Geopolitics Quarterly

Geopolitics Quarterly

An Examination of the Tension-Causing Factors between Russia and Ukraine within the Framework of Russia's Security Documents

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
Seyed Mohsen Mir Hosseini 1
Seyed Hussain Emran 2
1 Assistant. Professor Law and Political Science Department, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran.
2 PhD Student of Political Science, Iranian Studies, Faculty of Law, Political Science and History, Yazd University, Yazd, Iran.
10.22034/igq.2026.520192.2035
Abstract
Extended Abstract     
Introduction
The eruption of the Russia-Ukraine war on February 24, 2022, signified a critical inflection point in post-Cold War international relations. While some observers have interpreted the conflict as a sudden and unjustified act of aggression by the Russian Federation, a more nuanced and historically grounded analysis reveals a complex web of motivations rooted in strategic thought, security concerns, and geopolitical rivalry. This study takes a causality-based approach, drawing upon the logic that no major geopolitical shift occurs without underlying catalysts. It argues that the Russian invasion should be interpreted not as a spontaneous maneuver, but as the culmination of a series of structural tensions, doctrinal changes, and regional dynamics shaped over the past two decades.
Within this framework, Russian strategic and national security documents serve as vital instruments for understanding the Kremlin’s worldview. These texts not only articulate Russia’s threat perceptions but also serve as policy roadmaps that reflect evolving national priorities and foreign policy ambitions. This research examines three key strategic documents—the National Security Strategy, the Military Doctrine, and the Maritime Doctrine—to elucidate how Russia perceives its geopolitical environment and justifies actions in its so-called "near abroad," particularly toward Ukraine. These documents provide the discursive and doctrinal foundations for understanding the causes of the ongoing conflict.
 
Methodology
The methodology of this study is based on qualitative content analysis, with a primary focus on official strategic documents issued by the Russian government between 2000 and 2023. A document analysis framework is employed to trace recurrent themes, linguistic cues, and strategic narratives embedded in these policy texts. In addition to primary sources, the research engages with secondary academic literature in international relations and security studies to contextualize and interpret the findings. This dual-layered approach—combining empirical document review with theoretical interpretation—enables the identification of consistent patterns in Russian strategic thought.
Analytical emphasis is placed on concepts such as sovereignty, multipolarity, geopolitical influence, and national identity. The study also considers Russia’s diplomatic history, security treaties, and reactions to NATO’s institutional behavior. This methodological approach facilitates a multi-dimensional exploration of how textual narratives in official documents translate into foreign policy actions on the ground.
 
Results and Discussion
The study identifies three principal factors as the core of Russia’s strategic hostility toward Ukraine: the ideological ambition to restore the “Russian World,” the broader objective of establishing a multipolar world order, and persistent opposition to NATO’s eastward expansion.
1.    The Revival of the Russian World (Russkiy Mir)

The concept of the Russian World is rooted in civilizational identity and shared cultural, religious, and linguistic bonds among ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking communities in the former Soviet space. It envisions a transnational Russian civilization that transcends current political boundaries. According to official narratives, Russia assumes a moral and strategic obligation to protect these populations, even through extraterritorial intervention. Russian strategic documents, particularly the 2021 National Security Strategy, explicitly stress the protection of Russian cultural identity abroad. This ideology has justified various interventions in the post-Soviet space, with Ukraine—a country central to the Slavic Orthodox tradition and historical roots of the Russian state—being a key focus.
2.    The Quest for a Multipolar World Order
                            
Russia’s strategic thinking reveals a deep dissatisfaction with the unipolar world system dominated by the United States. The National Security Strategy (2009 and 2015 versions) and subsequent updates consistently highlight Russia’s aspiration to serve as an independent pole of power in a decentralized international system. This entails reducing Western dominance, particularly in Eurasia. Ukraine’s growing alignment with Western institutions—be it NATO, the EU, or bilateral cooperation with the United States—is perceived by Moscow as a direct threat to its strategic autonomy and sphere of influence. Russia’s interventions in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Syria (2015) can be interpreted as manifestations of its desire to assert itself as a great power in a multipolar world.
3.    NATO’s Eastward Expansion
Perhaps the most frequently cited threat in Russian security discourse is the continued enlargement of NATO. Since the late 1990s, Russia has voiced consistent opposition to NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe, viewing it as a violation of verbal agreements made during the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Strategic documents, such as the Military Doctrine of 2014 and the National Security Strategy of 2021, explicitly list NATO’s military infrastructure near Russia’s borders as a national security threat. Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO represents a red line for the Kremlin, not merely because of geographic proximity, but because it undermines the strategic buffer zone Moscow believes is essential for its survival.
The study also emphasizes Russia’s failed diplomatic efforts in the lead-up to the 2022 war, including proposals for security guarantees from the West, which were ultimately rejected. This rejection intensified Russia’s perception of encirclement and justified, in its own doctrine, a pre-emptive strike to neutralize what it saw as imminent strategic threats.
 
Conclusion
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is best understood through the lens of long-term strategic planning and security doctrine, rather than short-term political motivations. The findings indicate that the invasion of Ukraine was a calculated move rooted in doctrinal principles articulated over two decades of strategic discourse. Russian national security documents reveal that Moscow had repeatedly expressed its concerns about NATO, Western interference, and the cultural separation of Ukraine from the Russian orbit.
The war can therefore be seen as a response—albeit a violent and controversial one—to the erosion of Russia’s regional influence and its failed attempts to resolve the security dilemma through diplomacy. A thorough reading of Russian strategic texts offers a deeper understanding of the structural logic behind its actions, and suggests that similar flashpoints could arise in other parts of the former Soviet space if current trends persist.
Keywords
NATO's Eastward Expansion
Russia
Russian World
Security Documents
Ukraine

Subjects

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Geopolitics Quarterly
Volume 22, Issue 1
Spring 2026
Pages 142-168

  • Receive Date 25 June 2025
  • Revise Date 13 September 2025
  • Accept Date 03 January 2026