فصلنامه بین المللی ژئوپلیتیک

فصلنامه بین المللی ژئوپلیتیک

سیاست خارجی جمهوری فدرال آلمان در قبال حزب‌الله لبنان

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان
1 استادیار گروه مطالعات اروپا، دانشکده مطالعات جهان، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.
2 کارشناسی‌ارشد مطالعات کشورهای آلمانی زبان، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.
3 استادیار گروه مطالعات غرب آسیا، دانشکده مطالعات جهان، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.
10.22034/igq.2026.558716.2126
چکیده
آلمان در سیاست جهانی به‌عنوان یکی از کشورهای موثر در اتحادیه اروپا نقش‌آفرینی‌ میکند و به دلیل رشد اهمیت و قدرت آن در سطح منطقه‌ای و بین‌المللی، منافع این کشور در خاورمیانه و همچنین تهدیدات آن از این منطقه افزایش یافته و سبب شده تا این کشور حضور جدی‌تری در منطقه و تعامل با بازیگران مختلف آن داشته باشد. از سوی دیگر، اسرائیل همواره در سیاست خارجی آلمان جایگاه ویژه‌ای را به خود اختصاص داده است. از این چشم انداز، کشور کوچک لبنان در سیاست خاورمیانه‌ای آلمان جایگاه برجسته‌ای می‌یابد. بزرگ‌ترین بحران‌های امنیتی اسرائیل در دهه‌های اخیر و در دوران پیشا ۷ اکتبر در مرزهای لبنان، به‌ویژه در سال‌های ۱۹۹۶ و ۲۰۰۶، رخ داده است. این درگیری‌ها، به‌ویژه جنگ ۲۰۰۶، ظرفیت حزب‌الله را به‌عنوان یک بازیگر غیردولتی با توانایی ایجاد بازدارندگی در برابر اسرائیل تثبیت کرده و واقعیت مزبور اهمیت لبنان و حزب‌الله را از چشم انداز سیاست خاورمیانه‌ای آلمان قوت بخشیده است. از منظر سیاست داخلی نیز حضور و گستره فعالیت حزب‌الله در آلمان مورد چالش قرار گرفته و به مجموعه ای از اقدامات دولت آلمان علیه فعالیت‌های آن در این کشور انجامیده است. لذا مطالعه منظم سیاست آلمان در قبال حزب‌الله حائز اهمیت پژوهشی است.براین اساس، مقاله حاضر به بررسی این پرسش میپردازد که «سیاست آلمان در قبال حزب‌الله لبنان در بازه زمانی ۱۹۸۲ تا ۲۰۲۴ چه تحولاتی را تجربه کرده و این تحولات تحت تأثیر کدام عوامل شکل گرفته است؟» در پاسخ به سوال مذکور، این فرضیه مطرح است که «سیاست آلمان در قبال حزب‌الله لبنان در طول دهه‌های گذشته تحت تاثیر عوامل هنجاری و هویتی درونی شده و عمیق، به تدریج از سیاستی محتاطانه و مداراجویانه به سوی سیاستی سخت و طردکننده میل نموده است». برای آزمون این فرضیه از نظریه سازه انگاری هویت و هنجارمحور و از روش تحلیل محتوای کیفی برای تحلیل دادههای حاصل از ارزیابی اسناد رسمی و منابع مکتوب کتابخانهای و اینترنتی استفاده شده است.
کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله English

Germany’s Foreign Policy toward Hezbollah

نویسندگان English

Behzad Ahmadi 1
Hamed Kazemi 2
Hadi Borhani 3
1 Assistant Professor, Department of European and Eurasian Studies, Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
2 Master of Studies in German-Speaking Countries, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran..
3 Assistant Professor, Department of Middle East Studies, Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
چکیده English

Extended Abstract     
Introduction
As the largest economic power and the driving engine of integration within the EU, the Federal Republic of Germany is considered one of the influential countries in the international system due to its decisive role in global political and security dynamics. Israel has consistently occupied a special place in German foreign policy. Germany has long sought to erase the legacy of Nazi-era racism and the atrocities of World War II through supportive policies toward Jews and the State of Israel. From this perspective, Lebanon finds a prominent position in the German Middle East policy. After the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon in 1982, Hezbollah was formed  as a new resistance force in this country, which gradually became the main enemy of Israel and has created security challenges against it especially in the years 1996 and 2006. The conflict, particularly in the 2006 war, has established Hezbollah’s capacity as an actor with the ability to create deterrence against Israel, and the fact has strengthened the importance of Lebanon and the Hezbollah in German policy.
From the domestic policy perspective, from the 1980s, Lebanese immigrants, many of whom were from the south of Lebanon, settled in various German cities, including Berlin, Hamburg, and Cologne. The migration provided opportunities for Hezbollah to establish a base in Germany by building relations with these communities. Over time, the presence and scope of activities of Hezbollah have challenged German government and led to a set of measures against it. Accordingly, understanding Germany’s foreign policy toward Hezbollah can provide deeper insight into Berlin’s decision-making and strategies regarding the Axis of Resistance—including the Islamic Republic of Iran—and offer a better understanding of Germany’s position within the diplomatic and security equations of the Middle East, particularly in the Levant, and its relations with other regional actors such as Israel.
This study seeks to answer the question: What foreign policy does Germany pursue toward Hezbollah in the period 1982 - 2024? The central hypothesis posits that "Germany's policy towards Hezbollah during the past decades is heavily under the influence of internalized and deep Identity–Centered and Norm-Consistent factors and has gradually moved from a cautious, limited and informal engagement with the group to a strategy of containment and rejection, expressed through political opposition to the organization and support for international efforts to impose pressure and sanctions—largely influenced by Germany’s historical, emotional, and strategic commitment to Israel. Furthermore, the argumentative foundation rests on hypothesis testing; in this regard, a prominent theory in foreign policy studies— Norm-Consistent and Identity–Centered Constructivism —is applied to Germany's foreign policy towards Hezbollah.
 
Methodology
This research adopts a qualitative, descriptive–analytical approach. Data were collected primarily from documentary and library sources in German, English, and Persian. Due to the scarcity of equivalent primary materials and the relative novelty of the topic, data collection required extensive cross-field investigation, drawing on political, academic, and media sources. The collected data fall into three main categories:
- Official and international documents: strategies, resolutions, and materials published by the German Federal Government, the European Union, NATO, and other international organizations;
- Academic studies and policy papers: analyses by reputable institutions such as the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), the German Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, and relevant peer-reviewed journals;
- News and analytical sources: reports and analyses from leading European and Middle Eastern media, along with official statements by German officials reflecting the political and practical dimensions of current developments.
 
Result and Discussion
Germany’s relationship with Hezbollah encompasses complex layers of occasional cooperation and increasing tension. While Germany has traditionally maintained friendly relations with Lebanon and has played an active role in regional affairs for decades, its direct relations with Hezbollah have been shaped by political, security, and international constraints. According to the identity- and normative pattern, the following factors are important regarding the foreign policy of Germany towards Hezbollah:
Israel's security and survival: Germany’s policy toward Hezbollah is primarily shaped by the imperative of protecting Israel’s security. The historic responsibility of Germany for the nazi crimes, especially the Holocaust, has created a deep political and moral obligation and commitment to security and the existence of the Israeli state. Germany considers Hezbollah’s continuing armed confrontation with Israel, contradictory with its normative commitment, which has led to the recognition of Hezbollah as a vital threat. Adding this threat perception to the identity element of historic responsibility for the Holocaust and the Nazi legacy, makes the Israeli variable a pivotal element in forming of Germany’s policy towards Hezbollah.
Countering terrorism and the extremist ideology: Identifying  Hezbollah as a terrorist organization on one hand and countering its ideology as an extremist ideology on the other hand, are influencing the German policy towards Hezbollah. In December 2019, the Bundestag passed a nonbinding draft, which urged the government to ban all activities of Hezbollah (including both political and military wings) .In March 2020, the federal government officially banned all of Hezbollah activities according to its normative values including stability of Germany in supporting a rules – based order.
Internal political Dynamics: Domestically, despite differences between Germany’s right- and left-wing parties regarding the two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, strong media and political pressures—combined with pro-Israel lobbying and the legacy of Germany’s historical responsibility toward Jews—have produced a near-consensus among German political parties in support of Israel’s right to exist and to self-defense, fighting instances of antisemitism, and securing the Jew’s life in Germany.
European Integration: The descriptive dimensions of the German government 's identity, sees its interests in close political and economic integration into EU and the transatlantic community. At the European level, cooperation between Germany and the European Union in countering Hezbollah’s activities has become a core component of the bloc’s foreign and security policy. The EU has pursued a multifaceted and relatively complex policy toward Hezbollah, aimed at preserving regional stability, strengthening pro-Western forces in Lebanon, and countering the organization’s influence. In July 2013, the EU designated Hezbollah’s military wing as a terrorist entity, leading to extensive sanctions against the group. Germany, as one of the EU’s leading members, has not only followed but also shaped and reinforced the Union’s tougher stance toward Hezbollah, particularly in recent years.
Rules-based Order and the bilateral relations with the Lebanese government: In practice, Germany has been actively involved in Lebanese affairs, seeking to influence the country’s internal balance of power through development assistance, support for anti-Hezbollah political factions, and diplomatic engagement aligned with its national interests. The operational dimensions of Germany’s policy toward Hezbollah—reflected in its humanitarian aid, participation in the UNIFIL mission, and role in prisoner exchange negotiations—demonstrate limited but sustained engagement designed to safeguard Germany’s political and security interests in Lebanon.
 
Conclusion
The German policy towards Hezbollah is constructed based on norms such as counter-terrorism, security and survival of Israel, antisemitism, European integration, and the rules- based order, which has led to an identity understanding Hezbollah as increasing threat over time. This threat perception has brought Berlin to try to maintain consistency between its normative commitments deeply internalized in the form of actions such as implementation of criminal law, freezing of assets, and organizational bans that due to normative and identity nature, is the case of high political consensus among different parties. According to this, Hezbollah poses a challenge to the Jew’s life in Germany, to the liberal democratic order, and is inconsistent with the German normative commitments. These findings yield two major conclusions:
First, Germany’s stance has undergone a significant transformation—from a mediator and soft critic to a firm opponent. This shift culminated in the designation of both Hezbollah’s political and military branches as terrorist organizations and the prohibition of all its activities in Germany.
Second, especially after October 7, 2023, Berlin’s foreign policy has become noticeably harsher and more aligned with that of Israel and the United States—setting Germany apart from other European partners, particularly France and the United Kingdom, and even from the broader EU consensus.
Germany’s foreign policy toward Hezbollah over the past four decades thus reflects a combination of normative constraints rooted in its historical responsibility toward Israel and pragmatic flexibility aimed at protecting national interests. Findings based on the identity- and norm-centered constructivist approach indicate that Germany’s postwar identity as a “civilian power” committed to human rights, alongside its deeply institutionalized norm of responsibility for Israel’s security and existence, has sharply limited policymakers’ room for maneuver. 

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Germany
Israel
Foreign Policy
Hezbollah
Middle East
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68.   ZDF (2024). “Deutschland unterstützt Libanons Armee weiter”, Available at: https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/politik/ausland/libanon-deutschland-armee-hilfe-hisbollah-israel-100.html.
دوره 22، شماره 1
بهار 1405
صفحه 260-298

  • تاریخ دریافت 15 آذر 1404
  • تاریخ پذیرش 12 اردیبهشت 1405