بررسی مساله رودخانه هیرمند: رهیافت نظریه بازی ها

نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 استادیار اقتصاد، دانشکده اقتصاد و مدیریت، دانشگاه تبریز، تبریز، ایران

2 دانش آموخته دکتری اقتصاد، دانشگاه تهران، تهران ایران

چکیده

تعداد زیادی از رودخانه‌ها در فضای سرزمینی بیش از یک کشور جریان دارند که منجر به اختلافاتی بین کشورهای حوضه این رودها، برای استفاده از منابع آب می‌شوند. رودخانه هیرمند در شرق ایران نیز از چنین ویژگی برای دو کشور ایران و افغانستان برخوردار بوده و غالبا در راس مسائل دو کشور قرار داشته‌است. اختلافات زیادی بر سر چگونگی تقسیم آب رودخانه هیرمند وجود داشته که به‌رغم تلاش‌های متعددی که در سالهای گذشته صورت‌گرفته، مساله هنوز حل نشده باقی مانده‌است و در حال حاضر حقوق ایران در رودخانه هیرمند در وضعیت مطلوبی قرار ندارد.
در مطالعه حاضر، مساله تقسیم آب رودخانه هیرمند با استفاده از رهیافت نظریه بازیها و در قالب یک بازی چانه‌زنی بحران مورد بررسی قرارگرفته‌است. در این مطالعه با درنظرگرفتن هزینه‌های فرصت اقتصادی و سیاسی و با استفاده از ابزار نظریه بازیها سهم تعادلی دو کشور ایران و افغانستان از آب رودخانه هیرمند که می‌تواند منجر به توافقی پایدار بین دو کشور گردد، مورد محاسبه قرار گرفته است. همچنین نشان داده شده‌است که هر چه منافع افغانستان از روابط اقتصادی و سیاسی با کشور ایران افزایش یابد، سهم تعادلی ایران از آب هیرمند افزایش خواهدیافت و هر چه وابستگی اقتصادی و سیاسی ایران به افغانستان بیشتر شود، این سهم کاهش خواهدیافت. بنابراین باید با یک رویکرد جامع و با استفاده از روشهای نوین علمی، تمام جوانب در تقسیم و سهم‌بندی آب درنظرگرفته‌شود، در غیر این‌صورت دستیابی به توافق و امضاء قرارداد ممکن است در کوتاه مدت مشکل را برطرف نماید، اما در بلندمدت نمی‌تواند راهگشا باشد.

کلیدواژه‌ها


عنوان مقاله [English]

An Exploration of the Issues on Hirmand River: A Game Theory Approach

نویسندگان [English]

  • Elham Nobahar 1
  • Mahboobeh Kabiri Renani 2
1 Assistant Proffssor of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Tabriz,Tabriz, iran
2 PhD in Economics, University of Tehran, Tehran, iran
چکیده [English]

Extended Abstract     
Introduction
Water scarcity threatens the well-being of humans all over the world and caused hydropolitical crisis between the countries. A large number of rivers flow from the land area of more than one country which results in some disputes over using water resources among the countries located in the basins of these rivers. Hirmand river in the east of Iran has such a problem within Iran and Afghanistan and this issue is taken as the main problems between the two countries. There have been many disagreements about the division of the water within Hirmand river. In spite of several attempts which have been made in the past years, the problem has remained unsolved and currently the right of Iran does not seem to be in a favorable condition.
 Methodology
In the present study, the problem of water division of Hirmand River is investigated and modeled adopting the game theory approach and a crisis bargaining game. In this study, the equilibrium shares of the two countries of Iran and Afghanistan from the water within Hirmand River are computed considering the opportunity costs resulting from economic and political interdependence, employing the game theory, so that it may lead into a stable agreement between the two countries.
Result and discussion
With regard to the calculated equilibrium shares, it can be concluded that one of the reasons that the agreements between the two countries of Iran and Afghanistan on how to divide the water of the Hirmand River, were unstable and not fully implemented, is that the determined shares for the two countries have not been the equilibrium shares and determined without considering the economic and political interdependence. Also the study demonstrates that when the benefits of Afghanistan from the economic and political relationship with Iran increase, the equilibrium share of Iran from Hirmand’s water rises. In addition when the economic and political interdependence of Iran on Afghanistan increases, the equilibrium share of Iran decreases. So all of the aspects of water division and rationing should be considered using a comprehensive approach and employing new scientific methods, otherwise achieving consensus and signing a contract might solve the problem in the short term but cannot solve it forever.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Hirmand river
  • game theory
  • Crisis Bargaining Game
  • Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)
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