Geopolitics, Geo-economics and the Prospect of Iran-India Cooperation in Chabahar

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 Associate Professor, Political Science and International Relations, Shahid Beheshti University,Tehran, Iran

2 M.A. in International Relations, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran,Iran

Abstract

Extended Abstract
Introduction
Chabahar as a deep-sea port is located near the Oman Sea. Chabahar’s location is very important for many countries such as India. India and Iran in 2003 singed the “New Delhi Declaration”. The declaration was about a lot of issues like investment, South-North Corridor and trade. One of the most important issues in this declaration was India and Iran’s plan for developing the Chabahar port. But after two decades, the Chabahar agreement in 2016 was signed and ratified, though after two years the progress has been very slow. In short, despite Iran and India's willingness to develop the Chabahar port, their cooperation in this port has had its ups and downs and has not yet reached a definite end. With this introduction, the question is that, given the delay in the development of Chabahar port, what are the obstacles to cooperation between the two countries, and what are the goals of Iran and India for the development of the Chabahar port and whether the goals of the two countries are overlapped. So, the main question of the paper is that what are the main reasons for delaying India's investment project in Chabahar (from 2003 to 2019) and what is the prospect of cooperation between the two countries in Chabahar port?
 
Methodology
By applying a conceptual as well as theoretical framework using the geopolitics and geo-economics literature, the research is mainly based on a descriptive-analytic method. The data gathering procedure is based on library findings and interviews.
 
Results and Discussion
From the geo-economic aspect, Iran and India have common goals. Both countries want to use Chabahar port as a commercial and transit hub. India seeks to facilitate its access to central Asia and Afghanistan’s markets and resources, and Iran has been trying to attract FDI and access to more markets. On the other hand, conflicting geopolitical goals seems to be a main hindrance for India and Iran’s cooperation in Chabahar port. Iran is trying to use the port as a tool to confront the US in the region. India as other partner wants to use the port against China and Pakistan. Iran does not want to strain its relation with China and Pakistan, and India has good relation with the US and two countries in some areas have strategic cooperation. From Iran’s aspect, it does not want to use its port against its real friends. For Iran, China and Pakistan are good friends in the South and East Asia and thus wants to develop its relationship with them. In this regard, we cannot see a tangible accomplishment in the near future for both countries in Chabahar port.
 
Conclusions
If India and Iran don’t change their view of Chabahar from a geopolitical to a geo-economical port, we possibly will not see any progress in their cooperation in Chabahar port in near future. They should use Chabahar as an economic tool to increase economic interactions in Central, South and West Asia. Iran needs to invite other states like South Korea and Japan to invest in the port. And at the end, Iran should increase economic choices for countries that participate in the port like India and Afghanistan

Keywords

References

  1. Aghaei, B (2018). personal interview.
  2. Agnew, J (2004). Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World Politics, London: Routledge.
  3. Ahmadi, S.A; Ahmadi, I (2017). Investigating the Strategic Capabilities of Chabahar Free Zone in Line with Iran's Geopolitical Weight and National Strength (from Domestic, Regional and International Perspective), Strategic Quarterly, No. 83, pp. 235-263. [In Persian]
  4. Ahmed, Z. Sh; Akbarzadeh, Sh (2018). Understanding Pakistan’s Relationship with Iran. Middle East Policy, 25(4), 86-100. doi: 10.1111/mepo.12380.
  5. Akram, M (2016). The New Great Game, DAWN, Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1264242/.
  6. Alam, A (Ed). (2011). India and Iran: an assessment of contemporary relations. New Century Publications. doi:10.1111/dome.12014.
  7. Amirthan, Sh (2017). What Are India, Iran, and Afghanistan’s Benefits from the Chabahar Port Agreement?, Strategic Analysis, 41(1), 87-93. doi:10.1080/ 09700161.2016.1249184.
  8. Asgari Kermani, H (2016). Chabahar Port and Region, Journal of Foreign Relations, No, 1, pp. 17-23. [In Persian]
  9. Azimi, A.H (2018). The Most Economical Railway Project needs money; Can Indians Finance the Chabahar-Zahedan Railway?, Available at: https://cfzo .ir/ns/163. [In Persian]
  10. Behuria, A; Alam Rizvi, M. M (2015). India’s Renewed Interest in Chabahar: Need to Stay the Course. Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses. Available at:https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/191336/IB_Chabahar_BehuriaRizvi_130515 .pdf
  11. Bhattacherjee, K (2019). Union Budget 2019-20: Bhutan Gains, Chabahar Loses in Budget pie, The Hindu, Available at: https://www. thehindu. Com /business.
  12. Chari, P. R. (Ed.). (2014). Indo-US nuclear deal: seeking synergy in bilateralism. New Delhi: Routledge.
  13. Cohen, S (2001). India: Emerging Power, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
  14. Conrad, M.P (2017). China's Access to Gwadar Port: Strategic Implications and Options for India. Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 13(1), 55-62. doi:10.1080/09733159.2017.1317123.
  15. Daniels, R (2013). Strategic competition in South Asia: Gwadar, Chabahar, and the risks of infrastructure development. American Foreign Policy Interests, 35(2), 93-100. doi:10.1080/10803920.2013.776887.
  16. EIA (2019), Executive Summary of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, EIA Beta, Available at: https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.php?iso=KAZ/ TUR.
  17. Ezati, E; Shokri, Sh (2012). Investigating the Position of Chabahar in North-South Transit and its Role in the Development of Neighboring Cities, Geographical Land Quarterly, No.36. pp. 1-14. [In Persian]
  18. Hafeznia, M.R (2017). Principles and Concept of Geopolitics, Mashhad: Papoli Publications. [In Persian]
  19. Hafeznia, M.R; Romina, I (2005). Analysis of Geopolitical Capacities of the South-East Coast of Iran in National Interest (Neglected Space), Geography and Development Quarterly, No. 6, pp. 5-20. [In Persian]
  20. Hanauer, L; Chalk, P (2012). India's and Pakistan's Strategies in Afghanistan, Rand Corporation.
  21. Jaffrelot, Ch (2011). A Tale of Two Ports, Yale Global Online, Available at: https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/tale-two-ports.
  22. Karim, U (2017). Iran-Pakistan Relations: The Current State of Affairs, Ankara: Center for Iranian Studies in Ankara.
  23. Kordi, A (2017). “Afghan Investment Companies Record Holder of Foreign Registration Company in Chabahar Free Zone", Chabahar Free Zone, Avialable at: https://cfzo.ir/ns/163. [In Persian]
  24. Kumar Kothari, R (2014). India’s Connect Central Asia Policy: Emerging Economic and Security Dimensions, Sociology and Anthropology, 2(6): 239-254. doi:10.13189/sa.2014.020605.
  25. Luttwak, E. N. (1990). From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce, The National Interest, (20), 17-23.
  26. MEA (2019). Press Statement by EAM after First India-Central Asia Dialogue, Available at: https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/30907/.
  27. Mitra, R (2019). India’s Persian desire–analyzing India’s maritime trade strategy vis-à-vis the Port of Chabahar. Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India, 41-50. doi.: 10.1080/09733159.2019. 1625226.
  28. Mojtahedzadeh, P (2002). Political Geography and Geographical Politics, Tehran, SAMT Publications. [In Persian]
  29. Mojtahedzadeh, P (2007). Iranian Democracy and Identity, Tehran: Kavir Publications. [In Persian]
  30. Muzalevsky, R(2014). Central Asia's Shrinking Connectivity Gap: Implications for US Strategy, Army War College Carlisle Barracks Strategic Studies Institute.
  31. Nader, A.R; Scotten, A. G; Rahmani, A. I; Stewart, Robert; Mahnad, L (2014). Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan: Implications for the US Drawdown, Rand Corporation.
  32. Nasirpour, Gh.R (2019). “Iran-India Relations with Future Prospects”, Geopolitics Quarterly, Vol. 14, Issue 52, pp. 165-187. [In Persian]
  33. OEC (2019). India and China Export Profile in 2017, Available at: https://oec .world/en/visualize/.
  34. OEC (2020). Iran Profile: Iran and China Trade, Available at: https://oec.world /en/profile/.
  35. Pant, H.V. (2010). "India in Afghanistan: A test case for a rising power". Contemporary South Asia, 18(2), 133-153. doi:10.1080/09700161.2012. 689527.
  36. Pant, H. V. (2018). India-Iran Cooperation at Chabahar Port: Choppy Waters. CSIS Briefs.
  37. Pant, H. V; Mehta, K (2018). “India in Chabahar: A Regional Imperative”, Asian Survey, 58(4), pp: 660-678. doi: 10.1525/as.2018.58.4.660.
  38. Partovi, M (2006). Obstacles and Limits of Chabahar Port Development as a Free Zone, Economic Journal, vol 64. pp. 17-22. [In Persian]
  39. Patnaik, A (2016). Central Asia: Geopolitics, security and stability. Routledge.
  40. Pethiyagoda, K (2018). India's Pursuit of Strategic and Economic Interests in Iran. Rand Corporation.
  41. Price, G (2013). India's policy towards Afghanistan. Chatham House.
  42. Rahim, N; Asghar, A (2018). The Sino-Indian Geo-Strategic Rivalry: A Comparative Study of Gwadar and Chabahar Ports. Dialogue, 13(1). Available at: http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/thedialogue/.
  43. Shafiee, N; et. all. (2012). “India Approach toward Afghanistan after September 11, 2011, Geopolitics Quarterly, Issue 26, pp. 125-52. [In Persian]
  44. Shariatinia, M (2012). Determinant Factors of Iran and China Relations, Journal of Foreign Relations, No. 2, pp. 179-210. [In Persian]
  45. Sidhu, W.P.S (2016). The United States, India, and Iran: Managing a Delicate Balance, NYU, CIC, Center on International Cooperation.
  46. Storch, B (2017). Balancing Security and Development: The Case of Chabahar: Iran, Chennai Centre for China Studied. Available at: https://www.c3sindia. org/.
  47. Tasnim (2019a). Developing Chabahar Port Transit Routes is Constructive Inter -action with the World, Available at: https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news /. [In Persian]
  48. Tasnim (2019b). Zarif: Chabahar plays an important role in transit of goods, Avialable at: https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1398/03/02. [In Persian]
  49. The Time of India (2016). Chabahar Deal ‘not finished’; Pakistan, China welcome: Iran, Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com.
  50. The White House (2017). National Security Strategy of the United State of America, Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/ 12/ NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.
  51. Tishehyar, M; Tuyserkani, M (2017). "The Geopolitical Basis of the US and China Silk Road in Central Asia", Central Asia and Caucasus Journal, No. 99, pp. 1-25. [In Persian]
  52. Vatanka, A (2019). China’s Great Game in Iran, Foreign Policy, Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/05/chinas-great-game-in-iran/.
  53. Veicy, H (2017). “Investigation of Geopolitical and Geo-economic Competitions of Pakistan and Iran to Create South-North Corridor of Eurasia: Preferences and Threats”, Geopolitics Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 101-124. [In Persian]
  54. Winand, P; Vicziany, M; Datar, P (2015). The European Union and India: Rhetoric Or Meaningful Partnership?. Edward Elgar Publishing.
  55. World Nuclear Association (2019). Uranium Mining Overview, Available at: https://www.world-nuclear.org/.
  56. Yuldasheva, G (2016). The Role of Iran and the United States of America in Geopolitics of Central Asia, Riga: Latvian Institute of International Affairs.
  57. Zaki, Y; Vali Gholizadeh, A (2009). "Investigation and Analysis of Iran's Geopolitical and Geoeconomics Status for CIS Countries", Geopolitics Quarterly, Issue 3, pp. 21-56. [In Persian]

Zarif, M.J (2019). Shared vision binds Iran-China Relations, Global Times, Available at: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1162671.shtml

Geopolitics Quarterly
Volume 17, Issue 63
July 2021
Pages 61-87

Files

History

  • Receive Date: 30 November 2019
  • Revise Date: 16 April 2020
  • Accept Date: 23 April 2020

Share

How to cite

Statistics