Geopolitics Quarterly

Geopolitics Quarterly

A Critical Analysis of Dominant Theoretical Approaches to Science Diplomacy in a Changing Geopolitical Landscape

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
1 Assistant Professor of Politics and International Relations, Institute of Cultural and Social Studies, Ministry of Science, Research and Technology, Tehran, Iran.
2 Postdoctoral Student, Moscow State University of International Relations, Russia. Researcher, University of Religions and Sects, Qom, Iran.
Abstract
Extended Abstract
1. Introduction
Science diplomacy has increasingly become a pivotal domain at the intersection of international relations, scientific advancement, and global governance. The emergence of complex geopolitical transformations—including strategic competition among major powers, the securitization of emerging technologies, and the rise of new scientific actors—has fundamentally reshaped the environment in which science diplomacy operates. Early frameworks, most notably the 2010 Royal Society–AAAS tripartite model, conceptualized science diplomacy as a cooperative, universal, and largely apolitical arena. This model framed the field around three functions: Science in Diplomacy, Diplomacy for Science, and Science for Diplomacy, each emphasizing the potential of science to foster trust, enable collaboration, and support peaceful international engagement.
A second influential framework, developed by Gluckman et al. (2017), introduced a more pragmatic and interest-oriented understanding of science diplomacy. Their approach highlighted the role of science as a strategic asset for national interests, while simultaneously acknowledging its potential to generate collective transnational benefits. While these frameworks played an essential role in establishing the conceptual foundations of the field, they were formulated before the onset of profound geopolitical changes now shaping global scientific interactions.
The accelerating rise of AI-driven geopolitics, quantum technology competition, biotechnology rivalries, and data governance disputes challenges existing theoretical models. Moreover, the increased influence of non-state actors—such as multinational technology firms, transnational scientific networks, and indigenous knowledge communities—reveals a need for theoretical refinement. This study offers a critical analysis of the dominant theoretical approaches, identifies their limitations in the contemporary geopolitical context, and outlines conceptual directions for a more comprehensive analytical model.
2. Methodology
This research employs a directed qualitative content analysis, a method well-suited for examining theoretical adequacy against evolving geopolitical realities. The approach allows for a structured interrogation of the assumptions, internal coherence, and empirical applicability of dominant frameworks in science diplomacy.

2.1. Primary Sources and Analytical Corpus
the Royal Society–AAAS and Gluckman et al approaches to science diplomacy are the two foundational theoretical sources which serve as the basis of our analysis:
(1) the Royal Society–AAAS (2010) report, representing the normative-holistic framework;
(2) Gluckman et al. (2017), representing the pragmatic-interest-based framework.
These works are supplemented by recent literature (2020–2024) in science–technology studies, geopolitical risk, global scientific collaboration, and emerging technology governance.

2.2. Coding Strategy
Analytical coding is focused on three dimensions:

Ontological assumptions (conceptualization of science, diplomacy, and power);
Functional mechanisms (how science diplomacy is theorized to operate);
Limitations and contradictions (normative biases, empirical validity, geopolitical blind spots).

2.3. Comparative Evaluation
The frameworks were examined in relation to contemporary geopolitical developments, including:

rising technological powers in the Global South,
securitization of AI, quantum, and biotechnology,
technological decoupling and new blocs,
multi-level and multi-actor governance systems,
disruptions in global knowledge infrastructures.

2.4. Conceptual Synthesis
Insights were integrated into a multi-level model connecting geopolitical structures, policy mechanisms, and knowledge infrastructures. This synthesis highlights conceptual gaps and informs potential revisions to science diplomacy theory.
3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Limitations of the 2010 Royal Society–AAAS Framework
The tripartite model remains foundational but insufficient for contemporary analysis. The study identifies several challenges:

Conceptual Ambiguity

The boundaries between the three categories lack analytical clarity and often overlap in practice, complicating empirical application.

Normative and Idealistic Orientation

The framework assumes scientific neutrality, universality, and cooperation, overlooking the deeply political and competitive nature of scientific activity in global affairs.

Limited Attention to Power Asymmetries

It does not adequately account for geopolitical inequalities or the role of science in advancing strategic national interests.

Incompatibility with Technological Geopolitics

The framework predates the AI–quantum–biotech revolution, global data regimes, and the rise of private tech giants—now central forces in shaping science diplomacy.
As a result, the 2010 model functions more as an inspirational or normative narrative than a robust analytical tool.
3.2. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Gluckman et al. (2017) Framework
The 2017 framework offers an important corrective by positioning science diplomacy within the domain of national interests and geopolitical strategy. It acknowledges:

the strategic use of science for national advantage;
the role of multi-sector actors;
the tension between national priorities and global challenges.

Yet, limitations remain:

Static Interpretation of National Interest

In a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment—marked by tech competition, sanctions, and supply chain disruption—national interests are fluid and contingent.

Underrepresentation of Non-State Power Actors

While more inclusive than earlier models, it still fails to fully integrate multinational tech corporations, global scientific platforms, and data-driven governance structures.

Insufficient Treatment of Security Dimensions

The model does not fully account for the securitization of scientific domains, particularly AI, biotech, and cyber.

Lack of Adaptation to Geopolitical Fragmentation

Emerging technological blocs (e.g., U.S.–EU vs. China), South–South scientific alliances, and regional science diplomacy architectures require a more dynamic theoretical lens.
Despite these shortcomings, the model marks an essential transition from idealism to pragmatism.
3.3. Emerging Context: Science Diplomacy in the Age of Techno-political Rivalry
This study demonstrates that science diplomacy now functions within a radically changed landscape shaped by:

Technological Power Politics:
AI, quantum, biotech, and cloud infrastructures act as strategic assets and tools of geopolitical competition.
Multi-Actor Networks:
Scientific collaboration increasingly involves universities, NGOs, private tech firms, indigenous communities, and transnational research alliances.
Redefinition of Interests:
Access to critical technologies, data sovereignty, standard-setting power, and resilience capacities now shape national and transnational priorities.

These transformations render classical frameworks analytically insufficient.
4. Conclusion
This critical analysis concludes that dominant theoretical approaches in science diplomacy—both the normative 2010 model and the pragmatic 2017 model—lack the conceptual capacity to explain the dynamics of the current geopolitical–technoscientific environment. Science diplomacy has evolved into a hybrid ecosystem of power, knowledge, and technology, where cooperation and competition co-exist and where emerging technologies reshape notions of national and global interest.
The study underscores the need for a new conceptual framework that captures:

the interplay between geopolitical structures and scientific infrastructures,
the role of multi-actor and multi-level governance,
the implications of transformative technologies,
fluid national–transnational interest alignments.

Such a framework will enhance theoretical precision and policy relevance for analyzing science diplomacy in an era defined by technological rivalry and geopolitical fragmentation.
Keywords
Subjects

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Volume 22, Issue 3
Summer 2026
Pages 70-108

  • Receive Date 07 January 2026
  • Revise Date 16 February 2026
  • Accept Date 05 May 2026