نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 ـ استادیار علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه بینالمللی امام خمینی (ره)، قزوین
2 ـ کارشناس ارشد علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه بینالمللی امام خمینی (ره)، قزوین
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
Game theory is one of the procedures in the international relations that can be used for studying many events and incidents such as war. Rationality of the players is one of the key points in a game. This means the players take part in the game upon required calculations to get the maximum advantages from the other side. The players meet at a point known as saddle point, which has the maximum profit and minimum loss. The disagreement in the saddle point will have negative consequences for both sides.
This study has relied on a descriptive-comparative method to divide Iran-Iraq War into four stages in order to find the best time, or the saddle point, for finishing the war.
Findings showed that the saddle point in Iran-Iraq War was the third stage when Resolution 598 was adopted by the UNSC. At that stage, when the Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution 598, Iraq officially accepted the resolution but the Iranian government did not accept the resolution for some reasons. That time, Iran had a large part of Iraqi territory under control and did not want to give them back without gaining some advantages. Since then, Iraq retook occupied lands in Fav, Basra suburbs, and Majnoon Islands and forced Iran accept Resolution 598 at a time Iran had lost the majority of Iraqi lands under its control. In sum, rejecting the resolution immediately after its adoption increased Iran’s costs and repayments as a player in the war. It seems, Iran could accept the resolution immediately after adoption to prevent further damages to life and property in the closing months of the war and to sit at the negotiation table with many achievements and advantages.
کلیدواژهها [English]
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