

Theory of Intelligence Deterrence in Foreign Policy (From Military Deterrence by Punishment to Intelligence Deterrence by Denial)

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Abstract

Due to the anarchic nature of international relations and the era of uncertainty, the right to self-defense is impossible without endogenous security and indigenous self-help. Force and power are still necessary and integral parts of international relations. It means the ruling of the logic of power, not the power of the logic in the global politics. Anyway, Self-defense and self-help are two sides of the same coin. In such a system, outsourcing security is a grave strategic mistake. Accordingly, Security under no circumstances can be negotiable, let alone outsourcing to others, otherwise it will lead to security dependency and, as a result, lack of political independence and violation of national sovereignty by intervening powers. Therefore, there is no other way to resist against strategy of bandwagoning than internal/external balancing policy. The main question of this article is what kind of deterrence can guarantee national security against external threats?, The hypothesis is that military deterrence will be vulnerable and unreliable without intelligence deterrence, more specifically the intelligence deterrence by deniable is complementary and protective necessity to the military deterrence by punishment.

It is argued that independent countries that oppose the existing order in the international system cannot and should not place their national security solely on the basis of military deterrence by punishment, but their deterrence should be spill over to intelligence deterrence by denial. By the way, it seems deterrence and balancing policy in the framework of coercive diplomacy determines the fate of the strategic conflict between the two orders namely resistance-based order and dominance-centric order. Needless to say Resistance has active/offensive orientation in nature, not passive/ defensive approach. Because of that, we do not have legitimate or illegitimate resistance. Righteousness is a source of inspiration for resistance. In fact, attention to deterrence and coercion is rooted in a belief in resistance.

Keywords: Deterrence, Intelligence, Resistance, Punishment, Denial, Coercion.

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1. Introduction

Basically, national security in any country depends directly on maintaining its security environment. Based on this, a country that cannot identify and eliminate the type of threats, the level of threats and also the sources of threats, it will face a national crisis and disaster from within sooner or later. Therefore, reason dictates that the security-creating elements should be strengthened and supported everywhere and the security-destroying factors - abroad or domestic-should be destroyed or at least restrained. And what a short-sighted and suspicious view is "maintaining national security solely and exclusively within the framework of geographical borders!!". Because national interests are subject to security and therefore borders of national security are beyond geographical borders. The security realm is determined by identity, power and politics along with the geographical factor!!

Using IR theories and adopting an interdisciplinary approach (between Geography and IR), this issue could be explained to some extent and create a link International Relations with Geography (Fatemi Nejad,2024:308). Regional powers are the most powerful states in a geographical region and their number depends on the distribution of power in that region (Shariati and Vazirian,2024:247).

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Iran's foreign policy faced a paradigm shift and Iran's orientation, goals, and national interests were reassigned. The regional strategy of Iran in the period of 1980-2001 was twofold: first, countering the intervention of the great powers in the region with an emphasis on the unity of the Islamic world and second, supporting regional multilateralism. Islamic Republic of Iran in the post-revolutionary years, due to its unique geographical location, high legitimacy of the political system, and its Islamic identity, had more potential, compared to the Pahlavi era to protect the region (Shariati and Vazirian,2024:255). Iran's flexible foreign policy to establish extra-regional alliances against regional threats has been one of the pragmatic aspects of this method; (Shariati and Vazirian,2024:261-2).

Today, unlike in the past, there are no clear structures of conflict and cooperation and no clearly definable threats, and a stable world order does not appear to be on the horizon (Schwarz,2005:12). That's why national interests are not only limited to borders, but the national interests of a country are a variable dependent on its national and international security. So national interests are conditioned by the two components of "security"

and “threat” in all its dimensions and levels. Yes, national interest is a variable related to security. Security is the top line of national interests. Of course, such a view and such an approach are never allowed to outsource security under any circumstances! Otherwise, nothing will remain of independence and national sovereignty.

Deterrence is a multifaceted phenomenon that can be effective in diverse conflicts. A country without deterrence easily surrenders to coercive diplomacy. Any international agreement without an “intelligence agenda” will not only be a Pathfinder, but it will also provide a platform for coercion and influence of foreign elements in decision-making process. Some experts believe that deterrence is thus a political concept and, derivatively, a military one. It cannot be effectively used without a clear idea of what one seeks to achieve and how one intends to deal with conflicts and threats. Moreover, it serves as an instrument of diplomacy, which would be impotent without power. As much, deterrence can be seen as the bread and butter of diplomacy and politics that is necessary for dealing with conflicts and securing the peace. The ends and means of military deterrence must correspond to these tasks. That is especially true for nuclear deterrence¹ (balance of terror), which is only legitimate as a means of gradually abolishing the use of violence in politics. This means, however, that nuclear powers are obligated to practice political and military self-restraint and to strengthen the workings of an international order based on the norms, rules and standards of political behavior, and cooperate in international organizations. That also means that military measures are bound to the legal norms and due process as defined by the UN charter (Schwarz,2005:11).

Here we outline the conceptual model and applied model of national security before entering the next part of this article. Diplomatic power and intelligence power are two main components of national security conceptually along with cultural, political, economic and military power (Fig 1).

1.Nuclear Weapons in itself are not Offensive Weapons.



Fig (1): Conceptual Model of National Security

Also Deterrence in high politics, Interdependence in low politics and Détente in diplomacy are right-angled triangles are the formation of national security in terms of functionality. Naturally, if one of these three sides is destroyed, the national security structure will be incomplete and ineffective and national interests will not be served and saved (Fig2).



Fig (2): Applied Model of National Security

It goes without saying that among a variety of tradeoffs associated with its own security, a sovereign state faces two kinds of tradeoffs concerning guns and butter. One is of how to allocate productive resources between national security and economic prosperity. The other is of how to distribute military budget between the capabilities of disrupting military forces (guns) and of damaging civilian values (butter) (Nakao,2019:2). A successful foreign

policy may need to address the balance between these two capabilities (Kissinger,1957).

2. Research Method and Innovative Dimension

In terms of methodology, this research uses an Ijtihad (independent reasoning by an expert or the thorough exertion of a mental faculty in finding a solution to a question) and understanding method based on a qualitative research approach. Methodologically, this research uses the ijthihad and method and based on a qualitative research approach that uses an extensive literature review to collect relevant information, a thorough analysis of existing journals and books, and a comprehensive understanding of the critical stream of international relations theorizing. It has been formulated and theorized after years of studying and mastering competing theories and the history of diplomacy, and especially objective observations/field experience. This theory is the product of a continuous dialectic between theory and practice, field and thought, which, through years of activity in both the academic and executive fields, has been able to analyze the system of indigenous problems in a mental framework, semantic system and a specific intellectual system, and present this indigenous theory with an ijthihad and understanding method. Basically, every scientific activity is an ijthihad activity, and the scientist acts as a Mujtahid (an authoritative interpreter, commentator and analyst) in every science sphere. Therefore, ijthihad activity is an understanding and exploratory activity that is in the position of discovering a specific subject matter / reality. It is emphasized that no useful and effective theory will be achieved simply by being in the library without engaging with the field and society in a dialectical process; otherwise it will soon and quickly disappear and be destroyed.

It is necessary to emphasize that the difference and distinction of this article is in presenting a theory that is presented for the first time in a reputable international journal, namely *Geopolitics*. Deterrence has so far generally been raised in the defense-military field, and I have firstly extended deterrence to the intelligence-security field, and secondly, I consider this issue a vital condition for resisting the coercive diplomacy of hostile countries against independent and freedom-loving states. Therefore, I have theorized the theory of intelligence deterrence for the first time in the scientific and academic community, and it has never been raised by anyone before me.

3. Intelligence Studies

Intelligence studies is an interdisciplinary academic field that concerns intelligence assessment and intelligence analysis. Intelligence has been referred to as the "lost dimension" of the field of international relations (IR) and diplomatic history, as the secretive nature of the subject means most intelligence successes are unknown (Evans and Newnham,1998:256). Stephen Marrin has suggested that Intelligence Studies is an academic complement to the practice of national security intelligence (Marrin, 2016:1). On the central question of whether 'intelligence' should be defined purely as an information or knowledge process or whether it is also a power process involving policy and action, we take the latter view. The very act of gathering information can affect others and, if the intended object of intelligence is not to influence action or policy, what is it for? Therefore we have defined intelligence as: 'the mainly secret activities – targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and action – intended to enhance security and/or maintain power relative to competitors by forewarning of threats and opportunities' (Gill and Phythian,2012:30).

We should remember Wilhelm Agrell's observation that 'if everything is intelligence, then nothing is intelligence' (Agrell and Treverton,2009:5). Therefore we must be able to distinguish 'intelligence' from the 'knowledge management' that is the bedrock of all state and corporate activities. We suggest that the key factors are security, secrecy and the fact that its exercise will be subject to resistance (Gill and Maek,2016:6).

Intelligence Studies, then, is a rich and expanding academic field but it should not strive for the status of an academic discipline. There may not seem to be much difference between the definitions of a 'discipline' as 'a branch of knowledge' and a 'field' as 'a branch of study or sphere of activity' but, for us, the former implies a narrower, more technical approach which risks losing the advantages of interdisciplinarity and failing the necessary test of examining intelligence within its social and political context (Gill and Maek,2016:10). Therefore, Stephen Marrin is missing the point when he suggests that "intelligence studies as a field of knowledge is subordinate to other more traditional academic disciplines including political science, history, anthropology, sociology, psychology, and communications disciplines" (Marrin,2016:13).

We do believe that Intelligence Studies is much more than an academic complement to the practice of national security intelligence. Intelligence

Studies academics can promote normative values and thinking - not just about efficacy, but also concerning the relationship between intelligence, the state and the individual, the means of providing security through intelligence, and the implications of the 'cost' of this security in a liberal democratic context. Intelligence Studies should not just service national security intelligence; it has a much broader role and responsibility, that is, not only to be a 'critical friend' to intelligence practitioners but also to speak to a wider audience of citizens who are concerned about the effectiveness, control and oversight of this important activity whether conducted by states or non-state actors (Gill and Maek,2016:14-16). In the United States, a basic (if incomplete) definition of national security intelligence is the "knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us—the prelude to Presidential decision and action" (Central Intelligence Agency,1991:13). This definition points to intelligence as a matter of "situational awareness," that is, understanding events and conditions throughout the world faced by policymakers, diplomats, and military commanders (Johnson,2010:3).

Intelligence Studies should, of course, be relevant to intelligence practice; this is not an argument for irrelevance. Indeed, one's purpose might be 'to improve the practice of intelligence (Agrell,2005:265). Until recently, International Relations scholars had limited interest in intelligence assessment. Even historical strategists such as Clausewitz and Machiavelli paid scant attention to intelligence (Jackson,2005:173). In British universities, intelligence studies developed within international history departments, while in US institutions it became the preserve of political science, and even then the subject was approached in terms of public policy and decision-making rather than IR. Recently attempts to connect intelligence studies with international relations theory have emerged, such as Andrew Rathmell's work on a postmodern theory of intelligence (Jackson and Scott,2005:174).

Intelligence and security organizations are the main axis of power and policy-making and play a role in the framework of statecraft and governance. Among them, the cognitive role is considered the most basic and essential role of intelligence organizations. The cognitive role is meant to collect intelligence, analysis it, and ultimately present intelligence products to policymakers (consumer). Therefore, many believe that the essence of the intelligence community is to support policymakers.

Specifically, the intelligence community is a service-providing community whose sole purpose is to assist policymakers in matters of national security. Thus, the main task of intelligence organizations, the existential philosophy and ontological indicator of intelligence is the cognitive role. It is to gain the knowledge expected by politicians of phenomena that can be effective in their decision-making process. If two hidden and obvious dimensions are considered for each phenomenon, the task of the intelligence organization is to produce hidden knowledge and intelligence knowledge. Another task of intelligence organizations is to monitor the correct performance of various individuals and institutions of the country in order to optimally implement the decisions taken. The last task of intelligence organizations is to carry out operations that are in line with advancing the goals of policymakers and that, if carried out openly, create risks for the country. This type of operation is called "covert action" in intelligence literature. Therefore, three distinct tasks can be considered for intelligence organizations: "cognitive", "supervisory" and "executive" roles (Mirmohammadi,2011:29).

Accordingly, the intelligence organization performs four types of functional activities to fulfill its three tasks: collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action. Collection refers to activities that are carried out with the aim of accessing intelligence that is being attempted to be kept secret from the collecting organization. Analysis is the process by which the collected news is transformed into intelligence after evaluation and synthesis and made available to customers. Counterintelligence is an activity that is carried out to prevent individuals from illegally accessing intelligence. The purpose of covert action is physical or destructive activity that is carried out against the intended targets and its primary purpose is not to gain knowledge or prevent knowledge, although it may be carried out for secondary intelligence, counterintelligence, and even analytical purposes (influencing the opponent's analysis) (Mirmohammadi,2007:153-198).

On this basis, Intelligence collection capabilities, technical or human, also should be used only to collect information that can reasonably be determined, or that has been previously validated, to be of importance to a specific policymaker or intelligence user. The analytical function raises similar practical issues. In theory, intelligence analysts take information provided by perhaps all three collection disciplines, combine it with information from publicly available sources, and produce "all source" analysis for the customer. Because the analysis contains information

obtained by intelligence sources, it is typically classified (The Role of Intelligence,1991:16). Covert actions are used to influence political, military, or economic conditions or situations abroad, where it is intended that the role of the Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. These might consist of propaganda activities, support to political or military factions within a particular country, technical and logistical assistance to other governments to deal with problems within their countries, or actions undertaken to disrupt illicit activities that threaten the acting government interests. Such actions complement and supplement parallel overt measures (e.g., diplomacy, trade sanctions, or military activities) undertaken by the executive branch. Covert actions can be undertaken only in support of an “identifiable” foreign policy objective (The Role of Intelligence,1991:17). The counterintelligence function involves protecting the country, as well as intelligence agencies, from the activities of foreign intelligence services. Counterintelligence, as a function of intelligence agencies, however, goes much beyond detecting and monitoring the activities of foreign intelligence services and investigating employees suspected of espionage. Counterintelligence is an integral part of the entire intelligence process. All agencies that undertake intelligence collection, whether through human or technical means, must be constantly on guard that what they are collecting is genuine. This requires continuous evaluation of their sources as well as the information gathered from them (The Role of Intelligence,1991:19,20).

Counterintelligence prevents espionage, subversion or sabotage by foreign intelligence services or foreign controlled political groups, protecting intelligence sources and methods at home and abroad. Defensive measures for counterintelligence rely on inquiries, vetting and surveillance; offensive measures for counterintelligence include operations to penetrate, deceive, disrupt and manipulate other organizations. Covert action, also known as special political actions or active measures, is a type of secret operation that aims to influence political, military or economic conditions in a foreign country. Types of covert action range from propaganda and political activity abroad to providing assistance to foreign governments or disrupting illicit activities on foreign soil. Covert action provides states with an alternative to direct military action when diplomacy and other policy measures fail. In states with multiple intelligence agencies, usually only external intelligence services engage in covert action (Intelligence Services,2017:2).

Counterintelligence (CI) is the responsibility of secret agencies to thwart hostile operations directed against them and their nation by foreign intelligence services or terrorist organizations (Johnson,2010:4). Counterintelligence consists of two matching halves: counterespionage and security. Counterespionage is the offensive or aggressive side of counterintelligence; it involves identifying specific adversaries and developing detailed knowledge about their operations against the Government. Counterespionage officers attempt to thwart these enemy operations by infiltrating a secret agent or asset (“mole”) into the hostile intelligence service or terrorist cell—an operation known as a “penetration.” As a CIA document explains (Church Committee,1975), counterespionage “involves knowing all about foreign intelligence services—their people, their installations, their methods, and their operations,” while security consists of “all that concerns perimeter defenses, ID badges, knowing everything you have to know about your own people” (Johnson,2010:22). Security is the passive or defensive side of counterintelligence. It entails putting in place static defenses against all hostile and covert operations aimed against the Government. Security defenses include the screening and clearance of personnel, as well as the establishment of programs to safeguard sensitive intelligence information; in short, the administration of controls to shield against the theft of information inside America's government. The goal is to defend the personnel, installations, and operations of America's intelligence agencies and other components of the government against infiltration by enemy intelligence services and terrorist organizations (Johnson,2010:22).

It should be noted that in the intelligence and security literature, the role of intelligence organizations in implementing foreign policy is called "covert action." Covert action is the opener of many blind spots in foreign policy and relations, in situations where formal (open) diplomacy is insufficient and resorting to force(war) is not possible. Therefore, this important intelligence function is placed between war and diplomacy to secure and guarantee national security interests without paying the military costs of war and the prestige costs of diplomacy.

Anyway, I believe that Intelligence studies basically study and examine three main and central issues: the relationship between Intelligence and Intelligence; the relationship between Intelligence and politics; and the relationship between Intelligence and society (Fig 3). In the first axis, the

main research issue is the Cohesion & Integration of intelligence organizations under a single, centralized, and superior management within the framework of the intelligence community. In the second axis, the issue of the distance and proximity of intelligence to the field of politics and statecraft is considered, and in this article, its optimal model is Impartial Relevancy. And in the third area, the issue of the two-way relationship between intelligence and society (People) is raised with the aim of situational awareness on the one hand and intelligence surveillance & accountability¹ on the other.




Fig (3): Conceptual Model of Intelligence Studies

Thus, one of the most important issues examined in intelligence studies, along with the two issues of "oversight" and "accountability" of intelligence organizations, is the "relationship between intelligence/analyst and policymaker." The discussion about the correct relationship between the people who collect and analyze intelligence (intelligence producers) and the authorities who receive and use this intelligence (consumers) began with the establishment of the new intelligence system at the end of World War II (Hulnick,2011).

1.If power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely, as Lord Acton, famously warned, secret power can be the ultimate danger to freedom in a democracy. For this reason, the several democracies have experimented with measures to hold the intelligence agencies to a high standard of accountability before the public and their representatives. (Barrett,2005; Johnson,2004; Miller,2008; Schwarz and Huq,2007).

Without a common inter-subjective understanding between the two intelligence and political institutions of the fundamental concepts of governance such as security, threat, espionage, terrorism and such issues, it will never be possible to witness dynamic, vibrant and healthy relations between these two intelligence and political systems, and this issue will not be achieved without managerial and bureaucratic focus in the form of a single and coherent intelligence community despite the multiplicity and plurality of intelligence organizations. The political institution must ultimately face a single voice and analysis of the entire intelligence community in order to be able to make decisive and timely decisions. Even intelligence anarchism (an incoherent, uncoordinated and parallel intelligence community) is far worse and more dangerous than intelligence dictatorship (the consolidation and integration of intelligence organizations under one roof) for the political institution / policy-making apparatus and the governance of national security. Although this article believes in the multiplicity and plurality of intelligence organizations with the observance of specialized division of labor, clear dividing lines and boundaries, away from any parallel work, under a single and centralized high management, that is, unity of command. Unfortunately, the spirit and approach of "totalitarianism" prevents any coordination, coherence, and intelligence integrity.

It is recalled that intelligence is customer-oriented, but the customer is not right; in other words, the ultimate goal of intelligence is not to satisfy the customer at any cost, but to ensure national security. The satisfaction of the people and society is a condition. Because public persuasion and social satisfaction are the marrow of the bones of national security, otherwise the osteoporosis of the bones of national security will be inevitable. Therefore, although intelligence has always been at the service of politics (and not politicians!!) and is formed in its context, this policy must be the foundation and protector of national security, not personal and partisan interests; I consider politicization to be "the forbidden fruit" and the "the original sin" of intelligence, which sooner or later will lead to the decline of the intelligence community from the level of sovereignty and the national level to the scorched earth and salt marsh of factional games and traps and seeds of power-seeking.

In this way, the "neutral relevance approach" (i.e., effective and constructive security-oriented interaction), as a third way of communication between

intelligence and politics or between the intelligence analyst and the policymaker, that can largely eliminate the two problems of “politicization of intelligence”¹ and “the uselessness of information products”. From this perspective, intelligence is customer-oriented, but the customer necessarily is not right; because the goal of an intelligence organization cannot and should not be solely to satisfy the customer, but in any situation, the goal is simply to ensure national security with a cross-partisan approach; whether the customer is pleased or not.

4. Intelligence and Foreign Policy

Intelligence focuses on the hidden side of the government (hidden governance). Such hidden side of the government includes secret agencies that provide security-related information to policymakers and carry out other covert operations on their behalf (Johnson,2010:1). Put simply, the main purpose of intelligence is to provide information to policymakers that may help illuminate their decision options. A leading intelligence official has suggested that the goal is one of “eliminating or reducing uncertainty for government decisionmakers” (Clapper,1995).

International politics and security simultaneously have two dimensions, overt and covert. If scholarship is limited to the overt dimension of phenomena, its knowledge of phenomena is solely derived from observing overt and apparent realities. Hence, paying attention to covert diplomacy as one of the procedures of the covert dimension of international relations is one of the necessities of addressing the issue of the relationship between intelligence and diplomacy, and more precisely, between intelligence-security organizations and the official diplomatic apparatus of countries. In fact, the participation of intelligence organizations in secret diplomacy is one of the solutions to link intelligence with the operational needs of foreign policy and diplomacy.

Intelligence agencies, due to their expertise and high experience in covert work, are the most important channel for establishing secret diplomacy between countries to guide and reassure official politicians and diplomats. The goal of secret diplomacy is for countries to assess each other's true intentions and create a suitable basis for establishing official diplomatic relations and mutual cooperation in the future. Intelligence and diplomacy

1. Priority of decision over analysis and intelligence estimates, just like "Put the Cart before the Horse"!!

have a two-way and reciprocal relationship, and intelligence-security organizations play a role in interacting with the diplomatic apparatus through secret diplomacy with the aim of discovering the true intentions and goals of the negotiating party/parties. The result is that continuing covert cooperation requires that the benefits of long-term cooperation prevail over the benefits of disclosing information.

Thus, in my opinion, secret diplomacy is the type of diplomacy in which the negotiators, the subject or subjects under negotiation, and especially the process of negotiations and bargaining between the parties, remain hidden from the eyes and ears of everyone (media, public opinion, and other governmental and non-governmental actors) with the exception of the security apparatus(es) and high-ranking decision-makers of a country to be subject to lapse of time or a result is achieved and the bilateral or multilateral political atmosphere to normalize. In fact, if we consider diplomacy as the art of advancing foreign policy goals peacefully, secret diplomacy is the art of hidden advancing foreign policy goals peacefully, or in other words, the art of secretly realizing national interests in the field of foreign policy. Hence, secret diplomacy is always in motion with engine on and lights off.

Intelligence organizations come to the aid of the diplomatic apparatus and play a role in two areas of implementation: “secret diplomacy” and “covert action”. Thus, one of the roles of intelligence agencies is to help manage the country's diplomacy. Establishing diplomatic relations with other countries or expanding and deepening them, as one of the missions of the diplomatic apparatus of governments, first of all requires awareness of the views of the leaders of other countries about the relationship with their own country. Since international actors hide the true intentions and motivations of their behaviors, foreign policy decision-makers are always in a kind of ambiguity and doubt regarding the main intentions and motivations of the behaviors of their competitors, enemies, and even friends. In such circumstances, intelligence agencies can be an appropriate tool to reduce these doubts and ambiguities. Intelligence agencies are required to remove “un” from uncertainty and provide decision-making in an atmosphere of certainty for politicians.

One of the most professional covert actions of intelligence services in the field of diplomacy and foreign policy is to provide the basis for establishing official and overt diplomatic relations through the management and launch

of secret diplomacy. In fact, the participation of intelligence organizations in secret diplomacy is one of the solutions to link intelligence with the operational needs of foreign policy and diplomacy. Although the participation of intelligence in secret diplomacy is considered one of the rare missions of intelligence, a look at the history of the Israeli regime's intelligence shows how a political system can exploit the capacity of intelligence services in establishing diplomatic relations in order to gain international and domestic legitimacy (Halevy,2006:206; Raviv and Melman,1991).

Therefore, what makes the role of intelligence agencies in foreign policy important is not their conventional role in supporting the country's official diplomacy. Just as secrecy is considered one of the inherent characteristics of intelligence, the special role of intelligence in diplomacy is also reflected in the field of secret diplomacy. Intelligence agencies, due to their expertise and high experience in covert work, are the best channel for establishing secret diplomacy between countries to accompany and reassure politicians and official diplomats; because secrecy and concealment are the ontological privilege and functional advantage of an intelligence service. Intelligence and security officers are invisible diplomats in the labyrinthine channel of diplomacy who play an effective role in confirming level/limit of trust and confidence in the other party.

5. Coercive Diplomacy

The United States is a superpower with a very strong dominance in the world (Djuyandi et al,2024:230). Foreign policy orientation is the general attitudes and commitments of a government toward external environment, where its main strategy is to achieve foreign and domestic goals and deal with ongoing threats. In relation to orientation, three basic orientations can be seen, which are: Alliance/Coalition, Non-alignment, and Isolation (Haghi and Yousefi Jouybari,2024:125-6). Among the theorists in the field of international relations, realists emphasize the need for balance and unity in the security policy of countries; They believe that without a "Balance of Power" or a "Balance of Threat," both of which are a form of balancing, long-term strategic goals will not be achieved. Each country builds power based on its own political and geopolitical requirements. But countries that are close to a threatening neighbor need more balancing (Ekhtiari Amiri et al,2024:176). In general, the concept of the theory of balance is based on two basic propositions: 1. the concentration of power by countries will

essentially reduce the security of other countries; 2. In an anarchic international system, countries are forced to confront the concentration of power in the international system to survive and increase their security. Whenever a power seeks to dominate the international system, the other powers unite to maintain their existence and independence while confronting the hegemonic tendencies in the system (Lieber,2005:1). Balancing is inspired by the fundamental hypothesis of realism that states form the main actors of the international system and rationally seek to increase their power or security given the anarchic establishment. The principle of survival, therefore, obliges states to confront the accumulation and concentration of power (Ekhtiari Amiri et al,2024:176).

Coercive diplomacy seems to be a contradictory and paradoxical combination, because it emphasizes diplomacy and negotiation, as well as pressure and coercion. Coercive diplomacy is a kind of forcing the other party to do or not to do something, that is, to act or not to act, in line with the interests of the coercive state. Therefore, this type of diplomacy attempts to change and manipulate the calculations (computational apparatus), decisions (decision-making process), and actions (behavioral pattern) of the opponent by threatening to use force or resorting to limited force. This process of influencing the calculations and decisions of the other party to change behavior by demonstrating and projecting power of the attacking actor is called coercive diplomacy. Of course, not only military tools but also economic tools, legal tools, political and cultural tools are used for the success of coercive diplomacy.

Coercion by denial has had many proponents. John Mearsheimer has argued that conventional deterrence essentially depends on the coercer's ability to convince the adversary that a blitzkrieg-type offensive would be foiled (Mearsheimer,1983). More recently, Robert Pape has picked up this debate on denial versus punishment. He argues that the most effective coercive strategies will be directed against the benefit side of the opponent's cost/benefit calculus (Pape,1996). Pape, however, is more concerned with conventional war and battlefield success. Thus he describes the purpose of coercion as obtaining concessions without having to pay the costs of a military victory. He further sees denial in terms of influencing the opponent's capacity to engage in battle while punishment is largely linked to the use of airpower to impose civilian suffering. But, as he acknowledges, 'the distinction between coercion by denial and the pursuit of military

victory is more ambiguous, for both present the target state with military failure' (Freedman and Raghavan,2008:221).

Denial is evidently a better strategy than punishment: even if the target fails to be coerced, the coercer can proceed to impose control. Viewing denial and punishment in this fashion clarifies yet another issue. There is no reason why we should consider punishment in terms of civilian damage alone: losses imposed on the target's armed forces can also constitute punishment as long as the target is not deprived of choice. The loss of the major part of one's army may have all sorts of dire consequences – related to internal as much as external threats. For instance, during the war in Kuwait, Saddam Hussein was anxious to protect his Republican Guard from being annihilated by the allies because of the role he envisaged for it in the preservation of his regime against Kurdish and Shiite rebels (Freedman and Raghavan,2008:221). A coercive strategy (or strategic coercion) involves deliberate and purposive use of overt threats of force to influence another's strategic choices. Strategic coercion may be divided into two subcategories in terms of the objective. Deterrence is the use of threats to dissuade an adversary from initiating an undesirable act. Strategies geared to coercing an adversary to do something or to stop doing something have been described as compellence or coercive diplomacy (Freedman and Raghavan,2008:217). Deterrence and Compellence differ on several counts: initiative, time scale and the nature of demands. Deterrence involves making clear through explicit threats what the coercer considers undesirable and then waiting, leaving the overt act to the adversary. The coercer would need to act only if the adversary makes the forbidden move. Compellence, on the other hand, involves initiating an action that stops or becomes harmless, only if the target responds. Compellence, then, might require the coercer to punish until the target acts, unlike deterrence, which requires administering punishment only if the adversary carries out the undesirable act. Deterrence has no time limit. The threat will be carried out whenever the adversary acts undesirably. Indeed, the coercer would prefer to wait forever. Compellence, however, requires a clear deadline. In fact, if the adversary is not given a specific time limit by when to change his behavior, the threat could become irrelevant. Deterrent threats are usually clear because they aim at preserving the existing situation, which may be observed with a reasonable degree of confidence. Compellent threats, by contrast, 'tend to communicate only the general direction of compliance, and are less likely to be self-limiting, less

likely to communicate in the very design of the threat just what, or how much, is demanded' (Schelling,1966:73).

A corollary to this is the role of assurances. Every coercive threat carries with it an implicit assurance that if the adversary behaves as desired, the threat will not be implemented. Since the demands of a compellent threat are not as evident as those of a deterrent threat, the former may need to be accompanied by overt assurances. In addition, with deterrence compliance is literally a non-event; it does not require any special rationalization by the target. With compellence, however, compliance will be blatant, and will carry with it the added reputational significance of humiliation. Compellence, therefore, may be more difficult than deterrence. Once an engagement has begun, the difference between the two, like the difference between defence and offence, may disappear. Consider the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. The USA was at once warning the Soviet Union to stop constructing missile sites in Cuba (Compellence) and not to pass ships carrying any more missiles through the American blockade (deterrence). When it was deciding what steps to take, Moscow in turn warned Washington that if its threats were implemented then terrible consequences would ensue. This was therefore a case of both sides trying to coerce the other, with deterrence and compellence underway at the same time (Freedman and Raghavan,2008:218).

Coercion (Coercive Diplomacy) is of two types. In the deterrent type, the other party is convinced that they should not perform the action due to fear of the consequences of performing the action, but in the compellent type, the other party is convinced that they must perform the action due to fear of not performing the action. More precisely, compellence is a positive strategy, but deterrence is a negative strategy (Snyder,1959). Threats need not only be applied in a passive-defensive manner, they can also be active-offensive in nature in order to force an enemy to change his current improper behavior or alter an undesired condition. This is known as compellence. Thomas Schelling defined "compellent threats" as "intended to make an adversary do something (or cease doing something)" as opposed to "deterrent threats" which are "intended to keep him from doing something" (Schelling,1960). compellence is riskier than deterrence and can propel the adversaries into an escalation of threat and counterthreat, in which their roles as object and subject of deterrence change several times. This can result in fatal

misunderstandings. Overcoming such a situation takes great effort and requires considerable political skill (Schwarz,2005:10).

The concept of deterrence can be defined as the use of threats in limited force by one party to convince another party to refrain from initiating some course of action (Huth,1999:25-48; Morgan,1977:26-30). In *Arms and Influence* (1966), Schelling offers a broader definition of deterrence, as he defines it as "to prevent from action by fear of consequences" (Schelling,1966). Glenn Snyder also offers a broad definition of deterrence, as he argues that deterrence involves both the threat of sanction and the promise of reward (Snyder,1961).

Deterrence remains a key component of and an important form of interaction in international relations. It can also be effective against many of the new threats. Deterrence is undoubtedly more precarious in the context of the new security situation than the old one. In other words, the new threat situation is what makes deterrence problematic. It is not a question of a lack of rationality, but rather that there are now other political norms and their associated values, interests, and ideas about power at play which are foreign to western civilization (Schwarz,2005:13).

According to Schelling, deterrence was concerned with making the other party passive, that is, forcing the other party not to do something they wanted to do against their will. But compellence, wanted to force the other party to do something against their will. In deterrence, B must be persuaded not to do something. After A has explained the consequences of non-compliance to B, he can simply wait to see what action B will take anyway. But in compellence, A sets in motion a train of events, and this train will only stop moving when B has given A the appropriate response. The most important difference between deterrence and compulsion is that deterrence confirms the status quo, while compulsion takes on a more extreme form, dictating movement towards a destination, and the intention, acceleration, and stopping of this movement may not be clear (Schelling,1966:89,73,75,175).

Furthermore, in deterrence, compliance is literally a matter of common sense, and therefore the deterred does not have to justify his behavior. Whereas in compellence, compliance will be obvious and therefore will result in infamy and humiliation. Alexander George also has a similar view to Schilling: The general intention of coercive diplomacy is to support a demand by threatening to punish the enemy for her non-compliance,

because the threat of punishment is so effective and credible that it convinces her that compliance with that demand is in her interest (George and Simons,1994:2).

To understand the relative efficacy of coercive strategies, let us consider the two types of costs with which the coercer might threaten his target: resistance costs and compliance costs. Resistance costs are those involved in defying the coercer's demands, i.e. the costs the target will incur should the coercer implement its threat. Resistance costs have two components. First, the costs involved in trying to prevent the coercer from executing the threat; second, the pain imposed by the coercer's action. Much of the literature tends to equate resistance costs with the latter alone. This is a valid assumption when studying nuclear coercion, since the target cannot hope to resist a nuclear strike. But when examining nonnuclear coercion, we cannot overlook the costs attached to resisting the coercer's attempts to punish non-compliance. Even if the target succeeds in thwarting the coercer's efforts, it would have incurred some costs. The target, then, suffers even before the coercer fully implements its threat. If the target fails to foil the coercer's efforts, it will have to incur the compliance costs. These are costs associated with forgoing benefits or accepting losses by acquiescing in the coercer's demands. The resistance and compliance costs reflect the central calculation which is at the heart of coercion. Coercion may thus be understood as an attempt by A to present B with a choice between two types of costs: that of resisting A's efforts to punish and incurring the subsequent pain that A threatens to cause, and that of complying with A's demands. In the simplest version, coercion is likely to succeed if B is convinced that the resistance costs exceed the compliance costs. The difference between denial and punishment may be understood in terms of these costs. Both threaten the target with resistance and compliance costs; the difference lies in linkage between the two sets of costs in each strategy. In denial, the target is presented with resistance and compliance costs together (Freedman and Raghavan,2008:222).

The coercer threatens the target that if its resistance fails, compliance costs will automatically follow; since control will be imposed on the target, leaving it with no choice. In punishment, the two sets of costs are uncoupled: even if resistance fails, the target still has the option of choosing whether or not to comply. As long as the coercer has not got what it wants, the target may have a way out. Viewed in this framework, it is all the more

clear why denial is preferable to punishment (Freedman and Raghavan,2008:223). Coercion is a dynamic process: the target, too, will attempt to influence the coercer's cost calculus. We may call this counter-coercion. In framing a coercive strategy, the coercer will have to consider the enforcement costs, which will indicate the effort required to render the threat credible and to implement it if necessary. The target will invariably try to increase the coercer's enforcement costs. This could be done in many ways. The target may issue a deterrent threat to the coercer; it may strengthen its own defences; it may escalate militarily or invoke the support of a powerful patron to convince the coercer to back down. In most conflicts, mutual coercion, even somewhat one-sided, is much more likely than a wholly asymmetric relationship. Indeed, such an asymmetric relationship would imply scant freedom of maneuver for the target and hence control (Freedman and Raghavan,2008:223).

Enforcement costs are also related to resistance costs. A threat will be credible only if resistance costs for the target exceed enforcement costs for the coercer. This indicates the importance not only of threatening the target with high costs, but also of denying it the opportunity to neutralize the coercer's efforts to impose costs or to present effective threats to the coercer in turn (Freedman and Raghavan,2008:224). Bernard Brodie wrote in 1959 that a credible nuclear deterrent must be always ready (Brodie,1959:264-304). An extended nuclear deterrence (a means of extending deterrence to allies and friends) guarantee is also called a nuclear umbrella, under the umbrella of nuclear mushroom. According to Kenneth Waltz, there are three requirements for successful nuclear deterrence: 1.Part of a state's nuclear arsenal must appear to be able to survive an attack by the adversary and be used for a retaliatory second strike, 2.The state must not respond to false alarms of a strike by the adversary, 3.The state must maintain command and control (Sagan and Waltz,1995:20).

Since the early 2000s, there has been an increased focus on cyber deterrence. Cyber deterrence has two meanings: 1.The use of cyber actions to deter other states, 2.The deterrence of an adversary's cyber operations (Schneider,2019:95-120). There are various ways to engage in cyber deterrence (Hneider,2019:95-120): 1.Denial: preventing adversaries from achieving military objectives by defending against them (Orghard and Lonergan,2021:534-569). 2. Punishment: the imposition of costs on the adversary. 3. Norms: the establishment and maintenance of norms that

establish appropriate standards of behavior (Finnemore and Hollis,2016:425-479). 4. Escalation: raising the probability that costs will be imposed on the adversary (Brown and Fazal,2021:401-417). 5. Entanglement and interdependence: interdependence between actors can have a deterrent effect (Nye,2017:44-71).

There is a risk of unintended escalation in cyberspace due to difficulties in discerning the intent of attackers, (Lin,2012:46-70) and complexities in state-hacker relationships (Maurer,2018). According to political scientists Joseph Brown and Tanisha Fazal, states frequently neither confirm nor deny responsibility for cyber operations so that they can avoid the escalatory risks (that come with public credit) while also signaling that they have cyber capabilities and resolve (which can be achieved if intelligence agencies and governments believe they were responsible) (Brown and Fazal,2021:401-417). According to Lennart Maschmeyer, cyber weapons have limited coercive effectiveness due to a trilemma "whereby speed, intensity, and control are negatively correlated. These constraints pose a trilemma for actors because a gain in one variable tends to produce losses across the other two variables (Maschmeyer,2021:51-90).

Intra-war deterrence is deterrence within a war context. It means that war has broken out but actors still seek to deter certain forms of behavior. In the words of Caitlin Talmadge, "intra-war deterrence failures... can be thought of as causing wars to get worse in some way" (Talmadge,2019:864-887). Examples of intra-war deterrence include deterring adversaries from resorting to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons attacks or attacking civilian populations indiscriminately (Legro,1995). Broadly, it involves any prevention of escalation (Carson,2018).

Anyway, There are two main types of coercion: A- Compellence: to put pressure on another actor to do something against their wishes. In this regard, Morgenthau's definition of power is very interesting:" When we talk about power, we mean human control over the minds and actions of other humans. Therefore, the statement that "A" has political power over "B", or wants such power, always means that "A" is able or wants to be able to control some actions of "B" by influencing his mind. Therefore, the concept of power emphasizes the "psychological element of political relations" (Freedman,2008:Ch2). B-Deterrence: not to do something they had planned to do. Deterrence is the practice of discouraging or restraining someone—in world politics, usually a nation-state—from taking unwanted actions, such

as an armed attack. The logic of deterrence is the same as Newton's third law: for every action (force) in nature there is an equal and opposite reaction.

Deterrence theory is a "power relationship" for strategic studies, which has received more attention than other theories.¹ This problem can be understood by considering this point. George and Smoke have provided a standard definition: "Deterrence is simply the persuasion of one's opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits" (George and Smoke, 1974). This definition makes clear that the idea of deterrence is to discourage the other party from starting an action, not to force him to do or thwart and neutralize "action" against his will that distinguishes it from a more general definition of power.² If the opposite side does not take these threats seriously or counts, deterrence will fail.

We realize there is a difference between "immediate deterrence" (a potential attacker is actively considering the use of force, and the deterrer, aware of that threat, issues a counterthreat to deter) and "general deterrence" (the possibility of armed conflict is present, but the potential attacker is not actively considering the use of force to threaten the interests of the deterrer). We understand the difference between basic (or Type I) deterrence (we are eyeball-to-eyeball with the adversary threatening our national survival) and extended (Type II) deterrence (in which the objective is to defend allies and friends from attack and is inherently less credible). We also know the difference between strategic nuclear deterrence (the level at which the majority of the theorizing has occurred, at which the use of intercontinental thermonuclear weapons has been threatened, and at which deterrence is usually thought to have held) and conventional deterrence (the level that has received considerably less attention, at which, by definition, threats to use unconventional weapons of mass destruction are excluded and at which deterrence, arguably, has been prone to fail) (Haffa, 2018:97).

It goes without saying that self-deterrence can be defined as the unwillingness to use coercive military power against an adversary, despite a declaratory threat to do so, due to self-imposed as opposed to other-imposed constraints (Paul, 2015). It means accepting failure and admitting the lack of

1. This question is considered in more detail in (Freedman, 1989).

2. A distinction is developed in literature between deterrence and compellence- between inducing inaction and making someone perform. It has been most fully elaborated by (Schelling, 1966).

ability and courage to act. A similar concept of self-deterrence is internalized deterrence. Deterrence may be applied against the target actor and at the same time there is no direct interaction with the deterrence agent. The phrase of self -deterrence sometimes means not desire to take the necessary actions as a result of the fear of their own consequences (Freedman,2008:Ch 2).

Actor B may conclude that if he acts directly against A's interests, the profits that gains are small, and the things that loses perhaps be more. This issue, also known as self-deterrence, means "unwillingness to take the necessary initiative as a result of a self-induced fear of the consequences." Another example of internalized deterrence is the threat that parents impose on their children:" After a while, the children come home on time without their parents saying a word to them. Only they know there is a kind of restraining relationship. They really want to stay out more but they are afraid of their parents' reaction. But after a while this pattern of behavior may become so internalized that there is no longer any problem. The challenge facing strategic deterrence is how to create internalized deterrence in terms of its objectives (i.e., its audience)" (Freedman,2004:50-51).

Therefore with these details, deterrence in an international relations context is the application of deterrence theory to avoid conflict. Deterrence demands that the adversary refrain from acting, whereas compellence demands that the adversary undertake action (Schaub,2004:389-411). Deterrence is second-strike capability but compellence is first-strike attack. Deterrence is widely defined as any use of threats (implicit or explicit) or limited force intended to dissuade an actor from taking an action (i.e. maintain the status quo) (Morgan,1977:26-30; Gartzke and Lindsay,2019). Deterrence is unlike compellence, which is the attempt to get an actor (such as a state) to take an action (i.e. alter the status quo).Both are forms of coercion (Art and Greenhill,2015:3-5).

6. Intelligence Deterrence

Power is a concept that governments and states have been continuously seeking to gain. Scientists believe that power is the foundation of politics and that politics is a tool for gaining power; therefore, there has been a continuous synergistic relationship between politics and power. Throughout history, politicians have demanded scientists find some solutions for

expanding their power, so water, land, and air have been considered as the key areas of power at different times (Nasirzadeh et al,2024:2).

Deterrence is one of the most important tools and levers of national power. Deterrence is divided into three categories, which are mentioned below:

1. In terms of fundamental approaches: Denial Versus Punishment .The classic literature distinguishes between two fundamental approaches to deterrence. Deterrence by denial strategies seek to deter an action by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives— deploying sufficient local military forces to defeat an invasion, for example (Beaufre,1965:23). At their extreme, these strategies can confront a potential aggressor with the risk of catastrophic loss. Deterrence by denial represents, in effect, simply the application of an intention and effort to defend some commitment. A capability to deny amounts to a capability to defend; “deterrence and defense are analytically distinct but thoroughly interrelated” (Morgan,1983:32). The most common way of measuring the health of a deterrence threat grounded in denial capabilities is the immediate balance of forces in the contested territory—but, as will be explained, the local balance of forces is not the only, or even always the most important, factor. Deterrence by denial should not be equated with military balances alone. Deterrence by punishment, on the other hand, threatens severe penalties, such as nuclear escalation or severe economic sanctions, if an attack occurs. These penalties are connected to the local fight and the wider world. The focus of deterrence by punishment is not the direct defense of the contested commitment but rather threats of wider punishment that would raise the cost of an attack (Mazarr,2018:2).

As mentioned above, the two most prominent deterrent strategies are "denial" (denying the attacker the benefits of attack) and "punishment" (inflicting costs on the attacker) (Eginbotham,2018:128-169). A strategy of denial is potentially more reliable than a strategy of punishment because its quality can be measured in more physical terms and thus more confidently. Calculating the amount of military effort required to hold on to a piece of territory may not be an exact science, but it is still more straightforward than an attempt to discern the effect of prospective punitive measures on an opponent's decision-making. Furthermore, it offers a greater hope of retrieving the situation if the opponent presses on regardless (Freedman and Raghavan,2008:220).

2. In terms of circumstances: Direct Versus Extended. Deterrence can be used in two sets of circumstances. Direct deterrence consists of efforts by a state to prevent attacks on its own territory. Extended deterrence involves discouraging attacks on third parties, such as allies or partners (Mazarr,2018:3). Scholars distinguish between "extended deterrence" (the protection of allies) and "direct deterrence" (protection of oneself) (Huth and Russett,1984:496-526; Lee,2021:761-796).

3. In terms of time periods: General Versus Immediate. Finally, the theoretical literature distinguishes between two overlapping time periods in which deterrence policies can be employed. General deterrence is the ongoing, persistent effort to prevent unwanted actions over the long term and in non-crisis situations. Immediate deterrence represents more short-term, urgent attempts to prevent a specific, imminent attack, most typically during a crisis (Levy,1988:485–512). Therefore, part of the goal of general deterrence is to reduce the need for immediate deterrence—to create deterrent and dissuasion effects that become so ingrained that hesitation to attack becomes habitual (Mazarr,2018:4).

In this article, we will focus on the first division. Most classic studies suggest that denial strategies are inherently more reliable than punishment strategies (Huth and Russett,1988:42). Steps taken to deny, such as placing significant military capabilities directly in the path of an aggressor, speak loudly and clearly. An aggressor might doubt, on the other hand, a defender's willingness to impose punishments (Snyder,1959:4-6,38). An aggressor might also convince itself that the defender will hesitate to follow through on threats to punish because of attendant risks, such as further escalation, that the deterring state may not be willing to run once the moment arrives (Snyder,1959:35). As Thomas Schelling noted, there are threats that a state would rather not fulfill, and weakness in deterrence can emerge when an aggressor believes the defender will ultimately prove unwilling to carry out its threats (Schelling,1980:123).

Today, threats are used in a combined and simultaneous manner. These threats include both soft or ontological threats and military and physical threats: A. Ontological threats, i.e. threats against civil values and indigenous human rights, which are called soft threats with butter tools; B. Physical threats, which are naturally applied by resorting to military force and gun. In short, Threats are two types, Ontological Threat (Butter/civilian

values/human Rights) and Physical Threat (Guns/Military force).¹ Accordingly, as stated above, Hybrid Deterrence also is two types: A.Deterrence-by- denial: dissuasion (denial) through strengthening (changing the enemy's calculations). B.Deterrence-by-punishment: retaliation (punishment) through valid response (not repeating the violation) Deterrence-by-denial relies on convincing the opponent that it is unlikely to attain its immediate objectives at a reasonable cost, whereas deterrence-by-punishment consists of the threat of great harm which will be imposed after the opponent has engaged in unwanted behavior. deterrence by denial, that is, blocking the enemy's military objectives through the attrition of his attacking forces. Deterrence by punishment, owing to the perceived limitations of conventional weapons in reaching over the battlefield to target the aggressor's leadership and infrastructure, was left for nuclear weapons (Haffa,2018: 101).

Hence, the two most prominent deterrent strategies are "denial" (denying the attacker the benefits of attack) and "punishment" (inflicting costs on the attacker) (Heginbotham and Samuels,2018:128-169). Deterrence by punishment or retaliation is directed against an enemy's civilian resources (counter-value) while deterrence by denial is directed against his military capabilities and scopes for action (counter-force) (Snyder,1959 and 1961:14-16).

In the meantime, the success of deterrence is highly dependent on the credibility of the threat. The components of deterrence normally include "capability", "credibility", and "communication": 1.Capability: Capability refers to the acquisition and deployment of military forces able to carry out plausible military threats to retaliate in an unacceptable manner or to deny the enemy's objectives in an unaffordable way. 2. Credibility: As the

1.Almost all scholars have framed this concept (ontological security) based on Anthony Giddens' perspective. In his book *Modernity and Self-identity*, Giddens defines ontological security as "confidence that most human beings have in the continuity of their self-identity and in the constancy of the surrounding social and material environments of action. A secure understanding of one's surroundings is the foundation of ontological security" (Giddens,1991:243). In other words, if an actor cannot reach the self-esteem stage through a recognized social position and social relations, i.e. the social and political agency of a community, one will feel one's identity at risk and will inevitably show a violent reaction. These conditions are more likely to occur in contexts that have historically been associated with some form of ontological insecurity and identity threat (Zakeri and Haji-Yousefi,2024: 57).

declared intent and believable resolve to protect a given interest, credibility can be reinforced by force structure, proximity, and power-projection capability and must be evaluated through comparative analysis. 3-Communication: Communication involves relaying to the potential aggressor, in an unmistakable manner, the capability and will to carry out the deterrent threat (Haffa,2018:96-97).

Successful deterrence requires a number of elements. For state A to successfully deter state B, state B must know that state A has the following: The capabilities required to harm state B; The will to launch a credible reprisal and the reputation that it would.; Knowledge of what will cause state B such losses as to deter it in the first place.; The resolve to accept any harm to it that may be caused by a reprisal act in response to the original deterrent act (Roberts and Hardie,2015:8).

In other words, key requirements for successful deterrence can be summarized as follows: Viewing deterrence through the eyes of the adversary and not one's own, including removing a western perception of rationality from the risk calculation. This should also encompass an appreciation of, in some cases, the futility of dialogue and argument with some parties. Some term this detailed threat deconstruction; Possessing (and demonstrating) sufficient capability and capacity for retaliation; Forward positioning and regular, visible deployments of forces that would be required to take action for punishment, retribution or escalated response; A political and social willingness to accept pain – whether financial, political, economic or loss of life – as a result of actions; An ability to adapt responses allowing decision-makers to transform a state's response from deterrence to coercion as individual situations dictate; Humility in deterrence, which allows an adversary the opportunity to de-escalate each situation and escape the time and decision compression that frequently occur in testing scenarios; Appreciating the link between resilience and deterrence and investing in both, particularly in military capabilities that provide greater resilience and therefore change the cost-benefit calculation for an adversary (Roberts and Hardie,2015:35-36).

Deterrence is the practice of discouraging or restraining someone— in world politics, usually a nation-state—from taking unwanted actions, such as an armed attack. Not surprisingly, deterrence works best when targets can act rationally and when the deterrer and the deterred operate within a common normative framework (Freedman,2004:7). Deterrence works best between

rational actors who have a mutual understanding of the status quo and who, to some extent, understand each other's motives. In this context, deterrence by denial or retaliation is effective (Roberts and Hardie,2015:13). For this reason, the relationship between rationality and deterrence is one of the important issues for understanding the actions and reactions of the actors involved in this conflict. In particular, the "Imbalance of rationality and management" among policymakers and decision-makers is the greatest challenge to a correct and comprehensive understanding of the concept of deterrence. Of course, the enemy must be deterrable, and in this regard, state actors are more deterrable than non-state actors because of lack a specific territory and population. Deterrence is a coercive strategy. Deterrence –in particular deterrence by punishment-will not be effective in dealing with suicide terrorism.

Here we would like to explain two types of deterrence, institutionally and functionally, namely military deterrence (Intelligence Forces) and intelligence deterrence (Armed Forces). The differences between military deterrence and intelligence deterrence are as follows: A- Military deterrence: Overt and promotional, asymmetric deterrence. B-Intelligence deterrence: secret and silent, symmetrical deterrence. The strategic warning is that weakness and failure in intelligence deterrence will gradually weaken and disable the country's military deterrence through penetration in deep, sabotage, and corruption in the policy-making system or decision-making process.

In the field of foreign policy, dimensions of intelligence deterrence Includes:

1. Covert action: assassination, coup, spying, subversion, market disruption, cyber attack, disturbance and subversion, psychological warfare, intelligence theft and so on. Loch K Johnson in article of "Four Seven Sins of Strategic Intelligence" believe that the indiscriminate use of covert action is Sin No. 4 (Johnson,1991). Covert action (CA), whereby a nation seeks to intervene secretly into the affairs of other nations or factions in hopes of advancing its own security interests (Johnson,2010:4).

2. Secret diplomacy(back door/ channel): track one, track two, and track three and even dual track diplomacy or one and half diplomacy. It is necessary to explain that, foreign policy, as a national and sovereign matter, is managed and implemented in three formats: "official diplomacy", "public diplomacy", and "secret diplomacy". Secret diplomacy itself carries out its

mission in three types: "first track" (secret communication between official officials); "second track" (secret communication between unofficial representatives); and "third track" (secret communication between intelligence officers) in the political, economic, intelligence and military fields. Accordingly, the conceptual and functional model of secret diplomacy can be drawn as follows: (Fig 4)




Fig (4): Conceptual Model of Secret Diplomacy

Some of the most important requirements for intelligence deterrence include: The use of offensive intelligence in situational awareness and intelligence invasion in action; Unity of command and management concentration of the country's intelligence forces/assets in the field of internal and foreign intelligence; Separation of intelligence agency from the security agency to focus intelligence on collecting and analysis, and in particular covert action in foreign affairs; Absence of cognitive barriers and conflicts of organizational interests to strengthen inter-organizational coordination and cooperation; Cooperation of the scientific and research centers of the country's intelligence community at all levels and dimensions. In the foreign field, military deterrence and intelligence deterrence are the two main pillars of national security, and this type of deterrence, both at the level of "denial" and at the level of "punishment", requires the strengthening of defense intelligence and foreign intelligence of the intelligence services in the different countries. intelligence deterrence is impossible and incomprehensible without strengthening the objective and subjective infrastructure of "covert action" and secret diplomacy in the face of

adversary and hostile countries. Many countries are currently in the condition of underdeterrence (inadequate deterrence) and some states in framework of overdeterrence (excessive deterrence).

Anyway, Secret diplomacy does not require the payment of prestige and credit due to "plausible denial" and lack of external trumpet (media). In fact, the participation of intelligence organizations in secret diplomacy is one of the ways to connect intelligence with the operational needs of foreign policy and diplomacy. "Special covert action" and "intelligence secret diplomacy" are pathfinder many blind knots of foreign relations, in a situation where official diplomacy is not enough and war (use of force) is not possible or legitimate; Because neither diplomacy nor war alone determine the type of relations between countries anymore. Therefore, we are faced with a concept called DIPLOWAR, which means the combination of diplomacy and war. Covert action in the middle of war and diplomacy starts right here (Fig 5).



Fig (5): Position of Covert Action among Diplomacy and War

At the height of the Cold War, covert action was justified as a quiet option, to be used where diplomacy was insufficient and force was inappropriate (Scott,2004:330). It should be noted that the DNA of intelligence deterrence, unlike military deterrence, operates away from any publicity and media hype. The message of this type of deterrence is: "If you want to shoot, shoot; don't talk...". Intelligence deterrence is a hidden and undeniable power that, according to Newton's third law (for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction) appears preventive and retaliatory measures symmetrically.

As previously mentioned above, There are two types of costs in the deterrence literature: resistance costs and compliance costs. The costs of resistance are the costs that will be incurred if the other party prevents A from carrying out the threat. Compliance costs are the costs that will be incurred if resistance fails. In this case, B has been harmed before A is in a position to carry out the original threat. When the costs of B's resistance outweigh the costs of compliance, any coercive action by A is likely to be successful (Freedman,2004:60). Of course, the costs of resistance are always

less than the costs of compliance and surrender. In this case, the policy of non-compliance will be pursued. Meanwhile, in international law, unlike domestic law, the death penalty/capital punishment (regime change) of criminal countries will be more of a deterrent in preventing others from committing crimes than life imprisonment, house arrest (containment and isolation). This is based on the logic of proportionality between crime and punishment. Therefore, criminologists have studied deterrence more than international relations scholars.

Needless to say one of the most important decisions about how to view deterrence involves its scope: Is it viewed narrowly or broadly? The narrowest definitions hold that deterrence refers solely to military tools of statecraft—using the threat of military response to prevent a state from taking an action. A broader conception keeps the focus on threats but expands the scope to nonmilitary actions: A state can deter using threats of economic sanctions, diplomatic exclusion, or information operations (Mazzar,2018:4). These two approaches agree with the basic definition that deterrence is “dissuasion by means of threat.” It can be based on “the capability of defense denying the adversary its immediate objectives” or on “the threat of inflicting heavy punishment in a larger struggle” (Huth and Russett,1988:30). Either way, it is an effort to affect the calculus of risk and cost by threatening either the potential success or the other interests of the aggressor (Morgan,1983:37).

Alexander George and Richard Smoke have written, “deterrence is simply the persuasion of one’s opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits” (George and Smoke,1974:11). This concept suggests that deterrent strategies can help prevent an action by including steps to make an action unnecessary—including offering concessions or reassurances (Mazzar,2018:5).

Much of classic deterrence theory can be boiled down to a simple proposition: The potential aggressor must believe that the defender has the capability and will to do what it threatens (Paul,2009:2; Knopf,2009:31-57). This criterion is, again, perceptual: The question is not whether the defender actually has such capabilities or will, it is whether the aggressor believes that it does. Deterrence depends on the perception of the “threatener’s determination to fulfill the threat if need be”—and, more importantly, on the potential aggressor’s “conviction that the threat will be carried out” (Schelling,1980:11). Deterrence fails, Bruce Russett concludes, “when the

attacker decides that the defender's threat is not likely to be fulfilled" (Russett,1963:98). This axiom highlights two distinct factors— capability and will. Perceived weakness in either can undermine deterrence (Mazarr,2018:10). Aggressors can try to undermine a defender's willingness to respond by using "salami slicing" approaches—using a long series of low-level aggressions to change the facts on the ground without ever taking action that would justify a major response.

Deterrence works best between rational actors who have a mutual understanding of the status quo and who, to some extent, understand each other's motives. In this context, deterrence by denial or retaliation is effective. Politically, deterrence is therefore perceived as an attractive policy option: it is believed to have a track record of success while helping to reassure one's own population and allies (Roberts and Hardie,2015:13). A combination of political, cultural, economic, as well as Cyber-Deterrence deterrence strategies (Comprehensive deterrence of all pillars of national power) can prove effective and achieve tangible results without the need to resort to violence and war. One of the key elements of deterrence is changing the cost-benefit calculation of a threatening opponent.

With description, any strategic policy-making needs to know the geopolitical environment. Iran's regional environment is associated with signs of crisis, chaos and conflict. Saul Cohen considers this region as a geographical area that will be involved in endless crises. Its main cause should be considered in the social, cultural and strategic conflicts of the actors with each other. Each of the regional actors has the idea of developing power and this controls mutual threats to others. The Iranian revolution left a decisive role in the new regional balance. During the Cold War years and after that, Iran has always tried to play a "regional balancing role" (Mossalanejad,2025:5).

7. Conclusion

According to history, "disarmament" has paved the way for "regime change". If independent countries want to remain independent, they must create some kind of "change regime" in the field of deterrence and strategic balance. Many strategists and analysts of international security issues believe that "transparency is a double-edged sword", that is, unlimited transparency in front of the enemy, on the one hand, may build trust, but on the other hand, it takes the country out of strategic ambiguity and uncertainty, which is the peak of deterrence.

Therefore, over transparency is like the Sword of Damocles on the head of national security of any country; because the basis of international relations and politics is not honesty and trust, but step-by-step verification, deception and maximum mistrust. That is why countries pay more attention to relative advantage/gain than absolute advantage in mutual relations. In this direction, deception and secrecy in strategic problems is the product of anarchic nature of international relations (lack of central supremacy) and the policy of regime change by the dominant powers against independent states and outside the circuit of domination system. In such circumstances, any kind of imposition of the disarmament regime, especially intelligence and security disarmament, will be the beginning of regime change. The aim of deterrence is to prevent certain actions by another actor. Deterrence can be defined as a policy designed to dissuade an actor from carrying out a certain intended course of action. The lack of intelligence deterrence by denial, in principle, leads to the submission to coercive diplomacy or the payment of heavy damages and sometimes irreparable national security costs. In this regard, intelligence deterrence should be truly on the main agenda of the country's intelligence community and utilize all the actual and delayed organizational and management capabilities and capacities with the aim of synergy and joint national operations. Naturally, in order to achieve this important national goal, it is necessary to eliminate the conflict of inter-organizational interests through inter-subjective joint understanding, removing legal and cognitive barriers, and applying structural changes in order to strategic understanding literally. This issue must be institutionalized and internalized at the top and base of the intelligence community pyramid. Needless to say, deterrence is a survival strategy to maintain the status quo (Defensive Realism), but compellence is a strategy of influence to change the status quo (Offensive Realism). Deterrence is actually the ability to have second- strike against adversaries, while compellence is the ability to have first- strike. However, the center of gravity of national security is the simultaneous use of word and sword (bullet), that is, soft power and hard power, or more precisely, the balance and equilibrium between “discourse” (tongue) and “force” (tooth). Thomas Schelling believes: "A weapon that can inflict casualties on people and cannot harm the attacking force of the other side is deeply defensive and does not motivate the weapon holder to strike first" (Schelling,1960:233). Offensive realism means entering the arena of competition with superpowers and great powers, not aggression.

Defense can be passive or active. Coercive intelligence is a necessity for intelligence deterrence to ensure security survival and to secure security interests at the national and international levels. Let's not forget that deterrence is essentially a theory of survival (to be alive), but compellence is a theory of external penetration and deepening (International prestige and reputation). Finally, I do believe that entering into any type of diplomacy and negotiation with foreigners, without the support of power and security namely national deterrence and international compellence, is treason and a kind of national disaster. Honestly, in a situation where all options are on the table by the dominant powers against independent and resistance-based countries, deterrence and coercive diplomacy are strategic options at all levels and dimensions. Securitization, fear/threat-mongering, and demonization of anti-hegemonic states have always been the policy of arrogant, interventionist, and occupying powers. Anyway, Resistance minus deterrence is neither rational nor possible, except by the logic of the imbalance of rationality. In my opinion, deterrence basically means deterrence that is denial-based (first-strike capability), not just punishment-based(second-strike capability)

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9. Conflict of Interest

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest and that all ethical principles in research have been fully observed, including avoidance of plagiarism, duplicate publication or multiple submission of the manuscript, unauthorized replication of others' research, data fabrication or falsification, citation manipulation and reference fabrication, conducting research without informed consent of participants, research misconduct, and other unethical practices.

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