فصلنامه بین المللی ژئوپلیتیک

فصلنامه بین المللی ژئوپلیتیک

Theory of Intelligence Deterrence in Foreign Policy From Military Deterrence by Punishment to Intelligence Deterrence by Denial

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسنده
تهران. حکیمیه، میدان والفجر، بلوار ساحل، خیابان شهید خلیلی، بوستان ششم، پلاک20 طبقه دوم
10.22034/igq.2025.496174.1994
چکیده
Due to the anarchic nature of international relations and the era of uncertainty, the right to self- defense is impossible without endogenous security and indigenous self-help. Force and power are still necessary and integral parts of international relations. It Means the ruling of the logic of power, not the power of the logic. Anyway, Self-defense and self-help are two sides of the same coin. In such a system, outsourcing security is a grave strategic mistake. Accordingly, Security under no circumstances can be negotiable, let alone outsourcing to others, otherwise it will lead to security dependency and, as a result, lack of political independence and violation of national sovereignty by intervening powers. Therefore, there is no other way to resist against strategy of bandwagoning than internal/external balancing policy. The main question of this article is what kind of deterrence can guarantee national security against external threats?, The hypothesis is that military deterrence will be vulnerable and unreliable without intelligence deterrence, more specifically the intelligence deterrence by deniable is complementary and protective to the military deterrence by punishment.

It is argued that independent countries that oppose the existing order in the international system cannot and should not place their national security solely on the basis of military deterrence by punishment, but their deterrence should be spill over to intelligence deterrence by denial. By the way, it seems deterrence and balancing policy in the framework of coercive diplomacy determines the fate of the strategic conflict between the two orders namely resistance-based order and
کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات


عنوان مقاله English

Theory of Intelligence Deterrence in Foreign Policy From Military Deterrence by Punishment to Intelligence Deterrence by Denial

نویسنده English

Rohollah Ghaderi Kangavari
تهران. حکیمیه، میدان والفجر، بلوار ساحل، خیابان شهید خلیلی، بوستان ششم، پلاک20 طبقه دوم
چکیده English

Due to the anarchic nature of international relations and the era of uncertainty, the right to self- defense is impossible without endogenous security and indigenous self-help. Force and power are still necessary and integral parts of international relations. It Means the ruling of the logic of power, not the power of the logic. Anyway, Self-defense and self-help are two sides of the same coin. In such a system, outsourcing security is a grave strategic mistake. Accordingly, Security under no circumstances can be negotiable, let alone outsourcing to others, otherwise it will lead to security dependency and, as a result, lack of political independence and violation of national sovereignty by intervening powers. Therefore, there is no other way to resist against strategy of bandwagoning than internal/external balancing policy. The main question of this article is what kind of deterrence can guarantee national security against external threats?, The hypothesis is that military deterrence will be vulnerable and unreliable without intelligence deterrence, more specifically the intelligence deterrence by deniable is complementary and protective to the military deterrence by punishment.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Deterrence
Intelligence
Punishment
Denial
Coercion

مقالات آماده انتشار، پذیرفته شده
انتشار آنلاین از 29 تیر 1404

  • تاریخ دریافت 13 بهمن 1403
  • تاریخ بازنگری 23 تیر 1404
  • تاریخ پذیرش 29 تیر 1404