

Geopolitics and the Roots of Islamic Fundamentalism (Case Study: Fundamentalist Groups in the Horn of Africa)

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Abstract

Islamic fundamentalism is a thought school in the Islamic World which is manifested in the formation of Islamic fundamentalist groups and different violent actions. The Horn of Africa is a region for Islamic fundamentalist movements. From past to present, the most active fundamentalist Islamic groups in the region are AIAI, ICU and Al-Shabab group. The most important issue in this relation is the relation between Islamic fundamentalism and geopolitics. This research is theoretical from viewpoint of the nature and method and also is descriptive-analytic in terms of its approach. The research data gathering procedure is based on library findings. The research analyzed the relation between Islamic fundamentalism and geopolitics with the investigation of Islamic fundamentalist groups in the Horn of Africa. The research main question is that what is the relation between geopolitics and the formation of Islamic fundamentalism in the Horn of Africa? The research findings showed that Islamic fundamentalism is in geopolitical thought and the leaders of Islamic fundamentalist groups not only follow geopolitical thought in their goals and utopias, but also the causes and roots of the formation of Islamic fundamentalist groups have geopolitical burden, and six geopolitical roots can be characterized for the formation of Islamic fundamentalist groups.

Keywords: Geopolitics; Fundamentalism; Islamic fundamentalism; the Region of Horn of Africa.

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1.Introduction

Fundamentalism is a movement and thought that root in Protestant Christian in the US, but it includes Islamic movements which are famous for violentism and extremism. Africa hosts a noticeable population from Islamic religious groups such as Shiites, Sunnis and other Islamic sects. The Horn of Africa including Somali, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea is a region that noticeable Sunni groups of Muslims live in there. One of the characteristics of the region is the presence and activity of fundamentalist groups with Salafi and Wahabist thoughts in Somali country. The history of Salafi thoughts in the Horn of Africa and Somali backs to 1940, but the formation and activities of Islamic fundamentalist groups back to 1970 and 1980. After 1991 and state defeat in Somali, these groups' activities were increased. The most important Islamic fundamentalist groups are as follows: AIAI, ICU and Al-Shabab group. Violent security and political actions of these groups have been at the focal point of local and international media. The main issue in relation with Islamic fundamentalist groups in general and the mentioned groups in the Horn of Africa, in particular is considering the roots of the formation of these groups. Geopolitics is a dynamic and in revolution knowledge that geography, politics and power are its three main elements. The investigation of the process and goals of the formation of Islamic fundamentalist groups in the Horn of Africa and its approaches show that Islamic fundamentalism and the establishment of these groups is in connection with geopolitics and the dominant principles. The research is intended to investigate Islamic fundamentalism in the Horn of Africa in relation with geopolitics and besides of characterizing the geopolitical roots of Islamic fundamentalism, analyzes the relation between the two variables. The dependent variable is formation of Islamic fundamentalist groups and the independent variable is geopolitics. The research main question is that what is the relation between geopolitics and the formation of Islamic fundamentalism in the Horn of Africa?

In connection with the research background, some studies have been conducted about the subject of Islamic fundamentalism in Africa and the Middle East. In these studies, the relationship between the formation of Islamic fundamentalism and geopolitics has not been directly considered and geopolitical analysis is neglected. The innovation of this research is complete focus on analyzing the geopolitical roots of the formation of

Islamic fundamentalism by examining the Islamic fundamentalist groups who are active in the Horn of Africa.

2. Methodology

The research is theoretical from viewpoint of the nature and method and also is descriptive-analytic in terms of its approach. The data gathering procedure is based on library findings. The research using qualitative method analyzed the relation between geopolitics and Islamic fundamentalism and the formation of Islamic fundamentalist groups in the Horn of Africa.

3. Theoretical Principle

3.1. Geopolitics

There is no unique definition of geopolitics, and specialists of the geopolitics domain have identified different pivots and functional scales ranging from global to local and have based their definition on it. Saul B. Cohen knows geopolitics applied study of the relation between geographic space with politics that investigates bilateral effects of spatial patterns, forms and structures with political beliefs and organizations (Cohen,1994: 17). In a comprehensive definition, geopolitics is the science of study of the relation between geography, power and politics and the transactions resulted from their combination (Hafeznia,2011:37). Geopolitics is a branch of political geography that has a scientific nature and also has fundamental and practical aspects. The fundamental aspect of geopolitics is the production of scientific propositions and the development of the realm of geopolitical epistemology and its practical aspect is the application of geopolitical knowledge to meet the needs of human societies (Hafeznia,2007:1). In fact, geopolitics is a part of nature and truth of political geography that is in connection with power and investigates mutual relation between geography and politics in connection with power, both in situation that the players consider geographic values to produce power, and in a situation that players relate with other players in the frameworks of competition, cooperation, integration and disintegration, war and peace, mutual respect, dominance and under-dominance based on their power and perception of itself (Hafeznia and Kaviani Rad,2014:153-154). The evolution from classic to modern geopolitics reveals the increasing role-playing of the religion (Simbar,2006:122). If geographic center of a religion is faced with new

evolution and consequently the political and religious powers are coincided, it can be said that the religion has a geopolitical nature. In other words, it starts the local and international role-playing, the periphery minorities are affected and move toward politicization and being organized; the core-periphery relations are promoted and the influence area of the center is expanded to the periphery regions and the religion finds geopolitical nature (Ahmadi,2010:70).

3-2. Islamic Fundamentalism

Fundamentalism means basic, principle and framework. This concept is a western concept and coined in Protestant religious debates at end of the 20th century in the time that some pamphlets were published under the title of “Principle” (Claudio,2010:13-14). There are different definitions of Fundamentalism. Chicago University scientists’ definition, presented in their “Fundamentalism Project”, would be one of the comprehensive definitions. They believe that fundamentalism means ethnic groups who are emerged in reaction to the crisis which threatens their identity, so cultural, ideological and social borders are drawn to protect “self” from “others”. So, fundamentalism is based on grievance against status quo. Fundamentalism sees the current path of the society and the world as a threat to their ideology and defines the duty and mission as a renewal of the ideology and make free the ideology from modernism consequences (Ahmadvand,2006: 109).

In the first eras, fundamentalist backed to the protestant radicals and classic Christians, but then was used for violent and extremist Islamic groups. There is not a united point of view about use of this concept for Islamist groups and the indexes of fundamentalism. This discourse has not been compatible with the dominant ideas of the West. Islamic fundamentalism has challenged western human rights ideas, democracy, globalization, secularism and western definition of terrorism by presenting concepts like Jihad, Islamic state and Islamic human rights (Mohaghegh Nia and Others, 2013:134).

The most important content values emphasized by Islamic fundamentalism are as follows:

1. Islam comprehensiveness and inclusiveness: from viewpoint of Islamic fundamentalism, Islam is a comprehensive and inclusive religion that includes all aspects of human life.

2.The relation between religion and politics in Islam: Islamic fundamentalism depends on lack of distinction between politics and religion. If Islam is a comprehensive project and plan, society and politics cannot be excluded from its domain.

3.Return to the principle: Islamic fundamentalism believes in fundamental values and beliefs and it is based on this idea that the principles should be discovered and reconstructed as a society base.

4.Establishment of an Islamic state: Islamic fundamentalism believes in the establishment of an Islamic state and knows its entity as a rational and Sharia' necessity.

5. Pragmatism and warrism: Islamic fundamentalism is pragmatist and has a militarist nature, because knows activity, try and effort as a necessity for the establishment of God Authority and end of the non-Islamic situation of the societies. Jihad, in this term, includes a range of actions including publication of books and journals, lecturing, holding religious classes, interpretation meetings, providing welfare, economic, social, and medical facilities and also military techniques learning and guerrilla activities (Khosravi,2006:127-138). Fundamentalism in the form of action and behavior is one of the security issues of today's world, in such a way that territorialize and territoriality of the fundamentalist terrorist groups has become a major part of the world's security literature (Kaviani Rad and Others,2018:26). The religious ideas, which have been turned into an ideology, have made regional activists use religion for political goals and objectives and this is one of the techniques of fundamentalist groups in the Middle East (Khalkhali,2016:86). The same can be said of fundamentalist groups in other parts of the world.

3-3. Constructivist Theory

Constructivists emphasize on the role of culture in international relations (Jepperson and et al,1996:48). Their emphasis on the role of culture and identity in international relations and security studies has drawn attention to the confrontation of cultures and the role of culture in the conflicts. The role of culture and how it affects the theory of constructivism has been theorized and it has given the role of an independent variable and it emerges as a factor shaping the identity of states and their perceptions of themselves and others (Yazdanfam,2008:737). In security studies, constructivists pay exact attention to the influence and effects of culture and identity on security

policies and practices (Mousavi and Others,2012:91). They look for the causes of security and insecurity in the approaches of actors towards phenomena and issues, especially interests and threats, and they believe that the more heterogeneous and contradictory the perceptions and attitudes of the actors towards the phenomena and issues, the greater is the mistrust between them (Abbasi Ashlaghi,2004:544).

3-4. Geopolitical Theory of Interfaith and Religious Conflicts

Based on “Geopolitical Theory of Interfaith and Religious Conflicts”, the actors’ interfaith and religious conflicts have geopolitical roots. This theory knows geopolitical causes of the interfaith and religious conflict as follows:


1. Foreign interventions and some states supports from religious groups;
2. Territorialization and expansionism of the followers of religions and triumph to establish religion-based state and religious government;
3. Colonial policies related to religion followers;
4. Lack of spatial justice for citizens and followers of the religions;
5. Lack of or weakness in participation of religious minorities groups in the power structure and administration of the state;
6. Happenings and historical mentality;
7. State policies violating religious rights of citizens;
8. Classic beliefs and ethnic nationalism;
9. Protection of religious identity and values (Hafeznia and Mirzaei Tabar, 2020:185).

3-5. The Region of Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa includes four countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somali in the east of the continent. Some know this region as “Great Horn” which also includes Kenya, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. Horn of Africa hosts 270 million people, hundreds of ethnic groups, ten climate regions, and has different levels of human development, colonial history and new political effects. This region is the most dynamic region in Africa. Besides, it is one of the most important communication lines in the world and also it is a natural game field for internal and external players in Africa. A combination of the factor including weak state, mutual destabilizing and foreign interventions are among driving factors which destabilize the Horn of Africa, constantly (Gaas,2019:11). In the Horn of Africa, as heterogenous geography, different climates, low and high elevated regions, people with

different religions including Islam, Christian, Jewish and pagan have created a mosaic that only is united politically and strategically, and does not united and coordinated from the viewpoint of other facets. This region is limited from east and southeast to the Indian Ocean, from north to Adan Gulf and from northeast to the Red Sea (Amir Ahmadian,2002: 39-41).

Figure (1): The geographical location of the Horn of Africa



(Source: Woo,2014: 84)

4. The Research Findings

4-1. Islamic Fundamentalist Groups in the Horn of Africa

4-1-1. Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AI) group

Al-Ittihad al-Islami Group that does not exist now was famous in the 1980 decade and its effectiveness culminated in 1992 (Watts and Others,2007: 77). In fact, this group was established in 1980 in Somali, and strengthened its power at first of 1990, but it was defeated in the establishment of Salafi Emirates in Somali and it is decreased in its power, gradually (United States Department of State,2007:282). Al-Ittihad al-Islami Group was established in 1980 with the unification of Salafi groups who had some proponents in 1960 and 1970 in Somali and received Somali people support by nationalist actions, not by Salafist thoughts (Watts and Others,2007:77). This group

performed different armed operations in 1995-1996 and 1999 against the Ethiopian state (Petrini,2010:11). After the collapse of Somali Council of Islamic Courts and after 2006, Al-Ittihad al-Islami Group started its activities in the Ogaden region (Somali) in the east of Ethiopia by education of the personals and personals attract. The members of this group were active in Somali country, the Ogaden region (Somali) in Ethiopia, Kenya and possibly in Djibouti (United States Department of State,2007:282).

4-1-2. Islamic Courts Union (ICU)

With the collapse of Siad Barre State and then the extraction of western peace protection forces from Somali in 1994, some opposition forces were formed based on tribal behavior. ICU was established in this situation. This group was developed in eleven regional religious courts in which Sharia' laws were executed. The courts had public support as a source of establishing social order. In 1999, the courts were united and formed a military group to control Mogadishu and fought with tribal insurgent groups. This group developed its control on Somali region beyond the coast in the internal region of Pant land (Eichstaedt,2010:45-46). In 2006, the ICU dominance on the southern region of Somali threatened the authority of national transition government. In that year, Ethiopian militants performed some operation to eliminate this group and strengthen national transition government. At the last of 2006, Ethiopian militants overcame ICU with the US air force supports and ended the ICU presence in the south of Somali (Abukar,2015:30). In spite of this defeat, the militia parties continued their activities and declared jihad against Ethiopia Christians. Eritrea was the main supporter of this group in Somali who supported this group, technically and financially (Eichstaedt,2010:46).

In 2008, violent conflicts between Islamist insurgents with the federal transition government of Somali to take power in the national level and change in the government system continued for three consecutive years. In this year, the conflict spread from Mogadishu into other regions such as Bay, Galgaduud, Mudug and Hiiraan. The insurgents who were loyal to ICU took the control of some important cities like, Jowhar, Dheere and Kismayo (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research,2009:40). In 2009, 149 members of the new parliament of Somali from the main opposition movement created a union for the freedom of Somali. The parliament extended the order of the presence of transition government for the latter

two years and Sheikh Sharif Ahmad, the former leader of ICU, swore as the new president (Abukar,2015:30).

4-1-3. Al-Shabaab Insurgent Group of Somali

Al-Shabaab group as a military branch of the ICU declared its presence in 2005-2006. The ICU was divided into two main groups including moderate nationalist and extremist religious groups that Al-Shabaab was among extremist religious factions (Bendtsen and Others,2012:43). When Sheikh Sharif Ahmad as the former leader of the ICU become the president of new transition federal government, the extremist faction of Al-Shabaab was opponent of the government and knew the government as a tool in hands of western powers, Ethiopia and also the US. So, the group fractioned from ICU and as Al-Shabaab group declared war against the transition federal government (Eichstaedt,2010:46). This group was tried to establish an Islamic state in Somali and performed different attacks on the state and organizations and western countries' citizens (Abukar,2015:30).

Almost all of the main tribes of Somali cooperated with Al-Shabaab. Many members of this group were attracted from Rahanwayn, Jareer and Murusade tribes. On one hand, Al-Shabaab is a tool for minority tribes to reach power, and from the other hand, it supports marginalized people and unsatisfied minority people to attract their supports. Minority people preferred Al-Shabaab presence in power than majority tribal dominance (European Asylum Support Office (EASO),2014:91). Ethiopia, that was entered in southern and central regions of Somali to confront with ICU faced with a great challenge named Al-Shabaab. Ethiopia extracted its forces from Somali in 2009, and Al-Shabaab took the control of southern regions such as the capital, Mogadishu (Solomon,2015:39). From viewpoint of time, Al-Shabaab attacked Mogadishu in 2009, and a new wave of attacks on the regions controlled by the federal state was started. In October 2009, Al-Shabaab insurgents seized Kismayo port in the north and then vast regions of the south of Somali. This group declared alliance with Al-Qaida group. Al-Shabaab left Mogadishu in august 2011. In October 2011, Kenya attacked some regions of Somali due to Al-Shabaab's kid-napping operations in the territory of Kenya. Since February 2012, Al-Shabaab group has lost its control on some regions, but it has been active and has not been disappeared (European Asylum Support Office (EASO),2014:24-25).

4-2. The Roots of the Formation of Islamic Fundamentalist Groups in the Horn of Africa

4-2-1. The goals and Roots of the Formation of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI) Group

Somali was the emerging place of Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) group. The main goals of this group were the Islamic state of Somali, separation of the Ogaden region (Somali) from Ethiopia and its annexation to Somali country and authority exertion on this region and also annexation of Somali ethnic group living in Ethiopia and Ogaden region to Somali country (United States Department of State,2003:127; Shinn,2005:101). In 1996, AIAI decided to unite local societies of ethnic group of Somali, and by passing from short term goals defined its long term strategy as the establishment of an Islamic state in the country of Somali based on its thoughts (Menkhaus, 2005:35). Besides of main goal of this group namely the establishment of Islamic state in country of Somali and dominance on Somali region -which was lost after the independency of Somali-, the other goals of this group were as follows: confrontation with Siad Barre government and prevention from the west influence (Watts and Others,2007:77-78). But, in a comprehensive term, this group main goal was the establishment of an Islamic state in countries of the Horn of Africa, namely Ethiopia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Somali (West,2006). In fact, AIAI was not only followed the Islamic state in the country of Somali, but also followed integration and unification of all Muslim nationalities in the region of the Horn of Africa (Loewenstein,2010).

A decisive date cannot be characterized as the formation date of this group, but it was almost at mid of 1970 and the declaration of new laws related to the family by Siad Barre government in Somali country which faced with Muslims' protests. In reaction, Siad Barre executed some of the clergies and incarcerated or exiled their proponents. In 1991, AIAI was activated with Wahabism and Salafi Islamic thoughts. Regarding that this thought roots in Saudi Arabia, most of Somali people know this thought imported ideology (International Crisis Group (ICG),2002:16). In some resources, it is put about AIAI that this group "a Wahhabi Islamist terrorist organization which arose in Somalia in the 1980s with the intention of replacing the regime of Mohammed Said Barre with an Islamic state." (Agbibo,2014:28). The founders of AIAI were young men educated by the west and southeast of Asia. Based on the group beliefs the sole way to get rid of corruption, suppression and tribalism in Somali controlled by Siad Barre government

was operationalization of political Islam (Menkhaus,2005:35). Salafi ideology was introduced by students graduated from Saudi Arabia to Somali for the first time in 1940. Somali Muslims were mainly Sunni Shafi'i, and Tasavvuf classic presence in the Horn of Africa had prevented the development of this ideology. Religious clergies issued some Fatwa which forbidden advertisement of Salafi ideology. A boom in oil prices in 1970 and 1980 caused an influx of Somali workers' immigration to the Persian Gulf States and most of them started working in Saudi Arabia. In these years, Saudi Arabia granted scholarships to thousands of Somalia students who started education at the Salafi education centers like the Islamic University of Medina, Om-al Quora in Mecca and the University of Imam Mohammad Bin-Saud in Riyadh. This evolution along with internal changes in Somali converted Somali from an anti-Salafi country to a receiving and executing of Islamic laws center. In some new centers of Salafi, they tried to attract forces from prayers settled in the countryside of Mogadishu and the northern region of Somali, and transferred their thoughts using Quran interpretation meetings and religious, political and social lectures. AIAI received financial and technical supports from rich people and charities in Saudi Arabia and also from Al-Qaida group (Watts & Others,2007:77-78). The leaders and supports of this group knew a return to Islam as the only way to settle the problems. AIAI was not a militia group in the first stages, and this group organized extremist forces in Somali after Ethiopia and Somali war in 1977-1978 (Loewenstein,2010).

4-2-2. The goals and Roots of the Formation of Islamic Courts Union (ICU)

From viewpoint of emanating place, ICU is a part of tribal power in Mogadishu. This group had the supports of Hawaye and it had the supports of businessmen class of Hawaye in Mogadishu for its preliminary goal, namely providing security (Barnes and Hassan,2007:152). In other words, Hawaye- Habr-Gidir was the dominant tribe in ICU. In 2005-2006, this movement followed the collapse of transition federal government. Its operations can be compared with other militia tribal movements that follow war with the dominant power, but its operations are related to Islam (Abbink,2009:98). In short term, ICU is intended to establish an Islamic state in Somali based o Sharia laws, but it is reported in media that the long-term goal of this group is the establishment of a greater Islamic state in the east of Africa (west,2006).

In September 2006, Abdelrahman M. Jinikow, vice president of ICU in Somali, put that: “we will enact the constitution based on Sharia laws, because Islamic constitution is the only law which acts based on justice for all of us. The current constitution of transition federal state of Somali does not have any relation with Islam. Secular constitution, democratic or other things, is not fair and correct, and Muslims have only one constitution which is based on Quran, completely and it is in favor of Muslims in this world and hereafter”. In sum, ICU declared its ideological political goals in the frame of slogans of “unification of all Somalia people in the Horn of Africa”, “establishment of a government based on Islamic Sharia laws” and “Jihad against Ethiopia” (Abbink,2009:101-102).

4-2-3. The Roots of the Formation of Somali Al-Shabaab

In fact, Al-Shabaab group is the remains of AIAI in Somali. The thought of the formation of Al-Shabaab group is inspired by Islamic researchers of Somali educated in Saudi Arabia as the followers of the Wahabism sect, and this group is intended to impose Wahabist thoughts in Somali and its promotion in throughout the Horn of Africa region and finally in the African continent (Ali,2008:1). Al-Shabaab group tries to establish Islamic emirates not only in Somali territorial state and space but also throughout of the settlement place of Somali people in the Horn of Africa (Rudincová,2011: 276). Besides of ideological and religious thought, this group sees itself as a state which reflects ethnic nationalism roots of Somali ethnic group to establish a “greater Somali” country (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, November20,2015). There are some disputes among the group leaders on the goals of the group; some intend to establish greater Islamic Republic of Somali, and some follow the establishment of an Islamic state and country in a territory stretched out to the internal regions of the east of Africa and to Egypt, and also some follows jihad and fight all around the world (Bendtsen and Others,2012:45 Quoted from: Harper,2012:86). In sum, the main goal of Al-Shabaab group is the establishment of Somali Caliphate with Wahabist thought in regions of the Horn of Africa settled by Somali people through military actions and using power vacuum resulted from state weakness in Somali country. In other words, this group intends to establish an Islamic state including Somali people settled in countries of Kenya, Somali, Ethiopia and Djibouti using violent methods and creating a Wahabist core in Somali country. In long term, Al-Shabaab group follows the promotion of

its ideology throughout the Horn of Africa and then central, southern and eastern regions of Africa to confront with the West influence in the Horn of Africa and development of Wahabist thoughts in Africa (Ali,2008:3).

5. Analysis

Considering the indexes and contents of fundamentalism and goals and behavior methods of Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) group, Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab group shows that these groups believe in the relation between religion and politics, return to Islamic principles, the establishment of Islamic state and pragmatism and warism to realize their goals and are defined as Islamic fundamentalists with Salafi and Wahabist thought. The emanating place and the roots of the formation of these groups and their thoughts and goals are in connection with geopolitics and dominant principles on it.

“Foreign support and intervention” is an important factor in the geopolitical analysis of the roots of the establishment of these groups. Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) group, Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab group are affected by Islamic thoughts of non-native Salafi and Wahabist thoughts emanated from Saudi Arabia who support these forces, technically and financially. In the framework of geopolitics concept, the role of Salafi and Wahabism in the formation of these groups can be investigated under the titles of “intervention” and “expansionism”. “Intervention” is an action which informal and formal players make use of it to reach the goals and develop the influence area in the affairs of the other political-spatial units and places in different scales.

From coming to power, one of the main foreign policy goals of Saudi Arabia has been the promotion of Salafi and Wahabism beyond national borders. This state and religious active groups of this country follows increase in influence area and expansionism in its immaterial facet and having foreign forces approval with its followed policies by taking interventionist policy in order to develop geopolitical territory and borders in geographic spaces beyond the borders and also to prevent the development of geopolitical borders and territories of the rivals. Granting scholarships to Somali citizens and education of the young people of Somali and introducing Salafi and Wahabist ideologies to them is done by Saudi Arabia in this relation. The formation of Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) group, Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab group who defend Salafi and

Wahabist ideologies and their leaders were educated in Saudi Arabia religious centers and supported technically and financially by active forces of this country are resultants of the policies of development of influence area and geopolitical expansionism taken by Saudi Arabia.

The second factor in geopolitical analysis of the establishment of Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) group, Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab group is “try to establish Islamic state and country” with Salafi thought in Somali and Horn of Africa. This issue can be investigated under the titles of geopolitical “territoriality” and “territory-expanding”. “Territoriality” is a try to authority and power exertion on a geographic space and defense and protection from values, interests and resources which paves the way for the construction and creation of a territory. But, “territory-expanding” has a hegemonic and expansionist nature and the players intend to develop their territory and to seize geographic space in physical (territorial expansion) and immaterial facets (having the approval of non-native citizens). In “territoriality” facet, Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) group claims the territory shared with Ethiopia and Somali and tried to separate the Ogaden region (Somali) from Ethiopia and to annex this region to Somali and to establish Somali Islamic state and country and authority exertion on it. Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) group knew the territorial space of Somali as its territory and intended to establish an Islamic state with the execution of Sharia laws. Al-Shabaab group knew Somali as its territory and defined its goal as taking control of the Somali. In “territory-expanding” facet, the three groups do not define their final goal as control over Somali land, and defined their goal as development of territory and dominance on throughout the Horn of Africa in physical, territorial and immaterial facets through integration and unification of Muslim nations. Even, Al-Shabaab group defined the range of its “territory-expanding” beyond the Horn of Africa and also the other regions in the east, west, north and south of Africa.

The third factor is “ethnic and religious identity claiming”. Regarding dependence on birth and living place, ethnicity, religion, language and other identity creating factors, each human has a local, ethnic, religious, linguistic and place identity and belonging. Negative reaction to the threats of identity depends on the level of sense, belonging and bias to the identity. Ethnic and religious identity is an important factor among identity factors for humans. When human and social groups in a territory see their ethnic and religious

identity under threat by the governments and feel a sense of spatial injustice and violation of their rights, show a negative reaction against this situation and try to realize their rights. In this situation, one of the actions is claiming independency, autonomy and separation from the country and establishment of a state with a common ethnic and religious identity. Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) group, Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab group seek their ethnic identity in relation with Safali and Wahabist Islam, and know their ethnic identity in connection with Somali ethnic and know their spatial identity in belonging to Somali territory and in a general approach to the Horn of Africa. The members of this group, regarding that they know their space, ethnic and religious identity under threat, by taking conflict and tension policies try to unite Muslim nation and ethnic of Somali in a united territory and establishment of Salafi and Wahabist Islamic state in an independent country.

Another root cause of the formation of Islamic fundamentalist group in the Horn of Africa backs to the “colonial decisions and actions” in dividing Somali people into countries of Horn of Africa. In the frame of colonial actions, colonialist countries follow territorial expansionism, territorial expansion and dominance on physical and immaterial resources of colonized countries to increase in power and development of geopolitical borders in competition with other rivals. So, geopolitics is located at the focal point of colonial movements. In the years of 1875-1885, Somali people’s ancestor territory was divided between four colonial powers including the UK, Ethiopia, France and Italy (Muir,2000:342). In 1897, colonial agreements signed by colonialists put Somali people under the colonial management of the UK, France and Italy (Haji Mukhtar,2003:3-4). Due to public discontent of Somali ethnic group about imposing new borders and dividing this ethnic group between Horn of African countries, Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) group, Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab group declared one of their goals as unification of Somali people and establishment of a state with the presence of this ethnic group in the Horn of Africa.

The final important factor is “state weakness and defeat and power vacuum”. Governments and states’ main duty in every territory and country is providing order and administrating policies and strategies. Three main concepts forming geopolitics include power, politics and geography that the

states and governments have these factors, and regarding this dominance on power, politics and geography their actions and policies used in the administration of the affairs have geopolitical nature. In this relation, state and government high capacity and execution of effective policies can bring growth and development. Correspondingly, if the government is weak and is defeated, the state is put in a retrogression path. In fact, the resultant of strong and effective state is a powerful country and the resultant of a weak and defeated state is a weak and disunited state. In a weak and defeated situation, the way is grounded for activation of opponent forces and internal and external protests, and these groups make use of the power vacuum to reach their goals and ideologies. In the Horn of Africa region, one of the main factors in the establishment of Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) group, Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab group is the weakness and defeat of the government in Somali. Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) group was formed in the space of opposition with the government, and after the collapse of Siad Barre government in Somali it started a new wave of activities. Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab group was formed and activated after the collapse and defeat of Somali government in 1991 and the following created a power vacuum.


6. Conclusions

The most important content values emphasized by Islamic fundamentalism are as follows: Islam comprehensiveness and inclusiveness, the relation between religion and politics in Islam, return to the Islamic principles, the establishment of an Islamic state and believe in pragmatism and warism. One of the characteristics of the region of Horn of Africa is the movements of Islamic fundamentalism with Salafi and Wahabist Islam ideology that most important groups among them are Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) group, Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab group. The spatial territory of these groups is Somali country, but the area of activity and expansionism of these groups is also defined the region of Horn of Africa. These groups declared their main goal and utopia as establishment of an Islamic state with Salafi and Wahabist ideology in Somali and Horn of Africa and unification of Somali people in a united territory. These three groups are similar to other violent Islamic fundamentalist groups in the world and in particular west of Asia. The investigation of the characteristics of these groups along with the dominance of Islamist thoughts on them reveals the role-playing of

geopolitical thoughts in the formation of these groups. In fact, although special thought, tendency and perception of Islamic beliefs which encouraged the leaders of these group to form a special movement were considered, but a root review of the causes of these groups formation show that geopolitics has played role in their formation with the concept of the mutual relation between power, politics and geography and the resulted actions from their combination. In the establishment of Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) group, Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab group as the three active Islamic fundamentalist groups in the Horn of Africa the main geopolitical roots of “foreign support and intervention”, “try to establish Islamic state and country”, “territoriality and territory expansion”, “ethnic and religious identity claiming”, “colonial decisions and actions” and “state weakness and defeat and power vacuum” have played role. As it is mentioned in the analysis section, a combination of three factors forming the concept of geopolitics namely power, politics and geography have played a role in each root causes, and these factors have geopolitical burden. So, regarding that many prominent Islamic fundamentalist groups in other regions of the world and in particular in the west Asian region have ideology, goals, nature and structure in common with three active groups in the Horn of Africa, it can be generalized all of or most of geopolitical root causes to the causes of the formation of these groups. In sum, the formation of Islamic fundamentalism is in connection with geopolitics and factors with geopolitical nature have an effective and important role in the formation of Islamic fundamentalist groups. In other words, in a systematic process, the combination of the factors of power, politics and geography and the resulted actions form a concept called “geopolitics”. This concept makes strategies and methods of behaviors of formal and informal players in following its goals to have geopolitical burden. In formation of Islamic fundamentalist groups in general and in particular three Islamic fundamentalist groups, namely Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) group, Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab group strategies, goals and causes such as “foreign support and intervention”, “try to establish Islamic state and country”, “territoriality and territory expansion”, “ethnic and religious identity claiming”, “colonial decisions and actions” and “state weakness and defeat and power vacuum” have played role that each of these has geopolitical concept and burden. Combination of these factors along with special ideology results in the

formation of “Islamic fundamentalism” and “Islamic fundamentalist groups”.

Figure (2): The Relation between Geopolitics and Islamic Fundamentalism



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