US Comparative Policy toward Iran and the Middle East Security

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Received: 15/06/2018 Accepted: 08/09/2018

Abstract

Strategic policymaking and US foreign policy decision making towards Middle East in different historical periods have been accompanied by signs of continuity and change. The reason for this must be seen in the United States' geopolitical and strategic attitude toward Iran. Countries such as Iran have unique characteristics in terms of their strategic position, which minimizes the impact of the political system in decision-making. George Bush Jr, Barack Obama and Donald Trump are among the presidents of America who belong to different strategic traditions, but their behavioral pattern in dealing with Iran is based on indications such as "containment", "Sanction", "asymmetrical action", and "proxy war". Although the intellectual teachings and behavioral patterns of each of the presidents are different, the main strategic orientations of the US in the 21st century are based on signs of "low intense confrontation". To use of social forces to confront the patterns of political behavior and foreign policy of Iran. The support of counter-party groups with Iran in the peripheral environment within the framework of "proxy war" can be part of US strategic policy making in the form of "offshore balancing". The main purpose of this article is to understand the behavioral patterns of that group of US presidents who have had relatively different strategic goals and policies. The main question of the article is: "What kind of strategic policy making model for Iran's presidents in the 21st century has been?" The hypothesis of the paper points to this: "The difference in the mentality of the presidents of the United States in the 21st century has not influenced the strategy of offshore balancing and its policies in the form of low-intense confrontation, proxy war, and containment". The realistic approach has been used in this article.

Keywords: Proxy war, Strategic policy making, the Middle East, Iran, US.

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1. Problem Statement

Two decades ago, the U.S sponsored liberal international order seemed to be going from strength to strength. Now, both order and sponsor are in crisis, and the future is up for grabs. There are many elements of the story military and economic blunders, stagnation for the middle and lower classes in the developed world, a populist backlash against globalization, dizzying technological change but a shifting balance of power may be the most important of all. That’s why we’ve focused on how the troubled hegemon and the confident challenger are trying to write the story’s next chapter (Rose, 2019: 3).

U.S strategic making value, waterway has always been of particular interest both to the regional and foreign Powers. In the past, when control of the maritime routes guaranteed the supremacy of European states, dominating the Middle East was the supremacy of European states, dominating the Persian Gulf ports was the subject of covetousness for these powers, particularly the British Empire.

The discovery of oil, combined with the Cold War exigencies, captured the attention of new super powers towards this region. The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory of forces of freedom—and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.

Barak Obama and Trump’s approaches like George Bush junior pictures his worldview with a triumphant tone. US presidential favors the following measures: to extend its military umbrella over the friendly countries in the Persian Gulf through a massive military presence and build-up mainly in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain; a close military cooperation between this council members and other pro-American Arab states like Egypt and Jordan as being the only viable players in the Middle East; and a massive sale of military hardware to enhance the capability.

Richard Haass sees the glass half empty and getting emptier. The order can’t be revived; Washington must accept that fate and put its efforts into managing its deterioration. The demise of the Concert of Europe, the world’s last great order-building effort, showed the risks of catastrophe and offers lessons for policymakers today who want to avert one. Washington needs to be selective in its commitments, avoid unforced errors, and shed its reflexive opposition to multilateralism (Haass, 2019: 21).
2. The Framework and Methodology of Research
The strategy of national security and strategic making of the United States in the Middle East and in dealing with Iran has been based on a low intensive of confrontation. The overall policy and strategic objectives of the United States have not changed much in the past two decades. George Bush Jr named Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the axis of evil. Barack Obama created the ground for the withdrawal of US military forces from Iraq. Such an action has been taken to limit US challenges in Iraq and to reduce the role of the region in Iran. Donald Trump emphasizes the need to reduce North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities and review the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

2.1. The Analytical of Research
These claims are self-serving, even deluded, a political fantasy. The George W. Bush administration created many of today's worst geopolitical problems. First, President Bush used a terrorist attack conducted by Saudi citizens trained in Afghanistan as an excuse to invade Iraq, a long-time objective of neoconservatives as part of their plan to reorder the Middle East(Walter, 2002: 15).

President Trump announced that the US goals of the national strategic making is to ensure the protection of our nation's fundamental and enduring needs: protect the lives and safety of Americans, maintain the sovereignty of the United States, with its values, institutions and territory intact, and provide for the prosperity of the nation and its people. He also firmly stated that the strategy will achieve three core objectives of developing US security, bolstering America economic prosperity, and promoting democracy.

2.2. Question of Research
The question of article is: “what are the differences between US presidential for Regional Role toward Iran in first twenty years of 21th century? It is possible to create a favorable environment that will enable oil-producing states to send their oil to the world market. Trump’s policy in regional security may be on a Crusade-type mission in the aftermath September 11, in The National Security Strategy of the United State of America.
2.2. Hypothesis of Research
The hypothesis of research emphasized that: “U.S security policy and strategic making in Bush Jr, Barak Obama and Trump’s era was adopted as to low intensive confrontation toward Iran’s strategic objectives”? U.S policy underwent a limit change from engagement to confrontation in new era like Bush period. The axis of evil policy show the confrontation policy required the U.S to use pressure and containment diplomacy in dealing with Iran. This process has been perpetuated from Bush Jr until Donald Trump’s policy and strategic making.

3. Finding
The region encompasses a vital strategic importance for three reasons. Its geographic location; its continuing instability; its energy resources—approximately 60% of the world's oil reserves is located in the region. Counter terrorism against radical groups in regional security, and optimizing the Critical infrastructure protection. this Process shows the US commitments for allied regional countries security.

The Finding of this paper shows that, the US Middle East Security needs following some items in different Presidential era after cold war. These Indexes are; the improvement of capability and ability of PGCC defense capabilities and interoperability; Promoting of security issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Counter proliferation.

3.1. The concepts and Process of US Middle East policy and Security making
For decades, U.S. policymakers followed Brodie’s and Kennedy’s lead, putting deterrence preventing rivals from attacking in the first place at the center of U.S. defense strategy. Applied effectively, deterrence discourages an adversary from pursuing an undesirable action. It works by changing the adversary’s calculation of costs, benefits, and risks (Krepinevich Jr, 2019: 40).

US policy and strategic making in literature has the signs of change and continuity in US foreign policy. US strategic making toward Iran in the study of international relations and policy making going back at least to the work of “Thucydides” as a realistic approach. It is closely associated with both diplomatic parlance and “realist theory”. Its logic derives from the self-help imperative and coalition with major actor in the international systems.
The characteristics of “Neoliberal Global System” is that the fields need to redefine the concepts of peace, development, security and national modernization provided by optimizing and enhancing social capital. Strategic decision-making can be considered as an inevitable part of strategic policymaking in countries that are in the course of national development and modernization. After World War II, some countries tried to improve their strategic and geopolitical positions and achieve some indications of strategic benefits (Mossalanejad, 2017: 5).

The power approach in US strategic making based on anarchic structure in the international system and priority of states for survival and security. Trump’s Policy and regional security has a large-scale costs for United States security. In this situation congress must now rise to the occasion in order to pursue a single overriding imperative: to defend American national interests and values from a dangerous president. To do so, Democrats will have to stay disciplined and united and use the powers the Constitution grants them in ways they have not done in years (McKeon and Tess, 2019: 45).

3.2. Low intensive confrontation and Proxy war against Iran

The distinction between the president and the government is not a product of the Trump era, but it has become one of the administration’s defining characteristics. Rhetorically, the president has often squarely rejected the U.S. foreign policy consensus of recent decades. He has questioned the United States’ commitment to allies in Asia and Europe, fumed about U.S. wars in the Middle East, and lauded the leaders of Washington’s geopolitical rivals (Abrams, 2019: 49).

Barak Obama policy toward Iran and Middle East concentrated on low intensive confrontation and proxy war against Iran’s regional interests. Obama foreign policy depended on Iran’s role in regional balancing of power. Geopolitical approaches emphasized on Trump interaction of geography and strategy. President Trump has been continued US regional policy toward Iran’s regional policy in Persian Gulf and Middle East.

The regional and strategic policy of US presidents in the 21st century has been to enhance power and security in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. The regional and strategic policy of US presidents in the 21st century has been to enhance power and security in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.
The offshore balancing pattern during George Bush’s son, Barack Obama and Donald Trump has tactical and operational differences in strategic US policy.

3.3. Discourage negotiation in regional crises
Asian Pacific is an important region in world economy and security. Given to this, and because of growing power of China and increased threat of North Korea, U.S. in recent years has concentrated to this region. Its clear manifestation was Asia pivot or rebalancing by Obama’s administration. But, Donald Trump as elected U.S. new president both in his election campaign and after winning the completion has declared some new principles that are very different from past. Because of this, in this article, we are seeking the answer to this question: is there a new trend in U.S. in relation to Asia Pacific? Do the geostrategic pivot of Washington in changing? (Ghahramani, 2017: 140).

In Syria Washington inadvertently discouraged a negotiated compromise between Bashar al-Assad and the opposition by insisting on the former’s departure. That convinced some regime opponents that the US would force Assad’s ouster, precluding need for compromise which might have ended or at least limited the conflict early. (Perry, 2015: 9)

The Obama administration turned Libya into another fulcrum of conflict, following Europe’s lead in promoting low-cost regime change in the name of rescuing the Libyan people. That policy generated chaos, highlighted by competing governments and proliferating armed bands. More recently murderous Islamic State acolytes filled the void. (Luft, 2014: 35)

3.4. Enlargement of Partnership Through Regional Cooperation
When U.S. President Donald Trump talks about the Middle East, he typically pairs bellicose threats against Iran and the Islamic State (ISIS) with fulsome pledges of support for the United States’ regional partners, such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. But the tough talk is misleading: there is little reason to think that Trump actually wants the United States to get more involved in the region (Karlin and Cafman Wittes, 2019: 42).

Enlargement of Partnership is a Conceptual approach for concentrated on promotes US national interest. Trump’s policy will effect on regional structure of international politics. Trump’s team argues that defense and security policy depended on how US policy and regional countries
collaborates their goals and interests. Trump’s foreign policy team has systematically tried, significant rapprochement among the Persian Gulf states on the issue of security almost impossible. For these reasons, a collective regionally crafted security arrangement that includes littoral states on Iran.

3.5. Offshore Balancing in US Regional policy
The American administration launched a new Persian Gulf “Security Dialogue” that principal coordination mechanism between the U.S. and these littoral states. The core objectives of the dialogue are the promotion of intra-PGCC and PGCC-U.S. cooperation to meet common perceived threats. He couldn’t be more explicit in stating how redesigning and transforming U.S. forces are a crucial instrument of American foreign policy.

Clinton continued the same general course. He advanced North American economic integration, renewed the U.S.-Japanese alliance, expanded NATO to Eastern Europe, contained regional security threats in the Middle East and Asia, promoted the Arab-Israeli peace process, and also managed U.S. finances responsibly. By the turn of the millennium, the United States and the order were stronger, richer, and more secure than ever (Rose2, 2019: 15).

Devastating wars have created the opportunity for the U.S to regain and reinforce the position they had in the Middle East before the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. American rehabilitation started with the Iraq –Iran war. The Kuwaiti crisis Jan 1991 consolidated the US Partial domination over the region. The events of 9/11 contributed to the denunciation of Islam and pretending it as a violent religion and depicted Muslims as terrorists and anti-Westerners.

3.6. War against terror
The war on the Taliban and the subsequent occupation of Afghanistan extended the long military arm of the U.S, portrayed as apparent savior of Muslims from the tyranny of their own Islamist rulers. With the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the U.S. became a Middle Eastern country in the same way they became European after the World War II. As their presence in Afghanistan and Iraq continues, America behaves like other states in the region by interfering in regional security affairs. The Dialogue provides a
framework for US engagement with the PGCC countries for offshore balancing.

3.5. US offshore balancing and the Middle East Proxy security

Trump in national security document in 2017 December assumes that a nuclear capable Iran, with ballistic missiles capacity, would be a truly frightening prospect. Moreover, in Trump image and attitude, Iran by far the most populous country, is emerging as a more powerful state in the region and can damage the US offshore balancing in Persian Gulf and Middle East region. The security making in the Persian Gulf Council and the Middle East countries are likely to have an increasingly important impact on Trump national security document and Euro-Atlantic security.

This approach promised to resolve the tension between American interests and American ideals by achieving them simultaneously, on the installment plan. The United States would protect its interests by amassing power and using it as necessary, and it would serve its ideals by nurturing an ever-growing community of independent countries that played nicely with one another. Cooperation would lead to integration and prosperity, which would lead to liberalization. Slowly but steadily, Locke’s world would emerge from Hobbes’ (Rose2, 2019: 7).

Because of Trump’s strategic importance, there has been considerable Western, primarily US and United Kingdom military presence in the Persian Gulf for decades. The perception of the region’s pivotal international security role has further increased. The Middle East states who have basing agreements with the United States, the most powerful NATO member, serve as important bridgeheads for the hyper-power. Furthermore, in the context of the war against terrorism, forces from NATO member countries have been operating in the region.

All NATO member states are highly aware of the dangers of instability in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and the importance of assisting the new Iraqi authorities to take control of the security situation themselves. The Persian Gulf also presents an increased strategic importance for United States and NATO countries for ongoing operations in Afghanistan. Trump has a new doctrine for security building in Afghanistan. The future of Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan is a crucial determinant for the whole region.

Trump’s national security on December 2017 has been a rebalancing
between Western powers and states of the Middle East. Trump’s doctrine has been a shift away from Western states as the global center of economic power; and as economic power has been shifting to the East, countries in the region have been turning their political attention there as well. The role of shale oil in its energy mix has reduced the importance of the Middle East to the US, a trend which is likely to lead, over time to a concomitant diminution of the protection offered by the Western security umbrella to the region (Mossalanejad, 2018: 25).

3.6. Regional coalition and arms selling in Trump doctrine

The United States also has vital interests in the Persian Gulf kingdoms countries facilitation of air and sea travel between Asia and Europe. United States’ regional strategy based on military support rather than opposition to US policies and interests in the region, and its continued reliance on conventional rather than nuclear weapons for its defense.

Saudi Arabia is the center of Trump’s regional security in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Offshore balancing is the axis of Trump’s regional security and strategy making. Saudi Arabia has no alternative to the United States as the ultimate guarantor of its security. The next administration should strive to restore U.S.-Saudi relations so that they permit exploration of how to advance interests that both countries share with Iran, like the stabilization of Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

Trump has also enflamed the ”War on Islam” rhetoric, and the resultant spike in Islam phobia could conceivably lead to increased torture, bans on American Muslims, and indiscriminate bombings in the Middle East all of which would exacerbate the problem of international terrorism. Alternatively, Trump may be inclined to outsource his Middle East policies to Russia (Khashoggi & Others, 2016: 7).

In spite of the existing regional organizations such as the league of Arab States and the September 30, 2006, the United States delivered over $72 billion in weapons, training, equipment, and related services to the six member states of the council through the government-to-government foreign military sales program for enforcement of offshore balancing. The total of US military sales is over $57 billion of these sales were made to Saudi Arabia (Defense Security, 2016).

It seems that Washington justifies the Arab purchase of U.S. armaments,
especially after the regime change in Iraq, as a measure to counter Iran. In late July 2007, the United States announced new military pacts worth 20 billion dollars for Saudi Arabia, 13 billion dollars for Egypt and 30 billion dollars for Israel in a bid to counter and confronting Iran. This process has continued and increased since Bush Jr to Donald Trump era.

Arms sales are a powerful component of the U.S. and other defense firms regard the [Persian] Gulf kingdoms as an especially lucrative market today, given that record oil prices have them swimming in surplus revenue. The six PGCC states spent $233 billion on arms imports from 2000 to 2005, accounting for 70 percent of total armament expenditures in the Arab world” (Gearon, 2007: 65).

The U.S. government has always attached conditions for the use of arms purchased by Arab countries. This package follows the same rational. "In October 2007, 188 Members [of Congress] signed a letter to president Bush stating that unless the Administration provides assurances that the sale of JDAM (Joint direct Attack Munitions) kits to Saudi Arabia will not 'harm U.S. forces in the region or undercut Israel's qualitative military advantage'.

In November 2007, 117 Members signed a letter to President Bush requesting that formal notification regarding any proposals to sell 'high technology armaments to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia' be postponed until January 15, 2008. This process is against Iran’s security role in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. US policy toward Iran in some of times was hostility and antagonistic (Blanchard & Grimmett, 2008:1).

The joint AIPAC-Congressional pressure on the white House appeared to be an extra assurance since in July 2007; Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert confirmed that Israel had received a detailed and explicit commitment from the United States to ensure Israel's qualitative military edge over the Arab states. This has been reiterated by Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak during an October 2007 visit to Washington, where he stated that Israel has understandings and arrangements with the U.S. Administration that make Tel Aviv confident that Israel's military qualitative edge will be kept. (Blanchard & Grimmett, 2008:1)

This process will be formed by optimizing the signs of endogenous development and national renovation. Many researches have been done in social capital notion, which is a concept in economics, business, and sociology, policy and development strategy. The field of strategic policy
making concentrated on the issues of development and modernization in various countries based on self-reliance and social capital definition. Social development and self-reliance needs social capital. In general, social capital should be required as part of the tangled networks of developing community (Mossalanejad, 2017: 69).

3.7. Rebalancing Iran and strengthens Saudi Arabia
Attraction to create a fair society strongly has been the placement of further gathering wide spectrum of social justice aspects like economic justice, racial justice, environmental justice and global justice that introduce justice with each other both in corporeal dimension like redistributive policies and incorporeal dimension. The sign of incorporeal dimension is freedom, happiness, satisfaction, opportunity and security. Experiential researches of spatial justice’s idea in the matter of resource’s distribution and public Services have focused more on the issues like geographical distribution of financial supports and public services, appraisal financial equalization or normative deliberation justice advantage (Hafeznia & Ghaderi Hajat, 2016: 40).

The Trump’s policy toward Iran is based on power and strategy. Persian Gulf Countries are located in the southern littoral states of the Persian Gulf as its principal security partners in this region. They continued to spend above-average shares of GDP on defense despite reductions in oil prices in 1998. Relative to its share of total GDP, Bahrain contributed the largest share of ground combat capability; the second largest share of combat aircraft; and the third largest share of military naval tonnage.

When it comes to the Middle East, Donald Trump's stances are contradictory, especially regarding Iran. Saudi Arabia, while certainly concerned about the Islamic State's presence in Syria and Iraq, is much more perturbed by the actions of Shiite Iran. Trump is vocally anti-Iranian, but he also supports Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian conflict, which ultimately bolsters Iranian regional control. Thus, Saudi Arabia is rightfully nervous about a Trump presidency.

The Iranian-supplied rockets were raining down on Gen. James N. Mattis Trump’s defense secretary and before CENTCOM commander throughout the spring and summer of 2011 with greater and greater intensity. Six American soldiers were killed by a volley in eastern Baghdad in early June. A few weeks later, three more Americans died in a similar strike, driving the
monthly death toll to 15. It was the worst month for U.S. troops in Iraq in more than two years, and Iran’s proxies were vowing more rockets and more bloodshed (Greg & Entous, 2017: 2).

The core peace of the United States interests was maintained in both Europe and Asia at a price that a growing U.S. economy could easily afford. Increased international trade and opportunities for investment contributed to U.S. economic growth. Over time, more countries joined the ranks of the democracies. Neither order reflected a perfect consensus; rather, each offered enough agreement so that it was not directly challenged. Where U.S. foreign policy got into trouble such as in Vietnam and Iraq it was not because of alliance commitments or considerations of order but because of ill advised decisions to prosecute costly wars of choice (Haass, 2019: 22).

3.8. Confrontation with Iran and Jihadist groups
Trump’s doctrine based on power and threat. Power and threat is the main centric of US policy toward regional crisis is based on balancing of power. These claims are self-serving, even deluded, a political fantasy. The George W. Bush administration created many of today’s worst geopolitical problems. First, President Bush used a terrorist attack conducted by Saudi citizens trained in Afghanistan as an excuse to invade Regional Crisis, a long-time objective of neoconservatives as part of their plan to reorder the Middle East. The US failed to exert control, allowing widespread looting, and disbanded the military, creating a large pool of angry and unemployed young men (Walter, 2002: 15).

The United States, for its part, has committed costly overreach in trying to remake Afghanistan, invading Iraq, and pursuing regime change in Libya. But it has also taken a step back from maintaining global order and in certain cases has been guilty of costly under reach. In most instances, U.S. reluctance to act has come not over core issues but over peripheral ones that leaders wrote off as not worth the costs involved, such as the strife in Syria, where the United States failed to respond meaningfully when Syria first used chemical weapons or to do more to help anti-regime groups (Haass, 2019: 24).

In Syria Washington inadvertently discouraged a negotiated compromise between Bashar al-Assad and the peaceful opposition by insisting on the former's departure. That convinced some government opponents that the US would force Assad’s ouster, precluding need for compromise which might
have ended or at least limited the conflict early (Perry, 2015: 9).

Civil wars create ungoverned spaces where extremists and terrorist groups can organize, operate, and spread. It is no accident that many of the worst terrorist groups on the planet were born or incubated in civil wars. Today, the real terrorist threats from al-Qaeda and its offshoots are entirely located in states facing civil wars of one kind or another: Syria regional crisis, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, and Mali. These extremist groups keep trying to gain a foothold in strong states like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, and elsewhere, but haven’t succeeded.

The United States strategic making has spent years nurturing relationships with Middle Eastern governments to ensure consistent access to oil and to protect US allies in the region. The onset of civil war in any country means that new governments could come to power that are not only brutal, but also openly antagonistic to the United States, its allies, and its interests. Civil wars tend to create more violence both between neighboring states and within them (Pollack, 2014: 115).

The Syrian civil war is all too typical between the state repression and Fundamental Takfiri groups that support from interventionist groups. Some of which is all too inevitable and does all too good a job of “legitimizing” Fundamental Takfiri groups as an extremism given the crisis in region’s security. The war in Yemen is another example of violence that has interventionist actor have basic role. The United States has supported several of its partners (Whiteside, 2014: 21).

3.9. Escalation of threat against Iran

Such historical analogies are as popular as they are misleading, but the comparison contains a kernel of truth: the post-Cold War interregnum of U.S. hegemony is over, and bipolarity is set to return, with China playing the role of the junior superpower. The transition will be a tumultuous, perhaps even violent, affair, as China’s rise sets the country on a collision course with the United States over a number of clashing interests. But as Washington slowly retreats from some of its diplomatic and military engagements abroad, Beijing has no clear plan for filling this leadership vacuum and shaping new international norms from the ground up (Xuetong, 2019: 35).

Warsaw conference in 2019 February shows that Trump Policy toward Iran’s Security. The Iran’s foreign policies implemented by the Iran to
bring about their supra-nationalist ideology as well as the challenges they face in the current political world order. Iran’s foreign policy reflects some of the differences between, Iran’s political culture, political structure, and ideology. Nationalism and Shia are respectively, traditional and conservative (Kahn, 2014: 41).

Despite breaking off diplomatic relations, Iran and the United States maintained economic contacts for many years after that. In the early 1980s, in the critical phase of the revolution in other words, the United States was still the largest purchaser of Iranian oil. Iran’s “Identity and Revolution ideology” is not so much a stringently formulated ideology in the true sense of the word as a mixture of different political takes on the world embracing nationalism, anti-colonialism and anti-Imperialism, and traditional Shiite political thinking.

Advocates of US-Iranian rapprochement in both countries were able repeatedly to voice their views. It was not until the “Iran Libya Sanctions Act” of 1996 that US curtailed its trading relations with Tehran, and even then food and medicines remained exempt from the sanctions act until the middle of 2012. The United States was thus for a long time Iran’s most important supplier of wheat (Ramazani, 2004: 17).

Confrontation against terrorist groups and management of regional crisis is a section of Iran’s foreign policy. The direction of the Iran policy making has been a source of argument among the scholars since the establishment of the revolutionary government in 1979. It is probably thanks to these people that the two sides were able to keep open low-profile channels of Interaction known as Track Two Diplomacy. In May 2003 an Iranian memorandum was made public which formulated the chief points of possible cooperation between the United States and Iran (Katzman, 2011: 14).

Trump’s policy like Bush’s administration integrated regional approach. The Middle East Israeli-Palestinian conflict and favored the two-state solution as part of a new security equation to protect America. It was ironic for Bush junior to implicitly recognize the essence of Saddam Hussein's message on the interconnectedness of security issues in the Middle East; the message that Bush senior didn’t want to know about in the heat of the Kuwaiti crisis in 1990-1991 (Questi, 2007: 14).
3.10. Containment and Engagement Policy toward Iran

Iran’s foreign policy just like its revolution is still a mystery to many researchers as it is difficult to find an appropriate theoretical framework for it. A new genre of professional formation, steeping U.S. diplomats in the origins, questions, and debates around the creed of individual rights, will be necessary to equip them for this mission. Institutional practices and structures will also be needed; a corps invested in the mission will shape them best (Paik, 2015: 2).

The agreement puts in place the conditions to successfully deter Iran from pursuing an overt breakout using its existing uranium enrichment facilities. The limitations Iran has agreed to on the size of its enrichment program include no more than a 300-kilogram stockpile of 3.67 percent of low-enriched uranium for 15 years; 6,000 spinning centrifuges for 10 years; and limitations on research and development of next generation centrifuges. Together these limitations create a one-year breakout time for the first ten years of the agreement and a shrinking breakout time during years 10-15 that is likely to still keep Iran further from a nuclear weapon than the two-to-three-month breakout time that it faces today (Goldenberg, 2015: 13).

These timeframes should create a sufficient window of vulnerability in which Iran is deterred from pursuing a nuclear weapon through this pathway out of fear that it would be quickly caught and stopped if it tried a covert breakout to a bomb. It is also important to note that these breakout times are based on worst case scenarios that assume Iran will dash to only one weapon; in reality states that pursue nuclear weapons start by dashing to a small arsenal so it may have a credible deterrent and the ability to test a nuclear weapon. This would take significantly longer than one year (Shanahan, 2015: 19).

This reluctance has increased others’ propensity to disregard U.S. concerns and act independently. The Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen is a case in point. Russian actions in Syria and Ukraine should also be seen in this light; it is interesting that Crimea marked the effective end of the Concert of Europe and signaled a dramatic setback in the current order. Doubts about U.S. reliability have multiplied under the Trump administration, thanks to its withdrawal from numerous international pacts and its conditional approach to once inviolable U.S. alliance commitments in Europe and Asia (Haass, 2019: 25).
4. Analysis
The trends of foreign policy and US policy making in the post-Cold War era have been regional countering radical actors can be seen as part of the mechanisms for confronting threatening radical and revolutionary forces. In this historical period, new threats to foreign policy and the US security process have been emerged. This process has contributed to changing the tactical patterns of the United States.

The Trump administration chooses to confront the many challenges of the Middle East and Persian Gulf. A contradiction free American policy for the Middle East would only be possible with an ideological approach devoid of nuance or flexibility. Trump’s policies have any degree of certainty. Trump administration with optimism following a strained relationship with former US President Barack Obama. The Persian Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, also see a potential for cooperation with Washington on energy issues.

Although the US foreign policy and strategic policy making process has not changed in the form of offshore balancing, however, in every historical period, signs of tactical change can be seen in the behavior patterns of the presidents of the United States. The main axis of offshore balancing in George Bush's foreign policy has been to confront the axis of evil. Bush placed Iran at the axis of evil. During this period, US military forces in Iraq carried out military operations to topple Saddam Hussein.

The military occupation of Iraq created new security challenges for the United States. Offshore balancing policy has changed. The military defeat of Saddam Hussein and the occupation of Iraq led to a change in the balance of power. From this historical stage onwards, geopolitical mobility of Iran increased. The role of the Iranian region for security in the attitude of the United States and Western countries was considered a security threat.

After a nuclear deal, Rouhani will have strong political winds at his back. He will have succeeded in delivering on his promise to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to relieve the devastating sanctions harming Iran’s economy and that could have threatened the regime’s stability. With this success, he may have the Supreme Leader’s support and more leverage inside the Iranian system to play an increasingly influential role in Iran’s regional policies in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.
5. Conclusion
The necessary of Iran’s foreign policy for regional management crisis and confrontation to terrorist groups as so ISIS needs to promote revolutionary action. This incompatibility exists on three levels; firstly, Identity and Revolution places its emphasis on ideological boundaries rather than political borders and therefore rejects the idea of nationalist states. Secondly, Identity and Revolution denies current sources of legitimacy with regard to international laws and regulations, and finally, Identity and Revolution calls for the elimination of cultural, ethnic and geographical boundaries among Muslims in order to unite Muslim communities in a new power bloc within the current political world order.

George Bush Jr created new restrictions on Iran. The negotiations between Iran and European countries about nuclear diplomacy led Iran to withdraw from direct pressure mechanisms. Flexibility in Iran's foreign policy should be considered as one of the components that led to a reduction in US security threats. In general, George W. Bush's offshore balancing policy continued.

Barack Obama has used more cooperative mechanisms in relation to Iran. Obama, like Trump and George Bush, emphasized the need for offshore balancing policy. The outcome of Barack Obama's foreign and security policy in dealing with Iran should be treated in the same way as coercive diplomacy in the process of offshore balancing policy. Barack Obama was able to create a joint global plan of action in the nuclear diplomacy process. Barack Obama's new policy has been to reduce Iran's strategic capability to maintain offshore balancing policies.

Then Washington attempted to remake Regional Crisis society, pushing an American-made constitution and deploying U.S. political appointees even to draft Baghdad traffic regulations. Keeping a few troops on station against the Regional Crisis's would have changed little after all, the Bush administration failed to transform the Baghdad government when tens of thousands of American soldiers that were fighting on its behalf in Regional Crisis. In the era of Donald Trump, a new form of strategic US policy was created that promoted regional balance. The central axis of regional balance and Donald Trump Coalition policy can be seen in expanding economic and strategic cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia's purchases from the United States increased as Saudi Arabia was the main focus of regional
power in Iran. In this process, the US strategic limits to Iran were intensified. Donald Trump tries to close the confrontation with Iran through software and mechanisms of low intensive policy.

6. Acknowledgment
I want to thank the Research Deputy of Tehran University and Editorial Board of Geopolitics quarterly who cooperated with me for publishing this article.
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