فصلنامه بین المللی ژئوپلیتیک

فصلنامه بین المللی ژئوپلیتیک

From Trade Embargoes to Diplomatic Outreach: The Evolving Landscape of Sanction

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان
1 Faculty of Law, University Kebangsaan, Malaysia..
2 College of Law, Al-Bayan University, Iraq.
3 College of Law, Al-Mustaqbal University, Iraq.
4 Faculty of Law, University Kebangsaan, Malaysia.
10.22034/igq.2025.544684.2073
چکیده
Sanctions have transitioned from broad trade embargoes to multifaceted tools of diplomacy aimed at altering state behaviour while avoiding direct military conflict. Despite their growing use, questions persist regarding their legality, effectiveness, and ethical implications, particularly when employed by powerful states against weaker ones. This study addresses the conceptual and legal gap surrounding the evolution of sanctions from punitive measures to instruments of strategic diplomacy. The article’s main objective is to evaluate whether sanctions today function as effective diplomatic tools or if they serve coercive interests that compromise international norms. Using a qualitative, doctrinal methodology, the paper examines primary legal frameworks such as the UN Charter and WTO agreements, complemented by secondary literature and case studies including Iran, North Korea, Russia, Myanmar, and Malaysia. The findings reveal a dual nature: while sanctions can successfully enforce international law and support human rights, they often harm civilian populations and reflect power asymmetries when used unilaterally. Moreover, targeted states increasingly adapt through strategic alliances and economic resilience, diminishing the impact of sanctions. The study concludes that sanctions are most effective when legally grounded, proportionate, multilaterally enforced, and embedded in broader diplomatic strategies.
کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله English

From Trade Embargoes to Diplomatic Outreach: The Evolving Landscape of Sanction

نویسندگان English

Chuyan Devbie Anak Dishong 1
Siti Nuryaqiena Binti Shaari 1
Shahad Ali Noori 2
Ali Jasem Al-Saadi 3
Mohamad Azhan Yahya 4
1 Faculty of Law, University Kebangsaan, Malaysia..
2 College of Law, Al-Bayan University, Iraq.
3 College of Law, Al-Mustaqbal University, Iraq.
4 Faculty of Law, University Kebangsaan, Malaysia.
چکیده English

Sanctions have transitioned from broad trade embargoes to multifaceted tools of diplomacy aimed at altering state behaviour while avoiding direct military conflict. Despite their growing use, questions persist regarding their legality, effectiveness, and ethical implications, particularly when employed by powerful states against weaker ones. This study addresses the conceptual and legal gap surrounding the evolution of sanctions from punitive measures to instruments of strategic diplomacy. The article’s main objective is to evaluate whether sanctions today function as effective diplomatic tools or if they serve coercive interests that compromise international norms. Using a qualitative, doctrinal methodology, the paper examines primary legal frameworks such as the UN Charter and WTO agreements, complemented by secondary literature and case studies including Iran, North Korea, Russia, Myanmar, and Malaysia. The findings reveal a dual nature: while sanctions can successfully enforce international law and support human rights, they often harm civilian populations and reflect power asymmetries when used unilaterally. Moreover, targeted states increasingly adapt through strategic alliances and economic resilience, diminishing the impact of sanctions. The study concludes that sanctions are most effective when legally grounded, proportionate, multilaterally enforced, and embedded in broader diplomatic strategies.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Economic Embargoes
Sanction
Diplomatic Outreach
International Trade Law
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دوره 21، شماره ویژه
زمستان 1404
صفحه 116-137

  • تاریخ دریافت 18 شهریور 1404
  • تاریخ بازنگری 22 مهر 1404
  • تاریخ پذیرش 24 مهر 1404