A Comparative Study of the Russian Federation's Perception and Model of Crisis Management in Syria and Ukraine Based on the Cuban Crisis Model

Document Type : Original Article


1 Ph.D. student of political science, Future studies orientation, Political studies of the Islamic Revolution, Shahed University

2 uni


Extended Abstract      
The crises of Syria (in the Middle East region) and Ukraine (in Eastern Europe), which began with some internal, regional and global issues, have continued to threaten the interests of stakeholders such as the Russian Federation. There are many theoretical models for analyzing crises and how the reactions and reactions of stakeholder stakeholders and stakeholders are presented. The crisis model is one of the important theoretical models in this relation. The action and reaction of actors during the crisis stemmed from their perception of the severity of the defeat of the three elements. It should also be noted that actors often face three types of software, hardware, and intelligence management in crisis situations in order to control risky conditions and to deal with destabilizing elements. Russia is not averse to taking clever measures and avoiding a passive approach to manage the upheaval of Syria and Ukraine, as the length of the conflicts imposes more damages on Russia than anything else. It is worth noting that one of the important reasons that the author choose Russian Federation as a case study is its interest and influence in both crises, as well as many aspects of social-cultural contexts, political structure. The economic and geographic location of the two countries has been struck by the crisis, and there are some interesting and remarkable similarities about the bases and reasons for the onset and continuation of the crises. This paper is intended to find an answer this question that “How did the Russian Federation perceive the crises in Syria and Ukraine and how did it manage its transformation, according to the model of the crisis cube?
The research method is descriptive-analytic and it is a fundamental in terms of its nature. The method of data gathering is based upon library studies and the use of books, articles and online resources.
Result and Discussion
Considering the reasons for Syria's importance in political, security, military and economic areas and the occurrence of a crisis in Syria shows that perceptions of the Russian authorities are based on three indicators of the severity of the threat, the amount of time and the level of consciousness. Evidences suggest that in Syrian crisis, given that there was enough time available to the Kremlin decision makers which pave the way for engagement in bureaucratic and advisory actions, and because the threat is mild and with sufficient time to make decisions, bureaucratic actions have been turned up and many plans have been chosen to choose the best strategy, but due to the lack of detailed information about the plans and strategic options of the rivals of the time, the place and the type of possible actions of the enemies, the level of uncertainty Russian strategy has not been comprehensive.
The research findings shows that the perception of the authorities of the country was seriously threatened by the crisis as a result of the Ukrainian crisis in the strategic depth and the Russian Federation's secretion, hence the following high-risk crises or at the point A of the Cube on the other hand, the Russians face a lot of pressure for practical action, and the element of strategic surprise has put them under pressure. However, according to the Russian authorities, the Syrian crisis is in the midst of crises and stagnation, or at the C-point, and there is no direct threat to the vital values ​​of Russia, so there is little threat, and this is due to the presence of terrorist elements in the autonomous states of Chechnya and Dagestan, as well as fears from collapse of the balance of power in the Middle East. On the other hand, there is a great deal of opportunity for the Russian authorities and political authorities. Russia has placed a major emphasis on crisis intelligence management with the priority of leveraging hardware and software in crises such as Ukraine, so the scope of Russian actions is prioritized including using an invasive military force, an energy weapon, diplomatic political mechanisms (Geneva one and two, Minsk one and two, and Normandy four) and the media. On the other hand, in the Syrian crisis, due to the fact that there is no direct threat to the Russian land and is outside the country's security loop, it has made the crisis intelligent management model more effective, with a focus on the use of soft, optimal and less costly mechanisms. Hence, the line of Russia's actions in the Syrian crisis has been prioritized, with the urgency of aggressive behavior from diplomatic politicos, the ban on the Tunis Summit, the ban on the Paris Summit, the active participation in the Summit of Astana and Sochi, the alliance and coalition, financial and economic assistance, and information, military support Weapons and media are stretched.


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