Geopolitics Quarterly

Geopolitics Quarterly

The Turkey-Israel Conflict in Post-Assad Syria: From Geopolitical Competition to Clash of Interests

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
1 Assistant Professor of Regional Studies, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Ilam, Ilam.
2 PhD in Political Science and Visiting Professor at Ilam University, Ilam, Iran
Abstract
Extended Abstract
Introduction
The contradictory behavioral patterns and the existence of conflicting regimes in the Middle East have, for many years, subjected the geopolitical map of the region to significant changes. These changes, exacerbated by the intervention of extra-regional political entities, have escalated tensions, creating a tangible reality marked by geopolitical crises, which culminated in internal revolutions and regional confrontations. The outbreak of the “Al-Aqsa Storm” by Palestinian forces introduced a new and impactful shockwave to the region’s geopolitical transformations, which ultimately led to the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria. This development thrust the region into a state of uncertainty and new fluctuations. Post-Assad Syria emerged as a new arena for regional competition between Israel and Turkey, both striving to redraw the regional order. This study aims to examine the level of conflict and divergence of interests between Turkey and Israel in the new Syria following the recent developments, and to demonstrate how these two regional powers have found themselves in conflict across various domains.
 
Research Methodology
The primary goal of this study is to gain an in-depth understanding of the geopolitical actions of Israel and Turkey in the evolving post-Assad Syrian landscape and to explain the logic of their behaviors within the framework of the balance of power theory. Accordingly, this research adopts a qualitative approach and is descriptive-analytical in nature. The data for this study were collected through the review of primary and secondary sources, including academic articles, books, scientific reports, credible news sources, and official government statements. The research focuses on qualitative content analysis of political-strategic concepts based on the declared and practiced policies of the two actors under study, aiming to extract behavioral patterns, strategic preferences, and structural developments in the regional balance of power. The selection of this method is grounded in the complexity and multilayered nature of Syria’s developments and power struggles at the regional level. Furthermore, employing the balance of power theory as the theoretical framework provides a coherent and systematic context for analyzing the actors’ behaviors, allowing the researcher to uncover causal relationships between geopolitical transformations and competitive strategies.
 
Findings
The new dynamics shaping the regional environment and the fragile state of post-Assad Syria reveal that changes in the regional balance of power have weakened and, in some cases, dismantled many alliances and coalition networks. Turkey and Israel, which once aligned in weakening Iran’s power and the axis of resistance, have become two new regional rivals following the fall of Bashar al-Assad. The shifting balance of power in the region has introduced new fears and concerns for Turkish and Israeli elites, as the leaders of both countries perceive each other as the primary regional rival for the future. This perception has elevated the issue of survival and self-preservation to a strategic priority, prompting both countries to design political strategies aimed at weakening and countering one another. The new realities in Syria have created novel dynamics, demonstrating that Turkey and Israel are in conflict and have diverging interests across multiple dimensions and domains. The future political system in Syria, its structure and nature, the power of ethnic and religious groups such as the Kurds and Druze in the new Syria, trade routes and corridors through Syria, and a strong military presence in Syria’s political-security sphere are among the areas that highlight the levels of conflict and divergence between Turkey and Israel.
 
Conclusion
Geopolitical changes in the region, triggered by the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government, have also led to significant shifts in the regional balance of power. Turkey and Israel, driven by the need to maintain regional dominance and fearing the rise of the other, are actively engaging in the new Syria to establish themselves as the region’s new hegemon. The clash of interests between these two political entities indicates that the shifting balance of power in Syria and the region shapes their interventionist objectives in Syria. To achieve this, Israel has pursued policies such as advocating for a decentralized and weakened Syrian state, supporting ethnic and religious minorities, maintaining a strong military presence, and establishing land corridors to secure future power. In contrast, Turkey has prioritized strengthening the central government, weakening Kurdish power, establishing an energy corridor from Qatar through Syria to Turkey, and expanding its military influence through the establishment of various bases. These objectives have created a conflict and divergence of interests between the two countries in Syria, making the future of Syria and its developments contingent upon the ebb and flow of this rivalry.
Keywords

Subjects


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Volume 22, Issue 1
Spring 2026
Pages 199-230

  • Receive Date 28 July 2025
  • Revise Date 05 January 2026
  • Accept Date 04 February 2026