فصلنامه بین المللی ژئوپلیتیک

فصلنامه بین المللی ژئوپلیتیک

Economic Sanctions and Sovereignty: Balancing Trade Laws and International Norms

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان
Anussha A/P Komarasamy 1
Dhaifina Hani Mohmad Yusri 1
Eshraq Mahmood Shukur 2
Ali Hamza Nimrud 3
Mohd Izzat Amsyar Mohd Arif 1
1 Faculty of Law, University Kebangsaan, Malaysia.
2 College of Law, Al-Bayan University, Iraq.
3 College of Law, Al-Mustaqbal University, Iraq.
10.22034/igq.2025.544598.2071
چکیده
In recent decades, economic sanctions have become an increasingly preferred instrument of international diplomacy, aiming to enforce global norms without resorting to armed conflict. However, the expanding use of unilateral sanctions—particularly those with extraterritorial reach—has reignited tensions with foundational principles of state sovereignty and international trade law. Despite their growing prevalence, the legal legitimacy of these measures remains contested, with many occupying a gray area in international law. This study addresses the gap in scholarly consensus on the legal and normative status of unilateral sanctions vis-à-vis multilateral regimes. The central objective is to evaluate whether economic sanctions, especially those not authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), are legally compatible with principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. Employing doctrinal legal research, the article analyzes core instruments like the UN Charter, GATT Article XXI, case law, and academic literature. Key findings reveal that while UNSC-backed sanctions enjoy firm legal standing, unilateral sanctions challenge established norms, often triggering disputes over jurisdiction and extraterritoriality. The study concludes that while sanctions may serve legitimate policy aims, their legal justification must balance sovereignty, proportionality, and global normative commitments to maintain legitimacy within the international legal order.
کلیدواژه‌ها
Economic Sanctions
State Sovereignty
International Trade Law
Non-Intervention
International Norms

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله English

Economic Sanctions and Sovereignty: Balancing Trade Laws and International Norms

نویسندگان English

Anussha A/P Komarasamy 1
Dhaifina Hani Mohmad Yusri 1
Eshraq Mahmood Shukur 2
Ali Hamza Nimrud 3
Mohd Izzat Amsyar Mohd Arif 1
1 Faculty of Law, University Kebangsaan, Malaysia.
2 College of Law, Al-Bayan University, Iraq.
3 College of Law, Al-Mustaqbal University, Iraq.
چکیده English

In recent decades, economic sanctions have become an increasingly preferred instrument of international diplomacy, aiming to enforce global norms without resorting to armed conflict. However, the expanding use of unilateral sanctions—particularly those with extraterritorial reach—has reignited tensions with foundational principles of state sovereignty and international trade law. Despite their growing prevalence, the legal legitimacy of these measures remains contested, with many occupying a gray area in international law. This study addresses the gap in scholarly consensus on the legal and normative status of unilateral sanctions vis-à-vis multilateral regimes. The central objective is to evaluate whether economic sanctions, especially those not authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), are legally compatible with principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. Employing doctrinal legal research, the article analyzes core instruments like the UN Charter, GATT Article XXI, case law, and academic literature. Key findings reveal that while UNSC-backed sanctions enjoy firm legal standing, unilateral sanctions challenge established norms, often triggering disputes over jurisdiction and extraterritoriality. The study concludes that while sanctions may serve legitimate policy aims, their legal justification must balance sovereignty, proportionality, and global normative commitments to maintain legitimacy within the international legal order.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Economic Sanctions
State Sovereignty
International Trade Law
Non-Intervention
International Norms
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فصلنامه بین المللی ژئوپلیتیک
دوره 21، شماره ویژه
زمستان 1404
صفحه 178-200

  • تاریخ دریافت 18 شهریور 1404
  • تاریخ بازنگری 21 مهر 1404
  • تاریخ پذیرش 24 مهر 1404