The objective of this study is to critically examine the Comprehensive Strategic Agreement signed between Iran and Russia on December 17, 2024. The research employs a dual-methodological approach, integrating the framework of critical geopolitics with Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (CDA). The CDA methodology is applied in detail at three analytical levels: structures, forces, and context. At the structural level, the agreement’s text is dissected to identify Russia as a security-guaranteeing object, with the guarantee of Iran’s geopolitical security serving as a floating signifier. This security is positioned in opposition to the counter-securitization discourses advanced by the United States and Israel, which are constructed as threatening geopolitical objects. These actors are shown to employ complex strategies to consolidate pressure on Iran. The analysis of forces focuses on Russia’s strategic partnership with Iran, which is pursued through two main actions: first, by placing Iran on a non-securitized agenda, and second, by creating distance and imposing its own geopolitical perspective. At the contextual level, the study examines how the U.S. seeks to minimize Iran’s benefits from the agreement by linking it to the nuclear dossier, thereby influencing the broader geopolitical context. The findings reveal that, despite the agreement’s intentions, Russia is unable to persuade other geopolitical actors to establish robust, hardware-based relations with Iran. As a result, Russia cannot logically guarantee Iran’s geopolitical security, highlighting the limitations of the agreement within the current geopolitical landscape.