Extended Abstract     
Introduction
Since its establishment, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been shaped within a complex interplay of ideological, institutional, and environmental factors, and has consistently been influenced by domestic, regional, and international conditions. One of the most salient features of this policy concerns how the political system responds to strategic crises and makes decisions under circumstances in which the continuation of the status quo entails escalating costs and policy options become progressively constrained. In such situations, high-level foreign policy decision-making reflects not only objective and material considerations, but also the perceptions, interpretations, and cognitive frameworks of political elites.
The acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 598 in 1988 and the nuclear agreement (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) in 2015 represent two historical and strategic turning points in the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Both cases constitute paradigmatic instances of crisis situations in which comparative analysis can provide deeper insight into the logic of Iranian decision-making under pressure.
Although the acceptance of Resolution 598 and the JCPOA occurred in distinct temporal, political, and institutional contexts-and despite fundamental differences in the nature of the crises, the actors involved, and the structure of the international system-both cases unfolded under conditions of intense external pressure, severe domestic economic challenges, growing security threats, and a narrowing of strategic options. In both instances, the political system, following a period of resistance and steadfast opposition to external pressures and a reluctance to negotiate, ultimately consented to an agreement that was officially portrayed as a relative and emergency retreat from previously declared positions. This raises a central question: how did the decision-making pattern of the Islamic Republic of Iran take shape in confronting these two crises, and which variables played a decisive role in its formation?
The study advances the hypothesis that Iran’s decision-making in accepting Resolution 598 and the JCPOA follows a coherent and recurring pattern that can be conceptualized as a three-stage model. This model consists of: (1) an initial phase of resistance and emphasis on a discourse of steadfastness; (2) a phase of delayed and insufficiently realistic cost–benefit assessment; and (3) a final phase marked by the acceptance of negotiation and agreement under conditions of maximum pressure and strategic urgency. Within this process, political elites tend to avoid strategic reassessment as long as dominant ideological and discursive narratives are capable of justifying the status quo. However, as pressures accumulate and the cost balance shifts, they are compelled to revise their positions and opt for a diplomatic course.
 
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of the study is grounded in Robert Jervis’s elite perceptions approach, which underscores the role of perceptions, beliefs, misperceptions, and the interpretation of the international environment by decision-makers. From this perspective, foreign policy outcomes are not merely the result of rational responses to objective stimuli, but rather the product of interaction between structural realities and the ways in which political elites perceive and interpret those realities. Accordingly, delays in decision-making, the persistence of resistance, and the eventual acceptance of agreements under emergency conditions can be analyzed through the gradual transformation of elite perceptions regarding costs, threats, and opportunities.
 
Methodology
Methodologically, the article employs a combination of comparative case study analysis and process tracing. The comparative case study method enables a systematic comparison of the two historical cases within a shared theoretical framework, allowing for the examination of similarities and differences in decision-making across distinct structural, institutional, and temporal contexts. At the same time, process tracing focuses on the step-by-step reconstruction of the sequence of events, decisions, and perceptual shifts, thereby revealing the causal mechanisms influencing elite decision-making. This approach moves beyond reductionist explanations centered solely on material variables and highlights the significance of internal decision-making processes.
 
Findings
The findings indicate that in both cases, extensive international sanctions, the formation of a global consensus against the Islamic Republic of Iran, escalating security threats, domestic economic pressures, declining financial resources and foreign exchange revenues, and disruptions in the performance of key economic sectors played a decisive role in reshaping elite perceptions. In the case of Resolution 598, the continuation of a war of attrition, the loss of strategic territories-most notably the Faw Peninsula-the expansion of Iraq’s chemical attacks, declining oil revenues, and the risk of direct U.S. intervention gradually magnified the perceived costs of continuing the war among decision-makers. In the case of the JCPOA, the intensification of financial and oil sanctions, a sharp decline in oil exports, severe currency depreciation, and rising social discontent contributed to a reassessment of the feasibility of maintaining the status quo.
Nevertheless, in both cases, this perceptual shift did not occur in a preemptive manner, but rather under conditions in which policy options had become severely constrained and the costs of all available choices had increased substantially. Consequently, the acceptance of Resolution 598 and the nuclear agreement can be understood as emergency decisions aimed at exiting a deadlock, involving a relative retreat from ideological positions in order to preserve the overall system and manage the crisis. This suggests that the logic of decision-making in these two cases was shaped less by continuous and forward-looking assessments of environmental change than by dominant discourses and the gradual transformation of elite perceptions in response to accumulated pressures.
 
Conclousion
Overall, the study demonstrates that any analysis of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran that neglects the role of elite perceptions risks offering an incomplete and reductionist account. Decision-making in the acceptance of Resolution 598 and the JCPOA was not solely the result of objective shifts in the balance of power, but rather the outcome of the interaction between on-the-ground realities, structural pressures, and the ways in which these realities were interpreted by political elites. While the findings of this article are limited to two specific cases and cannot be generalized to all foreign policy crises of the Islamic Republic of Iran, they nonetheless provide an analytical framework that can be applied to the understanding of similar crises and to the analysis of Iran’s future behavior under conditions of pressure.