عنوان مقاله [English]
The crisis in Iraq as the result of Ethnic-Religious conflicts, has been one of the oldest crisises in the middle during the 21st century. Some of the researchers argue that lack of integrity among different religious and ethnic groups in Iraq to form a nation state has been the main result of the current crisis. In fact, the Ethnic-Religious conflicts through the current century since 1921, has caused the lack of integrity between different of Ethnic-Religious groups. Regarding this point of view, The dominance of Sunni governers through the 21st century and on the other hand the dominance of shiite governers in Iraq through the post Saddam Era, has been a considerable factor regarding the current conflicts in Iraq. The political dominance for each of the above mentioned governers has brought a sort of deprivation of political stance and power for the other. It has also caused a great deal of reactions in form of movements and ethnical tensions.
The current research has a different approach in comparison to the past ones. There is a focus on the hegemonic role and the political interference by The US while examining the roots for the continuity of the ethnic tensions in Iraq through the 21st century. The research method in this article is descriptive-analytic and the data collection method is based on library resources.
Before the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, the idea historically became prevalent among conservatives that democracies should be able to suppress their enemies with full authority, even by force. According to this view, the creation of a weak democracy can not survive. Thus, the use of force to establish and promote democracy and justice is not only permissible but also necessary. In this context, the most serious threat to democracy is from states that have not embraced democratic values. The neoconservatives believed that a change in autocratic regimes, or, in modern parlance, insurgency, is a desirable means of preserving American democracy and security. These ideas became the basis for the creation of a kind of democracy known as "boot democracy".
The occupation of Iraq, the rise of Shiites, the attempts to purge former members of the Ba'ath party of the new government, all led to a radical divergence that fueled and legitimized the Sunni uprising, which was both ideological and sectarian. The Salafi-jihadists, on the other hand, found a common goal with the former Ba'athists and other Islamist and nationalist groups to fight both foreign occupation and the new Shiite authority, which led to the formation of the Islamic State and the subsequent Islamic State of Syria and Iraq. It took the form of a dispute over geographical territory between ethnic and religious groups in Iraq, in general, the rivalry between the Shiite majority and the Sunni minority has been at the center of the dispute over nation-state building since the fall of Saddam. In fact, sectarian tendencies have affected the state-building process and caused insecurity in the country. But the Iraqi government has not made a clear effort to overcome this division and build a common national identity. In fact, some of these measures have led to further secession and a conflicting government. Historically, the separation of Shiites and Sunnis has been driven by disagreement over political, religious, and doctrinal issues, but its modern manifestation has led society to compete for power, resources, geography, and government. It is formed in the form of a system of religious-ethnic representation. These institutionalizations of sectarian identity have led to differences over the status, size, boundaries, and power of each of the two Sunni and Shiite communities. These differences have an unstable effect, especially when they legitimize the violent actions of groups that claim to represent their community.
Different sections of Iraqi society have different memories and historical narratives about what Iraq is and should be. To monitor the country's major divisions, Iraq needs to undertake a fundamental overhaul of the laws that govern the country's current political system. The new political system has been a compromise between the idea that an Iraqi nation exists independently of its sub-communities, and the idea that the Iraqi nation is nothing more than a subset of its sub-communities. The contradictory effects of these two currents have affected the constitutional process and political differences and social dynamics.
The dominance of the nationalization paradigm portrayed Iraq as a multicultural society whose communities need to expand an integrated system of government. This is in contrast to the classical notion of nation-building, by a nationalism, integration, and approach that strengthens a center of hegemony and marginalizes shared local identities. Although the constitution does not explicitly state that the distribution of power is based on separate communities, the methods of distributing power in Iraq further validate sectarian identities as a political classification.
According to the processes, three scenarios can be imagined for the future of Iraq:
The first scenario is to end the crisis and maintain the current political structure won the basis of centralism. Maintaining the current structure of Iraq depends on several conditions. First, the failure of the Islamic State is the most important challenge to the stability and integration of Iraq and its complete withdrawal from Iraq, which current processes indicate the success of this process in the short and long term. The second is to reduce sectarianism and increase Sunni confidence in the Iraqi political structure, which depends on the serious participation of Sunnis in the political structure. In fact, in order to maintain the unified political structure of Iraq, the Sunnis must first have a significant presence in the Iraqi governing branches, in order to eliminate the Sunni perception of being marginalized in the power structure. Second, the Iraqi electoral system must move towards a system of trans-religious-ethnic representation based on factional-intellectual rivalries, as was somewhat shaped in the 2010 national elections. The third is the reform of the constitution and the creation of new mechanisms based on the distribution of income commensurate with the sectors and structures of Iraq. Also, paying more attention to the natives of the officials in the provincial executive bodies can help this process. Fourth is the non-interference of regional powers, including the GCC and Turkey, in Iraq's security efforts, which could, to a large extent, lead to Iraqi political stability as well as sectarian-religious trust. Finally, it seems that in this scenario, the Kurdistan Regional Government will continue to play a role as an autonomous government.
The second scenario is the full implementation of federalism in Iraq.
The third scenario is the division of Iraq into three climates, Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni, which was re-introduced by the US Congress in 2014 (the plan was proposed in 2007 by Joe Biden).
In fact, although the plan to divide Iraq was put forward in the US policy-making system, the United States is not yet pursuing this plan seriously, and the fight against the Islamic State is still a more important priority. Finally, it seems that considering the political processes and the unity of the Shiites with the support of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this scenario is the most unlikely scenario among the three scenarios mentioned.