چالش‌های همکاری‌ دولت‌ها در نظام حکمرانی زیست‌محیط جهانی

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استاد روابط بین‌الملل، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران.

2 پژوهشگر پسا دکترای روابط بین‌الملل، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران

چکیده

 گستردگی و ماهیت مرزگذر مسائل زیست‌محیطی از یک‌سو و اجماع معرفتی مبنی بر فوریت تهدیدهای ناشی از تخریب محیط‌زیست از سویی دیگر، کشورها را در چند دهه اخیر به این واداشته تا در چارچوب موافقت‌نامه‌های چندجانبه، رژیم‌های متعددی برای تدبیر مسائل زیست‌محیطی تعبیه کنند. با این ‌حال عملکرد این رژیم‌ها از لحاظ میزان انطباق‌پذیری و رعایت‌پذیری به‌استثنای چند مورد، چندان کارآمد و مؤثر نبوده است. هدف مقاله حاضر پاسخ‌گویی به این سؤال است که چرا با وجود آگاهی فزاینده جامعه جهانی در مورد تهدیدات ناشی از تخریب محیط‌زیست، همکاری‌ دولت‌ها در عمل با چالش روبرو بوده است؟ یافته‌های پژوهش گویای این موضوع است که جایگاه متفاوت کشورها در نظام بین‌الملل، موجب شکل‌گیری نظام‌هایی مختلف از همبستگی‌های شناختی و هویت‌های جمعی در میان کشورها شده که نتیجه آن تفاوت در ارجحیت‌های آن‌هاست. در حالی‌که در نزد کشورهای توسعه‌یافته مشکلاتی مثل آلودگی هوا، کاهش لایه اوزون و خطر از بین‌رفتن تنوع‌زیستی در اولویت است، دغدغه کشورهای درحال‌توسعه دست‌یابی به توسعه پایدار و ریشه‌کنی فقر است. چنین وضعیتی موجب کاهش در میزان نهادینگی ارزش‌های زیست‌محیطی و به ‌تبع آن ناکارآمدی رژیم‌های بین‌المللی برای رفع این تهدیدات شده است. روش تحقیق مبتنی بر استدلال شرطی خلاف واقع یا برهان خلف است. نتیجه کلی مقاله این است که با تغییر انگاره‌های مربوط به طبیعت و محیط‌زیست و نیز اعمال اصلاحاتی در سازوکارها و روندهای حاکم بر نظام تصمیم‌گیری می‌توان به بهبود کارآمدی رژیم‌های زیست‌محیطی کمک کرد.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله [English]

Challenges of States’ Cooperation in the Global Environmental Governance System

نویسندگان [English]

  • Seyed Jalal Dehghani Firoozabadi 1
  • Morteza Shokri 2
1 Professor of International Relations, Allameh Tabataba’e University, Tehran, Iran
2 International Relations, Postdoctoral Researcher at Allameh Tabataba’e University, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]

Extended Abstract
Introduction
The wide-ranging nature of environmental issues, as well as the epistemological consensus on the urgency of threats to environmental degradation have led countries in recent decades to establish multiple regimes to address environmental issues under multilateral agreements. However, in practice, with a few exceptions, these regimes have not been very effective in terms of adaptability and compliance. The purpose of this article is to answer this question: “why despite the growing awareness of the international community about the threats posed by environmental degradation, the cooperation of governments in practice has been challenged? The authors argue that the different positions of countries in the international system have led to the formation of systems of different cognitive correlations and collective identities among them resulting in differences in the degree of institutionalization of environmental values and reduced effective cooperation of governments in effective regimes to address these threats. The research method is based on counterfactual conditionals.
Methodology
To do research, authors based on constructivist analysis framework, use “counterfactual argument” as a methodological tool for explaining international environmental regimes. Counterfactuals make claims about events that did not actually occur. It is argued in this paper that such propositions play a necessary and fundamental, if often implicit and underdeveloped, role in the efforts of scientists to assess their hypotheses about the causes of the phenomena they study. The argument is that if environmental values and norms were sufficiently institutionalized in countries, the effectiveness of environmental cooperation and regimes would increase.
Findings
While today states may show an increasing readiness to accept that global environmental protection is a common concern of humankind, they do not yet constitute a community that, in the spirit of international solidarity and justice, acts in concert for achieving this end. States are still far from taking joint protective and remedial environmental action that suffices to achieve the aim of preserving and administering our common natural heritage for the benefit of the present and future generations.
The basic ideas of international solidarity and justice should constitute the theoretical starting point for constructing an international legal framework of environmental and developmental cooperation between the North and South. However, both perceptions, because of their abstractness and vagueness, only give some rough direction to the way in which both sides should shape their future inter-relationship in substantive and procedural terms. Therefore, they should be understood as sources for developing more meaningful instruments that might bridge the North-South divide in practice.
Despite the spread of international institutions and regimes –which are mostly created after "The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment" in Stockholm (1972) - they have failed to minimize the threats posed by destructive environmental practices. In other words, despite the global consensus on the dangers of environmental degradation, state cooperation has not been successful in practice except in a few cases, such as the Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer regime, the Antarctic Convention, and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). That is, many international agreements have either been incompletely ratified, or except a few cases, countries' compliance rates are weak in practice. Two groups of international relations scholars have responded to this question. The first group is those who, in the context of mainstream theories or rationalists, believe that anarchy and its consequences, such as free-riding, is a major factor in reducing the incentives for governments to cooperate on environmental issues. Critical approaches, by contrast, argue that the international system is not anarchic, but rather is hierarchical in nature. In this system, capitalist countries are at the top and developing countries are at the bottom. Contrary to the above approaches, this article argues that the problem of inefficiency of environmental cooperation is due to the lack of institutionalization of environmental values. The authors believe that countries have a different definition and understanding of the status of environmental threats due to their different position in the international system. This perception has led to differences in the institutionalization of environmental values and the reduction of effectiveness of international environmental regimes, like “sustainable development”, “common but differentiated responsibilities”, “equitable participation”, and etc. Findings show that by changing the perceptions and understanding about the nature and environment, as well as by implementing reforms in the mechanisms and processes of decision-making system, it is possible to help improve the efficiency of environmental regimes.
Conclusions
The North and South country's issues due to their position in the international system, do not have enough consensus on environmental principles and norms. During international negotiations, although they have had a minimal consensus on the enactment of these norms, it varies from commitment to these norms according to the internal conditions of countries. However, we should not consider the ineffectiveness of the international environmental regimes as unlikely. The successful environmental regimes, such as the ozone layer or the ruling regime on the Rhine River, show any progress in the effectiveness of environmental regimes is due to the approach of states' definition of the situation. According to that, if South and North countries converge their perceptions of the natural system, they can gradually take effective practical steps to form effective governance in the field of environmental issues.
.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Environment
  • cooperation
  • Environmental Regimes
  • identity
  • Efficiency
  1. Adler, E. (1997). Imagined (security) communities: cognitive regions in international relations. Millennium, 26(2), 249-277.
  2. Amin Mansour, J (2012). “From Rio to Rio + 20: Reviewing the Negotiations and Results of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development”, Foreign Policy, Issue 2, Scientific-Promotional PP: 453 to 488. [In Persian]
  3. Amini, A and et al (2018). “The Role of Diplomacy in the Paris Agreement”. Geopolitics Quarterly, Vol 14, No.1, pp 148-175. Tehran. [In Persian]
  4. M (2016). “The Role and Status of the Shiite Values in Public Diplomacy; Case Study: Iran and Iraq Shiites”, Geopolitics Quarterly, Vol 12, No.2, pp 124-150. Tehran. [In Persian]
  5. Azadbakht, B and et al (2013). “Legal Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflicts with Emphasis on the Second Gulf War”, Geopolitics Quarterly, Vol 9, No.3, pp 195-222. Tehran. [In Persian]
  6. Bernauer, T. (1997). Managing international rivers. Global governance: Drawing insights from the environmental experience, 155-19.
  7. Burchill, S; Linklater, A; Devetak, R; Donnelly, J; Nardin, T; Paterson, M; True, J. (2013). Theories of international relations: Macmillan International Higher Education.
  8. Busby, J. (2018). Warming world: Why climate change matters more than anything else. Foreign affairs (Council on Foreign Relations), 97(4), 49-55. Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-06-14/warm- ing-world.
  9. Campbell, T. E. (1973). The Political Meaning of Stockholm: Third World Participation in the Environment Conference Process. Stan. J. Int'l Stud., 8, 138.
  10. Catacora-Vargas, G. J. A. B; Review, D. (2012). Socio-economic Considerations under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Insights for Effective Implementation.
  11. Cox, R. (1981). Social forces, states and world orders: beyond international relations theory. Millennium, 10(2), 126-155.
  12. Cox, R. (1993). 10 STRUCTURAL ISSUES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE. Gramsci, historical materialism, 26, 259.
  13. Daly, H. E. (1996). Beyond growth: the economics of sustainable development: Beacon Press.
  14. Faure, M. G; Lefevere, J. (2012). Compliance with global environmental policy. HE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTIONS, LAW POLICY, 163-180.
  15. Fearon, J. D. (1991). Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science. World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations, 169-195.
  16. Finnemore, M.; Sikkink, K. J. I. o. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. 52(4), 887-917.
  17. GA, U. (2015). Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Division for Sustainable Development Goals: New York, NY, USA.
  18. Gandhi, I. (1972). The Unfinished Revolution. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
  19. Goldemberg, J. (1994). The road to Rio. Paper presented at the Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
  20. Goldstein, J.; Keohane, R. O. (1993). Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions, and political change: Cornell University Press.
  21. Haas, M. (1990). Saving the Mediterranean: the politics of international environmental cooperation: Columbia University Press.
  22. Haas, M. (2002). UN conferences and constructivist governance of the environment. Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 8(1), 73-91.
  23. Haas, M; Levy, M. A; Parson, E. A. J. E. S. ;Development, f. S. (1992). How Should We Judge UNCED's Success? 34(8), 6-33.
  24. Haggard, S.; Simmons, B. A. (1987). Theories of international regimes. International organization, 41(3), 491-517.
  25. Hopf, T. (1998). The promise of constructivism in international relations theory. International security, 23(1), 171-200.
  26. Hunter, D; Salzman, J.; Zaelke, D. (2007). International environmental law and policy (Vol. 4): Foundation Press New York.
  27. Kasa, S; Gullberg, A. T.; Heggelund, G. (2008). The Group of 77 in the international climate negotiations: recent developments and future directions. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 8(2), 113-127.
  28. Kavianirad, M (2011).“Assessment of the Relations between Security and Ecology”, Geopolitics Quarterly, Vol 7, No.3, pp 80-100, Tehran.[In Persian]
  29. Kellenberg, D.; Levinson, A. (2014). Waste of effort? international environmental agreements. Journal of the Association of Environmental Resource Economist 1(1/2), 135-169.
  30. Khor, M. (2012). Reaffirming the Environment-development Nexus of UNCED 1992: Third World network (TWN).
  31. Klotz, A. (2002). Transnational activism and global transformations: The anti-apartheid and abolitionist experiences. European Journal of International Relations, 8(1), 49-76.
  32. Levy, D. L.; Newell, P. J. (2002). Business strategy and international environmental governance: Toward a neo-Gramscian synthesis. Global environmental politics, 2(4), 84-101.
  33. Matsui, Y. (2002). Some Aspects of the Principle of" Common butDifferentiated Responsibilities". International Environmental Agreements, 2(2), 151-170.
  34. McFate, M. (2005). Anthropology and counterinsurgency: The strange story of their curious relationship. Military review, 85(2), 24.
  35. Meyer, H. (2007). The precautionary principle and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: development of a concept. Biosafety first-holistic approaches to risk and uncertainty in genetic engineering and genetically modified organisms, 469-482.
  36. Nadelmann, E. A. J. I. O. (1990). Global prohibition regimes: The evolution of norms in international society. 44(4), 479-526.
  37. Natarajan, U.; Khoday, K. (2014). Locating nature: Making and unmaking international law. LJIL, 27, 573.
  38. O'neill, K. (2017). The environment and international relations: Cambridge University Press.
  39. Panel (SAP). Environmental Effects Assessment Panel (EEAP), and the Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP) of the Montreal Protocol.
  40. Pease, K. K. S. (2015). International Organizations: CourseSmart eTextbook. Routledge.
  41. Peterson, M. J. (2006). International regimes for the final frontier: SUNY Press.
  42. Poor Ahmadi, H; mohammadi Lord, A (2011). “International organizations, environment and North-South economic issues”, Journal of Environmental Sciences, year 8, No.3, pp 129-144.[In Persian]
  43. Rajamani, L. J. I. A. (2012). The changing fortunes of differential treatment in the evolution of international environmental law. 88(3), 605-623.
  44. Raman, M. J. T. T. W. N. (2012). North-South divide over Rio+ 20 outcome document.
  45. Ramazani Ghavam abadi, M.H (2014). “Green Economy: A Step towards the Realization of Sustainable Development in International Environmental Law”,Journal of Economic Law, Year 21, N. 6, pp: 141-114.[In Persian]
  46. Sandler, T. J. O. E. P. (2017). Environmental cooperation: contrasting international environmental agreements. 69(2), 345-364.
  47. Sands, P.; Peel, J. (2012). Principles of international environmental law: Cambridge University Press.
  48. Savaresi, A.; Hartmann, J. J. L. R. I. (2015). Human rights in the 2015 agreement.
  49. Tallberg, J. (2002). Paths to compliance: Enforcement, management, and the European Union. International organization, 56(3), 609-643.
  50. Terriff, T; Croft, S; James, L.; Morgan:M. (1999). Security Studies Today Malden, MA. In: Blackwell.
  51. Tickner, J. A. (1992). Gender in international relations: Feminist perspectives on achieving global security: Columbia University Press.
  52. UNEP/WMO. (2003). Synthesis Report of the Scientific Assessment
  53. Wallerstein, I. (1974). The rise and future demise of the world capitalist system: concepts for comparative analysis. %J Comparative studies in society, 16(4), 387-415.
  54. Wendt, A. (1999). Social theory of international politics: Cambridge University Press.
  55. Williams, M. (2005). The Third World and global environmental negotiations: interests, institutions and ideas. Global Environmental Politics, 5(3), 48-69.