

## **Evaluation of Peace Incentives for Terrorist Group on Deradicalization Programs in Indonesia**

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### **Abstract**

This article evaluates the policy of deradicalization of terrorist groups in Indonesia by using a mix method approach to explore the message structure in terrorism regulation related to the idea of peace incentives. Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, this study analyzes how current terrorism regulations communicate and implement peace incentives. The findings of the study show that despite deradicalization efforts, terrorism activities in Indonesia are still ongoing. This is closely related to the lack of institutionalization of the idea of comprehensive peace incentives for families and terrorism networks. The lack of integration of peace incentives in deradicalization programs causes the approach applied to be incremental and partial, not touching the root of the problem holistically. This research highlights the importance of developing more inclusive deradicalization policies, which not only focus on terrorist individuals, but also pay attention to and engage their families and networks. Thus, the deradicalization program can run more effectively and sustainably, support the achievement of a more stable peace and significantly reduce terrorism activities in Indonesia.

**Keywords:** Peace Incentive, Indonesian Policy, Terrorist Deradicalization Program.

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## **1. Introduction**

The emergence of modern terrorism in Western countries, especially since the late 20th century, has been marked by a change in motives and more complex and organized ways of expression. The motives behind modern acts of terrorism are often driven by extreme ideologies, be they political, religious, or social. For example, groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS use jihadist ideology to recruit and mobilize their sympathizers, with the aim of creating fear and instability in Western countries. In addition to ideological motives, other factors such as social discontent, marginalization, and economic injustice are also often the driving force for individuals or groups to engage in terrorist activities (Simbar,2005).

Since the Bali bombings in 2002, the terrorism landscape in Indonesia has undergone significant changes. Terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) have experienced fragmentation, while new groups such as Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) have emerged with affiliations to ISIS. As is known, ISIS, which is centered in the Middle East region, has condensed its spread to a number of countries in Central Asia, and South Asia (Alishahi et al., 2017). This change indicates that deradicalization approaches that worked in the past may no longer be effective in today's context (Muhammad,2014).

Deradicalization programs in Indonesia have involved a variety of approaches, including religious education, job skills, and psychological counseling. However, the success of this program is still debated. Research by Pujiyono & Rukmono (2020) found that despite some individual successes, these programs often fail to address the social and economic factors that drive radicalization. Additionally, these programs are often poorly integrated, leading to a lack of coordination between government agencies and non-governmental organizations involved (Pujiyono & Rukmono,2020; Magrie et al.,2022).

The problem of terrorism in Indonesia shows an important dynamic in the last 20 years, since Indonesia has an anti-terrorism policy regulation in Government Regulations in Lieu of Laws Number 1 of 2002 and Act No. 5 2003 based on initial regulation on terrorism. This regulation was born after the Bali 1 bombing incident in 2003, where so far the Indonesian government has not felt the need to make a special terrorism policy (Farhad Darvishi,2013). This regulation then places Indonesia as part of the country that ratifies the convention against terrorism, so Indonesia needs to make a number of regulatory adjustments in line with the convention , in an effort to

improve the effectiveness and productivity of counter-terrorism policies (Ahmadipour and Reza Jonidi,2017). However, the frequency of terrorism incidents is still present regularly in 2019-2023, which places Indonesia as a country that is still and continues to be threatened by terrorist activities.

Moreover, there is a transformation of actors and targets of terror activities. In the period from 2002 to 2015, terror actors were dominated by men, and carried out in groups. But in the period 2016-2018, a number of terrorism incidents involve women and even children. Similarly, in the target, from public areas such as restaurants, hotels, shopping centers, state representative offices, changed to police office areas in a number of areas simultaneously (Wirandari & Qodir,2022). The expansion of terrorism incidents is also increasingly spreading, not limited to the islands of Java and Bali as epicenters, but terrorism incidents also occur on the islands of Sumatra and Sulawesi. For handling the phenomena, Indonesian government introduced the new regulation on terrorism 2018 with Terrorism Act 2018.

**Table (1): Terrorism Incident in Indonesia**

<b>Terror Incident Periods</b>	<b>Amounts</b>
2000-2005	13
2006-2011	4
2012-2017	10
2018-2023	10

(Source: Collected from Several Sources)

Post 2018, terrorism events are still present and become an important threat to Indonesia's stability. The collapse of the epicenter of world terrorism that represented by al Qaeda and ISIS, did not reduce acts of terrorism in Indonesia (Wibisono & Maulana,2022). In this context, it is necessary to evaluate terrorism policies in Indonesia. Whether the regulation can accurately capture the problem of terrorism, and whether the social capital and incentives offered in managing the issue of terrorism are adequate and competitive to manage the problem of terrorism in Indonesia.

One of the key findings of the latest research is the importance of including comprehensive peace incentives in deradicalization policies. Research shows that the involvement of families and communities in the deradicalization process can increase the effectiveness of programs. A study by Mubaraq (2021) shows that programs that involve terrorist families in the reintegration process can help reduce stigma and increase social support for

former terrorists, which in turn reduces the likelihood of their return to terrorist activities (Mubaraq et al.,2022).

The evaluation of deradicalization policies must also be based on up-to-date empirical data. The use of technology and big data analysis can help identify trends and patterns in radicalization and deradicalization. A report by the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Radicalism of the University of Indonesia (2022) shows that data analysis from social media and communication platforms can provide insights into the radicalization process, helping to design more targeted interventions.

One of the main challenges in evaluating deradicalization policies is the lack of transparency and access to data (Iqbal Ramadhan, et al,2024). The government needs to increase collaboration with academics and independent researchers to ensure that evaluations are carried out objectively and thoroughly. In addition, the evaluation should consider the local context and adopt a holistic approach, involving all stakeholders, including local communities, families, and civil society organizations. An evaluation of Indonesia's deradicalization of terrorism policies in the past 10 years is critical to ensure that the approach taken remains relevant and effective in the face of evolving threats. Through in-depth data analysis, community engagement, and the integration of peace incentives, deradicalization policies can be scaled up to achieve the long-term goal of creating peace and stability in Indonesia.

This article raises the main question, namely why the terrorism law in Indonesia remains ineffective in the deradicalization program, even though there have been revisions to the regulation 3 times. Is this related to the existence of the idea of peace incentive which is still minor, or is it also because of the mis-leading idea of peace incentive that is not comprehensive in the regulation so that the deradicalization program does not lead to terrorist families.

## **2. Literature Review**

Referring to the study Sukabdi, solving the problem of terrorism can be started by tracing the motives of the terrorists to carry out their actions. Are motives related to collective, personal, or problem issues such as social, economic, political, to religious problems (Sukabdi,2022). In the context of acts of terrorism in Indonesia, Polo shows that the expression of terrorists carrying out their actions is collective, meaning that these actions are supported until facilitated by groups, both domestic and international. The

propaganda push about the glory of terrorist activity as Jihad through books, videos, websites which dominates the knowledge space to the offer of material facilities in the form of economic and social aid to immaterial facilities such as martyrdom (Polo,2020).

Meanwhile, in the context of the issue, terrorist motives in Indonesia are very complex and diverse. However, there is a strong common thread that acts of terrorism use judgment that there are problems in the problem of political, social, economic, and religious injustice to Islamic groups, both at the international and national levels. The motive of collective solidarity is always built on religious arguments, that doing critical and violence action (*nahi munkar*) to tyrannical rulers or what is often used the term oppressive ruler. The solidarity of groups, based on group of nations (*qaumiyyah*), nations (*wathaniyyah*) and Islam packaged simultaneously has made the bonds of terrorism networks strong and institutionalized (Stout,2009).

It is important to track Indonesia's regulatory structure in managing the problem of terrorism. A study conducted by Surwandono (et.al) shows that Indonesia's security policy governance is dominated by a realism approach. This approach recommends policies to strengthen the repressive capacity of the state to be competitive in order to significantly neutralize the strength of competitors (Maksum & Surwandono,2021). Referring to Johan Ardli (et.al), the realism approach was widely practiced by the United States in the Global War on terrorism campaign which was later used by Indonesia, in its development showed a number of ineffectiveness, such as the continued existence of terrorist groups characterized by the ability to carry out surprise and deadly attacks. Coupled with the growing criticism of the repressive choice with accusations of human rights violations (Kusuma et al,2019).

Deradicalization of terrorist groups and networks in Indonesia has become an important focus in the government's efforts to reduce the threat of terrorism. This deradicalization program adopts a variety of approaches, including structural, cultural, and repressive approaches. The following is an analysis of each of these approaches and an evaluation of their effectiveness. First, The structural approach focuses on changes in systems and institutions that affect individuals and groups that are vulnerable to radicalization. In Indonesia, this includes policy reforms, law enforcement capacity building, and the development of educational programs that include an understanding of radicalization and extremism. The effectiveness of structural approaches often depends on the ability of governments to implement sustainable systemic change. A study by Sumarlan shows that despite progress, lack of

coordination between institutions is often a major obstacle. Without good synergy, deradicalization programs often run separately and do not achieve their goals effectively (Sumarlan,2016). Second, the cultural approach involves understanding and addressing the cultural and social roots underlying radicalization. In Indonesia, this includes efforts to strengthen the values of moderation in religious teachings and local traditions. Cultural deradicalization programs involve clerics, community leaders, and educational institutions to spread anti-radicalization messages. Ishomuddin found that this approach is quite effective in reducing radicalization in certain communities. However, the main challenge is the consistency and sustainability of the program, as well as the ability to reach more closed and hard-to-reach groups (Ishomuddin et al.,2021).

Third, the repressive approach involves cracking down and law enforcement against terrorist individuals and groups. In Indonesia, this approach is carried out through the arrest, detention, and prosecution of terrorists as well as the dissolution of terrorist organizations. This approach is important to immediately stop the direct threat posed by terrorist groups. However, repressive approaches often face criticism because they can lead to backlash or resistance from the suppressed group. According to Johan Ardli Kusuma et.al (2019) , the repressive approach needs to be balanced with a more humane and rehabilitative deradicalization strategy to prevent a continuous cycle of radicalization (Kusuma et al.,2019).

Although these three approaches have an important role, the effectiveness of deradicalization programs in Indonesia is often limited due to the lack of integration between structural, cultural, and repressive approaches. Research shows that more holistic and coordinated deradicalization programs are more effective in the long run.

The study by Philips (2015) highlights the need for a more comprehensive approach that involves a wide range of stakeholders, including governments, civil society, and the private sector. The peace incentive theory, which includes providing economic, social, and psychological incentives to former terrorists and their networks, has been proposed as an important addition to deradicalization programs. These incentives can include financial assistance, skills training, and social support to facilitate reintegration into society (Phillips,2015). Research by Sila & Fealyshows that peace incentives can help reduce stigma and increase social support for former terrorists, which in turn reduces their likelihood of returning to terrorism activities. Some of

the countries that have run programs with a peace incentive approach include Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and Singapore. (Sila & Fealy,2022).

### **3. Research Method**

The research method used is a mixed method by combining a content analysis approach and a secondary data-based social analysis. The first stage is the content analysis of the text of Law No. 15 of 2003 and Law No. 5 of 2018 concerning the eradication of terrorism crimes, especially articles containing provisions regarding deradicalization programs. This analysis aims to identify the extent to which the notion of peace incentive—i.e. peace incentives in the form of awards, leniency, social reintegration, or socio-economic support—is explicitly or implicitly accommodated in the regulation. The content analysis technique is carried out by coding on relevant themes, concepts, and narratives, so that a conceptual map is obtained regarding the depth and consistency of peace incentive arrangements within the legal framework of deradicalization in Indonesia.

The second stage integrates the findings of the content analysis with the contextual analysis of social relations that develop in society. Data was obtained from secondary sources such as research reports, scientific articles, media reports, and public statements by stakeholders of the deradicalization program, including families of former terrorists, academics and security experts, as well as special forces detasemen (Densus) 88. This analysis aims to relate the construction of peace incentive in regulation with the reality of its implementation, including the obstacles and opportunities that arise in the process of reintegration of former perpetrators of terrorism. With this approach, the study not only assesses the normative power of regulation, but also tests its relevance and effectiveness within the framework of real social relations. The results are expected to provide a comprehensive overview of the position of peace incentive in Indonesia's deradicalization policy, both in terms of legal design and social acceptance.

### **4. Discussion**

Since 2000, the Indonesian government's policy in managing the terrorism problem has undergone various changes and adjustments. This dynamic is influenced by a series of terrorist attacks that demand a firm and adaptive response from the government. The following is an overview of the development of anti-terrorism policies in Indonesia from 2000 to 2024. In the early 2000s, Indonesia experienced several major terrorist attacks, including the Bali I Bombings in 2002. This incident forced the government to formulate a more systematic anti-terrorism policy. The government

established Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88) in 2003, a special unit under the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia (Polri) aimed at dealing with terrorism effectively (Hilmy,2014). During this period, anti-terrorism policies were strengthened through institutional capacity building and international cooperation. Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning the Eradication of Terrorism Crimes was passed as a strong legal basis for the enforcement and prevention of terrorism. Indonesia also cooperates with other countries and international organizations to share information and technology against terrorism.

Second period (2010-2015) is marked by a focus on deradicalization and prevention programs. The National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) was formed in 2010 with a mandate to coordinate prevention and deradicalization efforts (Maufur,2017). Deradicalization programs began to be implemented in correctional institutions to deal with terrorist prisoners, with the aim of preventing the spread of radical ideology in prisons. Third period 2016-2020, the emergence of new terrorist groups such as ISIS operating globally requires Indonesia to adjust its anti-terrorism strategy. In 2018, the government revised the Anti-Terrorism Law through Law Number 5 of 2018, which gives greater authority to the security forces to deal with terrorism and expands the definition of terrorism. Counterterrorism approaches are also beginning to include aspects of technology and social media, given the important role of these platforms in spreading radical ideology. Fourth period (2021-2024), the latest period, the Indonesian government adopted a more holistic and comprehensive approach (Muhammad & Hiariej,2021). This policy includes prevention, enforcement, and deradicalization by involving various stakeholders, including civil society, academia, and the private sector. Radicalization prevention programs are extended to vulnerable communities, schools, and universities. In addition, information and communication technology is used to detect and prevent terrorism propaganda more effectively.

**Table (2): Ideas of for Combatting Terrorist in Indonesia Act**

Governance	Terrorism act 2003	Terrorism act 2018
	%	%
Prevention	0.7	2
Eradication	5.2	8
Criminal and imprisonment	94	77
Mentoring, Coaching Education, Reintegration	0	4
Deradicalization	0	7

(Source: Proceed data)

This table (3) shows that the big idea of terrorism policy in Indonesia is more to neutralize the existence of terrorists by carrying out reactive activities compared to preventive. For the 2002 Law, the choice is very rational where Indonesia is shocked by the Bali 1 bombing and the bombings at the Manila and Australia embassies in Jakarta. Act No. 15 of 2003, the deradicalization program does not contain the idea of a peace incentive at all. Based on the table, almost all policy portions are focused on the approach of repressive law enforcement through criminalization and imprisonment (94%), while the education, reintegration, and deradicalization components do not get a significant portion. Existing deradicalization efforts are limited to ideological education as long as inmates are in correctional institutions, without any concrete incentives that can motivate perpetrators to abandon violence. This approach places deradicalization as part of the general development of prisoners, rather than as a comprehensive strategy that integrates social, economic, and reintegration support into community life.

However, for the policy in 2018, it turns out that the idea of preventive measures has not changed much significantly, so the idea of arresting terrorists seems to be the main indicator of the success of the war against terrorists (Kusuma et al.,2019). In Act No. 5 of 2018, where the portion of policies based on education, reintegration, mentoring, and deradicalization began to appear, although still minor. Data shows that there are allocations for mentoring, coaching, education, reintegration (4%) and deradicalization (7%). This reflects the recognition that successful counterterrorism does not rely only on imprisonment, but also on peace incentives in the form of opportunities for social reintegration, leniency, or post-release support. However, the portion is still relatively small compared to the repressive approach which remains dominant (77%). This indicates that the 2018 regulation is indeed moving towards the paradigm of a soft approach, but has not made the peace incentive the main pillar of the deradicalization strategy. To be effective, the implementation of this policy requires clarity of mechanisms and cross-sectoral support so that it does not stop at the normative level.

The idea of conducting an observation process to coaching after a terrorism incident is also not widely articulated. This is reflected in the two regulations discussing minorly. The idea of deradicalization has not yet appeared in the regulations in 2002, but also appeared in the regulatory structure that was still in its infancy in the regulations in 2018. The idea of

deradicalization is carried out more by terrorism inmates in prison, and deradicalization activities outside prisons are carried out more through the publication of books and short films, and less involve religious organizations systematically (Sumpter et al.,2021).

**Table (4): Who get Peace Incentives in Terrorism Act**

Kind of Incentives	Terrorism Act 2002		Terrorism Act 2018	
	Terrorist Victims	Terrorist Families	Terrorist Victims	Terrorist Families
Compensation	0,354839	0	0,418182	0
Restitution	0,354839	0	0,145455	0
Rehabilitation	0,16129	0	0,181818	0
Assistance	0,129032	0	0,254545	0

Based on the data in the table 4, both in Act No. 15 of 2003 and Law No. 5 of 2018, the implementation of peace incentive is more directed to victims of terrorism than to families of perpetrators of terrorism. The forms of incentives given to victims include compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, and assistance, with a slightly increased proportion in the 2018 regulations. On the other hand, the families of the perpetrators of terrorism are not listed as recipients of incentives at all, either in the form of social support or reintegration. This shows that policy orientation focuses more on the victim-centered aspect, without taking into account the role of the perpetrator's family as part of the ecosystem that can affect the success of deradicalization.

When the peace incentive does not touch the perpetrator's family, the potential for marginalization of them becomes enormous. The perpetrator's family often faces social stigma, discrimination, and even denial of access to jobs, education, and public services (Nuswanto,2019). This situation reinforces social alienation, which in turn can form a narrative of injustice in their minds. In conditions without state support, the perpetrator's family is more vulnerable to being targeted by the recruitment of radical networks that use this sense of marginalization as propaganda material to strengthen ideological militancy (Toyibah,2022). In other words, the absence of incentives and social support to the perpetrator's family can be a risk factor that strengthens the cycle of radicalization across generations (Wirandari & Qodir,2022).

Reflectively, this overly biased policy has the potential to undermine the goal of comprehensive deradicalization. Deradicalization not only talks

about changing the behavior of terror perpetrators, but also includes preventing the birth of new radicalization through support for the perpetrator's closest social circle, including his family (Asrori & Syauqi,2020). If the state only focuses on the victim and ignores the perpetrator's family, then the peace incentive loses the dimension of long-term prevention. Integrating measurable support for the families of the perpetrators—without neglecting the priority of victim protection—can be a strategic step to break the chain of radicalization and build a more sustainable peace.

Civil society's disillusionment with the ineffectiveness of the government's deradicalization program, which has barely touched the families of perpetrators, has created a void in an effort to break the chain of radicalization. It is in this gap that civil organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama are present, not just as fillers of the void, but as social heroes. Through social assistance, psychological assistance, and economic empowerment, they reach out to marginalized families of perpetrators, erode stigma, and open the door to reintegration. This approach shifts the narrative from mere condemnation to social restoration, building bridges of trust that are an important foundation for peace and the prevention of radicalization across generations.

Muhammadiyah's socio-religious organization choose a more open nature, by providing opportunities for former terrorists to study at universities run by Muhammadiyah. Even Ali Fauzi, a former terrorist in the Bali bombings completed his doctoral education at the University of Muhammadiyah Malang (Medcom.id,2023). LAZISMU also provides research funding assistance for researchers who discuss the role of Islamic philanthropy in deradicalization programs. In addition, there are efforts from civil society to proactively provide housing assistance to former terrorist prisoners (Zaumm,2023). Members of the local parliament in Aceh, donated housing assistance to prisoners involved in terrorist acts in the Pepi Fernando's network, even though the government in the act known as the terror bomb through books. Nahdhatul Ulama also has the initiative to provide humanitarian and economic assistance to terrorist families, as an effort to ease socio-economic life (Alawi,2020).

Nahdlatul Ulama realizes that breaking the chain of radicalization is not enough just with a legal approach, but it is necessary to touch the socio-economic roots of the families of the perpetrators of terrorism. Through the distribution of zakat, infaq, and social assistance, NU seeks to

institutionalize a peace incentive that gives new hope to marginalized families. This assistance is not just material, but also a message of acceptance back to the community. With economic support and moderate religious guidance, NU creates a safe space for families so that they do not return to the circle of terror networks (Nucare-Laziznu,2020). This approach strengthens social reintegration as well as a preventive strategy against cross-generational radicalization.

This small idea provoked peace activist, Noor Huda Ismail, to create the Peace Inscription foundation, which provides space for ex-convicts and families of terrorists to work in his company. He has historical and sociological experience with a number of terrorist prisoners, some of whom were friends while studying at pesantren. But this creative idea did not develop well, where the development of restaurants was not widely found in a number of provinces in Java. Only one restaurant was found in Semarang and Solo that employed ex-terrorist convicts (Theconversation.com,2022).

The policy of providing peace incentives to the families of terrorism perpetrators began to receive the government's attention after new regulations on terrorism were passed in 2018. Although previously it was not explicitly regulated in Act No. 15 of 2003 or Act. No. 5 of 2018, this step is a breakthrough initiated through executive policy. The Head of BNPT emphasized that support for the perpetrator's family is not a form of justification for acts of terror, but a prevention strategy so that the family does not fall back into radical networks (Setpres,2020). President Joko Widodo even symbolically gave compensation to the families of the perpetrators, as a strong message that the state is present for all its citizens, including those who are vulnerable to being alienated due to social stigma (Sukmana,2018; Taufiqurahman,2018).

This step can be read as the government's effort to close the loophole that has been a weakness of regulations. Over the years, deradicalization programs have focused more on perpetrators who have been arrested, while their families have been largely neglected. As a result, many families of the perpetrators have fallen into a cycle of poverty, stigma, and alienation, which has become a fertile ground for radical group propaganda (Adhityawarman,2019). By providing social assistance, economic support, and coaching, the government seeks to erode the sense of injustice that is often exploited by terrorism networks to reinforce their ideological militancy.

However, while this policy shows progress, its implementation still requires a more systematic and integrated design. Support for the families of perpetrators of terrorism must be accompanied by psychosocial assistance, moderate religious guidance, and guaranteed access to education and employment. Otherwise, the aid will only be a short-term solution without changing the root of the problem. This reality shows that the peace incentive for the families of the perpetrators of terrorism is not just a policy of mercy, but a strategic investment of the state to build social resilience and break the cycle of radicalization across generations.

### **5. Conclusion**

An evaluation of deradicalization policies through peace incentive interventions for families and terrorism networks in Indonesia shows that this approach still faces challenges. Terrorism prevention policy regulations in Indonesia place more emphasis on compensation for victims of acts of terrorism, while terrorist families are not recognized as part of the victims. As a result, the incentives provided do not have a direct impact on the decline in terrorism activities.

The idea of peace incentives for terrorist families has not been officially voiced in the act, which results in the peace incentive policy carried out by the Indonesian government tends to be temporary and limited. These unplanned and unsustainable interventions reduce the effectiveness of deradicalization programs. To increase the success of the program, strong political support and the integration of the idea of peace incentives into official regulation are needed. Without these measures, deradicalization efforts will remain incremental and partial, failing to significantly reduce the threat of terrorism in Indonesia.

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### **7. Conflicts of Interest**

We do not have any conflict of interest. This is purely academic research that attempts to solve the problems in society.

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- PP tersebut menegaskan bahwa korban tindak pidana terorisme, ahli waris%2C atau kuasanya kepada LPSK%2C” kata P.
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