فصلنامه بین المللی ژئوپلیتیک

فصلنامه بین المللی ژئوپلیتیک

Theory of Intelligence Deterrence in Foreign Policy (From Military Deterrence by Punishment to Intelligence Deterrence by Denial)

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده
Rouholah Ghaderi Kangavri
Associate Professor at International Relations in Imam Hossein Comprehensive Univesrity, Tehran, Iran.
10.22034/igq.2025.496174.1994
چکیده
Due to the anarchic nature of international relations and the era of uncertainty, the right to self- defense is impossible without endogenous security and indigenous self-help. Force and power are still necessary and integral parts of international relations. It means the ruling of the logic of power, not the power of the logic in the global politics. Anyway, Self-defense and self-help are two sides of the same coin. In such a system, outsourcing security is a grave strategic mistake. Accordingly, Security under no circumstances can be negotiable, let alone outsourcing to others, otherwise it will lead to security dependency and, as a result, lack of political independence and violation of national sovereignty by intervening powers. Therefore, there is no other way to resist against strategy of bandwagoning than internal/external balancing policy. The main question of this article is what kind of deterrence can guarantee national security against external threats?, The hypothesis is that military deterrence will be vulnerable and unreliable without intelligence deterrence, more specifically the intelligence deterrence by deniable is complementary and protective necessity to the military deterrence by punishment.
It is argued that independent countries that oppose the existing order in the international system cannot and should not place their national security solely on the basis of military deterrence by punishment, but their deterrence should be spill over to intelligence deterrence by denial. By the way, it seems deterrence and balancing policy in the framework of coercive diplomacy determines the fate of the strategic conflict between the two orders namely resistance-based order and dominance-centric order. Needless to say Resistance has active/offensive orientation in nature, not passive/ defensive approach. Because of that, we do not have legitimate or illegitimate resistance. Righteousness is a source of inspiration for resistance. In fact, attention to deterrence and coercion is rooted in a belief in resistance.
کلیدواژه‌ها
Deterrence
Intelligence
Resistance
Punishment
Denial
Coercion
موضوعات

عنوان مقاله English

Theory of Intelligence Deterrence in Foreign Policy (From Military Deterrence by Punishment to Intelligence Deterrence by Denial)

نویسنده English

Rouholah Ghaderi Kangavari
Associate Professor at International Relations in Imam Hossein Comprehensive Univesrity, Tehran, Iran.
چکیده English

Due to the anarchic nature of international relations and the era of uncertainty, the right to self- defense is impossible without endogenous security and indigenous self-help. Force and power are still necessary and integral parts of international relations. It means the ruling of the logic of power, not the power of the logic in the global politics. Anyway, Self-defense and self-help are two sides of the same coin. In such a system, outsourcing security is a grave strategic mistake. Accordingly, Security under no circumstances can be negotiable, let alone outsourcing to others, otherwise it will lead to security dependency and, as a result, lack of political independence and violation of national sovereignty by intervening powers. Therefore, there is no other way to resist against strategy of bandwagoning than internal/external balancing policy. The main question of this article is what kind of deterrence can guarantee national security against external threats?, The hypothesis is that military deterrence will be vulnerable and unreliable without intelligence deterrence, more specifically the intelligence deterrence by deniable is complementary and protective necessity to the military deterrence by punishment.
It is argued that independent countries that oppose the existing order in the international system cannot and should not place their national security solely on the basis of military deterrence by punishment, but their deterrence should be spill over to intelligence deterrence by denial. By the way, it seems deterrence and balancing policy in the framework of coercive diplomacy determines the fate of the strategic conflict between the two orders namely resistance-based order and dominance-centric order. Needless to say Resistance has active/offensive orientation in nature, not passive/ defensive approach. Because of that, we do not have legitimate or illegitimate resistance. Righteousness is a source of inspiration for resistance. In fact, attention to deterrence and coercion is rooted in a belief in resistance.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Deterrence
Intelligence
Resistance
Punishment
Denial
Coercion
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فصلنامه بین المللی ژئوپلیتیک
دوره 22، شماره 2
تابستان 1405
صفحه 186-225

  • تاریخ دریافت 13 بهمن 1403
  • تاریخ بازنگری 23 تیر 1404
  • تاریخ پذیرش 29 تیر 1404