by Trump, has been strongly opposed to China's single-currency policy, which ultimately reduces Trump's ability to deal simultaneously with China and North Korea.

Ultimately, the policy of ambiguity in dealing with goals and rivals seems to be the main feature of Trump's strategy in foreign and security policy. For Trump's cabinet, the threat of threats in a different way from the Obama administration and reluctance to multilateralism in the management of international crises in conjunction with Trump's policy of ambiguity, particularly in areas such as the containment of the Islamic Republic of Iran or the confrontation with North Korea will be drafted in the form of a Madman theory of Henry Kissinger; an action model based on the rejection of common formal and international arrangements and an attempt to expand US unilateralism. However, it should not be forgotten that the policy of ambiguity and the model of action taken by the security forces of Trump itself will widen the scope of these contradictions, and on this basis the Trump government's potential for international consensus against objectives such as the Islamic Republic of Iran, the fight against terrorism And ... much less than the Obama administration. However, according to the early experience of the third millennium, unique events with remarkable consequences, known as "surprises" in international affairs, could, if they occur, affect Trump's approach to security and international issues and

hence its national security strategy. In addition, put in a completely different direction. The expansion of terrorism and radicalism in the Middle East into the United States, or at least the repetition of events such as September 11, 2001, has the potential to make sweeping changes in the current Trump strategy to increase direct action.

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